Contingent v Necessary Mind

[CouldntCareMore]

I am reflecting on the thinking of David Bentley Hart in 'The Experience of God' and Bernardo's work. In TEOG DBH outlines God as a necessary being and contrasts God with 'objects' (or even subjects!) that are finite and contingent. My question is this: are there aspects of Mind At Large which suggest it might only be a contingent mind itself dependent on another necessary Meta-Mind (or series of contingent minds in such a relation)? What features might we expect of a contingent v necessary mind? For me, part of this would emerge from a finiteness. It would seem intuitively odd that there would be a necessarily existent finite mind as the cause of all else (within it).

Had BK addressed such issues anywhere? If you're reading this Bernardo, I'd be intrigued tk know your thoughts.

[Simon Adams]

I don't think Bernardo would see that distinction (others here will be better able to answer than me). I have heard him once talk about the possibility that there could be some kind of heirarchy within mind at large that "goes all the way up to the godhead". However I've only heard him say that once, and I think he usually rejects that type of distinction. Maybe its a question you can put to him

For me personally I see a distinction between god and what Plato called the "World Soul", and I see Mind at Large as this World Soul. However I'm fairly sure Bernardo would not agree with that.

Interesting that you mention David Bentley Hart, as I was just reading an article of his Roland on Consciousness which is bizarre but quite funny. I believe he has a book our soon on consciousness which could be interesting.

[dkpstarkey]

I think that before we get into contingency vs necessity, we have to ask about finitude and the infinite. We are finite creatures and our creative source is, in contrast, infinite. Is M@L infinite? I would guess Bernardo would say yes.

As for necessity, it has a formal and formative nature only, in the mold of which the world of contingency exists. This world of changes to which we often must respond is experienced as an actual and immediate reality. But Jung says that psychic nature extends beyond our conscious experience. So that reality has a psychic nature. (I just read Bernardo's new book, it's very welcome.) I hope this makes sense and it could use some work but here it is.

[CouldntCareMore]

Thanks. Yes I'd be interested in BK dialoguing with some theologians of Hart's stature. The problem I'd have in elevating BKs M@L to divinity is the problem of evil of an impersonal, unbothered Being who is effectively into self- harm via creating /dissociative processes.

[SanteriSatama]

I am reflecting on the thinking of David Bentley Hart in 'The Experience of God' and Bernardo's work. In TEOG DBH outlines God as a necessary being and contrasts God with 'objects' (or even subjects!) that are finite and contingent. My question is this: are there aspects of Mind At Large which suggest it might only be a contingent mind itself dependent on another necessary Meta-Mind (or series of contingent minds in such a relation)? What features might we expect of a contingent v necessary mind? For me, part of this would emerge from a finiteness. It would seem intuitively odd that there would be a necessarily existent finite mind as the cause of all else (within it).

Had BK addressed such issues anywhere? If you're reading this Bernardo, I'd be intrigued tk know your thoughts.

If I understand correctly, the question is mainly about the Russian Doll relation describing the alter-part and MAL-whole. In that sense, the question involves deep questions concerning nature of time, questions which Bernardo seems well aware of, but AFAIK has mainly co-operative and patient attitude towards, instead of trying to offer hasty answers. He has said that he considers Bergson's philosophy supportive of his own view, and that implicates that he's not opposed to Bergson's philosophy of time.

Temporal finiteness/transfiniteness becomes very nuanced issue in the Russian Doll etc. mereological necessity. A duration as such is neither unity nor multiplicity, and modern computer science offers highly meaningful analogy of Bergson-duration: the undecidability of Halting problem. That means potentially transfinite process, but on the other hand the paradoxical idea of actual infinity seems excluded both in the intuitive senses of duration and its computability analogy.

Actual temporal finiteness can be tentatively defined here as a basic mereological relation, as how a contained part (cf. subroutine) relates to the the whole of a container. In case of static metaphor of holography, the contained part presents the whole picture in finite resolution, without necessitating that the whole itself is finite. Mandelbrot sets etc. of Chaos theory offer good examples of this.

In conclusion, a finite part in potentially transfinite whole is a codependent part-whole relation, with both aspects necessary for the relation. Reduction to finiteness does not seem to work, as potentially transfinite entails also potentially holistic more-than-sum-of-parts character. I admit this argument is not fully fleshed out and might point towards lots of stuff that remain so far only implicated but not explicated. The implicated assumptions might contain at least possibility of evolution, continuum/continua as more fundamental than discrete phenomena.