Can you help me with metaphysical Isms?

[j.joerg@posteo.de]

Can you help me with metaphysical Isms!?

In my understanding there are five fundamental positions:
A all is mind - Idealisms
B all is matter - Realisms / Physicalisms / Materialisms
C all is either mind or matter - Dualisms
D all is mind and matter - Panpsychism
E all just is. Period. And nothing can be said about it. The ontological primal ground (Being) is infinite and eternal and not within space and time. It can not be grasped or described from a perspective of space and time, wherein thinking and language operate. In this metaphysical position mind and matter are just different perspectives of the ontological primal ground (Being) on the ontological primal ground (Being) and emerge out of the ontological primal ground. There is no difference between mind and matter whatsoever. They are one and the same thing. Weather you consider something to be mind or matter merely depends on the perspective you take within the relational network of Being.

Whats that position E called? Is it some sort of Panpsychism?
And who are prominent proponents of this position?

[Shaibei]

E sounds like dual aspect monism, Like Spinoza's. (extension and mind are 2 attributes of the infinite substance we can cognize). I do not think it's Panpsychism. The latter is the view that consciousness is a property of matter
Unfortunately I am not a philosopher. I'm sure there are people here who can contribute more

[SanteriSatama]

Can you help me with metaphysical Isms!?

In my understanding there are five fundamental positions:
A all is mind - Idealisms
B all is matter - Realisms / Physicalisms / Materialisms
C all is either mind or matter - Dualisms
D all is mind and matter - Panpsychism
E all just is. Period. And nothing can be said about it. The ontological primal ground (Being) is infinite and eternal and not within space and time. It can not be grasped or described from a perspective of space and time, wherein thinking and language operate. In this metaphysical position mind and matter are just different perspectives of the ontological primal ground (Being) on the ontological primal ground (Being) and emerge out of the ontological primal ground. There is no difference between mind and matter whatsoever. They are one and the same thing. Weather you consider something to be mind or matter merely depends on the perspective you take within the relational network of Being.

Whats that position E called? Is it some sort of Panpsychism?
And who are prominent proponents of this position?

Realism has too many meanings to list, not all related to materialism.
Physicalism means that physical phenomena have physical causes, it's a causal theory.
Panpsychism comes also in many varieties, micro- cosmic- etc., where discussion gets very nuanced.
D can refer to some forms of Panpsychism, as well as neutral monism and aspect dualism.

E would need qualification of how philosophy mathematics relates to Being, before Being could be classified as monism, dualism etc. Is being unity, multiplicity, both, neither? "One and the same thing" would seem to refer to Being as monism, but in that case Being becomes a subject of God of Number theory.

[j.joerg@posteo.de]

E would need qualification of how philosophy mathematics relates to Being, before Being could be classified as monism, dualism etc. Is being unity, multiplicity, both, neither? "One and the same thing" would seem to refer to Being as monism, but in that case Being becomes a subject of God of Number theory.

I would say that the relationship of philosophy or mathematics to Being might not make sense in terms of Aristotelian logic. Philosophy cannot relate to Being. Being is and that's it. Being cannot be subject of philosophy because Being would always be the philosophizing and not the philosophized. No matter how hard you try.

I suppose Monism would be the camp. But Being would not be the subject of God but simply be itself.

[ScottRoberts]

I would say that the relationship of philosophy or mathematics to Being might not make sense in terms of Aristotelian logic. Philosophy cannot relate to Being. Being is and that's it. Being cannot be subject of philosophy because Being would always be the philosophizing and not the philosophized. No matter how hard you try.

I would say, instead, that idealists, and only idealists, can relate to Being. My definition of idealism is that there is only conscious activity (only conscious activity "is"), and knowing is a conscious activity, so idealists know Being. Of course they only know (experience) a small part of conscious activity, but that just means that further questions about "what is" are to be answered empirically (by expansion of consciousness).

[j.joerg@posteo.de]

I would say, instead, that idealists, and only idealists, can relate to Being. My definition of idealism is that there is only conscious activity (only conscious activity "is"), and knowing is a conscious activity, so idealists know Being. Of course they only know (experience) a small part of conscious activity, but that just means that further questions about "what is" are to be answered empirically (by expansion of consciousness).

Conscious activity takes place as a relating between a seeming subject and seeming object. Now the idealist says there is only subject and the object too is a subject in essence. Which is true from within the relational network and that is where philosophy takes place. Being in contrast would be the whole network, neither subject nor object and both at the same time. It would be non relational, rather holistic.

[Eugene I]

E is neutral dual property monism. It's not a bad ontology actually.

[Soul_of_Shu]

'E' seems a lot like The Great Myst'E'riousness

[Soul_of_Shu]

E: all just is. Period. And nothing can be said about it. The ontological primal ground (Being) is infinite and eternal and not within space and time. It can not be grasped or described from a perspective of space and time, wherein thinking and language operate. In this metaphysical position mind and matter are just different perspectives of the ontological primal ground (Being) on the ontological primal ground (Being) and emerge out of the ontological primal ground. There is no difference between mind and matter whatsoever.

Isn't the issue with this still that it imagines a hypothetical, unknowable state ontologically prior to consciousness, which doesn't really amount to more than an abstraction within consciousness? Therefore, it still seems the most parsimonious starting point is the one state that is not an abstraction within consciousness, the one state that exists beyond any doubt whatsoever, which is the fact of consciousness, as the irreducible prime. Why postulate some mysterious add-on/abstraction to which consciousness must be reduced if it isn't really needed?

[SanteriSatama]

E is neutral dual property monism. It's not a bad ontology actually.

To iterate my comment/question about God of Number Theory, AFAIK Buddhist ontology (or most of it) is neither unity nor multiplicity, it's relational. Does your comprehension of Buddhist philosophy agree that sentient being can be pre-quantified?