Bernardo's latest essay

[Lou Gold]

Bernardo's latest essay "Here I part ways with Rovelli" contains an interesting paragraph.

Not only is it internally inconsistent to mix and match objective and introspective modes, introspective insights are also well-known to be largely ineffable. Therefore, when put to words, they almost invariably fail to capture the salient nuances of the intended point. That's why whole schools of thought in the East (and some in the West) have entirely given up on trying to explain what reality is. Instead, their writings are what Peter Kingsley refers to as forms of 'Μῆτις' (Mêtis) or 'incantation': they are meant not to describe reality, but to trick you into seeing it for yourself; to make you 'trip over' your own conceptual narratives and finally see through them. In weaving these incantations, sages will freely and liberally use contradiction, cognitive dissonance, metaphor, sleight of hand, shocking absurdities pronounced with a solemn face, deliberate inconsistencies, lies and, sure enough, even true statements mixed in; only the desired effect counts (Nisargadatta Maharaj, the Eastern sage I admire the most, contradicts himself several times in each page of I Am That). And I believe this is all epistemically valid because it is entirely consistent with the stated goals. The problem only arises when one fishes out a particular statement from the mystical writings of someone else, interprets it literally—as if it had been written by an 18th-century European philosopher in the finest Apollonian tradition, as opposed to a 3rd-century Indian sage—and then uses it as an arbitrary bridge to change the course of what is otherwise meant as an objective argument. This just doesn't work and should be viewed with at least great suspicion.

[Ben Iscatus]

Interesting, yes - and beautifully expressed.

[Simon Adams]

Yes I agree with Bernardo on this. The challenge of course is that when you see matter as fundamental, then what is left when you realise that it’s pure interaction.

I’m curious what Ashvin thinks of this;

In my view, if the physical world has no standalone reality and is entirely relational, then there necessarily is a deeper, by definition non-physical but absolute (in the sense of not being relative) layer of reality that grounds the physical world, and of which the physical world is but a measurement image akin to a set of dials.

[Jim Cross]

Yes I agree with Bernardo on this. The challenge of course is that when you see matter as fundamental, then what is left when you realise that it’s pure interaction.

I’m curious what Ashvin thinks of this;

In my view, if the physical world has no standalone reality and is entirely relational, then there necessarily is a deeper, by definition non-physical but absolute (in the sense of not being relative) layer of reality that grounds the physical world, and of which the physical world is but a measurement image akin to a set of dials.

Isn't that exactly trying to explain what reality is that many Eastern schools have given up on?

[Soul_of_Shu]

No surprise to see BK, our pugilistic protagonist in idealism's corner, stepping back into the ring whenever the Essentia role isn't quite dramatic enough.

[SanteriSatama]

Bernardo's latest essay "Here I part ways with Rovelli" contains an interesting paragraph.

Not only is it internally inconsistent to mix and match objective and introspective modes, introspective insights are also well-known to be largely ineffable. Therefore, when put to words, they almost invariably fail to capture the salient nuances of the intended point. That's why whole schools of thought in the East (and some in the West) have entirely given up on trying to explain what reality is. Instead, their writings are what Peter Kingsley refers to as forms of 'Μῆτις' (Mêtis) or 'incantation': they are meant not to describe reality, but to trick you into seeing it for yourself; to make you 'trip over' your own conceptual narratives and finally see through them. In weaving these incantations, sages will freely and liberally use contradiction, cognitive dissonance, metaphor, sleight of hand, shocking absurdities pronounced with a solemn face, deliberate inconsistencies, lies and, sure enough, even true statements mixed in; only the desired effect counts (Nisargadatta Maharaj, the Eastern sage I admire the most, contradicts himself several times in each page of I Am That). And I believe this is all epistemically valid because it is entirely consistent with the stated goals. The problem only arises when one fishes out a particular statement from the mystical writings of someone else, interprets it literally—as if it had been written by an 18th-century European philosopher in the finest Apollonian tradition, as opposed to a 3rd-century Indian sage—and then uses it as an arbitrary bridge to change the course of what is otherwise meant as an objective argument. This just doesn't work and should be viewed with at least great suspicion.

Hi bro. Yes, very good paragraph.

[SanteriSatama]

our pugilistic protagonist

If Bernardo is Batman from the classic 60's series, who is Robin? Etc. cast of archetypal characters?

[SanteriSatama]

What Rovelli seems to be now saying is that, although the physical world is constituted of no more than relationships, there is no underlying, non-physical world to ground those relationships. This is problematic for a number of reasons. For one, it immediately runs into infinite regress:

This is thoroughly unproblematic, especially from the math-foundation where Rovelli etc. physicalism are coming from.. The deeper philosophical discussion would go to foundations of mathematics, but on this level, Rovelli's etc. infinite regress is coherent.

Corollary: in my view, the sweet spot is taking e.g. the generative beauty of transfinitely continuous fraction of 1 (aka Golden Ratio) as ontologically transfinite middle ground bridge between finite and actual infinities by Cantor, transfinite under the general umbrella of undecidability of Halting problem. So no problem with turtles/ones/etc all the way down, as far as measuring and thinking bothers to continue.

The worst is this: to speak of pure relationships without non-relational entities to constitute and ground those relationships is literally meaningless, in a semantic sense; there is just no discernible meaning pointed to by the words in this claim, even though the claim itself can be articulated in language.

Well, that's the essence of De Saussure's linguistics and semiotics, ie. structuralism. It's also a very common view in Buddhist etc. philosophies that can be classified as advaita-anatta (no inherent existence for thing-objects). I'm sorry for Bernardo judging main tradition of Continental philosophy as well as Indian etc. philosophies as absurd without good grasp of these philosophical traditions, so he would steelman his argumentation instead of just declaring. I assume this follows from Bernardos fatal misunderstanding of the term "reductionism", when paired with "holism". Holism, including MAL-holism =/= reductionism, under the standard language that for holism whole is > than parts; for reductionism whole = sum of parts.

To call Nagarjuna mere "mystical insights" could not be greater misunderstanding. Nagarjuna was the Gödel of his age, his main contribution was in formal logic and formal proofs showing the futility of logicism, attempt to found this of that theory of metaphysics on a set of logical axioms. So, by arguing (out of ignorance and prejudice) against Nagarjuna, Bernardo is by association arguing also against Gödel. Which he blatantly does by talking about "internal consistency" as a logical possibility, seemingly as ignorant of Gödel as he is of Nagarjuna.

Rovelli coming to same philosophical conclusion of Holomovement as David Bohm should not be a surprise. It is the logical and coherent catuskoti-Gödel conclusion of most thoroughly thinking and investigating philosophical schools both ancient and modern.

PS: if anyone has access, feel free to relay this comment to Bernardo, in the same spirit of constructive criticism. I love and respect Bernardo very much. <3

[SanteriSatama]

PS: if anyone has access, feel free to relay this comment to Bernardo, in the same spirit of constructive criticism. I love and respect Bernardo very much. <3

Ah, never mind. There's a comment section in the blog, dumb me.

[AshvinP]

Yes I agree with Bernardo on this. The challenge of course is that when you see matter as fundamental, then what is left when you realise that it’s pure interaction.

I’m curious what Ashvin thinks of this;

In my view, if the physical world has no standalone reality and is entirely relational, then there necessarily is a deeper, by definition non-physical but absolute (in the sense of not being relative) layer of reality that grounds the physical world, and of which the physical world is but a measurement image akin to a set of dials.

BK's conclusion is correct here, but the major difference between us is how he presumes to reach it. I know nothing of Rovelli's metaphysics so I will leave him out of it. BK adheres to Schopenhauer's philosophy of universal Will, which presumes that in the individual's "direct" experience of will, absent all ideal content, there is experience of Reality-in-itself. There is a major error here, which is the same error of naïve realism (such as we find in physicalism) - a perception of experience (will) can be considered real without its ideal content. The naïve physicalist sees grass, flowers, trees, etc. outside himself and considers them all essentially real without thinking through how they relate in their ideal content. The philosopher of Will sees an act of will within himself and considers it essentially real without any ideal content relating it to the world at large.

The philosopher of Will is even more inconsistent than the physicalist because he arbitrarily gives priority to inner perception over outer perception.
This difference is very important because it leads directly to BK's concept of the physical world as "a set of dials". If the universal principle which links us to the world's Unity is the mere experience of will without ideal content, then one must claim all other perceptions in the world are pretty much useless towards knowledge of the underlying relations. They help us survive in a virtual reality game, but that's the entire extent of it. At the lowest level of resolution, we could say that concept is sufficiently accurate to challenge the naïve physicalist, but at any higher resolution, such as discussions which take place within idealism, it is simply incorrect.

I will say, though, that in discussion with Mark Vernon, BK speaks of the songs of birds and says it gives him a strong intuition there is more to the phenomenal world than simply forms which evolved for physical survival and only such survival. If he follows that intuition, then he cannot help but remove Thinking from his blind spot to recognize that ideational activity-content is what truly bears the world's aesthetic Unity.