Seeing the truth is not conductive to survival

[DandelionSoul]

That is to say, when the first of our ancestors to develop self-reflective thought did so, she did so in a world already full of meaning and purpose.

[AshvinP]

These are very interesting points. I will have to think about it some more to adequately respond (or maybe someone like Cleric will respond first alleviating me of that responsibility ). I am not sure we can ever ascribe "purpose" to a cat via her mere "instinctive" knowledge of her lack. Under idealism, a knowing element is inherent to every experience, so would that not imply all experience is "purposeful".

Yes and no. First, no, strictly speaking, not all experience is purposeful, since not all experience is a motivated action. If, on my way to the car, I trip on the stairs and faceplant on the driveway, the walking to my car was purposeful, but the faceplanting was... well, hilarious, but not purposeful. In fact, in that case, assuming I wasn't injured, it's the very purposelessness, the absurdity of it, that would make it funny to an onlooker.

But all motivated/deliberate/whathaveyou actions are purposeful, and the upshot is exactly what it sounds like: no human being was ever born into a world not already shot through with meaning and purpose.

In faceplanting example, it seems at least some aspect of it would be motivated or deliberate in the broad instinctive sense. Maybe you instinctively cover your face with arms on the way down, or something similar. Then we also have the problem of where to cut off the experience when determining its purposiveness. We could say we are only considering the time from when you trip to before you cover your face, but that's arbitrary. If we keep it broad enough, then we always find deliberate behavior. So I think that speaks in favor of self-reflective rather than instinctive knowledge as a necessary condition for purposeful thought-action.

[DandelionSoul]

In faceplanting example, it seems at least some aspect of it would be motivated or deliberate in the broad instinctive sense. Maybe you instinctively cover your face with arms on the way down, or something similar. Then we also have the problem of where to cut off the experience when determining its purposiveness. We could say we are only considering the time from when you trip to before you cover your face, but that's arbitrary. If we keep it broad enough, then we always find deliberate behavior. So I think that speaks in favor of self-reflective rather than instinctive knowledge as a necessary condition for purposeful thought-action.

I'm chewing on this. I have some impressions of thoughts about it -- offhand, it seems to me that self-reflection often involves a sense of purpose-seeking rather than purpose-creation, and if I'm right in thinking so, then it seems inevitable that purpose precedes self-reflection. But that's the beginning of a thought and I'm trying to work out an elaboration of it, complete with silly examples, and I haven't had a lot of time the past few days.

[AshvinP]

In faceplanting example, it seems at least some aspect of it would be motivated or deliberate in the broad instinctive sense. Maybe you instinctively cover your face with arms on the way down, or something similar. Then we also have the problem of where to cut off the experience when determining its purposiveness. We could say we are only considering the time from when you trip to before you cover your face, but that's arbitrary. If we keep it broad enough, then we always find deliberate behavior. So I think that speaks in favor of self-reflective rather than instinctive knowledge as a necessary condition for purposeful thought-action.

I'm chewing on this. I have some impressions of thoughts about it -- offhand, it seems to me that self-reflection often involves a sense of purpose-seeking rather than purpose-creation, and if I'm right in thinking so, then it seems inevitable that purpose precedes self-reflection. But that's the beginning of a thought and I'm trying to work out an elaboration of it, complete with silly examples, and I haven't had a lot of time the past few days.

Another thing Steiner was pointing to in that excerpt, when he says we can only speak of "purpose" in the domain of human aims which start as ideas (effect) and translate into action (cause) to bring about the results envisioned by the ideas, which I think you are also intuitively pointing to (or were in your original comment), is that cause-and-effect presuppose a human who imparts causal meaning to that ideal relation. It presupposes a human who observes ideal relation X, ideal relation Y, a fact which makes X-observation necessary for Y-observation, and then categorizes them as cause and effect respectively. If the essential observing is prior to all subject-object and cause-effect distinctions, as it must be, then the meaning of "purpose" is never implicated until after the cause-effect distinction is made by self-reflective cognition. So, in that sense, I do not think it is correct to say there was a world of "purposes" sort of floating around in Nature before the first self-reflective beings evolved to make the necessary distinctions. In fact, there was no "Nature" (with the meaning of that word) before such distinctions were made.

[DandelionSoul]

Another thing Steiner was pointing to in that excerpt, when he says we can only speak of "purpose" in the domain of human aims which start as ideas (effect) and translate into action (cause) to bring about the results envisioned by the ideas, which I think you are also intuitively pointing to (or were in your original comment), is that cause-and-effect presuppose a human who imparts causal meaning to that ideal relation.

I'm not at all convinced that it's only humans who can grasp causal relationships, but let's examine the idea of the idea involved in purposeful action and see where it takes us. When I undertake to do some purposeful action, it seems to me that I don't always have in my mind a clear image of the results. For instance, when I set out to write this post, I was not at all sure what I was going to write. I had only the sense that I wanted to write something, and it was that want, that desire and lack, that made this action purposeful. Obviously, the lack has a certain shape to it: it's such that, say, making a sandwich wouldn't fulfill the desire to write a forum post (I made a sandwich, just to be sure -- I am a woman of science). But I can't conceptualize the effect beforehand with anywhere near the clarity with which I can conceptualize it afterward. So I'm not envisioning a result and then bringing it about; I'm feeling a desire and then, after undertaking the action, assessing whether the result fulfills the desire.

This does not seem terribly different from the way a bird builds a nest. A bird doesn't start with a twig-by-twig blueprint in his little avian head. He just has the desire to build a nest and sets about doing it, and when he's done, he hops around the nest examining it to ensure that it's up to whatever standards birds use to judge their nests, and will make adjustments as necessary until it's right. So it is with all creative endeavors. The ideal content fills in the shape of the emptiness of the desire as the project itself is undertaken, and this is a process that -- I think -- preceded humans by quite some time.

This bit of introspection is why I would problematize the line between purposeful action and instinctive action: instincts are nothing but a set of inbuilt intuitions about what actions will fulfill what desires. I'd hardly say the lioness hunting a gazelle is doing so with no sense at all of what outcome she desires. I find it difficult to swallow the idea that a creature that knows what it wants and acts to fulfill that desire is not acting with purpose.

It presupposes a human who observes ideal relation X, ideal relation Y, a fact which makes X-observation necessary for Y-observation, and then categorizes them as cause and effect respectively. If the essential observing is prior to all subject-object and cause-effect distinctions, as it must be, then the meaning of "purpose" is never implicated until after the cause-effect distinction is made by self-reflective cognition. So, in that sense, I do not think it is correct to say there was a world of "purposes" sort of floating around in Nature before the first self-reflective beings evolved to make the necessary distinctions. In fact, there was no "Nature" (with the meaning of that word) before such distinctions were made.

In light of the above, I'd put it just the other way 'round: I think that causation emerged as a tool for sharpening our ability to bring about our purposes. All purpose is ultimately about power, and the ability to abstract causes and effects from the flow of the world around us is a great boost to our power.

[SanteriSatama]

Another thing Steiner was pointing to in that excerpt, when he says we can only speak of "purpose" in the domain of human aims which start as ideas (effect) and translate into action (cause) to bring about the results envisioned by the ideas, which I think you are also intuitively pointing to (or were in your original comment), is that cause-and-effect presuppose a human who imparts causal meaning to that ideal relation.

I'm not at all convinced that it's only humans who can grasp causal relationships, but let's examine the idea of the idea involved in purposeful action and see where it takes us. When I undertake to do some purposeful action, it seems to me that I don't always have in my mind a clear image of the results. For instance, when I set out to write this post, I was not at all sure what I was going to write. I had only the sense that I wanted to write something, and it was that want, that desire and lack, that made this action purposeful. Obviously, the lack has a certain shape to it: it's such that, say, making a sandwich wouldn't fulfill the desire to write a forum post (I made a sandwich, just to be sure -- I am a woman of science). But I can't conceptualize the effect beforehand with anywhere near the clarity with which I can conceptualize it afterward. So I'm not envisioning a result and then bringing it about; I'm feeling a desire and then, after undertaking the action, assessing whether the result fulfills the desire.

This does not seem terribly different from the way a bird builds a nest. A bird doesn't start with a twig-by-twig blueprint in his little avian head. He just has the desire to build a nest and sets about doing it, and when he's done, he hops around the nest examining it to ensure that it's up to whatever standards birds use to judge their nests, and will make adjustments as necessary until it's right. So it is with all creative endeavors. The ideal content fills in the shape of the emptiness of the desire as the project itself is undertaken, and this is a process that -- I think -- preceded humans by quite some time.

This bit of introspection is why I would problematize the line between purposeful action and instinctive action: instincts are nothing but a set of inbuilt intuitions about what actions will fulfill what desires. I'd hardly say the lioness hunting a gazelle is doing so with no sense at all of what outcome she desires. I find it difficult to swallow the idea that a creature that knows what it wants and acts to fulfill that desire is not acting with purpose.

It presupposes a human who observes ideal relation X, ideal relation Y, a fact which makes X-observation necessary for Y-observation, and then categorizes them as cause and effect respectively. If the essential observing is prior to all subject-object and cause-effect distinctions, as it must be, then the meaning of "purpose" is never implicated until after the cause-effect distinction is made by self-reflective cognition. So, in that sense, I do not think it is correct to say there was a world of "purposes" sort of floating around in Nature before the first self-reflective beings evolved to make the necessary distinctions. In fact, there was no "Nature" (with the meaning of that word) before such distinctions were made.

In light of the above, I'd put it just the other way 'round: I think that causation emerged as a tool for sharpening our ability to bring about our purposes. All purpose is ultimately about power, and the ability to abstract causes and effects from the flow of the world around us is a great boost to our power.

I've been listening to Lex Fridman podcast with Schmachtenberger. The guest discussed purpose very well, much better than I can do. Basically, he made an important distinctinction between purpose that arises from from a want in the sense of lack. Hunger is a want for nourishment and creates purpose to feed. Etc. On the other hand, purpose can arise also from the joy of living in the moment/duration, from fullness instead of want.

Is there some universal philosophical definition of causality, that can be given some exact and final mathematical definition? Does not seem like that. Causal relations can be created and caused in endless ways and forms, and can also cease in endless ways.

[AshvinP]

Another thing Steiner was pointing to in that excerpt, when he says we can only speak of "purpose" in the domain of human aims which start as ideas (effect) and translate into action (cause) to bring about the results envisioned by the ideas, which I think you are also intuitively pointing to (or were in your original comment), is that cause-and-effect presuppose a human who imparts causal meaning to that ideal relation.

I'm not at all convinced that it's only humans who can grasp causal relationships, but let's examine the idea of the idea involved in purposeful action and see where it takes us. When I undertake to do some purposeful action, it seems to me that I don't always have in my mind a clear image of the results. For instance, when I set out to write this post, I was not at all sure what I was going to write. I had only the sense that I wanted to write something, and it was that want, that desire and lack, that made this action purposeful. Obviously, the lack has a certain shape to it: it's such that, say, making a sandwich wouldn't fulfill the desire to write a forum post (I made a sandwich, just to be sure -- I am a woman of science). But I can't conceptualize the effect beforehand with anywhere near the clarity with which I can conceptualize it afterward. So I'm not envisioning a result and then bringing it about; I'm feeling a desire and then, after undertaking the action, assessing whether the result fulfills the desire.

This does not seem terribly different from the way a bird builds a nest. A bird doesn't start with a twig-by-twig blueprint in his little avian head. He just has the desire to build a nest and sets about doing it, and when he's done, he hops around the nest examining it to ensure that it's up to whatever standards birds use to judge their nests, and will make adjustments as necessary until it's right. So it is with all creative endeavors. The ideal content fills in the shape of the emptiness of the desire as the project itself is undertaken, and this is a process that -- I think -- preceded humans by quite some time.

This bit of introspection is why I would problematize the line between purposeful action and instinctive action: instincts are nothing but a set of inbuilt intuitions about what actions will fulfill what desires. I'd hardly say the lioness hunting a gazelle is doing so with no sense at all of what outcome she desires. I find it difficult to swallow the idea that a creature that knows what it wants and acts to fulfill that desire is not acting with purpose.

Yes but you seem to be underplaying the role of reflecting on your desire to write the post before writing it. I prefer to keep it in the sphere of human activity, because we cannot speak from experience if we are presuming the cognition of a bird or another non-human being. So let's shift to an example of someone sleep walking - can we say this person was purposefully making an omelet if he gets up and starts doing it in his sleep? I find that hard to reconcile with a reasonable meaning of "purpose". That is also recognized in our legal systems - hence mens rea or intentionality is required to convict of most crimes, and intoxication, insanity, involuntary movement, etc. can be affirmative defenses to otherwise criminal behavior.

I completely agree that purpose is not always at odds with instinct, and in fact I think one of the most fundamental human purposes is to bring into alignment their will, desire, feeling, and thoughts via Self-knowledge in its highest sense. For the person acting out of pure instinct, these things are just naturally in alignment due to lack of higher order Thinking. If we associate "purpose" with any such action, then there is no reason to even use the word "purpose" rather than "instinct" or "natural action" or something similar. But maybe I am missing something - do you think it is useful for the word "purpose" to be used in distinction to "instinct" and, if so, why?

It presupposes a human who observes ideal relation X, ideal relation Y, a fact which makes X-observation necessary for Y-observation, and then categorizes them as cause and effect respectively. If the essential observing is prior to all subject-object and cause-effect distinctions, as it must be, then the meaning of "purpose" is never implicated until after the cause-effect distinction is made by self-reflective cognition. So, in that sense, I do not think it is correct to say there was a world of "purposes" sort of floating around in Nature before the first self-reflective beings evolved to make the necessary distinctions. In fact, there was no "Nature" (with the meaning of that word) before such distinctions were made.

In light of the above, I'd put it just the other way 'round: I think that causation emerged as a tool for sharpening our ability to bring about our purposes. All purpose is ultimately about power, and the ability to abstract causes and effects from the flow of the world around us is a great boost to our power.

Yes I agree with that. But I say the tool of cause-and-effect relation and "purposeful" action arose at the same time via reflective Thinking which then allows for Memory. They naturally go hand in hand.

[DandelionSoul]

I've been listening to Lex Fridman podcast with Schmachtenberger. The guest discussed purpose very well, much better than I can do. Basically, he made an important distinctinction between purpose that arises from from a want in the sense of lack. Hunger is a want for nourishment and creates purpose to feed. Etc. On the other hand, purpose can arise also from the joy of living in the moment/duration, from fullness instead of want.

Is there some universal philosophical definition of causality, that can be given some exact and final mathematical definition? Does not seem like that. Causal relations can be created and caused in endless ways and forms, and can also cease in endless ways.

That distinction is interesting to me, and I may need to listen to the podcast to grasp it fully. Thank you for sharing that!

[SanteriSatama]

I've been listening to Lex Fridman podcast with Schmachtenberger. The guest discussed purpose very well, much better than I can do. Basically, he made an important distinctinction between purpose that arises from from a want in the sense of lack. Hunger is a want for nourishment and creates purpose to feed. Etc. On the other hand, purpose can arise also from the joy of living in the moment/duration, from fullness instead of want.

Is there some universal philosophical definition of causality, that can be given some exact and final mathematical definition? Does not seem like that. Causal relations can be created and caused in endless ways and forms, and can also cease in endless ways.

That distinction is interesting to me, and I may need to listen to the podcast to grasp it fully. Thank you for sharing that!

Grasping is what hands do from the purpose of taking something for a want. Hands can also give: a caress, a blessing, a sharing of a touch.

[DandelionSoul]

Yes but you seem to be underplaying the role of reflecting on your desire to write the post before writing it.

This seems to be the heart of the disagreement -- my sense is that reflection need not precede purposeful action. Rather, by the time we reflect on the actions we've taken, we find that we have already been acting with purpose. I want to be clear here, though, and say that I'm not suggesting that reflection can never come first, only that it doesn't have to. There are certainly cases where reflection does, as a matter of fact, arise first, and an action is chosen after reflecting upon it.

I prefer to keep it in the sphere of human activity, because we cannot speak from experience if we are presuming the cognition of a bird or another non-human being.

We can do that, but the difficulty is that this seems to be just the locus of our disagreement: whether purpose presupposes a human being and the distinctly (albeit perhaps not uniquely) human capacity for self-reflection.

So let's shift to an example of someone sleep walking - can we say this person was purposefully making an omelet if he gets up and starts doing it in his sleep? I find that hard to reconcile with a reasonable meaning of "purpose".

I'll bite that bullet -- to me it seems obvious that if someone cooks an omelet, they've done it on purpose. In fact, based on what you've said so far about purpose, that it comes from reversing cause and effect by envisioning the effect and then bringing it about, it seems that an action like making an omelet -- something that requires that sort of prior planning -- fits even by your definition. But I would propose that the person who fell asleep and the person who made the omelet are likely to be, in some relevant sense, different people.

That is also recognized in our legal systems - hence mens rea or intentionality is required to convict of most crimes, and intoxication, insanity, involuntary movement, etc. can be affirmative defenses to otherwise criminal behavior.

Now we're getting somewhere. I'm no legal expert, but I'll assume that you know what you're talking about here and that the law does work as you say, and I'll go a step further and say that ethics also works like this, that without the capacity for self-reflection, it's a category error to impute ethical meaning to particular actions. And here, I suspect, we may be back on common ground, and from here it may be easier to see the fundamental tension between our positions, which to me seems just to be the question of whether all meaning is necessarily ethical meaning.

(We could also use "moral" if you prefer; while there might be contexts where it's useful to differentiate the two, I don't think this is one of those contexts.)

I completely agree that purpose is not always at odds with instinct, and in fact I think one of the most fundamental human purposes is to bring into alignment their will, desire, feeling, and thoughts via Self-knowledge in its highest sense. For the person acting out of pure instinct, these things are just naturally in alignment due to lack of higher order Thinking. If we associate "purpose" with any such action, then there is no reason to even use the word "purpose" rather than "instinct" or "natural action" or something similar. But maybe I am missing something - do you think it is useful for the word "purpose" to be used in distinction to "instinct" and, if so, why?

Oh, sure. Instincts are just what we don't need to be taught or to learn on our own. I may need to learn what I can and can't eat, and refine my talent for eating without making a mess or risking choking, but that the feeling of hunger is a desire to eat is something I knew long before I knew any of those words. When I set about seeking food, I am acting on instinct, but I am also acting with a purpose: to sate my hunger. Meaning is most basically a connection between a stimulus and a purpose. When I act on my food-seeking instinct for my hunger-sating purpose, the category of food itself becomes meaningful, and things around me become meaningful as "food" or "not-food." This whole process -- desire-lack to purpose to meaning -- can happen whether or not I'm aware of myself as an experiencing "I," which is to say, without self-reflection, and it can happen by instinct or by learning or by a combination of the two.

You'll get no argument from me against the idea that the complex of desires, purposes, and meanings becomes more sophisticated and less connected to the immediate needs of the body the more sophisticated our whole cognitive apparatus becomes. New categories of desire-purpose-meaning (like ethics, as I mentioned) are generated through the course of a greater grip on symbolic thought. We become able to divide the unified world in ever more creative ways. Nevertheless, it seems to me as though that fundamental cluster of experiences is part and parcel with all life, that to be alive is just to experience desire-purpose-meaning, and so I would reiterate to what I said earlier: that in my view, no human was ever born into a world not already shot through with purpose and meaning.

Yes I agree with that. But I say the tool of cause-and-effect relation and "purposeful" action arose at the same time via reflective Thinking which then allows for Memory. They naturally go hand in hand.

Again, I'd put it the other way 'round: memory is necessary for self-reflection to emerge.