Can you explain the foundational rational principles used to form Coherence theory? I call them assumptions as a way to show that they may be wrong unless grounded.SanteriSatama wrote: ↑Wed Jul 14, 2021 7:49 am
As said, coherent conclusions are not derived from arbitrary assumptions.
This seems fairly decent description:
Coherence Theory of Truth
A coherence theory bases the truth of a belief on the degree to which it coheres ("hangs together") with all the other beliefs in a system of beliefs (typically one person's beliefs, but it could be any body of knowledge).
In philosophies of idealism, all the ideas or beliefs are said to cohere with one another, perhaps because the world is reason itself or created by a rational agent.
In scientific theories, every new observational fact must be integrated with existing facts to make them maximally coherent. Perfect coherence is not to be expected, of course. Charles Sanders Peirce's theory of pragmatic truth is the coherent inter-subjective agreement of an open community of inquirers.
In analytic language philosophy, the truth of a proposition depends on its agreement with some larger set of propositions, ideally all known true propositions and any logical inferences from those propositions.
In traditional epistemology, the coherence may be internal to a personal set of beliefs that are accessible to a subject. In this case, coherence is one way to justify a belief.
The coherence theory is close to the consistency theory of truth. But consistency is only possible for relatively modest logical and mathematical systems. In a system of belief as large as the culture of a society, there are many conflicting beliefs. Even in the mind of a single subject, consistency of beliefs is more demanding than coherence, but neither is very likely.
Coherence and consistency are best understood as desirable conditions for any theory of truth, including the correspondence theory of truth.
We can't assume that Münchausen trilemma gives exhaustive list of options and there is necessity for coherentism to rely on the circular horm. Of the five tropes asserted to Agrippa and given by Sextus Empiricus, coherentism associates with relation. Notion of relation is indispensable in mathematics, a general study of relation, and leads to process philosophy, as shown by Sextus.Im also curious how Coherence theory avoids the Münchausen trilemma?
This sounds similar to a mix between Leibniz's principle of compossibility, which in short states that, what exists defines what can exist (or, nothing can exist that contradicts what does exist), and scale invariance. Do these two ideas come in to your model at all?SanteriSatama wrote: ↑Wed Jul 14, 2021 2:13 pmCoherence Theory of Truth
A coherence theory bases the truth of a belief on the degree to which it coheres ("hangs together") with all the other beliefs in a system of beliefs (typically one person's beliefs, but it could be any body of knowledge).
How is the conclusion drawn from this theory that "the world is reason itself or created by a rational agent"? - Is this what you think? How is "reason" in this context defined?In philosophies of idealism, all the ideas or beliefs are said to cohere with one another, perhaps because the world is reason itself or created by a rational agent.
This is similar to the point of the OP - how can BK's theories (or yours in this case) be rationally/mathematically integrated with the truths of Quantum theories?In scientific theories, every new observational fact must be integrated with existing facts to make them maximally coherent.
Münchausen’s trilemma is faulty because it assumes that every form of logical development in an explanatory theory requires justification before we even consider how justification fits into an explanatory theory. Of course, axioms and infinite regress can’t be considered because they’re in need of explanation. With circularity, it’s not as if every fact is going to explain every other fact. Not every fact will lead to the logical principle underlying said fact, and yet every fact will need to be explained by a logical principle. Thus, there’s a divergence between facts and principles that must be accounted for, and this is how one can reconcile non-circularity with self-reference.
We can't assume that Münchausen trilemma gives exhaustive list of options and there is necessity for coherentism to rely on the circular horm. Of the five tropes asserted to Agrippa and given by Sextus Empiricus, coherentism associates with relation. Notion of relation is indispensable in mathematics, a general study of relation, and leads to process philosophy, as shown by Sextus.
The Münchausen trilemma question was very interesting, and helped me to clarify my thinking couple steps further. Thanks!
Coherence doesn’t prevent false positives and false negatives, since knowledge by coherence may, on the most barren analysis, provide a definition of knowledge only in terms of how well facts and intuitions fit together. Due to being overdetermined, knowledge by coherence cannot be relied upon because it doesn’t provide a sufficient criterion for discovering what is real or necessary.
Likewise, what coheres together factually cannot be considered provable knowledge in its own right, since we have no certainty as to its truth except through regularity, and many coherent scientific models have eventually been overturned. Coherence also produces false positives and false negatives, and on its own gives us no way to check for them and to eliminate them. In this way, anything that we call knowledge by coherence may be indistinguishable from certainty of our own dovetailed ignorance, and if we cannot be certain of its truth, then we cannot call it knowledge, but simply well-founded conjecture. Our belief in coherence is built also upon expectation that facts will cohere together and that will guarantee regularity, but if this is only based off of induction and is uncertain: our confidence here, too, is merely emotive.
Nicholas Rescher also gives conditions for an explanatory theory in terms of comprehensiveness, finality, the PSR (Principle of Sufficient Reason), and non-circularity. Rescher believes there is an impasse between these four conditions even though all of them seem intuitively desirable in any ultimate explanatory theory. Rescher finds his way out of the trilemma by weakening the requirements of an explanatory theory into a process rather than a definite answer, but this is to give up the explanatory ghost and settle more for a method than an answer.
The way out of this impasse is not as difficult as it seems, though it requires some creative thought. First, we must admit to ourselves that reality doesn’t face such paradoxes: humans do, and these paradoxes are a result of overly anthropic thinking. Nature isn’t propositional by necessity, nor is nature axiomatic. We’ve made our thinking dependent on propositions and axioms, but if these paradoxes arise when our thinking attempts to address the ultimate laws of natural order then we mustn’t be obliged to give up in favour of skepticism, nor should we imagine that nature should conform to the rules of our language.
Any explanatory theory must be able to explain itself and why it works as an explanatory theory for humans. It might even serve as a translation mechanism between humans and any possible intelligent non-human life. An ultimate explanatory theory should be able to tell us why it is right and why other attempts at explanation are not, and where any limits lie and how they can be overcome. If this were not the case, then we wouldn’t be able to know any ultimate explanatory theory. It might just be another efficient and quaint tool, but no definitive answer about the nature of life, the universe, and everything. If we want a definitive answer, we must demand that a theory explain itself without becoming trivially circular. An ultimate theory must explain itself and how we came to it—there is nothing wrong with that. It’s just the manner of the explanation that we must take issue with. In employing his criteria for an ultimate theory, Rescher uses formal logic to argue that the combination of his four requirements for an ultimate theory lead to circularity, thereby violating the condition that no fact can explain itself. But this is a mistake: facts cannot explain themselves, but principles of explanation and explanatory systems must explain themselves. To mix facts with the systems those facts are grounded in and defined by is a surefire way to find absurdity where there is none.
This isn't the only way to address the question of mathematics. Rather than the latest and greatest quantum stuff, I suggest consulting a broader approach that is not based on mathematical physics. Instead, it is founded on complexity, logic, and biology. Is anyone familiar with the work of George Kampis? He is a cognitive scientist and theoretical biologist in Hungary. Kampis wrote Self-modifying systems in biology and cognitive science (1991) in which he introduces "a new framework for dynamics, information, and complexity." Kampis introduces this framework in terms of logic and category theory, which might satisfy the desire for mathematical underpinnings. For those who've never been exposed to category theory, I think what Kampis is saying is worthy of an intro. If BK doesn't know of him, perhaps he should.Squidgers wrote: ↑Wed Jul 07, 2021 9:47 pm I was curious to find out if Bernado addresses the "unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics" in any of his discussions or writings.
How does a mathematical universe spring from a non-mathematical consciousness?
If consciousness is mathematical, shouldn't that be a central part of the premise? It would certainly give more room for rigor in the metaphysics if there were a mathematical component.
Does Bernado attempt to marry any current scientific mathematical knowledge of fundamental reality (topics such as Quantum chromodynamics) with his theory of consciousnesss?
Maybe you can provide some quotes from the book which you think give a good overview of his thinking in these areas?dkpstarkey wrote: ↑Wed Jul 14, 2021 9:39 pmThis isn't the only way to address the question of mathematics. Rather than the latest and greatest quantum stuff, I suggest consulting a broader approach that is not based on mathematical physics. Instead, it is founded on complexity, logic, and biology. Is anyone familiar with the work of George Kampis? He is a cognitive scientist and theoretical biologist in Hungary. Kampis wrote Self-modifying systems in biology and cognitive science (1991) in which he introduces "a new framework for dynamics, information, and complexity." Kampis introduces this framework in terms of logic and category theory, which might satisfy the desire for mathematical underpinnings. For those who've never been exposed to category theory, I think what Kampis is saying is worthy of an intro. If BK doesn't know of him, perhaps he should.Squidgers wrote: ↑Wed Jul 07, 2021 9:47 pm I was curious to find out if Bernado addresses the "unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics" in any of his discussions or writings.
How does a mathematical universe spring from a non-mathematical consciousness?
If consciousness is mathematical, shouldn't that be a central part of the premise? It would certainly give more room for rigor in the metaphysics if there were a mathematical component.
Does Bernado attempt to marry any current scientific mathematical knowledge of fundamental reality (topics such as Quantum chromodynamics) with his theory of consciousnesss?
No, this isn't about consciousness but it provides a logical foundation for theories of self-reference and autopoiesis. The cogency of his arguments and the clarity of his presentation help the reader to endure the more technical sections of his book. It is available as a PDF: http://kampis.web.elte.hu/Books/SMSCB_Kampis.pdf
Eidomorphism is the view that pure form can be wedded to pure content in a single fundamental substance. Ontological mathematics, as a variant of eidomorphism, gives a unique and very specific answer to what such a fundamental substance may be. Where people first assumed there were ‘atoms’, we found waves in their stead. When we couldn’t find what the waves were made of, we made them into probability distributions. When these weren’t enough, we looked to hidden variables. Monads are an example of such a hidden variable, and their waves are purely mathematical waves: intelligible, metaphysical objects instantiated by vanishingly small points in a domain outside of space and time. No width, to length, no passage of time: everything fundamental and conceivable is collapsed into a single point. Whatever differentiation there may be is purely formal. Space, time, perception, etc. are all relational phenomena: they result from relations within this mysterious domain. This is no doubt an unusual perspective, but not an impossible one.
Monads form a collective, and the bywords of this collective are self-organization, dynamic equilibrium, and autopoiesis. Monads evolve over time on their own, seeking symmetry: balance between one another, balance in every possible detail and in every possible way. It is in this quest for balance that monads organize to form dynamical systems, and systems within those systems: life. Evolution has a different aim than goodness, power, god, or randomness. Instead, it is symmetry in everything. This forms the beating heart of the universal ‘process’: the active, teleological quest for symmetry.
The advantage of ontological mathematics and of eidomorphism is in having a single, monolithic system. This allows for an encyclopaedic approach to knowledge, a more precise taxonomy, and a streamlined set of rules for understanding phenomena new and old alike. The disadvantage is in also having this single, monolithic system: more work must go into understanding, justifying, and extrapolating a single first principle and making it relevant to the world around us. Moreover, the PSR requires us to correctly wield our reasoning skills, leaving few passive ways for moderating our own ignorance. The correct use of the PSR requires an intensive and significant investment in education, and any monolithic system demands multidisciplinary knowledge that isn’t very easy to find.
Self-correction in science arises from an equilibrium of judgments about observations. Self-correction in the use of the PSR requires more self-discipline, and a rigid adherence to a singular method. Over time, the scientific and the rationalistic approaches can come to compliment each other The final goal of any eidomorphic philosophy is to have a clear method for the interfacing of metaphysics and natural sciences. This method has to have justifications on the philosophical level, as well as being empirically adequate: if the theory and the method are not predictive, then they must be explanatory at the very least. This final goal is a mathematical metaphysics.
Ontological mathematics is no doubt an example of this, but many predictive and explanatory hurdles must still be cleared. Explanatorily, ontological mathematics delivers a good first approximation, especially for something so far out and from such an unusual place. Time will tell if the tough hurdles can be cleared. As an example of mathematical metaphysics and the mathematicization of philosophy, ontological mathematics can inspire in us optimism when exploring new horizons in philosophy, physics, and the foundations of mathematics.
Neven Knezevic, Eidomorphism
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/521 ... domorphism
I think what you are saying is important, but its not either/or, but both/and.dkpstarkey wrote: ↑Wed Jul 14, 2021 10:15 pm Thanks, I didn't follow the progression of this thread but now it's obvious that Kampis is addressing a different audience.
I don't assume LNC as an axiom. Process ontology has complex and dynamic relation with contradition. Process ontology does not avoid relativism.Squidgers wrote: ↑Wed Jul 14, 2021 9:30 pm This sounds similar to a mix between Leibniz's principle of compossibility, which in short states that, what exists defines what can exist (or, nothing can exist that contradicts what does exist), and scale invariance. Do these two ideas come in to your model at all?
Ratio and relation are synonyms, and 'reason' refers also to causality.How is the conclusion drawn from this theory that "the world is reason itself or created by a rational agent"? - Is this what you think? How is "reason" in this context defined?
What are the truths of quantum theories? That's not an easy question. QT has at least mathematical and empirical aspects. From what I've gathered, many people are unhappy with the classical mathematical foundation of QT, and looking for better mathematical foundation, which would be coherent with the empirical aspect of QT. What are the empirical truths of QT beyond measurement problem, if such can be stated?This is similar to the point of the OP - how can BK's theories (or yours in this case) be rationally/mathematically integrated with the truths of Quantum theories?
Coherence with empirical facts of computational irreducibility and hence non-determinism does not provide error-free foundation. Which is a good thing, as with ability to make errors comes also ability to experience nice surprises. Fully deterministic universes would be totally uninteresting, and hence not worth living and experiencing. If you like, in that sense non-determinism can be considered also a rational ethical choice by experiencing agents. Coherence as such is the ethical choice of consensus seeking and communicability between perspectival multinatures.How does Coherence provide an error-free foundation for philosophy, mathematics, and the sciences - excluding no phenomena without warrant?
[/quote]Any explanatory theory must be able to explain itself and why it works as an explanatory theory for humans. It might even serve as a translation mechanism between humans and any possible intelligent non-human life. An ultimate explanatory theory should be able to tell us why it is right and why other attempts at explanation are not, and where any limits lie and how they can be overcome. If this were not the case, then we wouldn’t be able to know any ultimate explanatory theory. It might just be another efficient and quaint tool, but no definitive answer about the nature of life, the universe, and everything. If we want a definitive answer, we must demand that a theory explain itself without becoming trivially circular. An ultimate theory must explain itself and how we came to it—there is nothing wrong with that. It’s just the manner of the explanation that we must take issue with. In employing his criteria for an ultimate theory, Rescher uses formal logic to argue that the combination of his four requirements for an ultimate theory lead to circularity, thereby violating the condition that no fact can explain itself. But this is a mistake: facts cannot explain themselves, but principles of explanation and explanatory systems must explain themselves. To mix facts with the systems those facts are grounded in and defined by is a surefire way to find absurdity where there is none.
I've considered category theory way too abstract (wrong kind of abstract) to be interesting. It's mostly non-numerable fluff.dkpstarkey wrote: ↑Wed Jul 14, 2021 9:39 pm Kampis introduces this framework in terms of logic and category theory, which might satisfy the desire for mathematical underpinnings. For those who've never been exposed to category theory, I think what Kampis is saying is worthy of an intro. If BK doesn't know of him, perhaps he should.
On the contrary.