Jung and Deleuze

[JustinG]

Poststructuralist and postmodernist philosophy has its genesis in France in the 60's, where the influence of the 'three H's' (Heidegger, Husserl and Hegel) was supplanted by that of the 'masters of suspicion' (Freud, Marx and Nietzsche). Descombes' 'Modern French Philosophy' provides a good historical account of this transition (https://www.amazon.com/Modern-French-Ph ... 0521296722).

So, given that poststructuralist and postmodernist philosophy partially arose as a reaction against idealism (in the form of Hegel), these philosophies, which rail against things like 'foundationalism', 'essentialism' and 'totalization', may give an indication where future critiques of contemporary idealism may come from. Further, there are resonances between this anti-foundationalism and Nagurjana's philosophy, which may also be relevant to such critiques.

With this in mind, and given that BK characterises Jung as an idealist, the papers below may be of interest. The first critiques the alleged foundationalism of Jungian analytic psychology with its 'presuppositions that emphasize a self that is an inherent core of a given psychic realm versus a socially constructed self', whilst the second point towards an anti-foundationalist reconciliation of Jung with Deleuze.

I'm not overly familiar with either of these thinkers, but I find the attempt to bring them together interesting and potentially fruitful.

1. Un-thought out metaphysics in analytical psychology: a critique of Jung’s epistemological basis for psychic reality (https://www.researchgate.net/publicatio ... ic_reality)
2. Jung and Deleuze: Enchanted Openings to the Other: A Philosophical Contribution
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10 ... 18.1505236).

[AshvinP]

Poststructuralist and postmodernist philosophy has its genesis in France in the 60's, where the influence of the 'three H's' (Heidegger, Husserl and Hegel) was supplanted by that of the 'masters of suspicion' (Freud, Marx and Nietzsche). Descombes' 'Modern French Philosophy' provides a good historical account of this transition (https://www.amazon.com/Modern-French-Ph ... 0521296722).

So, given that poststructuralist and postmodernist philosophy partially arose as a reaction against idealism (in the form of Hegel), these philosophies, which rail against things like 'foundationalism', 'essentialism' and 'totalization', may give an indication where future critiques of contemporary idealism may come from. Further, there are resonances between this anti-foundationalism and Nagurjana's philosophy, which may also be relevant to such critiques.

With this in mind, and given that BK characterises Jung as an idealist, the papers below may be of interest. The first critiques the alleged foundationalism of Jungian analytic psychology with its 'presuppositions that emphasize a self that is an inherent core of a given psychic realm versus a socially constructed self', whilst the second point towards an anti-foundationalist reconciliation of Jung with Deleuze.

I'm not overly familiar with either of these thinkers, but I find the attempt to bring them together interesting and potentially fruitful.

1. Un-thought out metaphysics in analytical psychology: a critique of Jung’s epistemological basis for psychic reality (https://www.researchgate.net/publicatio ... ic_reality)
2. Jung and Deleuze: Enchanted Openings to the Other: A Philosophical Contribution
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10 ... 18.1505236).

This is a very interesting and important topic of comparative philosophy, thanks. Although I am generally finding it more productive to avoid these sorts of highly analytic philosophical arguments, it is still very helpful to engage in these comparative studies of great philosophical minds. However, the author in #1 is confused on several different fronts.

1) She assumes Jung held to mind-matter dualism of some sort, which I think BK adequately dispels in DJM. She relies on the fact that Jung made distinctions between "mind/matter, noumena/phenomena, conscious/unconscious, subject/object, instinct/psychoid, etc". It is a terrible argument, because absolutely every philosopher, scientist, etc. must use such distinctions to provide higher resolution on the inquiries they are speaking to. One cannot do any rigorous science or philosophy without making those distinctions. That does not say anything about Jung's underlying ontological position.

2) She ignores that Jung was engaged in phenomenology (like Heidegger) to develop his frameworks of objective psyche, archetypes, Self, etc. - he did not go to Kant, Schopenhauer, etc. and simply assume any metaphysical positions, but rather he blew right past Kant and Schopenhauer by focusing on the essence of knowing the World Soul via dream analysis, comparative mythology, etc. He was an empirical researcher first and foremost and did not propose any metaphysical-spiritual idea without first experiencing and studying it for many years.

3) She completely misunderstands Heidegger, which is understandable for his early work, but not so easy to do after considering his lectures on Thinking (1953). Jung intuitively grasped that Heidegger was approaching knowledge of the noumenal in the same phenomenological manner as him, even if he got some of Heidegger's terminology wrong here or there. This passage is clear example of that confusion:

Jung’s view of the psyche’s world-relatedness was contained within a neo-Kantian epistemology from which the universal and the relative were divided and cognized through a priori principles in contrast to Heidegger’s existence (Dasein) which was interpersonally and socially constituted and contextualized in the phenomena of everyday temporal reality. For Heidegger, meaning did not exist in principle. It was ‘disclosed’ through a process of ‘Gelassenheit’, of openness to being, and was not foundational. Jung’s foundationalist orientation relied on the notion of a priori meaning, which was lodged in the archetype and contained in the collective unconscious.

I really don't know how anyone could read Heidegger's lectures on Thinking and come to the bolded conclusion (although I am increasingly less surprised by such wacky interpretations these days). It is way off. It doesn't really matter if we call it "foundationalist" or "essentialist" or anything similar - what matters is the living essence that both Heidegger and Jung recognized in the phenomenal world which relates back to the noumenal spiritual realm from which they travel to our senses and thought.

The author is correct, though, that Jung's psychology flew in the face of Kantian epistemology on several different fronts. He viewed reality as essentially spiritual and knowable through archetypal manifestations of the World Soul, and those archetypes he considered to be literal spiritual beings. The author seems to think that is a bad look for Jung - that this means he "misread and misinterpreted" Kant - yet I would say it's the exact opposite - the farther one can get from Kant's unwarranted and nihilistic epistemology, the better. I don't think Jung misread Kant, he just did not agree with him. Kant's influence on Jung still shows up in some discussions around the inherent unknowability of the totality of the 'collective unconscious', but he certainly does more than any German idealist (apart from Steiner) to bridge the noumenal-phenomenal gap manufactured by Kant.

[SanteriSatama]

So, given that poststructuralist and postmodernist philosophy partially arose as a reaction against idealism (in the form of Hegel), these philosophies, which rail against things like 'foundationalism', 'essentialism' and 'totalization', may give an indication where future critiques of contemporary idealism may come from. Further, there are resonances between this anti-foundationalism and Nagurjana's philosophy, which may also be relevant to such critiques.

Critique of totalization is not against idealism as such, the main target of (self-)critique was the physicalist foundationalism, the metanarrative of Modernism. Dialectical antidialectics was an attempted antidote against too mechanical, oversimplifying and totalizing dialectics of Hegel (and Marx) and on the other hand De Saussure. Not antithetical criticism, but fine-tuning with more resolution.

[JustinG]

So, given that poststructuralist and postmodernist philosophy partially arose as a reaction against idealism (in the form of Hegel), these philosophies, which rail against things like 'foundationalism', 'essentialism' and 'totalization', may give an indication where future critiques of contemporary idealism may come from. Further, there are resonances between this anti-foundationalism and Nagurjana's philosophy, which may also be relevant to such critiques.

Critique of totalization is not against idealism as such, the main target of (self-)critique was the physicalist foundationalism, the metanarrative of Modernism. Dialectical antidialectics was an attempted antidote against too mechanical, oversimplifying and totalizing dialectics of Hegel (and Marx) and on the other hand De Saussure. Not antithetical criticism, but fine-tuning with more resolution.

Whilst physicalist foundationalism may have become a target, I think one of the main initial targets was Hegelianism, which was very big in French philosophy from the 1930s to the 1960s (though perhaps it was more the totalizing features of Hegelianism as you suggest rather than idealism as such).

In terms of anti-foundationalist critiques of BK's analytic idealism, I think an argument could be made that his justification for idealism relies a lot on parsimony arguments, but the emphasis on parsimony (as opposed to something like, say, aesthetic appeal) is itself a result of the scientistic/ physicalist bias of analytic philosophy. So, BK's tool might get you out of the physicalist cage, but once your out those tools may no longer be useful.

[SanteriSatama]

Whilst physicalist foundationalism may have become a target, I think one of the main initial targets was Hegelianism, which was very big in French philosophy from the 1930s to the 1960s (though perhaps it was more the totalizing features of Hegelianism as you suggest rather than idealism as such).

In terms of anti-foundationalist critiques of BK's analytic idealism, I think an argument could be made that his justification for idealism relies a lot on parsimony arguments, but the emphasis on parsimony (as opposed to something like, say, aesthetic appeal) is itself a result of the scientistic/ physicalist bias of analytic philosophy. So, BK's tool might get you out of the physicalist cage, but once your out those tools may no longer be useful.

It was the original topic and target of Lyotard's 'The Postmodern Condition', which coined the term in philosophical discourse:

Originally written as a report on the influence of technology in exact sciences, commissioned by the Conseil des universités du Québec, the book was influential.

And if we look around, it's the materialist-reductionists still adhering to Modernism by wearing their cape of scientism, which rail most vehemently against their projection of "post-modernism", quite unaware that the term originally refers to them and their post-modern condition of semantically obfuscating and empty language games at the heart of the physicalist paradigm and the grand narrative of modernism.

[AshvinP]

So, given that poststructuralist and postmodernist philosophy partially arose as a reaction against idealism (in the form of Hegel), these philosophies, which rail against things like 'foundationalism', 'essentialism' and 'totalization', may give an indication where future critiques of contemporary idealism may come from. Further, there are resonances between this anti-foundationalism and Nagurjana's philosophy, which may also be relevant to such critiques.

Critique of totalization is not against idealism as such, the main target of (self-)critique was the physicalist foundationalism, the metanarrative of Modernism. Dialectical antidialectics was an attempted antidote against too mechanical, oversimplifying and totalizing dialectics of Hegel (and Marx) and on the other hand De Saussure. Not antithetical criticism, but fine-tuning with more resolution.

Whilst physicalist foundationalism may have become a target, I think one of the main initial targets was Hegelianism, which was very big in French philosophy from the 1930s to the 1960s (though perhaps it was more the totalizing features of Hegelianism as you suggest rather than idealism as such).

In terms of anti-foundationalist critiques of BK's analytic idealism, I think an argument could be made that his justification for idealism relies a lot on parsimony arguments, but the emphasis on parsimony (as opposed to something like, say, aesthetic appeal) is itself a result of the scientistic/ physicalist bias of analytic philosophy. So, BK's tool might get you out of the physicalist cage, but once your out those tools may no longer be useful.

It's very ironic that the concept of "anti-foundationalism" is almost if not more abstract and rigid than "foundationalism". I agree both framings are problematic for many reasons, and that BK has major challenges to face from within idealist philosophies, but not for those reasons. It's like people arguing over whose symptoms are better representations of the underlying disease of modernity they all share.

[AshvinP]

Critique of totalization is not against idealism as such, the main target of (self-)critique was the physicalist foundationalism, the metanarrative of Modernism. Dialectical antidialectics was an attempted antidote against too mechanical, oversimplifying and totalizing dialectics of Hegel (and Marx) and on the other hand De Saussure. Not antithetical criticism, but fine-tuning with more resolution.

Whilst physicalist foundationalism may have become a target, I think one of the main initial targets was Hegelianism, which was very big in French philosophy from the 1930s to the 1960s (though perhaps it was more the totalizing features of Hegelianism as you suggest rather than idealism as such).

In terms of anti-foundationalist critiques of BK's analytic idealism, I think an argument could be made that his justification for idealism relies a lot on parsimony arguments, but the emphasis on parsimony (as opposed to something like, say, aesthetic appeal) is itself a result of the scientistic/ physicalist bias of analytic philosophy. So, BK's tool might get you out of the physicalist cage, but once your out those tools may no longer be useful.

It's very ironic that the concept of "anti-foundationalism" is almost if not more abstract and rigid than "foundationalism". I agree both framings are problematic for many reasons, and that BK has major challenges to face from within idealist philosophies, but not for those reasons. It's like people arguing over whose symptoms are better representations of the underlying disease of modernity they all share.

The paper #2 you provided sounds a lot more promising from the abstract. That is exactly the sort of "analysis" we need of these great philosophical minds - one that takes them from the realm of Kantian epistemic abstraction into the realm of pragmatic knowledge of the world in ever-expanding spirals of practical experience.

This paper draws from resources in the work of Deleuze to critically examine the notion of organicism and holistic relations that appear in historical forerunners that Jung identifies in his work on synchronicity. I interpret evidence in Jung's comments on synchronicity that resonate with Deleuze's interpretation of repetition and time and which challenge any straightforward foundationalist critique of Jung's thought. A contention of the paper is that Jung and Deleuze envisage enchanted openings onto relations which are not constrained by the presupposition of a bounded whole, whether at the level of the macrocosm or the microcosm. Openings to these relations entail the potential for experimental transformation beyond sedentary habits of thought which are blocked by a disenchanting ‘image of thought’ that stands in need of critique. Other examples of enchanted openings in Jung's work are signposted in an effort to counter their marginalisation in some post-Jungian critiques and to signal their potential value from a Deleuzian perspective.

[JustinG]

It's very ironic that the concept of "anti-foundationalism" is almost if not more abstract and rigid than "foundationalism".

I have found the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism of Nagarjuna and the Dalai Lama to be a useful way to approach anti-foundationalism. The Dalai Lama puts it in a nutshell (https://www.amazon.com/How-See-Yourself ... 0743290461):

"Ignorance keeps us from seeing the truth, the fact that people and other phenomena are subject to the laws of cause and effect but do not have essential being that is independent in and of themselves."

From this perspective, things like Jungian archetypes and the self are fluid phenomena that are socially and spiritually constructed, empty of inherent existence.

[AshvinP]

It's very ironic that the concept of "anti-foundationalism" is almost if not more abstract and rigid than "foundationalism".

I have found the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism of Nagarjuna and the Dalai Lama to be a useful way to approach anti-foundationalism. The Dalai Lama puts it in a nutshell (https://www.amazon.com/How-See-Yourself ... 0743290461):

"Ignorance keeps us from seeing the truth, the fact that people and other phenomena are subject to the laws of cause and effect but do not have essential being that is independent in and of themselves."

From this perspective, things like Jungian archetypes and the self are fluid phenomena that are socially and spiritually constructed, empty of inherent existence.

I understand the approach and critique, and there are clearly good reasons for them in the modern age. But I see it like this - the "foundationalist" says, "there is higher Self who is essential Being and grounds our experience in unknown manner". Implied from that is usually the idea that we must have blind faith in this Being who is independent and removed from our human existential experience. There is clearly a danger of nihilism in that formulation. So the "anti-foundationalist" responds, "you have not yet realized what you call 'higher Self' is a set of relations constructed according to various sociocultural factors." Implied in that are all sorts of things, but most importantly the notion that it does not make sense to speak of any archetypes or Self who exist and objectively ground all other phenomenon through their verifiable activity. Without that objectiveness and verifiability, the danger of nihilism reappears and this time there is not even faith in Being to fall back on because that has already been removed from the space of possibilities.

Both positions are responding to a 'meaning crisis' with pathological methods that have not overcome the habits of mind which led to the crisis in the first place. We do not transcend subject-object duality and totalizing theology, philosophy, psychology, etc. by getting rid of the "objective", rather we do it by empowering people to discover the objective for themselves and see that it is not other than what we now call "subjective". That is fundamentally what Jung, Heidegger, Gebser, Steiner, Barfield, and others were doing. The "anti-foundationalist" who critiques their phenomenology with abstract philosophy and social science has already betrayed their purpose by relying on the very thing that they are critiquing in the modern age. They are not critiquing the empirical data, such as thousands of data points on dream occurrences and mythological symbols in Jung's case, but only speculating on ways to ignore that data and hypothesize more abstract explanations for concrete experience.

The Dalai Lama quote is a great example of that abstraction. He is basically saying the law of phenomenal cause-and-effect is more real than the ego-"I" which experiences and gives meaning to that relation in the first place, so that we can understand what such a law entails. None of the above applies to ancient spiritual traditions and philosophy, because none of these experiences and thoughts were abstract for them in the same way it is for us now. I suspect Nagarjuna would cringe at that quote if he read it today, but I don't really know enough about his philosophy to say for sure. I suspect it because of my overarching metamorphic perspective on these things. It would never occur for ancient people 2,000 years ago to elevate phenomenal relations as they are perceived over noumenal essences which remain invisible. The "laws of nature" would never be considered anything apart from the activity of living spiritual beings who can be objectively and concretely experienced-known.

[JustinG]

The "anti-foundationalist" who critiques their phenomenology with abstract philosophy and social science has already betrayed their purpose by relying on the very thing that they are critiquing in the modern age.

Nagarjuna, at least, anticipates this with his teaching of the emptiness of emptiness. Emptiness also has no inherent existence, as do the teachings which teach emptiness. Further, emancipation (or nirvana) is itself the cessation of grasping for inherent existence, an overcoming of the 'will to truth'.

It would never occur for ancient people 2,000 years ago to elevate phenomenal relations as they are perceived over noumenal essences which remain invisible.

The Buddha taught the doctrine of no-self in opposition to the Brahmanic concept of Self, so whilst they are certainly not identical, I think there are some similarities in the tensions between Buddhism and Hinduism in ancient times and those between postmodernism and idealism.