John Horgan defends not knowing

[Jim Cross]

Ashvin,

Your argument would make sense if Hoffman's model really worked. Here is a pretty devastating critique.

https://www.rationalrealm.com/philosoph ... alism.html

[AshvinP]

Ashvin,

Your argument would make sense if Hoffman's model really worked. Here is a pretty devastating critique.

https://www.rationalrealm.com/philosoph ... alism.html

Jim - I am making a very simple point:

Jim's assertion: pursuing science with materialist or idealist metaphysics makes no difference, because the same paths of scientific inquiry are pursued and the results end up the same.

My assertion: many scientists throughout history up to present day, remaining metaphysically agnostic or assuming idealism, pursued much different paths of scientific inquiry and ended up with much different results than those with standard materialist metaphysical assumptions.

Your argument that Hoffman's model does not work is irrelevant to my assertion.

[Jim Cross]

Ashvin,

Your argument would make sense if Hoffman's model really worked. Here is a pretty devastating critique.

https://www.rationalrealm.com/philosoph ... alism.html

Jim - I am making a very simple point:

Jim's assertion: pursuing science with materialist or idealist metaphysics makes no difference, because the same paths of scientific inquiry are pursued and the results end up the same.

My assertion: many scientists throughout history up to present day, remaining metaphysically agnostic or assuming idealism, pursued much different paths of scientific inquiry and ended up with much different results than those with standard materialist metaphysical assumptions.

Your argument that Hoffman's model does not work is irrelevant to my assertion.

Wow! That's an incredible view.

That means anybody can do "science", make up whatever they want, and it is all the same because it doesn't matter if it works.

[Eugene I]

Ashvin,

Your argument would make sense if Hoffman's model really worked. Here is a pretty devastating critique.

https://www.rationalrealm.com/philosoph ... alism.html

I took a quick look but so far these objections seem laughable. Look at this argument

I want to dig down a little deeper here with a couple of specific examples illustrating the absurdity of Hoffman's position. Consider again Hoffman's case study using an organism's perception of the quantity of a resource [Hoffman et al 2015a: 1486]. In their simulation, the organism employing the interface (non-veridical) strategy is able to perceive a variable quantity of resource using just four colours. One such resource is water. Now picture yourself sitting in front of a very large transparent tank that is being gravity-filled with water at a constant rate. We know that the tank is being filled at a constant rate because the force of gravity is constant and the water is being fed through a fixed diameter tube.

Now Hoffman would have us believe that although the volume of water in the tank appears to be increasing, it may in fact not be so. For Hoffman, when the tank appears to be two thirds full, it could in reality be one third full or it could be two thirds full (green bands in Figure 3). You just don't know. The quantity you think you are perceiving is a 'you know not what'. Even more absurd, for Hoffman, when you perceive the tank as empty, it could in reality be full (red bands in Figure 3).

Hoffman then applies this absurd conclusion to all of the other properties we sense. These include temperature, shape, velocity, hardness, and so on. If we cannot in reality determine the scalar quantities of these properties, then how do Hoffman and other scientists practice science? If a hydrologist measures the volume of water as, say, 70 cubic litres, and we believe Hoffman, the volume could be anything. It could be one cubic litre or it could be 1000 cubic litres. We just don't know. How then can we support a science of hydrology, or cosmology or biology at all?

Is the guy a scientist or philosopher at all? No wonder his review was not published in any refereed journals.

Oh, apparently "Leslie Allan is a Former Managing Director at Business Performance Pty Ltd". OK, makes sense

[AshvinP]

Ashvin,

Your argument would make sense if Hoffman's model really worked. Here is a pretty devastating critique.

https://www.rationalrealm.com/philosoph ... alism.html

Jim - I am making a very simple point:

Jim's assertion: pursuing science with materialist or idealist metaphysics makes no difference, because the same paths of scientific inquiry are pursued and the results end up the same.

My assertion: many scientists throughout history up to present day, remaining metaphysically agnostic or assuming idealism, pursued much different paths of scientific inquiry and ended up with much different results than those with standard materialist metaphysical assumptions.

Your argument that Hoffman's model does not work is irrelevant to my assertion.

Wow! That's an incredible view.

That means anybody can do "science", make up whatever they want, and it is all the same because it doesn't matter if it works.

Who said any of that?

I don't think I can make my argument against your assertion any simpler to comprehend. And now it seems like you can't remember your own assertion, even though I retyped it and bolded it for you in the comment above, with the preface, "Jim's assertion".

Once again, your assertion had nothing to do with the validity of scientific results. If Goethe's color theory is wrong, and Hoffman's model of conscious realism is wrong (things it would take quite longer than a few comments on a thread to establish), how does that relate to your assertion in any way? I have now added blue color to it so it's easier for you to identify and jog your memory.

[Jim Cross]

Jim - I am making a very simple point:

Jim's assertion: pursuing science with materialist or idealist metaphysics makes no difference, because the same paths of scientific inquiry are pursued and the results end up the same.

My assertion: many scientists throughout history up to present day, remaining metaphysically agnostic or assuming idealism, pursued much different paths of scientific inquiry and ended up with much different results than those with standard materialist metaphysical assumptions.

Your argument that Hoffman's model does not work is irrelevant to my assertion.

Wow! That's an incredible view.

That means anybody can do "science", make up whatever they want, and it is all the same because it doesn't matter if it works.

Who said any of that?

I don't think I can make my argument against your assertion any simpler to comprehend. And now it seems like you can't remember your own assertion, even though I retyped it and bolded it for you in the comment above, with the preface, "Jim's assertion".

Once again, your assertion had nothing to do with the validity of scientific results. If Goethe's color theory is wrong, and Hoffman's model of conscious realism is wrong (things it would take quite longer than a few comments on a thread to establish), how does that relate to your assertion in any way? I have now added blue color to it so it's easier for you to identify and jog your memory.

Ashvin,

I can see the complete disconnect now and why we are forever talking past each other.

Science, to me, isn't science if it doesn't work. So, it doesn't matter where Hoffman or anybody else starts from, it doesn't end up as science unless it works.

I thought this was all pretty much a given in any discussion of science but you apparently can envision a science in which "it doesn't matter if it works."

My comments were made in regard to science where it does matter if it works.

Actually my argument that metaphysics doesn't matter inscience is almost self-evident because ultimately the test for science is that it works - that it predicts something or explains something more simply than we explained it before. It is all about measurement and results. That is the problem with Hoffman's approach. It doesn't predict anything that realistic science doesn't already predict while introducing new constructs for which no proof or evidence can be offered.

[Jim Cross]

Ashvin,

Your argument would make sense if Hoffman's model really worked. Here is a pretty devastating critique.

https://www.rationalrealm.com/philosoph ... alism.html

I took a quick look but so far these objections seem laughable. Look at this argument

I want to dig down a little deeper here with a couple of specific examples illustrating the absurdity of Hoffman's position. Consider again Hoffman's case study using an organism's perception of the quantity of a resource [Hoffman et al 2015a: 1486]. In their simulation, the organism employing the interface (non-veridical) strategy is able to perceive a variable quantity of resource using just four colours. One such resource is water. Now picture yourself sitting in front of a very large transparent tank that is being gravity-filled with water at a constant rate. We know that the tank is being filled at a constant rate because the force of gravity is constant and the water is being fed through a fixed diameter tube.

Now Hoffman would have us believe that although the volume of water in the tank appears to be increasing, it may in fact not be so. For Hoffman, when the tank appears to be two thirds full, it could in reality be one third full or it could be two thirds full (green bands in Figure 3). You just don't know. The quantity you think you are perceiving is a 'you know not what'. Even more absurd, for Hoffman, when you perceive the tank as empty, it could in reality be full (red bands in Figure 3).

Hoffman then applies this absurd conclusion to all of the other properties we sense. These include temperature, shape, velocity, hardness, and so on. If we cannot in reality determine the scalar quantities of these properties, then how do Hoffman and other scientists practice science? If a hydrologist measures the volume of water as, say, 70 cubic litres, and we believe Hoffman, the volume could be anything. It could be one cubic litre or it could be 1000 cubic litres. We just don't know. How then can we support a science of hydrology, or cosmology or biology at all?

Is the guy a scientist or philosopher at all? No wonder his review was not published in any refereed journals.

Oh, apparently "Leslie Allan is a Former Managing Director at Business Performance Pty Ltd". OK, makes sense

Does that matter? What do you do?

And I'm not sure what you are laughing at. Hoffman's bizarrely relies on mathematical models but at the same time says all of our measurements are false. How do his own models tell us something "true" while other models are false?

One of my favorite parts of critique:

Take, for example, Hoffman's bold announcement that his reconstructions give 'mathematically precise theories about how certain conscious agents construct their physical worlds' [Hoffman 2008: 106]. Unfortunately for Hoffman, however, his reconstruction shows only how one conscious agent constructs their world. Despite his promise, his reformulation says nothing substantive about 'conscious agents and their dynamical interactions' [2008: 104]. His mathematical model is entirely silent on how, when I get a headache from a rock falling on my head when I'm all alone, this is the result of a 'decision' and 'action' of another conscious agent. His model says nothing about how, when I look up and see the moon, my moon experience is the result of the 'decision' and 'action' of other conscious agents in the network.

[AshvinP]

Wow! That's an incredible view.

That means anybody can do "science", make up whatever they want, and it is all the same because it doesn't matter if it works.

Who said any of that?

I don't think I can make my argument against your assertion any simpler to comprehend. And now it seems like you can't remember your own assertion, even though I retyped it and bolded it for you in the comment above, with the preface, "Jim's assertion".

Once again, your assertion had nothing to do with the validity of scientific results. If Goethe's color theory is wrong, and Hoffman's model of conscious realism is wrong (things it would take quite longer than a few comments on a thread to establish), how does that relate to your assertion in any way? I have now added blue color to it so it's easier for you to identify and jog your memory.

Ashvin,

I can see the complete disconnect now and why we are forever talking past each other.

Science, to me, isn't science if it doesn't work. So, it doesn't matter where Hoffman or anybody else starts from, it doesn't end up as science unless it works.

I thought this was all pretty much a given in any discussion of science but you apparently can envision a science in which "it doesn't matter if it works."

My comments were made in regard to science where it does matter if it works.

Actually my argument that metaphysics doesn't matter inscience is almost self-evident because ultimately the test for science is that it works - that it predicts something or explains something more simply than we explained it before. It is all about measurement and results. That is the problem with Hoffman's approach. It doesn't predict anything that realistic science doesn't already predict while introducing new constructs for which no proof or evidence can be offered.

We were not really talking past each other, you have just changed the argument now to the bolded assertion (which any reasonable scientist should disagree with). To the original argument, another way to think about it is as follows - the idealist always orients towards finding a unified essence underlying manifold perceptions-measurements, because the underlying Reality must be unified in essence. I do not personally think we need to start with that assumption to arrive at it by way of phenomenal experience and scientific method, but that is a clear difference from the materialist. The latter will be perfectly satisfied ascribing manifold essences to manifold perceptions, for instance saying a plant has no essential relationship to a human being which influences how we should think about them and put that knowledge to use.

Your bolded assertion is not how any scientist approaches their endeavor - they do not assume their models of Reality will "work" right off the bat. In fact, they should assume the exact opposite - the models will not work until they are tested extensively, scrutinized, and reformulated to deal with predictive errors. Sometimes they will need to be scrapped altogether. That does not mean the person who formulated the flawed or scrapped model is not doing science. Anyone who follows the scientific method (which is not necessarily what naïve materialists assume it to be) is doing science. Hoffman is clearly doing science, even if you disagree with his models or think they are obviously flawed. Based on your critiques posted here, though, I don't think they point out obvious flaws at all. They are mostly centered around naïve realism which has been disproved by all modern science.

[Eugene I]

And I'm not sure what you are laughing at. Hoffman's bizarrely relies on mathematical models but at the same time says all of our measurements are false. How do his own models tell us something "true" while other models are false?

There is a misunderstanding of what DH is actually saying. As an analogy, think of the reality that we perceive as a screen image of a computer VR simulation (DH often uses this analogy). What we observe is images on the screen, what happens in reality is a stream of bits in the processor. However, there is a math algorithm that defines how bits are processed and produce screen images. Our measurements are positions and movements of the images. They are not "false" or "true", they simply do not represent the reality of the processor functioning bits directly. There are no "green trees" and "clouds" in the processor, only bits. But there is still an indirect representation because there is a functional (encoded) mathematical correspondence between the processor bits and the screen images and screen measurements. So, if we can figure out the underlying algorithm, we can then back-calculate the actual bit stream based on our screen measurements and figure out what is actually going on at the processor level. And once we know the algorithm, we can use it to our benefit to make predictions and develop technologies. In the DH model the "processor" is a network of conscious agents.

I find the arguments of that guy simply childish, he has no clue what DH is actually talking about. Certain level of professionalism does matter and is required in natural sciences and philosophy, just like in any other profession.

[Jim Cross]

And I'm not sure what you are laughing at. Hoffman's bizarrely relies on mathematical models but at the same time says all of our measurements are false. How do his own models tell us something "true" while other models are false?

There is a misunderstanding of what DH is actually saying. As an analogy, think of the reality that we perceive as a screen image of a computer VR simulation (DH often uses this analogy). What we observe is images on the screen, what happens in reality is a stream of bits in the processor. However, there is a math algorithm that defines how bits are processed and produce screen images. Our measurements are positions and movements of the images. They are not "false" or "true", they simply do not represent the reality of the processor functioning bits directly. There are no "green trees" and "clouds" in the processor, only bits. But there is still an indirect representation because there is a functional (encoded) mathematical correspondence between the processor bits and the screen images and screen measurements. So, if we can figure out the underlying algorithm, we can then back-calculate the actual bit stream based on our screen measurements and figure out what is actually going on at the processor level. And once we know the algorithm, we can use it to our benefit to make predictions and develop technologies. In the DH model the "processor" is a network of conscious agents.

I find the arguments of that guy simply childish, he has no clue what DH is actually talking about. Certain level of professionalism does matter and is required in natural sciences and philosophy, just like in any other profession.

Nobody is arguing that consciousness is not a representation of external reality. Hoffman's argument is that it is not a veridical representation. My argument is it is not that simple. There are aspects that are veridical and aspects that are not. Especially in the aspects that science is most concerned about - measurement and relationships - it is likely quite veridical; otherwise, as the author argues, we would never be able to launch a rocket and put a rover on Mars. We would never be to adapt to prism glasses that turns everything upside down. That are regularities in the world that we can perceive at some level is a requirement for being able to interact with the world.

Hoffman's network of conscious agents is derived from his PDA loop so we need to ask first if that is a useful way of picturing consciousness.

Well, it turns out it probably isn't.

I made my own arguments against it in my own posts. The problem is that it omits learning and memory from the picture. As I wrote, we are not like a beetle that sees brown and decides to mate. We can provide context to any external world stimuli through memory and learning. Memory and learning occur at the individual level in real time, not the species level in evolutionary time.

A closely related criticism is from this article that I linked in the other thread.

http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15846/1/article.pdf

Here I examine the game-theoretic version of this skeptical line of argument developed by Donald Hoffman and his colleagues. I show that their argument only works under an extremely impoverished picture of the informational connections that hold between agent and
world. In particular, it only works for cue-driven agents, in Kim Sterelny’s sense. In cases in which the agents’s understanding of what is useful results from combining pieces of information that reach them in different ways, and that complement one another (i.e., that are synergistic), maximizing usefulness involves construing first a picture of agent-independent, objective matters of fact.

The cue-driven agent is like the beetle that sees brown and decides to mate. More complex organisms have a more complex decision making process that takes into account memory and learning, that can test the environment through its own actions and correct perceptions or override them. But what are they testing against? They are testing against agent-independent, objective world that Hoffman tries to replace with his networks of conscious agents that is derived from his PDA loop which is shown to be reflect "an extremely impoverished picture of the informational connections that hold between agent and world."

For what it's worth, I actually thought Hoffman was on to something and, believe it or not, it was what drew me to this forum originally. I actually wrote a moderately favorable post but as time wore out I have come to the conclusion that whatever good insights he has have been provided by others before him and most of what is original in his thoughts and papers is nonsense.

Again nobody is arguing that "green" exists anywhere other than consciousness. Hoffman's desktop analogy is useful but isn't something he thought up himself. You can find the identical analogy in this book that was originally published in 1991.