Cleric's Responses to Mystical Metaphysics (or How to Make a Logical Argument)

[Eugene I]

The history of the pragmatic theory of truth is tied to the history of classical American pragmatism. According to the standard account, C.S. Peirce gets credit for first proposing a pragmatic theory of truth, William James is responsible for popularizing the pragmatic theory, and John Dewey subsequently reframed truth in terms of warranted assertibility (for this reading of Dewey see Burgess & Burgess 2011: 4). More specifically, Peirce is associated with the idea that true beliefs are those that will withstand future scrutiny; James with the idea that true beliefs are dependable and useful; Dewey with the idea that truth is a property of well-verified claims (or “judgments”).

Here is an illustration of inapplicability of such pragmatic theory of truth to ontology. Suppose someone comes up with a hypothesis that there exists a parallel universe, but unfortunately it is completely isolated from our universe and there is no possibility to communicate with it in any way. So, from the pragmatic theory of truth standpoint, the statement "a parallel universe exists" is not true, because there is no way for us to practically ascertain its existence. However, such parallel universe may actually in reality ontologically exist, so the statement " a parallel universe exists" can actually be true in the ontological sense, even though it may not be true in the pragmatic sense. That is why the pragmatic theory of truth can not be applicable to ontology, even though it may still be quite relevant and applicable to the epistemology of science and to human practical life.

[Cleric K]

Cleric, with all due respect and with my standard caveat that I'm not a philosopher I'd like to make an observation that is seemingly obvious to me. Your very logical voluminous outpourings amount to an act of modeling or representation, which, lead to an obvious and quite predictable conclusion: the model says, "thinking will lead to Thought and rigorous thinking will lead to rigorous Thought." What one gets out of this practice (quite predictably) is a never-ending thought process with endless new levels and representational higher beings. I dunno. It just seems obvious to me.

Sorry Lou, I don't have the energy for this.

Exactly, and that's what Adur and me pointed to Cleric here

I'm not surprised that you, guys, see things in this way. It's only natural when reality is irreconcilably divided into completely self-enclosed intellect and outside it only inexplicable experiencing/nothingness/formlessness/whatever. I tried to provide very simple metaphor with the 'thinking hand'. The fact that it is seen simply as never-ending intellectual rambling speaks loud and clear that no attempt is made to even think about it as a possibility, let alone experience it livingly.

I asked a simple question that if the intellect gives clear cognition and ego-consciousness that lifts consciousness above the dreaming animalistic/instinctive state, why should we imagine that all development has stopped and it's not possible that other even higher form of consciousness above the intellectual can be developed? This was of course ignored and the reasons are clear - such an idea is simply not tolerated by the intellect. The latter demands that it remains the king of the hill for all eternity and the only thing higher than it that can be admitted is completely inexplicable nothingness/plenum. It's completely blasphemous in the intellect's ears that there can be anything between it and the formless potential. That's the reason why the hand analogy is also completely dismissed. It simply doesn't fit well to speak of deeper strata of reality (the hand).

[Eugene I]

I'm not surprised that you, guys, see things in this way. It's only natural when reality is irreconcilably divided into completely self-enclosed intellect and outside it only inexplicable experiencing/nothingness/formlessness/whatever. I tried to provide very simple metaphor with the 'thinking hand'. The fact that it is seen simply as never-ending intellectual rambling speaks loud and clear that no attempt is made to even think about it as a possibility, let alone experience it livingly.

I asked a simple question that if the intellect gives clear cognition and ego-consciousness that lifts consciousness above the dreaming animalistic/instinctive state, why should we imagine that all development has stopped and it's not possible that other even higher form of consciousness above the intellectual can be developed? This was of course ignored and the reasons are clear - such an idea is simply not tolerated by the intellect. The latter demands that it remains the king of the hill for all eternity and the only thing higher than it that can be admitted is completely inexplicable nothingness/plenum. It's completely blasphemous in the intellect's ears that there can be anything between it and the formless potential. That's the reason why the hand analogy is also completely dismissed. It simply doesn't fit well to speak of deeper strata of reality (the hand).

To clarify my position with respect to PoF: I'm not against developing to higher cognition into the astral realms beyond the human level of cognition , but I do not believe it is the purpose and imperative of our human life. As many NDE accounts suggest, we do exist in our noncorporeal form in a hugely expanded and much higher levels of cognition, but we "downgrade" our level of cognition when we incarnate into humans for specific purposes, even though we never loose our connection to the Divine, this connection just becomes weaker. Why we do that and for what purpose is entirely different question. It is like being sent to some underwater mission, but when you get here, you start trying to elevate yourself and go back up to the surface. No, you descended down for specific purpose, you have work to do down there, and not suppose to escape and elevate yourself back to where you came from. You will be back when the work is complete, there is not reason to rush.

[Lou Gold]

Cleric, with all due respect and with my standard caveat that I'm not a philosopher I'd like to make an observation that is seemingly obvious to me. Your very logical voluminous outpourings amount to an act of modeling or representation, which, lead to an obvious and quite predictable conclusion: the model says, "thinking will lead to Thought and rigorous thinking will lead to rigorous Thought." What one gets out of this practice (quite predictably) is a never-ending thought process with endless new levels and representational higher beings. I dunno. It just seems obvious to me.

Sorry Lou, I don't have the energy for this.

I believe I know the feeling.

[AshvinP]

The history of the pragmatic theory of truth is tied to the history of classical American pragmatism. According to the standard account, C.S. Peirce gets credit for first proposing a pragmatic theory of truth, William James is responsible for popularizing the pragmatic theory, and John Dewey subsequently reframed truth in terms of warranted assertibility (for this reading of Dewey see Burgess & Burgess 2011: 4). More specifically, Peirce is associated with the idea that true beliefs are those that will withstand future scrutiny; James with the idea that true beliefs are dependable and useful; Dewey with the idea that truth is a property of well-verified claims (or “judgments”).

Here is an illustration of inapplicability of such pragmatic theory of truth to ontology. Suppose someone comes up with a hypothesis that there exists a parallel universe, but unfortunately it is completely isolated from our universe and there is no possibility to communicate with it in any way. So, from the pragmatic theory of truth standpoint, the statement "a parallel universe exists" is not true, because there is no way for us to practically ascertain its existence. However, such parallel universe may actually in reality ontologically exist, so the statement " a parallel universe exists" can actually be true in the ontological sense, even though it may not be true in the pragmatic sense. That is why the pragmatic theory of truth can not be applicable to ontology, even though it may still be quite relevant and applicable to the epistemology of science and to human practical life.

Eugene - you just provided the perfect illustration of why the pragmatic approach is the only reasonable one for ontology, philosophy, and inquiry in general. If there is no such pragmatic constraint, then all purely speculative ontologies can be regarded as having equal truth value. The guy who proposes completely isolated multiverse, unknowable in principle, can say "hey guys, my proposals should be published and considered too, because I am doing ontology just like everyone else". Same thing for the guy who proposes, "entirely trascendent God, unknowable in principle, created the physical universe with its laws and is watching it all unfold remotely". Eventually, the entire field of "ontology", "metaphysics", "philosophy", and "science" gets watered down by purely abstract speculative theories to complete practical insigificance for human knowledge and pursuits. And that is, in fact, what was happening and what prompted the development of pragmatic philosophy in the first place.

Is it a coincidence that this 'watering down' process became such a problem in the modern age when the egoic intellect became dominant and desired to remain "king of the hill for all eternity", as Cleric said in his last post? No, not at all. That is what the egoic intellect (left brain thinking) loves to do - perpetually speculate about what could be "true" without ever making firm progress towards integration of the various fields of knowledge into coherent and meaningful wholes. That is its natural desire, and this has been experimentally proven as well. That is why you cannot answer the simple question Cleric posed about why the development from instinct to intellect should not continue further. Your latest reponse was the equivalent of, "I am not against some people evolving instinct to intellect, but others can choose to opt out of cognitive evolution and remain in purely instinctual state and blindly follow whatever instinctual pleasures they want".

And, actually, in a certain way that is true at our current stage, but no reasonable person would consider that a positive option to pursue either in terms of their own self-interest or that of others. When we put it that way, we can see what absurd lengths the left brain intellect will go to retain its own totalizing power...

[Eugene I]

All you said is correct Ashvin with respect to epistemology and science, and in philosophy the pragmatic constraint is called "the principle of parsimony", and it is exactly this principle that Bernardo used to defend idealism. But Bernardo never said that his parsimony argument serves as a proof for idealism, but only as a strong and practical argument. Notwithstanding any pragmatic arguments, believe or not, the parallel universe or matter or neutrally-monistic OP may actually exist, and in such case we would be fooling ourselves with pragmatic arguments to make ourselves believe that they do not exist.

But I'm all for the pragmatic arguments as the basis for weighting alternative ontologies based on their pragmatic merits. For example, even if single-person-solipsism would be ontologically true, I would still not choose it as my pragmatic worldview because of its practical deficiencies. But in such case my pragmatic worldview would actually contradict with the Ultimate Truth.

But if that's the case, we might better drop any ontology whatsoever. Who cares what the reality ontologically is if there is no way we can ever find it our anyway? What matters for us is the choice of the worldview that pragmatically works for us. And that is fine, but in such case we should not claim that our pragmatic worldview has anything to do with ontology, with what the reality actually IS ontologically.

So, the bottom-line: we can choose the pragmatic approach to truth, but in this case we should drop any ontological claims (because pragmatic theory of truth is not applicable to ontology). Or, in addition to pragmatic approach, we can still consider ontological statements, but in this case such statements would be unsupportable and unprovable by any pragmatic arguments and would be simply our beliefs of choice. And so we go back to what I said in the beginning: all ontological statements are purely beliefs/hypotheses and should be recognized as only beliefs/hypotheses and not as any sort of unquestionable Ultimate Truths, because we have no ground to ascertain any version of the Ultimate Truth with any pragmatic arguments.

PS: as I mentioned to you before a few times, if would be nice if you would focus on philosophy and would not use any personal judgements or accusations. It only serves against the very worldview you are trying to defend, because it only demonstrates how your worldview and your spiritual practice of choice makes you personally more judgmental.

[AshvinP]

All you said is correct Ashvin with respect to epistemology and science, and in philosophy the pragmatic constraint is called "the principle of parsimony", and it is exactly this principle that Bernardo used to defend idealism. But Bernardo never said that his parsimony argument serves as a proof for idealism, but only as a strong and practical argument. Notwithstanding any pragmatic arguments, believe or not, the parallel universe or matter or neutrally-monistic OP may actually exist, and in such case we would be fooling ourselves with pragmatic arguments to make ourselves believe that they do not exist.

But I'm all for the pragmatic arguments as the basis for weighting alternative ontologies based on their pragmatic merits. For example, even if single-person-solipsism would be ontologically true, I would still not choose it as my pragmatic worldview because of its practical deficiencies. But in such case my pragmatic worldview would actually contradict with the Ultimate Truth.

But if that's the case, we might better drop any ontology whatsoever. Who cares what the reality ontologically is if there is no way we can ever find it our anyway? What matters for us us the choice of the worldview that pragmatically works for us. And that is fine, but in such case we should not claim that our pragmatic worldview has anything to do with ontology, with what the reality actually IS ontologically.

So, the bottom-line: we can choose the pragmatic approach to truth, but in this case we should drop any ontological claims (because pragmatic theory of truth is not applicable to ontology). Or, in addition to pragmatic approach, we can still consider ontological statements, but in this case such statements would be unsupportable and unprovable by any pragmatic arguments and would be simply our beliefs of choice. And so we go back to what I said in the beginning: all ontological statements are purely beliefs/hypotheses and should be recognized as only beliefs/hypotheses and not as any sort of unquestionable Ultimate Truths, because we have no ground to ascertain any version of the Ultimate Truth with any pragmatic arguments.

You're still not getting it, Eugene. Pragmatic approach to truth is not "the principle of parsimony". This has nothing to do with what can he held true for "practical convenience" vs. what "actually exists". The pragmatic approach says "what actually exists must be that which is knowable in principle and holds practical significance for our experience of the World Content". It completely rejects the assertion that there can be "actually existing" 'things' which we could never know or experience. Of course this is the natural conclusion of idealism as well if it is consistently applied. Scott mentions this in his essay on "How Idealism Simplifies Metaphysics":

Then there is the reality/appearance distinction. With idealism, all appearances are real. End of story. Well, one might point out that when we look at water flowing down a river, that that appears to us as non-conscious activity. In response, I would say that it is not a false appearance, rather, it is a false belief about what appears. We are not cognizant that it is a dream river (according to one scenario) or that it is a representation of the thought of highly advanced spiritual beings (according to another). A simple way to grasp this is to imagine someone who has never seen or heard of writing of any sort, then presented with a scrap of paper with some writing on it. That person will not be cognizant that the words on the paper mean something -- it will just look like random marks.

Next up, the ontology/epistemology distinction. With idealism, to modify Berkeley, to be is to be known, and so a theory of knowledge is at the same time a theory of being. So no distinction.

Similarly, there is no ontology/logic distinction. Taking logic in a more general sense, as the study of patterns of thinking, and since thinking is conscious activity, the study of logic is again the study of being.

To summarize, pragmatic truth, especially within idealist framework, is epistemology and ontology, both. The real question here is whether you hold to pragmatic ontology or rather to some correspodence theory of truth, which is standard among a lot of modern philosophies (mostly materialist-dualist ones). If the latter, which is what I suspect you hold to unknowingly, then a lot of PoF will seem just as you described it, "assuming there can be no universal limits to knowledge" instead of concluding it. Yet PoF also contains the arguments for why correspondence theory of truth is simply untenable and self-defeating for any knowing inquiry.


https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/trut ... spondence/

Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to, or with, a fact—a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (to be specified). This basic idea has been expressed in many ways, giving rise to an extended family of theories and, more often, theory sketches. Members of the family employ various concepts for the relevant relation (correspondence, conformity, congruence, agreement, accordance, copying, picturing, signification, representation, reference, satisfaction) and/or various concepts for the relevant portion of reality (facts, states of affairs, conditions, situations, events, objects, sequences of objects, sets, properties, tropes). The resulting multiplicity of versions and reformulations of the theory is due to a blend of substantive and terminological differences.

The correspondence theory of truth is often associated with metaphysical realism. Its traditional competitors, pragmatist, as well as coherentist, verificationist, and other epistemic theories of truth, are often associated with idealism, anti-realism, or relativism. In recent years, these traditional competitors have been virtually replaced (at least from publication-space) by deflationary theories of truth and, to a lesser extent, by the identity theory (note that these new competitors are typically not associated with anti-realism). Still more recently, two further approaches have received considerable attention. One is truthmaker theory: it is sometimes viewed as a competitor to, sometimes as a more liberal version of, the correspondence theory. The other is pluralism: it incorporates a correspondence account as one, but only one, ingredient of its overall account of truth.

PS - when I use "egoic", "intellect", etc. these are transpersonal critiques of the modern age and central to my argument here and PoF and spiritual science in general. At first, when it's simply a matter of communicating ideas to people, then those considerations can be left out. But when the people involved clearly cannot understand the ideas and, further, cannot understand why they do not understand the ideas, evidenced by months of similar misunderstanings and misrepresentations, then these deeper realities must be addressed. That is why Jungian depth psychology is so critical to consider as well. Once we understand PoF, we see why Self-knowledge, in the most concrete experiential sense of surveying all desires, feelings, antipathies, naively held beliefs, etc., is actually the key to every aspect of our spiritual experience and of our becoming into more consciously integrated and therefore free spiritual be-ings.

[Eugene I]

The pragmatic approach says "what actually exists must be that which is knowable in principle and holds practical significance for our experience of the World Content". It completely rejects the assertion that there can be "actually existing" 'things' which we could never know or experience. Of course this is the natural conclusion of idealism as well if it is consistently applied. Scott mentions this in his essay on "How Idealism Simplifies Metaphysics":

The funny thing is: the Reality as it IS does not care about your approaches to it, it does not care if your pragmatic approach rejects the actually existing things that we can never know. They may still ontologically exist and have nothing to do with any of your epistemological or pragmatic approaches. A parallel universe may perfectly exist not caring even a bit whether your pragmatic approach rejects such existence. And you can not make it disappear or not exist by exercising all of your pragmatic approaches The only thing you can do about it is to have a belief/hypothesis that asserts or rejects the existence of a parallel universe.

[Lou Gold]

Cleric, with all due respect and with my standard caveat that I'm not a philosopher I'd like to make an observation that is seemingly obvious to me. Your very logical voluminous outpourings amount to an act of modeling or representation, which, lead to an obvious and quite predictable conclusion: the model says, "thinking will lead to Thought and rigorous thinking will lead to rigorous Thought." What one gets out of this practice (quite predictably) is a never-ending thought process with endless new levels and representational higher beings. I dunno. It just seems obvious to me.

Sorry Lou, I don't have the energy for this.

I believe I know the feeling.

PS, Cleric,

I really do grok what you are saying and I see your system as a serious spiritual approach along with the particular strengths/weaknesses of any modality. The rub seems that my approach is more eclectic, multi-directional, networked and participative than would seem as compatible with a more monist hierarchical model. Some climb ladders toward celestial heights. Others flow upward and outward with a rising ground of being. I wish happy, healthy, fruitful trails for all.

[AshvinP]

The pragmatic approach says "what actually exists must be that which is knowable in principle and holds practical significance for our experience of the World Content". It completely rejects the assertion that there can be "actually existing" 'things' which we could never know or experience. Of course this is the natural conclusion of idealism as well if it is consistently applied. Scott mentions this in his essay on "How Idealism Simplifies Metaphysics":

The funny thing is: the Reality as it IS does not care about your approaches to it, it does not care if your pragmatic approach rejects the actually existing things that we can never know. They may still ontologically exist and have nothing to do with any of your epistemological or pragmatic approaches. A parallel universe may perfectly exist not caring even a bit whether your pragmatic approach rejects such existence. And you can not make it disappear or not exist by exercising all of your pragmatic approaches

This is what we keep trying to point out to you, Eugene. You are an unconscious materialist-dualist, as in you are not aware that you are one. Only those worldviews can coherently hold to the correspondence theory of truth that you are holding to, evidenced many times by phrases like the one in bold. Coherently as in the CTT does not automatically go against their metaphysical worldview of mind in here and matter out there (but eventually the logic breaks down), like it automatically finds itself at 100% odds with any consistent idealism. This is why we need to be more direct and point you towards the unconscious biases and beliefs you are holding to when you evaluate philosophy and science in general. These are biases purely born of the modern age and it's easy to directly see how they developed in the course of Western history. Cleric and myself have written directly about this history too many times to count.