I do believe that the mind cannot completely know itself, but I distinguish this from the mind being “completely cognized” — which I believe it can be. I think that the mind “knowing” implies the possession of informational properties, and the cognizing of such information. And I don’t think that the mind can cognize information and simultaneously be completely cognized, because the act of cognizing information implies a progression towards epistemological completeness (or at least “epistemological variation”). To attribute something as epistemologically complete and progressing towards epistemological completeness would be a contradiction.When you say Mind "falsely assumes that it 'recreates internally the total perceptual content which exists externally'", are you then implying this is why Mind cannot, in principle, know itself? In other words, Mind tries to recreate the total content within its dissociated boundaries, and convinces itself that it is doing so, but it really isn't and it never can? If so, then we still disagree.
So I would agree that “mind can be completely cognized” but disagree that “mind can completely know itself” because the latter statement implies the act of cognizing information. This disagreement could just be due to a misunderstanding of terminology, but I don’t believe it is.
If perceptual contents arrive from one of either source internal or external to the alter, then doesn’t this imply internal-external dualism? (I understand this assumption is likely wrong given my understanding of other aspects of your framework. But I need a clarification here regardless). Also, I agree that we are co creating the world, but i'm interested in a clarification for how proposition 1; “My view, reflected by Cleric and Goethe in the quoted post, is that one-half of the World's perceptual content arrives to us from within by way of our inner concepts, while the other half arrives from without as [outer] sensory-perceptions.” implies proposition 2; “In the process of knowing we are not simply observing the phenomenal world, but we are co-creating it”.My view, reflected by Cleric and Goethe in the quoted post, is that one-half of the World's perceptual content arrives to us from within by way of our inner concepts, while the other half arrives from without as [outer] sensory-perceptions. In the process of knowing we are not simply observing the phenomenal world, but we are co-creating it. Much of this happens subconsciously by way of inner intuitions and imaginations which arrive together with the sensory-perceptions, but also our normal intellectual reasoning is engaged in this co-creative process as well.
My claim that the mind cannot simultaneously be completely cognized and maintain informational properties does not imply that there is a fundamental limit to what the mind can know of the total world content. My claim does not deny the possibility for the mind to expand its knowledge of the world infinitely. In fact, it offers a potential solution for how this is the case.it should become much more clear why there is no fundamental limit to what (or how) we can know of the total World Content.
Also, you have previously claimed that the mind can be “completely cognized”, which would imply a limit to cognitive knowledge about the world. Is this a mistake, or can you clarify this distinction?
I agree with this general idea, but I think there are some logistics that need to be ironed out. I'm not sure how things can be discerned without some sort of arbitrary division -- it seems to me a necessary implication. As far as I can tell, the mind identifies information as both equal and unequal object identities so it can discern information (unequal object identities) embedded within the same medium (equal object identity). Below is a passage from my excerpt explaining why I think this is the case. You can let me know where you agree or disagree with the logistics:My position is that, in the ancient past, and also in the future, qualtiative discernments of Mind will be distinctions without divisions. The words will retain their meanings without ever being reified into meanings isolated and separate from the holistic meaning of the sentence, paragraphs, etc. they are embedded within. Again, this is all very hard to imagine from the perspective of abstract intellect, whose entire purpose (until recently) has been to reify distinctions into divisions (and that serves an integral purpose in my overall framework), but such mere intellect is really a momentary blip on the vast 'timescale' of the Cosmos.
Information is a term which has acquired various meanings in philosophy and science. However, what this theory has made certain is that information is conceived of by mind, and therefore must have intelligible properties. Furthermore, information is only intelligible when contextualized through relation. A relationship is only established when levels of similarity and difference between multiple phenomenal states are specified. Differentiating between multiple phenomenal states requires some level of sameness to specify how different they are, while relating multiple phenomenal states requires some level of difference to specify how similar they are. As such, information is intelligible only when the mind is able to attribute it as both equal (principle 1) and unequal (principle 2) respectively.