Criticism

[Eugene I]

So you think BK is adopting naive realism and subject-object dualism of abstract metaphysical idealist formulation for the sake of convenience of communication with others?

I don't believe he is adopting naive realism at all. Regarding subject-object, he's been very unclear on that, I'm not sure what's his take on it. Regarding metaphysics, he often speak in the metaphysical language, I believe for the sake of convenience of communication, but in many places clarified his phenomenological approach. Here is a definition of "Mind" that he gave in one of his blogs: "I use the term 'mind' in a very broad sense, not necessarily implying cognition, but just raw (potential for) experience" (meaning conscious experience of course). In one video he said that all that exists within the universe of Mind are only conscious experiences (=conscious phenomena) (I don't remember the exact wording but I believe I captured the meaning).

The problem is that we use a common language that has historically developed within the common paradigm of naive realism and subject-object dualism. Every sentence in our language follows the subject–verb–object structure. We don't have a special language to use for discussing anything beyond such paradigm. So, when for example BK says "a chair", what he means is ideations of a "chair" (=conscious phenomena) in MAL that excite corresponding sense perceptions of a "chair" (=conscious phenomena) in human minds. But his listeners, following habitual cognitive patterns of naive realism and subject-object dualism, will more often interpret it as if he is talking about an object of a "chair" existing in the "external world out there" (=abstraction) perceived by a subject "me" (another abstraction). Same situation happens when he talks about the MAL itself. This is inevitable, but at least it's a step on the path towards disentanglement from the patterns of naive realism and subject-object dualism, which usually takes a long time because there are so many layers of cognitive distorted dualistic perception/interpretation of reality do disentangle from.

[Soul_of_Shu]

I don't believe he is adopting naive realism at all. Regarding subject-object, he's been very unclear on that, I'm not sure what's his take on it.

So what do you make of my take on his take, as per my preceding reply/comment to Ashvin?

[Eugene I]

So what do you make of my take on his take, as per my preceding reply/comment to Ashvin?

Yes, I just saw it. I think he is right, but I think there is more going on here. This is a big topic. Essentially, once the so-called "dissociation" happens, the idea of a "perceiver" is adopted in the minds of alters (usually in early childhood) driven by human instinctual will for self-identification. This idea is so basic, common and essential for human survival that it became deeply carved in the human collective unconscious and genetics. It is planted so deeply in our mind structures that it became virtually unconscious for most of us and feels more like a intuitive "sense" of "me-the-perceiver", and we do not usually realize that it is essentially only a thought-form, an abstraction. It is very persistent and accompanies every our act (I do), perception (I perceive), feeling (I feel) and thought (I think), so that we get fooled by its continuous presence, take it as something eternally existing and self-identify with it. It basically becomes our unconscious religious belief. Needless to say, the "me" idea is also the origin of most of our individual psychological suffering and sense of isolation from the world and of the struggle with it, and the center around which all our egoic motivations revolve. Historically it helped humanoids to survive (a humanoid without the sense of "me" would die pretty quickly), but as humans developed, it became much more of a problem.

If we would be able to deidentify from this though-form for a moment, we would find that actually every conscious phenomenon appears (spontaneously of willingly) in our field of experience and then disappears, and while it is present, it is simply experienced, perceived, with the actual "perceiver" nowhere to be found. But simultaneously there is a though-feeling-form "I perceive this (object, thought, feeling...)" habitually accompanying the presence and experiencing of each phenomenon. In a way, it's an interpretational cognitive layer that filters the flow of our conscious phenomena and "redirects" it toward the imagined "perceiver". As a result, the intimate unity of the phenomenon and its perception/experiencing is conceptually divided into a pair of "me-the-perceiver" and "the thing that is perceived", creating the imaginary subject-object split. But in reality, the sense of "me-the-perceiver" is simply another conscious though-form phenomenon that is also intimately experienced while it is present. So, if someone is up to the work to dispel this imaginary split, the only thing they need to do is just to recognize the "me-perceiver" as simply another conscious phenomenon that appears and is being experienced within the flow of conscious phenomena. Once that happens, every conscious phenomenon becomes experienced without the subject-object split, but directly as it is - as a unity of the phenomenon and its direct experiencing. Once so dispelled and once it becomes not actively needed/involved in the functioning of consciousness, over time the "me"-though-form loses its momentum and disintegrates, but usually it takes a long time due its deep roots in our mind structures.

But, as a disclaimer, this deidentification practice is very radical and does not work for everyone. More often people adopt more gradual deidentification by shifting their identification from the "little human me" to the higher-Self or the cosmic-I associated with higher levels of global consciousness. This also practically works and has been adopted in many spiritual traditions, but in such practice the self-identification mind structure does not completely go away and so a subtle imaginary split between the perceiver (I) and the perceived (phenomena) still remains.

[Soul_of_Shu]

Yes, I just saw it. I think he is right, but I think there is more going on here...

To be sure, M@L in human alter-mode does seem to have become an identity-addict, and as with all addictions, it's prone to becoming extremely problematic and difficult to overcome. Here the challenge is now not to become identified as being someOne identity-free

[AshvinP]

So you think BK is adopting naive realism and subject-object dualism of abstract metaphysical idealist formulation for the sake of convenience of communication with others?

I don't believe he is adopting naive realism at all. Regarding subject-object, he's been very unclear on that, I'm not sure what's his take on it. Regarding metaphysics, he often speak in the metaphysical language, I believe for the sake of convenience of communication, but in many places clarified his phenomenological approach. Here is a definition of "Mind" that he gave in one of his blogs: "I use the term 'mind' in a very broad sense, not necessarily implying cognition, but just raw (potential for) experience" (meaning conscious experience of course). In one video he said that all that exists within the universe of Mind are only conscious experiences (=conscious phenomena) (I don't remember the exact wording but I believe I captured the meaning).

The problem is that we use a common language that has historically developed within the common paradigm of naive realism and subject-object dualism. Every sentence in our language follows the subject–verb–object structure. We don't have a special language to use for discussing anything beyond such paradigm. So, when for example BK says "a chair", what he means is ideations of a "chair" (=conscious phenomena) in MAL that excite corresponding sense perceptions of a "chair" (=conscious phenomena) in human minds. But his listeners, following habitual cognitive patterns of naive realism and subject-object dualism, will more often interpret it as if he is talking about an object of a "chair" existing in the "external world out there" (=abstraction) perceived by a subject "me" (another abstraction). Same situation happens when he talks about the MAL itself. This is inevitable, but at least it's a step on the path towards disentanglement from the patterns of naive realism and subject-object dualism, which usually takes a long time because there are so many layers of cognitive distorted dualistic perception/interpretation of reality do disentangle from.

What you write above is not the phenomenological approach at all. Defining mind as some vague "raw experience" which actually is nowhere to be found in our real concrete experience, is pure abstract metaphysics of the sort JW and myself are critiquing. Furthermore, the 2nd paragraph above is a description of pure naive realism and dualism - the phenomenal "chair" in "human minds" corresponds to the "ideation of a chair" in MAL. That is precisely what I am calling naive realism and implicit dualism and claiming leads to all manner of flawed conclusions from epistemology to ethics to aesthetics and so forth.

This is what I have been saying to you... BK and you hold to a view which adopts naive realism and implicit dualism, but neither of you realize it. When I try to point this out to you in my comments, it's as if you block out all of my explanations and just respond, "no, I don't hold to those things... here's why", and then proceed to write a comment which illustrates exactly what I am claiming you and BK hold to. It's a really bizarre bordering surreal phenomenon which occurs. Until we honestly confront this tendency within ourselves, and the inner motivations which lead to it, we will keep thinking in this way and reaching unsound conclusions without ever realizing that we made a wrong turn at the outset.

[AshvinP]

So you think BK is adopting naive realism and subject-object dualism of abstract metaphysical idealist formulation for the sake of convenience of communication with others?

I now seem to recall that in a recent interview BK said something to the effect (paraphrasing) that his take on the relational subject><object dynamic, born of so-called dissociation into M@L as conceiver of archetypal ideation vis-a-vis M@L as alter-mode perceiver of the corresponding percepts, is not as some dichotomous duality, irreconcilably set apart one from the other, but rather more of an ever-evolving feedback-loop polarity. Which would seem to be in accord with Scott's take on the formlessness><form polarity, with the subjective ipseity being the formless pole, and the objective percept being to form aspect. But I may be misrepresenting this here. Any edification is welcome.

Well I would be interested to hear that interview clip, because at least that formulation seems to overcome the implicit dualism in all of his other formulations. But the real question, as mentioned before, is how are these abstract concepts actually functioning in the rest of his philosophy, especially his epistemology. If the polarity formulation remains purely abstract, then I doubt it makes any significant difference on the rest of his philosophy. I would like nothing more than to hear BK change course on that and take the implications seriously throughout the rest of his philosophy, but that clearly has not occurred yet.

[AshvinP]

So you think BK is adopting naive realism and subject-object dualism of abstract metaphysical idealist formulation for the sake of convenience of communication with others?

I don't believe he is adopting naive realism at all. Regarding subject-object, he's been very unclear on that, I'm not sure what's his take on it. Regarding metaphysics, he often speak in the metaphysical language, I believe for the sake of convenience of communication, but in many places clarified his phenomenological approach. Here is a definition of "Mind" that he gave in one of his blogs: "I use the term 'mind' in a very broad sense, not necessarily implying cognition, but just raw (potential for) experience" (meaning conscious experience of course). In one video he said that all that exists within the universe of Mind are only conscious experiences (=conscious phenomena) (I don't remember the exact wording but I believe I captured the meaning).

The problem is that we use a common language that has historically developed within the common paradigm of naive realism and subject-object dualism. Every sentence in our language follows the subject–verb–object structure. We don't have a special language to use for discussing anything beyond such paradigm. So, when for example BK says "a chair", what he means is ideations of a "chair" (=conscious phenomena) in MAL that excite corresponding sense perceptions of a "chair" (=conscious phenomena) in human minds. But his listeners, following habitual cognitive patterns of naive realism and subject-object dualism, will more often interpret it as if he is talking about an object of a "chair" existing in the "external world out there" (=abstraction) perceived by a subject "me" (another abstraction). Same situation happens when he talks about the MAL itself. This is inevitable, but at least it's a step on the path towards disentanglement from the patterns of naive realism and subject-object dualism, which usually takes a long time because there are so many layers of cognitive distorted dualistic perception/interpretation of reality do disentangle from.

What you write above is not the phenomenological approach at all. Defining mind as some vague "raw experience" which actually is nowhere to be found in our real concrete experience, is pure abstract metaphysics of the sort JW and myself are critiquing. Furthermore, the 2nd paragraph above is a description of pure naive realism and dualism - the phenomenal "chair" in "human minds" corresponds to the "ideation of a chair" in MAL. That is precisely what I am calling naive realism and implicit dualism and claiming leads to all manner of flawed conclusions from epistemology to ethics to aesthetics and so forth.

This is what I have been saying to you... BK and you hold to a view which adopts naive realism and implicit dualism, but neither of you realize it. When I try to point this out to you in my comments, it's as if you block out all of my explanations and just respond, "no, I don't hold to those things... here's why", and then proceed to write a comment which illustrates exactly what I am claiming you and BK hold to. It's a really bizarre bordering surreal phenomenon which occurs. Until we honestly confront this tendency within ourselves, and the inner motivations which lead to it, we will keep thinking in this way and reaching unsound conclusions without ever realizing that we made a wrong turn at the outset.

I see Cleric posted a comment on another thread which captures what I am saying above as well:

"The problem lies in the cognitive patterns which are outside the thinker's consciousness. The thinker looks the facts straight into the face yet in the next moment, just like a broken record, with scratchy sound he snaps back to the semi-automatic thinking process."

(so it's not literally "bizarre and surreal", at least not after my own reflection, because we know exactly why this happens)

[Soul_of_Shu]

Well I would be interested to hear that interview clip, because at least that formulation seems to overcome the implicit dualism in all of his other formulations.

The thing is that all these interviews tend to blur into each other, some being exceedingly long, so keeping track of, and pinpointing specific passages is not what I'm inclined to do. And other than in such interviews, or now in some online course where presumably some Q&A is indulged, there's no immediate way to parse out and clarify any nuanced elaboration with him. Might have to move to the Netherlands and start stalking him

[ScottRoberts]

No, we wouldn’t need to show that, just that energy is a necessary condition for consciousness, which shows energy to be more fundamental. There can be energy with no consciousness, but no consciousness without energy.

How is this not a metaphysical claim, given that there is the possibility that all energy is conscious energy? A theist, for example, might claim that electricity is a form of God's conscious way of making things happen. Put another way, how would you demonstrate that there is energy outside of consciousness, other than through metaphysical argument?

[JeffreyW]

No, we wouldn’t need to show that, just that energy is a necessary condition for consciousness, which shows energy to be more fundamental. There can be energy with no consciousness, but no consciousness without energy.

How is this not a metaphysical claim, given that there is the possibility that all energy is conscious energy? A theist, for example, might claim that electricity is a form of God's conscious way of making things happen. Put another way, how would you demonstrate that there is energy outside of consciousness, other than through metaphysical argument?

Let’s once again clarify metaphysics, which is speculation transcending experience of what is presented in the physical world, and bounded only by what seems possible. A theist’s speculation of the consciousness of God is clearly transcendent possibility, but nothing encountered in experience of what is present before us in the physical world. The same would hold for any sort of consciousness outside of certain living beings as mere speculation of what might be possible. Non-metaphysical thought holds fast to what is experienced in the physical world. In our experience we encounter energy with no signs of consciousness, and we experience consciousness which is grounded in energy. That in itself reveals consciousness to be reducible to energy, and thus physical.

Kastrup sometimes gets himself into trouble due his insistence on metaphysical speculations while resorting to physical empiricism when cornered. His resorting to ATP to deny the possibility of consciousness in computers is a glaring example of this, which completely undermined his metaphysics. He resorted to our empirical experience of energy with no consciousness to maintain his argument.

Put another way, I avoid metaphysical speculation by referring to the infinite appearances of energy with no apparent signs of consciousness and the only appearances of consciousness arising from the energy dispersal of ATP. In other words, I appropriate Kastrup’s own argument.