Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

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Eugene I
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

Post by Eugene I »

Martin_ wrote: Fri Nov 19, 2021 7:23 pm Yeh, i know tha image. it's good. But i've always seen it as an ontological claim, not a phenomenal.

I don' tknow how you can go from the defenition of phenomenology that you and Eugene have agreed upon, and then conclude axiomatically, that that means that there is only one phenomenon. (no duality). How does this arise axiomatically, whthout "careful reasoning" out of the definiution of phenomenology. and, ok, say that it does, then you have to be VERY careful to constrain yourself and never claim that this unity is real. That would be an ontological statement. This, btw, i think is one of my main gripes with Steiner, i realize now. That - in my opinion - he mashes phenomenology and ontology into one with no rigor at all.
I'm on the same page with you, Martin, that's exactly what Steiner does, he is lacking a rigorous discipline in his presentation and smuggling too many unwarranted assumptions.

And saying this again and again, I have no problem with assumptions, as I said, we necessarily need them to move ahead from solipsism. But we always need to state them explicitly rather then smuggle them implicitly, so that people can decide whether they agree with these assumptions or not before accepting the whole philosophical package.
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

Post by findingblanks »

Thanks, Eugene. That helped a little. But looking back on your claim:

""Look at a chair in your room and reflect on the actual sensory phenomena in your 1-st person experience related to it. You will first notice the soup of colors and shapes of the whole visual experience of the room. Then you will notice a thought-image phenomenon that selects certain shapes and colors adjacent to each other spatially and interprets this collection of colors and shapes as a certain distinctive "object"."

I just think this phenomenology is way off, smuggling in lots of unjustified assumptions and treating the event as if you really have this 'first' and then this 'then' experience.

But maybe if you tell me more about this 'soup' experience. And I'd really be interested in the phenomenology of your 'selecting' comment. Whenever I come across philosophers or phenomenologists who insist on a core kind of 'selecting' that shapes our experience, I'm dubious. Steiner started to shift his language around 'selecting' later in life as he strove to better capture certain core aspects of experiencing. But he was never satisfied with having found a good way to describe it.

But I think a careful observation shows that there simply is no need to insert a notion or metaphor like "select" in the context of describing how experience presents itself, unfolds, metamorephosis.
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

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Martin_ wrote: Fri Nov 19, 2021 7:23 pm
AshvinP wrote: Fri Nov 19, 2021 5:14 pm
Martin_ wrote: Fri Nov 19, 2021 4:28 pm Ashvin, do you also agree with the following hypothetical exchange:

No because I reject the assumption of two separate "spaces" of meaning which just happen to "overlap" in certain instances. A phenomenological approach makes no such assumption and therefore we are dealing with a unified 'space' of experience in which there exists varying peripheral spatiotemporal perspectives perceving the same ideal content, loosely illustrated by the image below.
Yeh, i know tha image. it's good. But i've always seen it as an ontological claim, not a phenomenal.

I don' tknow how you can go from the defenition of phenomenology that you and Eugene have agreed upon, and then conclude axiomatically, that that means that there is only one phenomenon. (no duality). How does this arise axiomatically, whthout "careful reasoning" out of the definiution of phenomenology. and, ok, say that it does, then you have to be VERY careful to constrain yourself and never claim that this unity is real. That would be an ontological statement. This, btw, i think is one of my main gripes with Steiner, i realize now. That - in my opinion - he mashes phenomenology and ontology into one with no rigor at all.

I think what the PoF is suffering from trying to be too many things at once; it's using both Analytical Thinking, and Imaginative Thinking at the same time. It doesn't really work for me. It makes me confused about "What does he (Steiner) actually mean?". I'm just not wired the right way.


By the way. I have NO problem with a worldview aka. Steiner. I just can't follow his (and yours sometimes as well) trail of thought.

What's being misunderstood here is that I am not intending anyone to assume the image is true in a phenomenological inquiry. I am just using various methods of trying to help you guys imagine a scenario in which we are perceiving shared ideal content i.e. there is no explicit dualism from the outset. The reason is because people in the modern age keep getting stuck there, because they simply cannot even imagine a different scenario than atomized beings with their own private mental experiences. That is why every formulation Eugene writes is different formulations of that same dualist scenario. The best way to avoid that is to speak about 1st-person experiene and that's all - if you need to imagine a single human being in existence in order to do that, then that should be done.
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Eugene I
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

Post by Eugene I »

AshvinP wrote: Fri Nov 19, 2021 8:24 pm That is why every formulation Eugene writes is different formulations of that same dualist scenario. The best way to avoid that is to speak about 1st-person experiene and that's all - if you need to imagine a single human being in existence in order to do that, then that should be done.
I can show in a different post (I'll write it later) how the dualism can be avoided in a different formulation (according to non-dualist traditions). But I say right away that it does require making certain assumptions that I will state explicitly.

But note that so far I have not suggested any formulations yet (forget about the BK's DID formulation and "fragmented fields of experience" for now). In my above posts I only stated the bare facts of the 1-st person phenomenal experience and asked you: how exactly do you arrive from these facts to the formulation of a shared ideal content without making any assumptions at all?

Now, back to your point:
- Let's for now only speak about 1-st person experience as you suggested, which for me is my own 1-st person experience. Now the question right away is: how do I even know that any other 1-st person experiences exist at all? How would I prove that to myself? If I do not make such assumption that other 1-st person experiences exist, then, as you say: " you need to imagine a single human being in existence in order to do that, then that should be done." OK, ta-da! we arrived at a single person solipsism a-la Hume. Are you suggesting that? I don't think people are going to like it honestly :)
- If you are suggesting single-person solipsism, then what does the "shared ideal content" even mean? Shared with whom?
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

Post by Cleric K »

Eugene I wrote: Fri Nov 19, 2021 6:19 pm I'm going back to the same questions that I posted above, specifically:
How exactly, form the bare facts of your 1-st person phenomenal experience and without making any assumptions, you arrived at the statement that we all experience a shared ideal content?

My claim is that you can not arrive at such statement without any assumptions. In fact, as Hume showed long ago, if we only consider the base phenomenal single-person 1-st person experience and do not make any assumptions at all, we will get stuck at the extreme agnosticism/skepticism and single-person solipsism. We necessarily need to make certain unprovable assumptions to move from that dead end point. But the point is - we need to clearly and explicitly state which assumptions exactly we make. If you want to make an assumption of the shared ideal content - that's fine, I may even agree with you, but you need to explicitly admit that you are making such assumption.
There's no need to make an assumption. We are not forced by anything to make that assumption except by our worldly desire to have an opinion on a given topic. The question is not whether every one experiences individual conscious perspectives of reality. We can easily conclude that this is the case.

So we should understand what shared content really means. My feeling is that confusion arises because it is not well understood what is meant by this.

Let's consider RS's words:
One must distinguish between experiencing one's own world of sensation, and looking at that of another person. Every man of course can look into his own world of sensation; only the seer with the opened “spiritual eye” can see another person's world of sensation. Unless a man be a seer, he knows the world of sensation only as an “inner” one, only as the peculiar hidden experiences of his own soul; with the opened “spiritual eye” there shines out before the outward-turned spiritual gaze what otherwise lives only in the inner being of another person.

In order to prevent misunderstanding, it may be expressly stated here that the seer does not simply experience in himself what the other being has within him as content of his world of sensation. That being experiences the sensations in question from the point of view of his own inner being; the seer becomes aware of a manifestation of the world of sensation.

https://wn.rsarchive.org/Books/GA009/En ... c01_4.html

The second paragraph says it directly. The seer doesn't see the unique perspective of the person, he sees the manifestation of the sensations of that person. So we should be clear that all perspectives are unique but this doesn't mean that thoughts, feelings, sensations can't be perceived by another being (obviously from another perspective).

So the question shifts to: are the thoughts that the seer perceives the same as the ones that the person thinks. It depends on what we mean by 'the same'. If we ask if the experiences of the thoughts are the same in absolute sense, the above quote already answers - no, they are not. They are the same in the same sense as when we look at the same table and realize that it is in fact the same table - it's just that we experience it from different perspectives. Everything will be much more easier to understand if we realize that each one of us has clairvoyant consciousness but ordinarily only in a small domain that we designate as physical body. The key that unlocks this mystery is to understand that our thoughts and feelings exist as real processes within a shared world, in the same way we agree that our will operates within a shared physical world. So let's be clear: shared contents means something that we can have relative perspective of. This completely fits Rovelli's view. We're not speaking of objective world-in-itself out there but of reality which justifies us to speak, for example, about the same table.

The only reason we don't normally speak of same thoughts, feelings, sensations, is because our ordinary consciousness seems to be finely tuned to perceive only those within the physical, etheric and astral bodies that the "I" recognizes as its current metamorphic view. Obviously no one can prove this formally but we should be at least open to the possibility that when the "I" learns to loosen the links between the bodies, it is capable of experiencing thoughts and feelings that are to be found in the etheric and astral environment in the same way we can encounter the effects of the will of others in the sensory spectrum. We should understand that we're always seeing in the astral and etheric world but we're doing so in a quite limited aperture within a physical body. From the etheric world we perceive only those sensations and thoughts that resonate with the processes in the body. So it is for the astral (soul) world from which we feel only those desires that are sucked in by the body, similarly to the way a sponge absorbs water. If we understand this, many mysteries will be lifted.

When the "I" learns to extend its etheric and astral perimeter it can experience thoughts and feelings that lie in the general etheric and astral world in the same way it feels those that are in the vicinity of the physical body. If another "I" extends over the same parts of the etheric and astral world as our "I", this doesn't mean that it will have the same perspective as ours. So you see, the real challenge here is to overcome the uneasy feeling that makes us imagine our thoughts and feelings to be something that has existence only in our completely personal world and that only the senses and the will live in a shared environment. Even physical science shows that our thoughts and feelings have objective extension in the shared physical world where our brain and blood are to be found. From this point on, it is really only a prejudice of our times that what we experience as thoughts and feelings from our "I" perspective, doesn't have existence in shared layers of reality which can be known also from other relative perspectives.

So it all boils down to our ability to see our thoughts and desires as lawful part of the world, just like we see our will and sensations as belonging to that world. The only reason that people are reluctant to see things in this way is because through the influence of materialism they have learned to feel carefree about what they think and feel, because they assume it doesn't matter. As long as a person feels shame or something similar about his thoughts and desires, he'll feel obliged to imagine them as existing in a completely opaque world inaccessible by any other being. This is why all genuine spiritual traditions have always turned attention to purity. This is today laughed at by modern people. They see it as just another arbitrary rule that the elders have placed upon people in order to make their life more difficult. Well, purity has nothing to do with arbitrary rules. It is really something which everyone can feel for themselves. It's enough to imagine that the dead can see in the souls of the living. How does this makes us feel? Is there anything we want to hide, that we're afraid can be seen? It's not the point to be afraid that the dead will judge us. They won't, they have other tasks on their hands. The question is that as long as we feel that we need to imagine the boundaries of consciousness to be sealed, we can't really make any progress in higher development. The reason is simple: even the most rudimentary glimpses in the higher realms reveal that thoughts and feelings exist in shared realms, just like sensations and will exist in relation to the shared physical world. These are really like spectrum bands of the same one reality. It's only a materialistic belief, which imagines that we have common ground in the world of will but thoughts and feelings are only personal protrusions on top of that shared world.
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

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Eugene I wrote: Fri Nov 19, 2021 8:42 pm Now, back to your point:
- Let's for now only speak about 1-st person experience as you suggested, which for me is my own 1-st person experience. Now the question right away is: how do I even know that any other 1-st person experiences exist at all? How would I prove that to myself? If I do not make such assumption that other 1-st person experiences exist, then, as you say: " you need to imagine a single human being in existence in order to do that, then that should be done." OK, ta-da! we arrived at a single person solipsism a-la Hume. Are you suggesting that? I don't think people are going to like it honestly :)
- If you are suggesting single-person solipsism, then what does the "shared ideal content" even mean? Shared with whom?

Eugene,

In addition to what Cleric wrote...

I think you are so used to metaphysics which starts with conclusions that you assume every other approach must be doing the same thing. The entire field of phenomenology (and pragmatism) arose to get away from that approach. What does it mean that we can only derive knowledge from 1st-person experience, which is what Hume and Kant and many others concluded (but Kant forgot his conclusion a few pages after concluding it), and which you seem to agree with? It means we must start with "solipsism", if you insist on calling it that, IF we want to engage a genuinely phenomenological inquiry. If you want to go back to metaphysics or analytic idealism and start with conclusions, then you should rename this thread.

Especially in our age, anyone can see the flaw with assuming there are other human beings (or non-humans) with space of private conscious experiences and then reasoning from that assumption. A good programmer can design a virtual reality simulation where there are only AI bots and convince the single human participating that those are other humans plugged into the same VR system. This relates to the Turing test Cleric wrote about on the other thread. Once again, I must reiterate this is not my conclusion - I am not concluding each person lives in a simulation with bots. I am pointing out the inherent flawed reasoning that occurs when assuming anything otherwise from the outset. The alternative is to loosely hold to something like what Cleric shared above, but I imagine that is even more difficult for people today to begin with.

This is also why you and Martin are so confused about what Steiner is doing. You just have not been exposed to phenomenology before so you don't know what it looks like. Read through Hegel's PoS, or Husserl's many writings, or Steiner's PoF, or Heidegger (he's not easy to start with), or even Bergson, and you will be more familiar with what it looks like. Although Cleric has also taken this approach in many of his essays or posts, in even more clear and straightforward terms, so I am not sure how much of a difference it will make. But the first step comes with knowing what you don't know; understanding that you don't understand all of these things yet. Then your mindset will at least be open enough to explore from a different perspective than what you are used to.
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

Post by Eugene I »

Cleric K wrote: Fri Nov 19, 2021 10:23 pm The second paragraph says it directly. The seer doesn't see the unique perspective of the person, he sees the manifestation of the sensations of that person. So we should be clear that all perspectives are unique but this doesn't mean that thoughts, feelings, sensations can't be perceived by another being (obviously from another perspective).
Aha, precisely! It is still a mystery here: as you and RS said - every shared meaning is still experienced from the unique perspectives of different beings. If Consciousness/Thinking is one, why is there a multiplicity of being's perspectives? How is that possible? If we are sharing the same meanings on one end (of what is experienced), and the same "I" on the other end (of the "experiencer"), then why the perspectives and concrete experiences are still multiple and different? This is what BK calls "dissociation" and, according to RS, it still exists even in the transcorporeal states and it is still the case even with higher order beings. So, how is the BK view still "dualistic", and RS's view is not? What makes the RS view non-dualistic (compared to BK's) - is it the shared ideal content? But why if the perspectives are still unique and different?
So the question shifts to: are the thoughts that the seer perceives the same as the ones that the person thinks. It depends on what we mean by 'the same'. If we ask if the experiences of the thoughts are the same in absolute sense, the above quote already answers - no, they are not. They are the same in the same sense as when we look at the same table and realize that it is in fact the same table - it's just that we experience it from different perspectives. Everything will be much more easier to understand if we realize that each one of us has clairvoyant consciousness but ordinarily only in a small domain that we designate as physical body. The key that unlocks this mystery is to understand that our thoughts and feelings exist as real processes within a shared world, in the same way we agree that our will operates within a shared physical world. So let's be clear: shared contents means something that we can have relative perspective of. This completely fits Rovelli's view. We're not speaking of objective world-in-itself out there but of reality which justifies us to speak, for example, about the same table.
Yes, Cleric, I hear you. You are presenting here an "esoteric" view on this subject, which is great. I agree that it is sensible to adopt such perspective. But in this thread we are trying to take analytical approach and understand exactly what are the bare facts of our (perhaps very reduced) direct phenomenal experience as it is presented to us in our human state, and what exactly are the assumptions we need to adopt to arrive at the view that you or other idealists propose. In this way we can better understand at which point the assumptions of, for example, RS and BK' or other philosophical positions, diverge.

The problem is that in our current reduced-perspective state of our phenomenal experience we do not have that expanded perception of higher orders that you are talking about. We can not 100% confirm them with our current limited experience. I can intuit that the meanings that I experience might be shared telepathically with other being perspectives. I actually myself experience once in a while knowing thoughts of my family members before they say them, but I'm still not sure if I experience that thought exactly as another person experiences it, or only as some informational and somewhat distorted "copy" of it. So, we can still adopt the views (about the shared content etc), but at our human state we can only do it by adopting certain beliefs and assumptions. And so the rest of the vision that you present with higher order beings and so on - we can only adopt it by taking certain assumptions and beliefs as most of us do not have such direct experiences and clairvoyant abilities. Surely these beliefs will not be needed anymore when we develop our higher-cognition abilities or in the transcorporeal state, but for now we have to deal with what we have.
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

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AshvinP wrote: Fri Nov 19, 2021 11:24 pm Eugene,

In addition to what Cleric wrote...

I think you are so used to metaphysics which starts with conclusions that you assume every other approach must be doing the same thing. The entire field of phenomenology (and pragmatism) arose to get away from that approach. What does it mean that we can only derive knowledge from 1st-person experience, which is what Hume and Kant and many others concluded (but Kant forgot his conclusion a few pages after concluding it), and which you seem to agree with? It means we must start with "solipsism", if you insist on calling it that, IF we want to engage a genuinely phenomenological inquiry. If you want to go back to metaphysics or analytic idealism and start with conclusions, then you should rename this thread.

Especially in our age, anyone can see the flaw with assuming there are other human beings (or non-humans) with space of private conscious experiences and then reasoning from that assumption. A good programmer can design a virtual reality simulation where there are only AI bots and convince the single human participating that those are other humans plugged into the same VR system. This relates to the Turing test Cleric wrote about on the other thread. Once again, I must reiterate this is not my conclusion - I am not concluding each person lives in a simulation with bots. I am pointing out the inherent flawed reasoning that occurs when assuming anything otherwise from the outset. The alternative is to loosely hold to something like what Cleric shared above, but I imagine that is even more difficult for people today to begin with.

This is also why you and Martin are so confused about what Steiner is doing. You just have not been exposed to phenomenology before so you don't know what it looks like. Read through Hegel's PoS, or Husserl's many writings, or Steiner's PoF, or Heidegger (he's not easy to start with), or even Bergson, and you will be more familiar with what it looks like. Although Cleric has also taken this approach in many of his essays or posts, in even more clear and straightforward terms, so I am not sure how much of a difference it will make. But the first step comes with knowing what you don't know; understanding that you don't understand all of these things yet. Then your mindset will at least be open enough to explore from a different perspective than what you are used to.
Ashvin, I'm very flexible guy and even ok with solipsism. But still two questions here:
- I'm open to adopt any views. The only question I keep asking is: what exactly are the assumptions that I need to adopt to arrive from the purely 1-st person bare phenomenological experience that I have right now and described above in this thread to the view of the shared ideal content? You keep avoiding the answer. I'm just saying that I'm not comfortable with smuggled unwarranted assumptions. Just tell me the assumptions and I will consider, I'm very open to the view of the shared ideal content and currently intensely thinking about it.
- You and Cleric/RS seem to say different things here. "Cleric K wrote: The second paragraph says it directly. The seer doesn't see the unique perspective of the person, he sees the manifestation of the sensations of that person. So we should be clear that all perspectives are unique but this doesn't mean that thoughts, feelings, sensations can't be perceived by another being (obviously from another perspective)." And you are saying "anyone can see the flaw with assuming there are other human beings (or non-humans) with space of private conscious experiences". Am I getting something wrong here?
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

Post by Eugene I »

But anyway, think I'm roughly getting it. Under idealism all there is is Cosnciousness/Thinking activity with its phenomenal content. Now, we know from our 1-st-p. experience that we can will and manifest thoughts with meanings, But the sense perceptions seem to arrive to us without the control of our will. Where do they come from? If there is no matter and all is consciousness, then somehow they need to come from other conscious activity that we are directly unaware of. But what can be that activity that manifests the sense perceptions? It must be thinking with meanings (what else could it be)? So, some thinking activity of some other large-scale being or beings (call it Divine or MAL or Christ Consciousness) manifests on us their ideations/meanings that are experienced by us as sense perceptions. So, essentially, all phenomenal experiences are meanings/ideas or their manifestations, but some of them are just disguised as sense perceptions in our phenomenal experiences. Interesting that BK is essentially saying the same thing - our sense perceptions are what MAL ideations look like from our perspectives. But the thing is: this is still a metaphysical view, this is based on the assumption that our sense perceptions are indeed the manifestations of other being or beings ideas. We cannot confirm that directly from our current 1-st person perspective phenomenal experience. This is very reasonable assumption to take and I have no problem with it, the logic is reasonable, but it is still an assumption.
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

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Eugene I wrote: Sat Nov 20, 2021 12:06 am Ashvin, I'm very flexible guy and even ok with solipsism. But still two questions here:
- I'm open to adopt any views. The only question I keep asking is: what exactly are the assumptions that I need to adopt to arrive from the purely 1-st person bare phenomenological experience that I have right now and described above in this thread to the view of the shared ideal content? You keep avoiding the answer. I'm just saying that I'm not comfortable with smuggled unwarranted assumptions. Just tell me the assumptions and I will consider, I'm very open to the view of the shared ideal content and currently intensely thinking about it.

This is what I am telling you that Steiner has done in about 150 pages of PoF. So you can't just expect me to list it all out in one or two comments. That is why I was trying to go methodically through the reasoning of perceptions and cognitions as they manifest in our 1st-person experience. You and Martin criticized Steiner for those two passages but did not specify exactly what he wrote that you are taking issue with. I am pasting the table of contents to PoF below for anyone who wants to get a sense of the broad outline he works his way through.

https://wn.rsarchive.org/Books/GA004/En ... index.html
KNOWLEDGE OF FREEDOM

Chapter One Conscious Human Action
Chapter Two The Fundamental Desire for Knowledge
Chapter Three Thinking in the Service of Knowledge
Chapter Four The World as Percept
Chapter Five The Act of Knowing the World
Chapter Six Human Individuality
Chapter Seven Are There Limits to Knowledge?

THE REALITY OF FREEDOM

Chapter Eight The Factors of Life
Chapter Nine The Idea of Freedom
Chapter Ten Freedom — Philosophy and Monism
Chapter Eleven World Purpose and Life Purpose
Chapter Twelve Moral Imagination
Chapter Thirteen The Value of Life
Chapter Fourteen Individuality and Genus

ULTIMATE QUESTIONS

The Consequences of Monism
Eugene wrote:- You and Cleric/RS seem to say different things here. "Cleric K wrote: The second paragraph says it directly. The seer doesn't see the unique perspective of the person, he sees the manifestation of the sensations of that person. So we should be clear that all perspectives are unique but this doesn't mean that thoughts, feelings, sensations can't be perceived by another being (obviously from another perspective)." And you are saying "anyone can see the flaw with assuming there are other human beings (or non-humans) with space of private conscious experiences". Am I getting something wrong here?

There is no tension here.

First, Cleric was illustrating why the "shared ideal content" is not how most people envision it, i.e. a complete merging of perspectives into each other. Rather, it is more helpful to think of it like the physical world we all exist in and move around in and interact in - there aren't physical objects dedicated for your viewing over here, for me over there, etc., but objects we can all potentially view from varying spatiotemporal angles. So why should the ideal (spiritual) world 'underlying' it be any different? He explained the reasons why we would rather treat our ideal worlds as completely insulated from one another, and I don't think there is any denying the power of those reasons.

"And the eyes of both of them were opened, and they knew that they were naked; so they sewed together fig leaves and made coverings for themselves... and they hid themselves from the presence of the LORD God among the trees of the garden."

Second, I don't think Cleric was asking anyone to simply assume that there are "seers" out there who can perceive these things without first thinking it through carefully via phenomenological approach. From the outset, we can't assume anything about what is "really" happening when phenomena manifest in our experience - it takes discpline and effort to peel off the surface layers of phenomenal appearances and work our way towards their core. That is what all knowing inquiries are doing whenever they work their way from particular manifestations to broader 'laws of nature', principles, archetypes, etc., even if most of them are not self-aware of that.
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