Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

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Cleric K
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

Post by Cleric K »

Eugene I wrote: Sat Nov 20, 2021 10:16 pm
Cleric K wrote: Sat Nov 20, 2021 8:48 pm Let's make this fully clear.

Phenomenology doesn't imply that every conscious perspective is guaranteed to have access to every phenomena by default. This is not true even in the sensory spectrum. For those who have been in Egypt the Pyramids are sensory phenomena. I've never been there so I assume that they exist. Can I be absolutely certain? Not really. What if I'm in the Truman Show and this whole world is a set up that decided to make me believe there are pyramids while there aren't any. All movies, books, photos - everything is a part of a great conspiracy against me. And this is not as absurd as it sounds. Flat Earth conspiracy, Moon conspiracies and what not, show that the human psyche is fully capable of getting in such modes.
Cleric, I understand what you are saying. Indeed, the ability of consciousness to cognate and experience meanings is amazing an mysterious and allows for the rich and interconnected universe of meanings to exist in consciousness. However, in philosophical terms phenomenology does not study the meanings and their inter-relations with themselves and with the rest of reality, that belongs to epistemology. Phenomenology studies the raw conscious phenomena themselves, as was quoted from philosophical encyclopedia at the start of this thread, including all sense perceptions, feelings, thoughts and imaginations, and their qualia, but not including the meanings and ideas that the thoughts and imaginations bear. The challenge with studying the meanings is related to their complicated relations with the rest of reality (consciousness itself and the raw phenomena).
I have no rigorous philosophical schooling so I admit I'm using many terms somewhat instinctively. I thank you for the above remark because it helps make the point even clearer. I see that Scott has practically addressed this in his post.

I don't know what else I can say without repeating what Scott and Ashvin already pointed out. The GR image practically illustrates the point of overlap between phenomenology and epistemology, between the raw phenomenon and the meaning. This is at the core of PoF where they are called perception and idea. The GR metaphor speaks about completely the same things, it just tries to utilize the intuition that we have developed by delving into scientific thinking.

My example with the verbal thought from the previous post aimed precisely to show that tiny piece of curvature of meaning which completely explains the raw phenomena of verbal thoughts which follow its geodesics. This is the point of overlap. Here meaning is not simply post factum interpretation of the thoughts (raw phenomena) - they are interlocked into a sacred dance.

I'm sure you're familiar with Wheeler's words "Space-time tells matter how to move; matter tells space-time how to curve". Although this places everything in the abstract third-person view, we can still intuit something from it. With our spiritual activity we're weaving in meaning. Meaning is not a raw phenomenon that we observe in the field of consciousness. Instead it is the invisible geometry of consciousness, the meaning curvature of which makes sense of the way raw phenomena move.

You keep thrusting down both raw phenomena and meaning as mere contents of consciousness. Actually you can never thrust down meaning in this way. What is being thrust down is the thoughts that symbolize this meaning. In other words you seek to experience consciousness as something beyond both phenomena and meaning. And this is the simple reason why your meditations remain inexplicable. How could they ever be explicable if meaning is thrust down as mere details, while one imagines that true reality is to be found in the inexplicable 'experiencing'. This is at the core of the mystic soul mood. One strikes out meaning as something that has only provisional value for intellectual life in the body, while reality is sought in something that forever remains a buzzing vortex of confusion from the standpoint of the intellect. This is the duality that everyone here tries to point out. It is based on the prejudice that meaning (and thus ideas) serve only to give some handles for the intellect to operate in the sensory spectrum but in itself can not lead to reality. The most important thing to notice here is that ultimately this is a conclusion of the thinking intellect. It is the intellect which philosophizes that thoughts and meaning are only floating fragments and they must be thrust down in order to delve into the inexplicable, which the intellect believes to represent a deeper level of reality.

In the overlap of thinking we have first-person spiritual activity which curves meaning and thus determines the movement of raw phenomena. There simply is no other example in our consciousness, where we can experience meaningful activity which engineers in such an intimate way the phenomena. Now if we have this living example where meaning shapes reality, what gives us the confidence that this can be simply stricken out as irrelevant and we should succumb in the inexplicable instead? How many more years of meditation on the inexplicable we have to go through before our thinking concludes that the only way the inexplicable can become explicable is if it becomes meaningful. This is the contradiction of mysticism and also the reason of its concealed dualism. The so called consciousness seeks to experience itself as the ground reality, yet doesn't want to experience any meaning to it because the latter is considered inferior, second order manifestation of consciousness. This puts everything in a paradoxical situation because any meaning smells to the mystic of "I"-being but at the same time the "I"-being can only live in meaning and thus is cut clean from the supposed 'reality' of consciousness. So the mystic's "I"-being dissipates meaning into a cloud of inexplicable confusion, where it half-consciously believes that in this way it lives closer to the heart of reality.

We must really understand that we create this hard problem for ourselves. It is thinking which declares its impotence to penetrate reality. It says "The meaning in which I live is only a second order manifestation of the ground being". But how does thinking reaches this conclusion? How can this be known as a certain fact and not only as a belief? It cannot be known. Because the intellect, by its own self-definition dissolves when it tries to approach the first order reality.

Let's look at two great polar approaches to reality.

One of them is Schop-like mysticism where meaning is assumed to exist as spread out dark inexplicability in the World Will but gradually becomes swirled into focused lucid loci in human beings. So even though the such condensed world will, now experiencing itself as intellect, is assumed to be of the same essence as the ground being and thus Schop considers that the Kantian divide is resolved, the fact remains that the intellect can only abstractly conceive of all of this. If it was to verify this, it would have to begin tracing the steps of condensation in the reverse direction but this would only lead to less and less meaning, as the focus of meaning becomes more and more blurry and everything sinks into the inexplicable once again. So ultimately the reality of the blind Will can never be known. It forever remains within the intellect as a mental picture of that which is supposed to exist beyond the event horizon at which meaning dissolves into the inexplicable. So we see that the Kantian divide is not truly resolved because even though the intellect assumes the blind will to be the first order reality, this reality can never be known as such. It can be conceived only as a mental picture in the intellect, which even though of the same essence, is still a second order organization. This is effectively the same soul mood we have in materialism, pan-psychism and what not. The first order reality is assumed to possess the potential for thinking living in meaning but the latter is considered only a second order folding, twisting, curving of the ground being. When this curvature is complex enough it becomes possible that the primordial potential rises its head above the dark abyss and is awestruck by the peculiar situation in which it finds itself. I think every modern person can wholeheartedly understand this position not only intellectually but as living experience.

The other pole is the theistic, where it is assumed that the ground being of reality is infinitely aware, containing all potential to create out of itself everything. Here the Kantian divide is once again not in the least resolved because it is considered blasphemous by most to believe that the human soul and God's Consciousness experience reality from the same side (Mobius strip). Instead the soul is seen as opaque bubbles created by the Divine.

Now PoF shows precisely the way to attain to the proper integration of these two tendencies. This essential core is commonly missed for two main reasons. The first is purely technical - one has the good will to understand but simply fails to, similarly to the way one fails to understand some mathematical problem. The second is that one consciously or subconsciously feels that proper understanding will ruin the comfort of current conceptions (because the nature of PoF is such that once understood, something objectively changes in our organization and we can't simply undo that). After all this time it's still unclear to me what is Eugene's case and that's why I continue to participate in these discussions.

Consider this drawing by Escher:

Image

The mystic's philosophy sees only one aspect of the picture. He sees meaning as coagulating packets of inexplicability which when sufficiently organized become meaning. The theist on the other hand sees everything as emanating from the pole of absolute meaning. All this remains quite abstract unless we understand how it plays out in thinking. Thinking is the intersection of these two streams.

If we conceive of the meaning within thinking only as a second order coagulation of primordial inexplicability, it's natural that the higher we build the tower of Babel (thoughts upon thoughts), the more it seems we're moving away from the true ground of reality and into the clouds. And this is really the case with all the abstract science and philosophy of today. Strings, MAL, alters - all of this builds the tower. This is not to say that everything is completely useless, as in the Sisyphus myth. It's still exploration of degrees of freedom but it will never be anything more than abstract tower of thoughts unless we understand how the other pole of the Cosmic Polarity plays out.

The pole of meaning is just as real as the pole of the ground raw phenomena. When we turn the picture of Escher around, then we can see all meaning not as coagulation of inexplicability but as diminished meaning, as aliased meaning, primordial perfect meaning out of which holes have been cut out. When the holes are small it feels as if we're living in a completely meaningful Cosmos, where the holes move along the curvature of living ideas (invisible meaning). But when the holes become much greater than the light, it feels as if the Cosmos is mainly a mystery, a conscious phenomenon and only here and there we have sparks of meaning that give the intellect some sense of what's going on.

So we have two Cosmic Poles - one is the Pole of Mystery, the Cosmic raw phenomenon which in itself is inexplicable. The other is the Pole of Meaning, the grand Idea (in Goethe's sense) which is the perfect meaning of all and we have mystery phenomena only where the Idea has been hollowed out. In the GR metaphor the Pole of Mystery is the perceptual phenomena of mass/energy, the Pole of Meaning is the Cosmic curvature of meaning which makes sense of the phenomena's movement.

I believe most readers will understand this on the abstract level. The question is how to approach it as something real and not simply as floating sparks of intellectual thoughts. The only place we can start the process is thinking itself because this is the only place where we find real interplay of the two poles. It is the only place where we find curvature of meaning in conjunction with raw phenomena flowing along its geodesics. So it is from the point of concentrated thought that the holes of Mystery can begin to be filled with the Light of meaning.

This process is asymmetric. Just as Time. In fact, they are secretly related. The equations of physics look like Escher's painting. Scientists look at them, scratch their heads and ask "Why time flows along with the one flock of birds and not the other?" Then begin to spin wild theories about entropy and the likes. When we understand the picture through the Great Poles, the answer comes by itself. Time can flow only in the direction of increasing meaning, which on our everyday level is most readily grasped as increase of memory (every moment of life adds some meaning/knowledge, even if it is simply the awareness that we have moved forward in time and now we encompass more of our life). The whole problem comes because of the Kantian divide through which we keep insisting that the world (and thus time) exists in itself and as such time and its direction are attributes of that world. Our consciousness is simply dragged along and we try to understand why the world-in-itself drags in this direction and not the other. When we understand reality from the first person perspective, the answer is self-evident. Time can be experienced only as buildup of meaning. In the intellect we conceive of this as living and aging in a physical Cosmos with no clue why, in the spirit it is the continual filling of the holes of mystery with meaning. This filling is not monotonic but in rhythmic iterations. Sleep is the clearest example. We can never experience how we fall to sleep precisely because it's not possible to experience stream of consciousness where every next state is less conscious than the previous. But the rhythmic integration continues in the morning (or to some extent while dreaming).

So the key to PoF is to understand that even though the meaning of the intellect looks only like tiny sparks, it is of the same essence as the Absolute Meaning. One difficulty with this is that the modern mind is so addicted to reductionism that it simply can't conceive of meaning as the holistic essence of reality. It can see meaning only as accumulation of atoms into a mechanical complex. For this reason people see God as some kind of super intellect, as inconceivably complex computer. But the Absolute Idea is actually the simplest thing. It is the perfect sense, perfect unity, perfect wholeness, perfect clarity, perfect completeness. All existence flows in Time as integration of meaning between the two poles. At the poles at infinity themselves there's no existence in Time. The light of perfect meaning is the same as the darkness of complete mystery. Outside of Time they are one and the same. Yet between the two, consciousness can be experienced as a stream in Time only in the direction of the Light of meaning.
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

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ScottRoberts wrote: Sun Nov 21, 2021 3:45 amThis looks to me like the source of confusion. You see a difference between phenomenology and epistemology because your notion of epistemology stems from Kant, which presupposes a divide between what is real and what we know about it. Steiner's philosophical work was all about correcting this Kantian error. Kant's epistemology was asking "how do we know what is real about the world outside of us (his answer being "we can't"). Steiner, instead, asked, "What do we know", his answer being: phenomena (including the phenomena of thinking). Spiritual Science is about expanding our phenomenal universe, and hence increasing our knowledge. In short, Steiner's phenomenology is his epistemology, which differs from yours and Kant's.

This distinction between Kant's epistemology and Steiner's is perhaps better made clear in Steiner's book Truth and Knowledge, for which a good overview (47 page PDF) was linked to earlier: [url=https://static1.squarespace.com/static/ ... teiner.pdf[/url]
Hey Scott ... good to have you chiming in here. Given my 'union' background, I'm inclined to turn to a mediator to find some consensus for disputes in which a whole lot of argumentative laborious wordiness has not been able to reach any resolution. I've attempted to play that role at times, but I may now be too far into KISS mode to find a way through the wordiness. However, given to that you have often referenced both Franklin Merrell-Wolff—someone who surely Eugene can relate to—and Steiner, as significant influences on your way of addressing these questions, then presumably there is a way of reconciling those two approaches. So I'm thinking you may be best positioned to find some point of convergence between them, and thus play the mediation role.
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

Post by Eugene I »

AshvinP wrote: Sun Nov 21, 2021 8:06 pm Steiner is not concluding anything about the underlying essence of the "given" at this point - he is not claiming there is any essential nature of the given "other than thinking" which thinking must model for itself. That is made very clear in the first paragraph you quote - "that which lies before us ['the given'] prior to subjecting it to the process of cognition in any way, before we have asserted or decided anything about it by means of thinking."
That's right, he is not asserting that in what I've read so far, his presentation of the "given" in what I've read so far has been pretty agnostic. I will be reading the PoF, but if you can find any explicit and positive assertion by Steiner about the underlying essence of the "given", please post a quote in this thread.

At this point I left all my presuppositions behind and trying to read and digest exactly what Steiner says without adding, subtracting or (mis) interpreting anything. And, by the way, I'm very impressed with his presentation of phenomenology/epistemology (so far).
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

Post by Eugene I »

Cleric K wrote: Sun Nov 21, 2021 8:39 pm So the key to PoF is to understand that even though the meaning of the intellect looks only like tiny sparks, it is of the same essence as the Absolute Meaning. One difficulty with this is that the modern mind is so addicted to reductionism that it simply can't conceive of meaning as the holistic essence of reality. It can see meaning only as accumulation of atoms into a mechanical complex. For this reason people see God as some kind of super intellect, as inconceivably complex computer. But the Absolute Idea is actually the simplest thing. It is the perfect sense, perfect unity, perfect wholeness, perfect clarity, perfect completeness. All existence flows in Time as integration of meaning between the two poles. At the poles at infinity themselves there's no existence in Time. The light of perfect meaning is the same as the darkness of complete mystery. Outside of Time they are one and the same. Yet between the two, consciousness can be experienced as a stream in Time only in the direction of the Light of meaning.
Cleric, thanks, I get it, it's not so hard to understand. In yours and Ashvin's philosophy the world is the Absolute Idea only and there is nothing in the world other than the Idea, so yes, perfect wholeness and unity, and the Idea unfolds into a manifold of the living ideas constituting the shared ideal content. This is a legit version of idealism. What I'm trying to figure out is whether it is your interpretation (or even mis-interpretation) of the PoF, or whether this is in fact what Steiner meant and wrote. But I will need to study the whole PoF to figure that out, so pls give me some time. Once I read the whole PoF I will comment further.
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

Post by AshvinP »

Eugene I wrote: Sun Nov 21, 2021 9:31 pm
AshvinP wrote: Sun Nov 21, 2021 8:06 pm Steiner is not concluding anything about the underlying essence of the "given" at this point - he is not claiming there is any essential nature of the given "other than thinking" which thinking must model for itself. That is made very clear in the first paragraph you quote - "that which lies before us ['the given'] prior to subjecting it to the process of cognition in any way, before we have asserted or decided anything about it by means of thinking."
That's right, he is not asserting that in what I've read so far, his presentation of the "given" in what I've read so far has been pretty agnostic. I will be reading the PoF, but if you can find any explicit and positive assertion by Steiner about the underlying essence of the "given", please post a quote in this thread.

At this point I left all my presuppositions behind and trying to read and digest exactly what Steiner says without adding, subtracting or (mis) interpreting anything. And, by the way, I'm very impressed with his presentation of phenomenology/epistemology (so far).
Eugene,

This is direct quote from Steiner in last chapter of PoF. Please keep in mind these conclusions have been reached by rigorous phenomenology of perception-cognition throughout the rest of the book. So he is not starting from these conclusions, but what he has concluded about the essence of the given should be clear from what is written below.

Steiner wrote:THE uniform explanation of the world, that is, the monism we have described, derives the principles that it needs for the explanation of the world from human experience. In the same way, it looks for the sources of action within the world of observation, that is, in that part of human nature which is accessible to our self-knowledge, more particularly in moral imagination. Monism refuses to infer in an abstract way that the ultimate causes of the world that is presented to our perceiving and thinking are to be found in a region outside this world. For monism, the unity that thoughtful observation — which we can experience — brings to the manifold multiplicity of percepts is the same unity that man's need for knowledge demands, and through which it seeks entry into the physical and spiritual regions of the world. Whoever seeks another unity behind this one only proves that he does not recognize the identity of what is discovered by thinking and what is demanded by the urge for knowledge. The single human individual is not actually cut off from the universe. He is a part of it, and between this part and the totality of the cosmos there exists a real connection which is broken only for our perception. At first we take this part of the universe as something existing on its own, because we do not see the belts and ropes by which the fundamental forces of the cosmos keep the wheel of our life revolving.

Whoever remains at this standpoint sees a part of the whole as if it were actually an independently existing thing, a monad which receives information about the rest of the world in some way from without. Monism, as here described, shows that we can believe in this independence only so long as the things we perceive are not woven by our thinking into the network of the conceptual world. As soon as this happens, all separate existence turns out to be mere illusion due to perceiving. Man can find his full and complete existence in the totality of the universe only through the experience of intuitive thinking. Thinking destroys the illusion due to perceiving and integrates our individual existence into the life of the cosmos. The unity of the conceptual world, which contains all objective percepts, also embraces the content of our subjective personality. Thinking gives us reality in its true form as a self-contained unity, whereas the multiplicity of percepts is but a semblance due to the way we are organized (see page 67). To recognize true reality, as against the illusion due to perceiving, has at all times been the goal of human thinking.
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

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AshvinP wrote: Sun Nov 21, 2021 9:50 pm Eugene,

This is direct quote from Steiner in last chapter of PoF. Please keep in mind these conclusions have been reached by rigorous phenomenology of perception-cognition throughout the rest of the book. So he is not starting from these conclusions, but what he has concluded about the essence of the given should be clear from what is written below.

Steiner wrote:THE uniform explanation of the world, that is, the monism we have described, derives the principles that it needs for the explanation of the world from human experience. In the same way, it looks for the sources of action within the world of observation, that is, in that part of human nature which is accessible to our self-knowledge, more particularly in moral imagination. Monism refuses to infer in an abstract way that the ultimate causes of the world that is presented to our perceiving and thinking are to be found in a region outside this world. For monism, the unity that thoughtful observation — which we can experience — brings to the manifold multiplicity of percepts is the same unity that man's need for knowledge demands, and through which it seeks entry into the physical and spiritual regions of the world. Whoever seeks another unity behind this one only proves that he does not recognize the identity of what is discovered by thinking and what is demanded by the urge for knowledge. The single human individual is not actually cut off from the universe. He is a part of it, and between this part and the totality of the cosmos there exists a real connection which is broken only for our perception. At first we take this part of the universe as something existing on its own, because we do not see the belts and ropes by which the fundamental forces of the cosmos keep the wheel of our life revolving.

Whoever remains at this standpoint sees a part of the whole as if it were actually an independently existing thing, a monad which receives information about the rest of the world in some way from without. Monism, as here described, shows that we can believe in this independence only so long as the things we perceive are not woven by our thinking into the network of the conceptual world. As soon as this happens, all separate existence turns out to be mere illusion due to perceiving. Man can find his full and complete existence in the totality of the universe only through the experience of intuitive thinking. Thinking destroys the illusion due to perceiving and integrates our individual existence into the life of the cosmos. The unity of the conceptual world, which contains all objective percepts, also embraces the content of our subjective personality. Thinking gives us reality in its true form as a self-contained unity, whereas the multiplicity of percepts is but a semblance due to the way we are organized (see page 67). To recognize true reality, as against the illusion due to perceiving, has at all times been the goal of human thinking.
Well, I can see the word "monism" here but no explicit statement that this is the monism of the Absolute Idea. He has not been explicit and specific in this quote about the ontological/fundamental essence of this monist universe.
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

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Eugene I wrote: Sun Nov 21, 2021 10:01 pm
AshvinP wrote: Sun Nov 21, 2021 9:50 pm Eugene,

This is direct quote from Steiner in last chapter of PoF. Please keep in mind these conclusions have been reached by rigorous phenomenology of perception-cognition throughout the rest of the book. So he is not starting from these conclusions, but what he has concluded about the essence of the given should be clear from what is written below.

Steiner wrote:THE uniform explanation of the world, that is, the monism we have described, derives the principles that it needs for the explanation of the world from human experience. In the same way, it looks for the sources of action within the world of observation, that is, in that part of human nature which is accessible to our self-knowledge, more particularly in moral imagination. Monism refuses to infer in an abstract way that the ultimate causes of the world that is presented to our perceiving and thinking are to be found in a region outside this world. For monism, the unity that thoughtful observation — which we can experience — brings to the manifold multiplicity of percepts is the same unity that man's need for knowledge demands, and through which it seeks entry into the physical and spiritual regions of the world. Whoever seeks another unity behind this one only proves that he does not recognize the identity of what is discovered by thinking and what is demanded by the urge for knowledge. The single human individual is not actually cut off from the universe. He is a part of it, and between this part and the totality of the cosmos there exists a real connection which is broken only for our perception. At first we take this part of the universe as something existing on its own, because we do not see the belts and ropes by which the fundamental forces of the cosmos keep the wheel of our life revolving.

Whoever remains at this standpoint sees a part of the whole as if it were actually an independently existing thing, a monad which receives information about the rest of the world in some way from without. Monism, as here described, shows that we can believe in this independence only so long as the things we perceive are not woven by our thinking into the network of the conceptual world. As soon as this happens, all separate existence turns out to be mere illusion due to perceiving. Man can find his full and complete existence in the totality of the universe only through the experience of intuitive thinking. Thinking destroys the illusion due to perceiving and integrates our individual existence into the life of the cosmos. The unity of the conceptual world, which contains all objective percepts, also embraces the content of our subjective personality. Thinking gives us reality in its true form as a self-contained unity, whereas the multiplicity of percepts is but a semblance due to the way we are organized (see page 67). To recognize true reality, as against the illusion due to perceiving, has at all times been the goal of human thinking.
Well, I can see the word "monism" here but no explicit statement that this is the monism of the Absolute Idea. He has not been explicit and specific in this quote about the ontological/fundamental essence of this monist universe.

Consider the bold assertion. If the world is unified (monism) and the "conceptual world" is where we find the unity, then what else could it be? If Thinking gives us this unified reality in its true form, then how can Thinking activity not be the Ground? Anway, I am not sure what you are questioning here - do you think there is a chance that we have completely misunderstood Steiner and he is not an "absolute idealist"? I assure you there is no chance of that. But if in some parallel universe that is correct... then we would just say Steiner got it wrong and all the arguments remain.
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

Post by Eugene I »

Cleric K wrote: Sun Nov 21, 2021 8:39 pm You keep thrusting down both raw phenomena and meaning as mere contents of consciousness. Actually you can never thrust down meaning in this way. What is being thrust down is the thoughts that symbolize this meaning. In other words you seek to experience consciousness as something beyond both phenomena and meaning. And this is the simple reason why your meditations remain inexplicable. How could they ever be explicable if meaning is thrust down as mere details, while one imagines that true reality is to be found in the inexplicable 'experiencing'. This is at the core of the mystic soul mood. One strikes out meaning as something that has only provisional value for intellectual life in the body, while reality is sought in something that forever remains a buzzing vortex of confusion from the standpoint of the intellect. This is the duality that everyone here tries to point out. It is based on the prejudice that meaning (and thus ideas) serve only to give some handles for the intellect to operate in the sensory spectrum but in itself can not lead to reality. The most important thing to notice here is that ultimately this is a conclusion of the thinking intellect. It is the intellect which philosophizes that thoughts and meaning are only floating fragments and they must be thrust down in order to delve into the inexplicable, which the intellect believes to represent a deeper level of reality.
In the "mystical" approach (as you call it) the seeming duality of perceptions and ideas is overcome by an obvious experiential fact/observation that all of the phenomena are equally consciously experienced, or, in other words, being "awared". The Awareness of phenomena never changes or goes away (because it is impossible to experience the absence of Awareness), it remains unchanged whether phenomena are present or absent (as in the formless states experiences), it "glues" the wholeness of the 1-st person experience in the oneness of the "field of experience", and it is never apart from any phenomena (no phenomena can be separated from the experiencing/awareness of it). Also every act of thinking itself (intentional willing, cognition, intuition, imagination, comprehensions of meanings) is also automatically experienced (being awared of) and therefore are inseparable part of the wholeness of Awareness. This is what overcomes the duality, and this what is intimately given to us and known by us in our most intimate direct 1-st person phenomenal experience with no assumptions needed to be added whatsoever. We obviously can assume that similar 1-st person experiences exist from other beings perspectives. The only thing we would need to assume is that there is noting else in the world that exists beyond this, and that assumption brings us to the Awareness-based monistic idealism. It is also very direct and natural way to perceive the relaity - if we remove all our presuppositions and interpretations of what reality is, this is exactly how we will experience it from the 1-st person perspective - as a flow of phenomena in the integral space of Awareness with nothing (even "me the perceiver") standing apart form it. We can call it the monism of the Absolute Awareness. This is how reality directly presents itself to itself with nothing that needs to be "fixed". At least this is the formulation of the traditional Buddhist and Advaita philosophies as well as some modern ones (R. Spira).

I understand that you are presenting a different version of the idealistic monism - the monism of the Absolute Idea, and as I said, it is definitely a legit version. We just need to be clear about the differences of these two versions.
In the overlap of thinking we have first-person spiritual activity which curves meaning and thus determines the movement of raw phenomena. There simply is no other example in our consciousness, where we can experience meaningful activity which engineers in such an intimate way the phenomena. Now if we have this living example where meaning shapes reality, what gives us the confidence that this can be simply stricken out as irrelevant and we should succumb in the inexplicable instead? How many more years of meditation on the inexplicable we have to go through before our thinking concludes that the only way the inexplicable can become explicable is if it becomes meaningful. This is the contradiction of mysticism and also the reason of its concealed dualism. The so called consciousness seeks to experience itself as the ground reality, yet doesn't want to experience any meaning to it because the latter is considered inferior, second order manifestation of consciousness. This puts everything in a paradoxical situation because any meaning smells to the mystic of "I"-being but at the same time the "I"-being can only live in meaning and thus is cut clean from the supposed 'reality' of consciousness. So the mystic's "I"-being dissipates meaning into a cloud of inexplicable confusion, where it half-consciously believes that in this way it lives closer to the heart of reality.

We must really understand that we create this hard problem for ourselves. It is thinking which declares its impotence to penetrate reality. It says "The meaning in which I live is only a second order manifestation of the ground being". But how does thinking reaches this conclusion? How can this be known as a certain fact and not only as a belief? It cannot be known. Because the intellect, by its own self-definition dissolves when it tries to approach the first order reality.
That is correct. In the Awareness idealism thinking does not assume that the reality is fully cognizable/explicable, but neither it assumes that it is forever inexplicable for cognition. It takes no assumptions and remains open to both possibilities. In the current human form it seems to be inexplicable so far, but again, who knows, it may become explicable through some revelation even for some genius human. The Awareness idealism remains open to the possibility that the reality can be comprehended by thinking, but it makes no unwarranted assertions about that.

On the contrary, the idealism of the Absolute Idea requires an unwarranted assumption that the world is Idea only and therefore can be fully cognizable by thinking. I admit that this is very "optimistic" view, but to me it looks more like a wishful thinking. I'm not saying it's wrong though, I have nothing against this version of idealism, as I said, it's totally legit.

But I'm actually thinking about a synthetic kind of idealism combining both into one whole. This is why I got interested in studying the PoF. Nothing would prevent us from assuming that the reality is both Absolute Awareness and Absolute Idea, with Awareness being one aspect of reality (formless) and the Idea being the other aspect (forms), with both aspects being inseparable parts of the whole. I think this is what Scott also implied in his idea of Mumorphism, but I'll let him to correct me if I'm wrong.
Last edited by Eugene I on Sun Nov 21, 2021 11:05 pm, edited 2 times in total.
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AshvinP
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

Post by AshvinP »

Cleric wrote: The mystic's philosophy sees only one aspect of the picture. He sees meaning as coagulating packets of inexplicability which when sufficiently organized become meaning. The theist on the other hand sees everything as emanating from the pole of absolute meaning. All this remains quite abstract unless we understand how it plays out in thinking. Thinking is the intersection of these two streams.
...
I believe most readers will understand this on the abstract level. The question is how to approach it as something real and not simply as floating sparks of intellectual thoughts. The only place we can start the process is thinking itself because this is the only place where we find real interplay of the two poles. It is the only place where we find curvature of meaning in conjunction with raw phenomena flowing along its geodesics. So it is from the point of concentrated thought that the holes of Mystery can begin to be filled with the Light of meaning.

Also, if you did not read my latest phenomenology essay, here is another example of what Cleric writes above. I think it is extremely important to understand this meaning-to-perception relationship if one is to find the proper role of one's own Thinking activity. Of course Cleric's post goes into much more detail and therefore is more accurate, but I am just providing this as another example of the basic premise (which was taken from that paper Scott linked to).


viewtopic.php?f=5&t=619
We can discern above that our attention is inseperably tied to our intention, as it motivates what aspects of Nature we give our attention to. Our attention is really the first intentional cognitive activity we manifest in the world, prior to any systematic sense-observation or logical reasoning. Our intention manifested through attention first makes our individual activity a force of nature, so to speak, which begins integrating our individual qualities and talents into the phenomenal world at large. It is through this attentive activity that we announce our cognitive intentions to Nature; that we begin making proposals to her. We must keep in mind that all of these activities mentioned are concrete processes which manifest concrete results in the world content that both we and others can perceive, if and only if we know to actually look for those results. The following image gives us an illustration of what is occurring constantly and pervasively in the phenomenal world through our intentional and attentive activity. We should observe what occurs when we shift between attending to the image as a whole and, alternatively, when we attend only to one dark 'pac-man' circle.


Image


The upright white triangle manifests in the phenomenal image only when we first intend through our attention that the spheres and the underlying upside-down triangle be complete images. With that intention for completeness of meaning, the white triangle appears as the foreground to the background of the full black circles and the contiguous upside-down triangle. Although it is somewhat difficult after knowing what occurs, we can try to only focus attention on the black 'pac-man' circle and see how the white triangle disappears. This exercise makes clear that the white triangle is merely a perceptual symbol for the meaning we first intend for the image to possess as a whole. It will seem to our immediate perception as if the white triangle was "always there", but that just indicates how deeply subconscious our attending-intending activity is currently buried within us. If that activity were more conscious, then it would be perfectly clear that our own meaningful activity precedes the perceptual structures, not only with figures such as the one above, but with every phenomenal appearance in Nature.
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Re: Phenomenological idealism: definitions of common terms

Post by findingblanks »

"In short, Steiner's phenomenology is his epistemology, which differs from yours and Kant's."

Technically, this is true and helpful. However, anybody who decides to read a book like PoF because Steiner pointed to it as his most important book will be surprised if they are told that Steiner is doing phenomenology in that text. We can judge them. We can say they need to read closer. But we can also acknowledge, I think Scott can at least, that PoF is presented in the style of a logical progression within an epistemological frame much more than a careful pointing to the emergence and qualitative landscape of our phenomenology. But, yes, his 1916 additions make some very interesting phenomenological shifts that he did not carry into the original text for the various reasons he stated. In the core text that precieded PoF, Steiner explains why and how his philosophy can and should fall under the banner of 'epistemology.' But Scott's comments certainly clarify an important distinction between Steiner and Kant with regards to the boundaries they ultimate impose/find.
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