Are there any SIMPLE books refuting what Bernardo calls "The materialism of qualities"?

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AshvinP
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Re: Are there any SIMPLE books refuting what Bernardo calls "The materialism of qualities"?

Post by AshvinP »

Please, when you read what is written below, resist the first sentiment which pops into your mind. It will be - "this guy is an arrogant idealist making bold claims against my worldview, so I will assume he is wrong before reading what he writes and then find ways to support my assumption". I don't need to be a mind-reader to know that will be one of the first sentiment-thought that occurs, as I can see it occur in my own self-observation. If modern man was not very predictable in this way, no theoretical or clinical psychology would be possible. But he is, so they are.

Jim Cross wrote: Tue Sep 28, 2021 2:40 pm
Actually, materialists are by definition naïve realists.
Actually you don't know what you are talking about.

You may be confusing scientific realism with naïve realism.
Many philosophers claim that it is incompatible to accept naïve realism in the philosophy of perception and scientific realism in the philosophy of science.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Na%C3%AFv ... al_realism


Modern people have very flattened thinking. So when I say "perception", you assume it must be those 'things' you perceive on your desk, in the park, etc. That is because our entire inner world is ignored as a place of perceptions. It used to be materialists who mostly did this, but actually even many here who hold to idealism also ignore that inner world. I tried to point this to you before - the concept of "triangle" which you can form inwardly and perceive is no less of a "perception" than a triangular object you may perceive on your desk. Once we discover this inner world of perception, we will actually sense depth being added to our Thinking in a concrete way. We will see how naive realism can apply to our perceptions of feelings and concepts just like it can apply to our perceptions of rocks, trees, etc. in the outer world.


Jim wrote:When you get down to it, idealists are probably the most naïve of realists since what they are perceiving is consciousness itself so it must definitionally be real. There is no reason in idealism for perceptions to ever be wrong or incorrect since they are consciousness perceiving itself. No optical illusions would be possible.

What I am about to say applies to materialist and idealists alike - most people simply assume the only way to approach the phenomenal world is with abstract representational concepts. So, keeping in mind what I said before about perceiving inner concepts, what does this imply when any "truth claim" is made by such people? It means they are naively holding their own abstract concepts which they perceive about what is "true" to be the full extent of what is really true. Idealists do this all the time as well, and we see plenty of it right here on this forum. Again, this will not make sense to anyone who has not yet realized they do, in fact, perceive concepts like they perceive colors in the world.

What they perceive in both, and actually in any percept whether outer or inner, is the ideal content of that percept. Naive realism is not about thinking something is real when it is actually an "illusion" - it is about confusing what is perceived for the totality of the phenomenon at issue. It is about confusing partially perceived ideal content of any given perceptions for the totality of ideal content to be perceived. But, as we have mentioned many times on this forum, there is one instance where the percept and its total ideal content do arrive united in our experience, and that is in the perception of our own concepts such as "triangle". If one wants to avoid the pitfall of naive realism, materialist and idealist alike, they must fully understand what this unity of noumenon-phenomenon in our own Thinking activity means.

Jim wrote:As for Hoffman, are you saying color, for example, has no role in the desktop or its icons?
To return to the metaphor of the desktop interface on a PC, even though visible characteristics of the file icons (their shape, color, etc.) do not reflect their objective properties (the computer files themselves are not inherently shaped or colored), the interface nevertheless allows us to interact successfully with the computer because of the coherence between the “perceptual” and “action” mappings.


https://link.springer.com/article/10.37 ... 015-0890-8

What I am saying is that the ideal content of color, and all qualia, is what Hoffman holds to be real. No one holds the perception of "red", as a perception without any meaning, to be real by itself (such a perception does not exist). As I said above, we are always only perceiving meaning in the 'things' around us or within us. That meaning is the qualia and what Hoffman, and I would say any consistent idealist, must hold to be real.
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Re: Are there any SIMPLE books refuting what Bernardo calls "The materialism of qualities"?

Post by Jim Cross »

perception

the ability to see, hear, or become aware of something through the senses.

That wouldn't normally encompass the "inner world".

Nevertheless, your argument still is beside the point. Naïve realism believes we can become directly aware of objects in the external world through the senses. So the "inner world" isn't even in the question. You are trying to refute a belief about perceptions of the world through the senses by pointing out that consciousness is more than perceptions. You are correct but, as I said, it is beside the point.

It is not a requirement that materialists be naïve realists nor do most of them believe it.

Hoffman's Interface Theory of Perception is perfectly compatible with materialism. It is only his extension of it to conscious realism with which most materialists would quarrel. Hoffman himself writes that you can accept his Interface Theory of Perception and reject conscious realism. So the two are not inextricably tied together.
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Re: Are there any SIMPLE books refuting what Bernardo calls "The materialism of qualities"?

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Jim Cross wrote: Tue Sep 28, 2021 6:33 pm perception

the ability to see, hear, or become aware of something through the senses.

That wouldn't normally encompass the "inner world".

Nevertheless, your argument still is beside the point. Naïve realism believes we can become directly aware of objects in the external world through the senses. So the "inner world" isn't even in the question. You are trying to refute a belief about perceptions of the world through the senses by pointing out that consciousness is more than perceptions. You are correct but, as I said, it is beside the point.

It is not a requirement that materialists be naïve realists nor do most of them believe it.

Hoffman's Interface Theory of Perception is perfectly compatible with materialism. It is only his extension of it to conscious realism with which most materialists would quarrel. Hoffman himself writes that you can accept his Interface Theory of Perception and reject conscious realism. So the two are not inextricably tied together.

This is a perfect illustration of the naive realism I am speaking of. You hold to an abstract concept of "senses" which does not include thinking-sense which perceives thoughts, feelings, desires. You have naively accepted the standard materialist conception of "senses" which a priori excludes senses that are used to perceive the inner world, without any logical reason to do so, and concluded this narrow conception represents the absolute totality of all sensing activity. Anybody interested in genuine scientific knowing should be appalled by this - one half of the entire phenomenal world we can perceive is being 100% ignored because the naive realism which says only the five senses acknowledged by materialist dogma can be real. But like I said, many idealists accept this materialist dogma without even knowing it and therefore hold to very similar sorts of naive realism about the senses.

Do you have a logical argument why the perceptions we perceive inwardly should be left out of consideration entirely? Or why they cannot also be held as naively real? Are you so attached to the dictionary defintion of "senses" that you don't care at all about the underlying problem the "naive realist" critique is trying to address? If you have no logical responses to these questions, then you should really stop and reflect on why that is.

You're completely wrong about Hoffman ITP's compatibility with materialism. As I have shown you before, Hoffman makes clear that he believes his theory refutes physicalism. He wrote an entire book to that effect. Accepting ITP and rejecting conscious realism is not at all equivalent to "ITP is perfectly compatible with materialism". You are just piling up errors upon errors now - first Hoffman rejects the reality of qualia, now Hoffman has just been making a huge deal this entire time about a theory that doesn't even refute physicalism. It's just getting more and more absurd.
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Re: Are there any SIMPLE books refuting what Bernardo calls "The materialism of qualities"?

Post by Martin_ »

AshvinP wrote: Tue Sep 28, 2021 7:18 pm
Jim Cross wrote: Tue Sep 28, 2021 6:33 pm perception

the ability to see, hear, or become aware of something through the senses.

That wouldn't normally encompass the "inner world".

Nevertheless, your argument still is beside the point. Naïve realism believes we can become directly aware of objects in the external world through the senses. So the "inner world" isn't even in the question. You are trying to refute a belief about perceptions of the world through the senses by pointing out that consciousness is more than perceptions. You are correct but, as I said, it is beside the point.

It is not a requirement that materialists be naïve realists nor do most of them believe it.

Hoffman's Interface Theory of Perception is perfectly compatible with materialism. It is only his extension of it to conscious realism with which most materialists would quarrel. Hoffman himself writes that you can accept his Interface Theory of Perception and reject conscious realism. So the two are not inextricably tied together.

This is a perfect illustration of the naive realism I am speaking of. You hold to an abstract concept of "senses" which does not include thinking-sense which perceives thoughts, feelings, desires. You have naively accepted the standard materialist conception of "senses" which a priori excludes senses that are used to perceive the inner world, without any logical reason to do so, and concluded this narrow conception represents the absolute totality of all sensing activity. Anybody interested in genuine scientific knowing should be appalled by this - one half of the entire phenomenal world we can perceive is being 100% ignored because the naive realism which says only the five senses acknowledged by materialist dogma can be real. But like I said, many idealists accept this materialist dogma without even knowing it and therefore hold to very similar sorts of naive realism about the senses.

Do you have a logical argument why the perceptions we perceive inwardly should be left out of consideration entirely? Or why they cannot also be held as naively real? Are you so attached to the dictionary defintion of "senses" that you don't care at all about the underlying problem the "naive realist" critique is trying to address? If you have no logical responses to these questions, then you should really stop and reflect on why that is.

You're completely wrong about Hoffman ITP's compatibility with materialism. As I have shown you before, Hoffman makes clear that he believes his theory refutes physicalism. He wrote an entire book to that effect. Accepting ITP and rejecting conscious realism is not at all equivalent to "ITP is perfectly compatible with materialism". You are just piling up errors upon errors now - first Hoffman rejects the reality of qualia, now Hoffman has just been making a huge deal this entire time about a theory that doesn't even refute physicalism. It's just getting more and more absurd.
You'e both right.
Supporting Jim: Natural Selection Drives True Perception To Swift Extinction
Supporting Ashvin Consciousness and the Interface Theory of Perception

Actually, on second thought; I'm with Jim; ITP is only a part of Hoffman's chain of reasoning. ITP by itself does not require consciousness being fundamental. Instead, ITP it part of what ALLOWS for consciousness being fundamental.
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AshvinP
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Re: Are there any SIMPLE books refuting what Bernardo calls "The materialism of qualities"?

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Martin_ wrote: Wed Sep 29, 2021 12:39 am Actually, on second thought; I'm with Jim; ITP is only a part of Hoffman's chain of reasoning. ITP by itself does not require consciousness being fundamental. Instead, ITP it part of what ALLOWS for consciousness being fundamental.

I did not claim ITP "requires consciousness being fundamental". I said that, according to Hoffman, it disproves physicalism, as opposed to Jim's claim that it is "perfectly compatible" with physicalism. Here is what Hoffman himself says about it:

Hoffman wrote:Science is a method. It can test and discard ontologies. If our perceptions evolved by natural selection, then, according to the FBT Theorem, we should discard the ontology of physicalism. We should recognize that spacetime and objects are the perceptual interface used by Homo sapiens. They are our first-person experiences. The scientific study of physical objects in spacetime, even when conducted by large teams of scientists using advanced technologies, is necessarily a study of first-person experiences.

Hoffman, Donald. The Case Against Reality: Why Evolution Hid the Truth from Our Eyes . W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.
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Re: Are there any SIMPLE books refuting what Bernardo calls "The materialism of qualities"?

Post by Jim Cross »

Ashvin,

Your approach goes something like this:

1- I make a statement in regard to perception which definitionally is awareness through senses.
2- You redefine perception to include knowledge other than that obtained senses then claim I am wrong about perception.
3- You then declare my view itself is naïve when, in fact, I am only using the accepted definition of the term.
4- You rant on and on about some "narrow conception" when you really only talking about your own misconception.

If you intend to redefine every term, then there isn't any possibility for discussion. Senses mean senses. Naïve realism relates to sensual perception. See Wikipedia. Perception itself is awareness through senses. See a dictionary.

[quote]Although the interface theory is compatible with idealism,
it is not idealism, because it proposes no specific model of objective reality,
but leaves the nature of objective reality as an open scientific problem.

[/quote]

http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/interface.pdf

Hence, it is compatible with any ontology since, by itself, it has no model for objective reality.
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Re: Are there any SIMPLE books refuting what Bernardo calls "The materialism of qualities"?

Post by Ben Iscatus »

Jim, perception can mean more than apprehension by the senses - it can also mean apprehension by the mind (understanding). Some dictionaries extend the definition.
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Re: Are there any SIMPLE books refuting what Bernardo calls "The materialism of qualities"?

Post by Jim Cross »

Martin.

I'm mostly in favor of a modified view of Hoffman's ITP.

I think it is clear than the representations of consciousness are not direct awareness of the objects of the world and likely simplify and transform the external world for the utilitarian goal of survival.

However, in its most extreme form, Hoffman's theory is clearly incomplete, probably wrong. His model only works for the simplest reactive perceptions. It doesn't account for learning. It also doesn't make common sense. If there is no regularity in the world, then even the most simple actions would have unpredictable results. How could Homo erectus have made tools if its model of stone, how it fractures, and her own hand movements in three dimensional space lacked any degree of accuracy, that is failed to represent something in the external world that was regular and predictable?
Last edited by Jim Cross on Wed Sep 29, 2021 12:25 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Are there any SIMPLE books refuting what Bernardo calls "The materialism of qualities"?

Post by Jim Cross »

Ben Iscatus wrote: Wed Sep 29, 2021 11:52 am Jim, perception can mean more than apprehension by the senses - it can also mean apprehension by the mind (understanding). Some dictionaries extend the definition.
In the context of naïve realism, which is the context this is being discussed,it is clearly about perception by the senses.

[quoteIn philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, naïve realism (also known as direct realism, perceptual realism, or common sense realism) is the idea that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they really are.[1] When referred to as direct realism, naïve realism is often contrasted with indirect realism.[2]][/quote]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Na%C3%AFve_realism
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Re: Are there any SIMPLE books refuting what Bernardo calls "The materialism of qualities"?

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Jim Cross wrote: Wed Sep 29, 2021 12:23 pm
Ben Iscatus wrote: Wed Sep 29, 2021 11:52 am Jim, perception can mean more than apprehension by the senses - it can also mean apprehension by the mind (understanding). Some dictionaries extend the definition.
In the context of naïve realism, which is the context this is being discussed,it is clearly about perception by the senses.
In philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, naïve realism (also known as direct realism, perceptual realism, or common sense realism) is the idea that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they really are.[1] When referred to as direct realism, naïve realism is often contrasted with indirect realism.[2]]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Na%C3%AFve_realism

1. Jim perceives-conceives of his senses as sound, smell, taste, sight, and touch.

2. Through this unexamined naive conception, Jim fails to recognize senses of thinking, warmth, balance, and several others and their perceptual content. (Note one can perceive thought-forms not generated by one's own thinking, in case that wasn't clear).

3. Jim thereby refuses to consider any inner-endogenous perceptions as either (a) existing and/or (b) relevant to any scientific inquiry.

4. Jim is a naive realist with regards to senses.


That is my argument and it is compatible with the Wiki definition you use above (although I prefer Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy for all these terms). You are involved in a generally more extreme case of naïve realism here. In more milder case, the person naïvely regards what is perecived via senses as real. Here, you are failing to even perceive the senses in the first place. You are naively regarding the non-existence of certain senses as real, only because you fail to perceive them, even after they have been pointed out to you, and not on any reasoned grounds (hence naïvely).

My initial criticism was that you were falling for common trap of limiting the understanding of this modern prejudice so that it excludes your preferred worldview, as you hold to it, from its purview. With modern prejudices generally, people like to assume it applies to everyone but themselves. There was a time not so long ago I held to idealist understanding that also incorporated naive realism without knowing (for ex. "alter" is held as a naively real perception-conception for most). Also, the reason we can say "perception-conception" is that the two are inseparable, as all modern cognitive science has demonstrated.
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