Criticism

[Eugene I]

For some fans of Kant's epistemology on this thread:

It remains a scandal to philosophy, and to human reason in general, that we should have to accept the existence of things outside us (from which after all we derive the whole material for our knowledge, even for that of our inner sense) merely on trust, and have no satisfactory proof with which to counter any opponent who chooses to doubt it.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B XL

[ScottRoberts]

Non-metaphysical thought holds fast to what is experienced in the physical world. In our experience we encounter energy with no signs of consciousness, and we experience consciousness which is grounded in energy. That in itself reveals consciousness to be reducible to energy, and thus physical.

....

Put another way, I avoid metaphysical speculation by referring to the infinite appearances of energy with no apparent signs of consciousness and the only appearances of consciousness arising from the energy dispersal of ATP. In other words, I appropriate Kastrup’s own argument.

Appearances can be deceiving which, with some thought, can be corrected, for example, the sun appearing to revolve around the earth. For us (most of us), some energy appears to us as having no conscious aspect. But this was not necessarily always the case. As consciousness evolves, so do appearances. We are now naive dualists. A case has been made that once people were naive idealists. For more on this see my essay Idealism vs. Common Sense.

[JeffreyW]

If we put somebody in a sleeper hold the blood supply to the brain is cut along with the glucose. Guess what then goes out. That isn’t speculation.

I've experienced that, and subjectively there was no time at all. So when was it out?

During the time others were conscious and seeing you unconscious. You aren’t the only timekeeper.

[JeffreyW]

For some fans of Kant's epistemology on this thread:

It remains a scandal to philosophy, and to human reason in general, that we should have to accept the existence of things outside us (from which after all we derive the whole material for our knowledge, even for that of our inner sense) merely on trust, and have no satisfactory proof with which to counter any opponent who chooses to doubt it.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B XL

First, I’m not a Kantian. Second, your quote is out of context which goes on to argue against what you think it claims. He is referring to the scandal created by Hume’s skepticism and Kant goes on to resolve that scandal by securing a sure place for objective knowledge. It is always a bad idea to quote from a book you never read.

[JeffreyW]

Non-metaphysical thought holds fast to what is experienced in the physical world. In our experience we encounter energy with no signs of consciousness, and we experience consciousness which is grounded in energy. That in itself reveals consciousness to be reducible to energy, and thus physical.

....

Put another way, I avoid metaphysical speculation by referring to the infinite appearances of energy with no apparent signs of consciousness and the only appearances of consciousness arising from the energy dispersal of ATP. In other words, I appropriate Kastrup’s own argument.

Appearances can be deceiving which, with some thought, can be corrected, for example, the sun appearing to revolve around the earth. For us (most of us), some energy appears to us as having no conscious aspect. But this was not necessarily always the case. As consciousness evolves, so do appearances. We are now naive dualists. A case has been made that once people were naive idealists. For more on this see my essay Idealism vs. Common Sense.

And those earlier mistakes were only resolved from further observations, not metaphysical speculation. If we ever have observable evidence to support consciousness in non-living things, I will then reconsider my view. Until then, I have no reason to seriously consider such speculation.

[AshvinP]

There is nothing in [my] experience to suggest there is as there is nothing to suggest that consciousness exists without a living brain. I once underwent general anesthetic and had no consciousness of anything during that time. [My] observations support the understanding that consciousness only exists within living brains. I have no valid reason to assume anything beyond that.

Two things here:

1) There is an implicit assumption that "consciousness", whatever it is, must be a local phenomena existing within 'things'. I see no reason for that assumption beyond our naive perception of a physical brain, which in your own view is a spatiotemporal symbol for a deeper Reality (or whatever you call what is potentially deeper beyond space-time). There are plenty of reasons against it. Just in terms of modern science, we know that all natural phenomena are ever-evolving processes with no clear boundaries, including (and especially) living organisms. And obviously there are plenty of invisible processes involved in the visible phenomena. So if we say "consciousness" is the sole exception, that is an added and unwarranted assumption.

2) We really need to test our loyalty to the method of carefully reasoning through experience without adding assumptions. What we know is that our own experience does not suggest consciousness is possible without a living brain (reflected by my bolded substitutions in your comment), and that's not necessarily true of every person on the planet, just you and I. The last sentence was fine as it is.

I think you referenced earlier that Heidegger was deeply appreciative of Mythos and Logos. If there is anything beyond doubt when it comes to these ancient testimonies, it's that whoever wrote them experienced the world much differently than we do. So already there is a clear example of experiences which we could factor in as a data point beyond our own limited experiences in the 20th-21st centuries. There are also the experiences of deep sleep and, as you mention, states such as general asethesia. We don't remember having any, except for one - duration. If there was no experience of duration, it would be as if we immediately regained conscious experience as soon as we go to sleep or get put under. We also have continuity of Being through those states. As Bergson wrote - "There is at least one reality which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple analysis. It is our own person in its flowing through time, the self which endures. With no other thing can we sympathize intellectually, or if you like, spiritually. But one thing is sure: we sympathize with ourselves."

The other data point we cannot arbitarily leave out is that of those who claim to have gained higher cognitive faculties in some way or another and perceived beyond the threshold of spatiotemporal intellectual cognition. We know we are always evolving and that our personal cognition is always evolving, from infancy to adulthood. In my view, based on many data points from many different fields of inquiry, which I think is supported by Heidegger, it's pretty clear that the cognition of collective humanity has always been evolving as well. If we were to assume our current cognitive capacity is the only one (which is no different than what Kant assumed), then that is like starting observing the growth of natural phenomena at one moment, ceasing observation at a few moments later, and concluding what we happened to observe in those few moments was the totality of that phenomena.

I hope it's clear I am not asking anyone to simply assume there is consciousness without a brain, but to remain open to the possibility, perhaps even the probability, that there is IF we continue observing and reasoning through experience, without arbitrarily leaving out any data points. Again, if we demote our thinking activity to a secondary role from the outset, we will treat what we arrive through logical reasoning as a mere accretion to the phenomena which we can never really trust in. But that treatment is only warranted under metaphysical dualism. If we are not assuming dualism from the outset, then it becomes clear our cognition acts like a sense-organ perceiving shared intuitions and imaginations and concepts more broadly which belong to the natural phenomena just as much as their properties of colors, shapes, sizes, etc. By remembering that, we are not assuming those properties reflect exactly the underlying 'thing-in-itself', but that they are legitimate sense-perceptions of our experience which need to be factored in.

[JeffreyW]

There is nothing in [my] experience to suggest there is as there is nothing to suggest that consciousness exists without a living brain. I once underwent general anesthetic and had no consciousness of anything during that time. [My] observations support the understanding that consciousness only exists within living brains. I have no valid reason to assume anything beyond that.

Two things here:

1) There is an implicit assumption that "consciousness", whatever it is, must be a local phenomena existing within 'things'. I see no reason for that assumption beyond our naive perception of a physical brain, which in your own view is a spatiotemporal symbol for a deeper Reality (or whatever you call what is potentially deeper beyond space-time). There are plenty of reasons against it. Just in terms of modern science, we know that all natural phenomena are ever-evolving processes with no clear boundaries, including (and especially) living organisms. And obviously there are plenty of invisible processes involved in the visible phenomena. So if we say "consciousness" is the sole exception, that is an added and unwarranted assumption.

2) We really need to test our loyalty to the method of carefully reasoning through experience without adding assumptions. What we know is that our own experience does not suggest consciousness is possible without a living brain (reflected by my bolded substitutions in your comment), and that's not necessarily true of every person on the planet, just you and I. The last sentence was fine as it is.

I think you referenced earlier that Heidegger was deeply appreciative of Mythos and Logos. If there is anything beyond doubt when it comes to these ancient testimonies, it's that whoever wrote them experienced the world much differently than we do. So already there is a clear example of experiences which we could factor in as a data point beyond our own limited experiences in the 20th-21st centuries. There are also the experiences of deep sleep and, as you mention, states such as general asethesia. We don't remember having any, except for one - duration. If there was no experience of duration, it would be as if we immediately regained conscious experience as soon as we go to sleep or get put under. We also have continuity of Being through those states. As Bergson wrote - "There is at least one reality which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple analysis. It is our own person in its flowing through time, the self which endures. With no other thing can we sympathize intellectually, or if you like, spiritually. But one thing is sure: we sympathize with ourselves."

The thing about general anesthesia is that sensation of time passed. Rather the last moment of consciousness is spliced onto the first moment of regained consciousness. I suspect this has a lot to do with reported NDE’s.

The other data point we cannot arbitarily leave out is that of those who claim to have gained higher cognitive faculties in some way or another and perceived beyond the threshold of spatiotemporal intellectual cognition. We know we are always evolving and that our personal cognition is always evolving, from infancy to adulthood. In my view, based on many data points from many different fields of inquiry, which I think is supported by Heidegger, it's pretty clear that the cognition of collective humanity has always been evolving as well. If we were to assume our current cognitive capacity is the only one (which is no different than what Kant assumed), then that is like starting observing the growth of natural phenomena at one moment, ceasing observation at a few moments later, and concluding what we happened to observe in those few moments was the totality of that phenomena.

I hope it's clear I am not asking anyone to simply assume there is consciousness without a brain, but to remain open to the possibility, perhaps even the probability, that there is IF we continue observing and reasoning through experience, without arbitrarily leaving out any data points. Again, if we demote our thinking activity to a secondary role from the outset, we will treat what we arrive through logical reasoning as a mere accretion to the phenomena which we can never really trust in. But that treatment is only warranted under metaphysical dualism. If we are not assuming dualism from the outset, then it becomes clear our cognition acts like a sense-organ perceiving shared intuitions and imaginations and concepts more broadly which belong to the natural phenomena just as much as their properties of colors, shapes, sizes, etc. By remembering that, we are not assuming those properties reflect exactly the underlying 'thing-in-itself', but that they are legitimate sense-perceptions of our experience which need to be factored in.

In fact i have been the one here arguing against consciousness as a hermetically concealed container we cannot escape. It is far more like an entanglement that obliterates subject/object metaphysics. But experience only shows this when a living brain is part of the entanglement. I do see it as a local entangled event between equally participating entities.


My position is somewhat different. I don’t categorically rule it out, but don’t consider worth considering without experiential reasons to do so.

[Eugene I]

For some fans of Kant's epistemology on this thread:

It remains a scandal to philosophy, and to human reason in general, that we should have to accept the existence of things outside us (from which after all we derive the whole material for our knowledge, even for that of our inner sense) merely on trust, and have no satisfactory proof with which to counter any opponent who chooses to doubt it.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B XL

First, I’m not a Kantian. Second, your quote is out of context which goes on to argue against what you think it claims. He is referring to the scandal created by Hume’s skepticism and Kant goes on to resolve that scandal by securing a sure place for objective knowledge. It is always a bad idea to quote from a book you never read.

Ah, transcendental arguments?

Despite Kant’s remaining defenders, however, few now believe that transcendental arguments can yield a direct refutation of epistemic skepticism. Most now agree that more modest goals are in order if such arguments are to remain relevant.

Also:

[Soul_of_Shu]

During the time others were conscious and seeing you unconscious.

That's just speculation that I was unconscious from some temporal perspective. I'm relying on experience, not speculation.

[AshvinP]

In fact i have been the one here arguing against consciousness as a hermetically concealed container we cannot escape. It is far more like an entanglement that obliterates subject/object metaphysics. But experience only shows this when a living brain is part of the entanglement. I do see it as a local entangled event between equally participating entities.


My position is somewhat different. I don’t categorically rule it out, but don’t consider worth considering without experiential reasons to do so.

Once conscious activity is delocalized from physical objects like the brain, then I see even less reason for you to consider your own lack of memory as evidence of anything about the existence of the underlying conscious activity. When you had no memory (except duration and continuity of self, as mentioned before), at a bare minumum, we know for certain that conscious activity was occurring through other living organisms (also without hard boundaries) and some, perhaps 'entangled' with yours, were having the experiences surrounding you that you won't remember after you wake up.

I am not sure what "it" is that you say is not worth considering. The mythic evidence, the intuition of duration and continuity of self, the evidence of evolving perception-cognition over the epochs of human history, higher cognition which perceives supersensible phenomena? If you specify, I could elaborate on the concrete experiential reasons the evidence should be considered seriously and deeply.