A hypothetical for Bernardo and for YOU

[findingblanks]

What do you think would be Bernardo's response to this question:

What's more reasonable/possible

a) solipsism being the case
b) consciousness being derived from something non-conscious


Thanks

JF

[AshvinP]

A.

[Matthew Brett]

What do you mean by consciousness, or non-conscious? I could, for example, answer B because more plausible than solipsism is the idea that the kind of consciousness we refer to when speaking of egoic, self-aware waking consciousness might in fact derive from a more fundamental something that might not be "conscious," as the word is commonly used.

Put another way: If consciousness is defined as the sum total of your awareness in the common waking state, then consciousness is not fundamental, obviously, since you are not always in the common waking state. But, maybe whatever your inner life consists in when you are "unconscious" (in deep sleep, for instance) is something fundamental, or more fundamental, upon which the common waking state is built. Thus, I could reasonably answer B, since I think solipsism is absurd, and in this view B is less so.

Do you see the problem? Words left undefined can lead you astray, or turn a straightforward question, almost magically, into a leading question.

[David_Sundaram]

What's more reasonable/possible

a) solipsism being the case
b) consciousness being derived from something non-conscious

An attempt at 'forced' choice? My answer is:

(c) Neither!

[David_Sundaram]

What's more reasonable/possible

a) solipsism being the case
b) consciousness being derived from something non-conscious

An attempt at 'forced' choice? My answer is:

(c) Neither!

Consider the analogical idea of a 'seed' or 'root' that is 'Conscious'. Are the branches and leaves that grown from IT not also going to be 'Conscious'? And would it be possible for any of them to really (though there may be 'mirages' in this regard! ) be 'solipsistically' disconnected?

[Martin_]

What do you think would be Bernardo's response to this question:

What's more reasonable/possible

a) solipsism being the case
b) consciousness being derived from something non-conscious


Thanks

JF

As David noted; are you implying that a) and b) are the only 2 possible options? In that case; explain yourself!

[findingblanks]

No, not at all. This kind of casual 'forced choice' isn't an attempt to have a vigorous and precise philosophical conversation. Sorry, but not all useful conversations are in that realm, as Bernardo often demonstrates in his book and conversations.

When people shift from technical to casual conversations, they (some of them!) can enjoy what can be tugged out of such forced choices. Of course nobody here believes that these are our only two options I thought that was obvious in how I framed it. I suspect Bernardo understands the point (as trivial as it may be) of my question. That said, I expected a few smarty pants to scold and educate me Thanks!

I go with B, by the way. While I can't even begin to imagine what it would even mean for qualia to be derived from some non-qualitative substance, I find it even more difficult to grasp that my (limited ego) experience is all there is or ever has been.

[AshvinP]

I go with B, by the way. While I can't even begin to imagine what it would even mean for qualia to be derived from some non-qualitative substance, I find it even more difficult to grasp that my (limited ego) experience is all there is or ever has been.

It may be difficult to grasp, but you can imagine A, right? And you can't even begin to imagine B (neither can anyone else, really). That's why I say A must be more reasonable/possible than B.

[Matthew Brett]

Ashvin, I think conceivability or imaginability is always a poor basis for metaphysical argumentation. I believe Mr. Kastrup has written well on that very topic.

[Matthew Brett]

For the record, I'm with David. The correct answer is C.