What is the phenomenilogy of non-metacognitive consciousness in Bernardo's model?

[Hedge90]

Bernardo argues that MAL probably doesn't have metacognition. He also says that for example in anaesthesia, in his opinion we don't exactly LOSE consciousness, it's simply that memory formation is inhibited, so that we cannot create a contiunous story-like experience of those consciousness states.
However, Bernardo also argues that nothing really exists but the present moment, which is, however, a singularity, as you can't point out what the present moment is. You can only make sense of it as a point of contact between the past (memory) and the future (expectation).
Now, I was thinking about, what, exactly, non-metacignitive consciousness mean in that model? A non-metacognitive consciousness (MAL or an anaesthesised human) doesn't recall memories and doesn't have expectations, yet the present moment is infinitely small. To me, this seems like a paradox. What are your thoughts about this?

[Martin_]

This is how I see Bernardos model:
* There is MAL
* Mal is consciosness (NOT metaconsciousness)
* There is only the present
* There is dissociation in MAL - see it as some more-or-less isolated region in some MAL-space. (not spatial)
* Dissociacion is a necessary requirement for metacognition
* Metacognition makes sense of the infinite present by processing the rest of mal in sequenced chunks -> Time is born, and so is memory and expectation.
* Thus seeing the present as the intersection surface btw memory and expectation is taking things in the wrong order.

[Hedge90]

I get your meaning, but the problem still stands in my view. Any kind of sensation or experience can only exist as a process. When you accidentally bump your feet into a table leg, even if the pain lasts only a second, that second could be divided into infinite smaller time units, a kind of Zeno's paradox. The only thing that lets you make sense of the pain and experience it as "something" is that it happens as a process, i.e. it arises, peaks, and goes away.
What I'm trying to get to is that when there's no metacognition, there's nothing to register these processes, but because moment-to-moment, they are "nothing", metacognition - if even just in a very rudimentary form, i.e. being aware of the past few moments to put the present moment into context - seems necessary for the sensation to even exist.

[ScottRoberts]

Bernardo argues that MAL probably doesn't have metacognition. He also says that for example in anaesthesia, in his opinion we don't exactly LOSE consciousness, it's simply that memory formation is inhibited, so that we cannot create a contiunous story-like experience of those consciousness states.
However, Bernardo also argues that nothing really exists but the present moment, which is, however, a singularity, as you can't point out what the present moment is. You can only make sense of it as a point of contact between the past (memory) and the future (expectation).
Now, I was thinking about, what, exactly, non-metacignitive consciousness mean in that model? A non-metacognitive consciousness (MAL or an anaesthesised human) doesn't recall memories and doesn't have expectations, yet the present moment is infinitely small. To me, this seems like a paradox. What are your thoughts about this?

One might first point out that the idea that the present is infinitesimally small has no empirical basis whatsoever. As far as I can see, that idea only occurs in the mathematical abstraction of time used by physicists. Empirically, one experiences the present as having some duration, enough, e.g., to contain the first three notes and the beginning of the fourth in the beginning of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. Or long enough to see a fly go past.

This means that the present is big enough to contain a memory or expectation, so that resolves that paradox. I'm not sure how this relates to the question of meta-cognition, however.

[Martin_]

Also, in physics, the present is not a singulartiy. It stops at ~10^-35s (Planck Time) (so infinitesimal is a good word) . Not wthe same type of present that Scott is talking about but at least it's not a paradoxal singularity, just very very short...

[Ben Iscatus]

This means that the present is big enough to contain a memory or expectation, so that resolves that paradox. I'm not sure how this relates to the question of meta-cognition, however.

I'd suggest that if the present were all-encompassing, as with MAL, metacognition would likely be impossible, since there is no sense of causality, no event to reflect upon. "If this then that" would not be an option. All would be simply "this and that".

[Starbuck]

This means that the present is big enough to contain a memory or expectation, so that resolves that paradox. I'm not sure how this relates to the question of meta-cognition, however.

I'd suggest that if the present were all-encompassing, as with MAL, metacognition would likely be impossible, since there is no sense of causality, no event to reflect upon. "If this then that" would not be an option. All would be simply "this and that".

Exactly. Metacognition is a dualistic phenomena, adding weight to the view of the instinctive nature of mind at large.

[Ben Iscatus]

Metacognition is a dualistic phenomena

Yes, a good thought. It implies that, as alters, our thought processes are intentionally dualistic.