Prospects for a Phenomenological Idealism

[AshvinP]

PoF always seems to include more than I thought every time I return to it, so at this point, I am assuming it includes everything

That's ominous, with respect to what I'm trying to do with PoF. Anyway, here's a link to what I've done so far (I'm in the middle of Chapter 4). Very much subject to revision, and criticism, in particular as to what I've stripped out but shouldn't have.

[url=https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Eik ... sp=sharing[/url]

It looks good so far! I think it will be very helpful for people here who haven't been able to work their way through PoF yet. Perhaps V. would like to take a look once it's finished. It's always difficult to narrow such a work of philosophical art down without feeling some critical portion has been omitted, but I think it will serve its purpose if it at least motivates people to go read the full version with a broad intuitive and conceptual sense for what they will be encountering.

[Federica]

PoF always seems to include more than I thought every time I return to it, so at this point, I am assuming it includes everything

That's ominous, with respect to what I'm trying to do with PoF. Anyway, here's a link to what I've done so far (I'm in the middle of Chapter 4). Very much subject to revision, and criticism, in particular as to what I've stripped out but shouldn't have.

[url=https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Eik ... sp=sharing[/url]

Scott,

I have a couple of questions on you Ch. 1, which I report here:

Ch 1: Conscious Human Action
Are we free or are all our actions determined by something outside of ourselves?

Unlike a stone’s movements, which are determined by forces outside itself (gravity, being thrown), or a baby’s reaching for food, humans are conscious of the causes of some of their actions. We acquire knowledge of these reasons through thinking. Between the desire for something and acting on that desire, we have awareness of the desire, and a mental picture of what acting on it will entail, and choose whether or not to act on it.

Q1: Doesn't the expression "outside of ourselves" exclude the lack of freedom of the type 'unconscious action under the impulse of blind instinct', like the baby's?


Q2: I would think that the choice to act, as you characterize it, could still depend on a motive that "impels us with iron necessity". I am reminded of:

The primary question is not whether I can do a thing or not when a motive has worked upon me, but whether there are any motives except such as impel me with absolute necessity.

And of this connected passage too:

the question is just whether reason, purposes, and decisions exercise the same kind of compulsion over a man as his animal passions. If without my co-operation, a rational decision emerges in me with the same necessity with which hunger and thirst arise, then I must needs obey it, and my freedom is an illusion.

I wonder if you contemplated not to strip out that idea, insofar as it distinguishes Steiner’s idea of freedom as conscious action from other common conceptions. In particular, after your last sentence in the chapter, I feel it would help to add something about that distinction, with respect to desires we might reflect on, ad decide to act on, but without being free in Steiner's sense.


As Max Leyf wrote with regards to Steiner's idea of freedom in PoF:

After all, I did not choose my desires. By identifying them with my motives, I indenture my own will to their authority. The reason I said this is “coercion of the most pernicious sort” is precisely because a person in this condition is inclined to imagine himself to be free.

What's been your thought process on these distinctions?

[ScottRoberts]

I have a couple of questions on you Ch. 1, which I report here:

Ch 1: Conscious Human Action
Are we free or are all our actions determined by something outside of ourselves?

Unlike a stone’s movements, which are determined by forces outside itself (gravity, being thrown), or a baby’s reaching for food, humans are conscious of the causes of some of their actions. We acquire knowledge of these reasons through thinking. Between the desire for something and acting on that desire, we have awareness of the desire, and a mental picture of what acting on it will entail, and choose whether or not to act on it.

Q1: Doesn't the expression "outside of ourselves" exclude the lack of freedom of the type 'unconscious action under the impulse of blind instinct', like the baby's?

Yes. I will replace it with "outside of our control".

Q2: I would think that the choice to act, as you characterize it, could still depend on a motive that "impels us with iron necessity". I am reminded of:

The primary question is not whether I can do a thing or not when a motive has worked upon me, but whether there are any motives except such as impel me with absolute necessity.

And of this connected passage too:

the question is just whether reason, purposes, and decisions exercise the same kind of compulsion over a man as his animal passions. If without my co-operation, a rational decision emerges in me with the same necessity with which hunger and thirst arise, then I must needs obey it, and my freedom is an illusion.

I wonder if you contemplated not to strip out that idea, insofar as it distinguishes Steiner’s idea of freedom as conscious action from other common conceptions. In particular, after your last sentence in the chapter, I feel it would help to add something about that distinction, with respect to desires we might reflect on, ad decide to act on, but without being free is Steiner's sense.

I'll need to think about this some more, but I'm wondering if this can be boiled down to replacing my last sentence with:

"Between the desire for something and acting on that desire, we can have knowledge of the desire and the consequences of acting on it, as well as any other motives we may have for an action, and choose to act based on that knowledge."

As Max Leyf wrote with regards to Steiner's idea of freedom in PoF:

After all, I did not choose my desires. By identifying them with my motives, I indenture my own will to their authority. The reason I said this is “coercion of the most pernicious sort” is precisely because a person in this condition is inclined to imagine himself to be free.

What's been your thought process on these distinctions?

I'm not sure. I think I have been thinking that I will be thinking about them when I get to Part 2. By the way, just yesterday I decided I need to re-read Max's PoF summary.

Not so by-the-way, I have lately been thinking that what I finally end up with will not look like what is in the link. I now think of it more as just preparatory notes.

[Federica]

Q2: I would think that the choice to act, as you characterize it, could still depend on a motive that "impels us with iron necessity". I am reminded of:

The primary question is not whether I can do a thing or not when a motive has worked upon me, but whether there are any motives except such as impel me with absolute necessity.

And of this connected passage too:

the question is just whether reason, purposes, and decisions exercise the same kind of compulsion over a man as his animal passions. If without my co-operation, a rational decision emerges in me with the same necessity with which hunger and thirst arise, then I must needs obey it, and my freedom is an illusion.

I wonder if you contemplated not to strip out that idea, insofar as it distinguishes Steiner’s idea of freedom as conscious action from other common conceptions. In particular, after your last sentence in the chapter, I feel it would help to add something about that distinction, with respect to desires we might reflect on, ad decide to act on, but without being free is Steiner's sense.

I'll need to think about this some more, but I'm wondering if this can be boiled down to replacing my last sentence with:

"Between the desire for something and acting on that desire, we can have knowledge of the desire and the consequences of acting on it, as well as any other motives we may have for an action, and choose to act based on that knowledge."

Mm. I'll add my impressions, for what it's worth. I would think that your rephrasing is similar to the previous one in the face of Steiner's pointing. It’s not the variety of motives and their consequences and our knowledge of that variety, it’s the level of necessity with which motives compel us, be them instinctual or so-called rational. I believe the gist of the chapter resides in noticing how our thinking positions itself in the face of that level of compulsion. Is thinking a vassal of the desire (even rationalized) or is it a free agency operating above the level of absolute compulsion, thereby differentiating motives from desires?
This pointing, although not contradicted by your rephrasing, is not evident in it. I guess it would ultimately depend on how pedagogical you want your PoF version to be, versus a condensation, a pro-memoria, that distills the essential logical thread.

I'm not sure. I think I have been thinking that I will be thinking about them when I get to Part 2. By the way, just yesterday I decided I need to re-read Max's PoF summary.

Not so by-the-way, I have lately been thinking that what I finally end up with will not look like what is in the link. I now think of it more as just preparatory notes.

Yes, and I completely agree that you could alternatively address that more directly in Part 2.
I look forward to more preparatory notes and to the final version!

[ScottRoberts]

Mm. I'll add my impressions, for what it's worth. I would think that your rephrasing is similar to the previous one in the face of Steiner's pointing. It’s not the variety of motives and their consequences and our knowledge of that variety, it’s the level of necessity with which motives compel us, be them instinctual or so-called rational. I believe the gist of the chapter resides in noticing how our thinking positions itself in the face of that level of compulsion. Is thinking a vassal of the desire (even rationalized) or is it a free agency operating above the level of absolute compulsion, thereby differentiating motives from desires?

How does the following sound?

"Between the causes of our actions (desires, motives, character) and our actions, we (unlike babies and animals and stones) can be aware of those causes. We have knowledge of them. We gain that knowledge through thinking, and through thinking arrive at decisions. And so, if we want to answer the question of will, we need to examine the role of thinking. Do we arrive at our decisions freely, which is to ask, is our thinking free?"

This pointing, although not contradicted by your rephrasing, is not evident in it. I guess it would ultimately depend on how pedagogical you want your PoF version to be, versus a condensation, a pro-memoria, that distills the essential logical thread.

What I wanted was a logical thread that would imply the pedagogical. But now I am less sure if that can work.

[Federica]

Mm. I'll add my impressions, for what it's worth. I would think that your rephrasing is similar to the previous one in the face of Steiner's pointing. It’s not the variety of motives and their consequences and our knowledge of that variety, it’s the level of necessity with which motives compel us, be them instinctual or so-called rational. I believe the gist of the chapter resides in noticing how our thinking positions itself in the face of that level of compulsion. Is thinking a vassal of the desire (even rationalized) or is it a free agency operating above the level of absolute compulsion, thereby differentiating motives from desires?

How does the following sound?

"Between the causes of our actions (desires, motives, character) and our actions, we (unlike babies and animals and stones) can be aware of those causes. We have knowledge of them. We gain that knowledge through thinking, and through thinking arrive at decisions. And so, if we want to answer the question of will, we need to examine the role of thinking. Do we arrive at our decisions freely, which is to ask, is our thinking free?"

This pointing, although not contradicted by your rephrasing, is not evident in it. I guess it would ultimately depend on how pedagogical you want your PoF version to be, versus a condensation, a pro-memoria, that distills the essential logical thread.

What I wanted was a logical thread that would imply the pedagogical. But now I am less sure if that can work.

It sounds great! For me this phrasing points to the precise direction that you will develop in Part 2, with perfectly balanced wording. The question is clearly indicated, but in seed form, and concision of the logical thread is preserved.

[ScottRoberts]

Well, I seem to be stuck in Part II. On the one hand, I can't put into my own words what Steiner means by "intuitive thinking", at least as something one can distinguish in ordinary consciousness. (Any suggestions on that welcome, In Theosophy he says it is true and good ideas we get from the Spirit Self, but that of course won't do.) On the other, I'm not convinced that the message of Part II is any more than "Base your actions on your own ideals, arrived at by your own thinking." Or as Max Leyf says: "Fundamentally, acting out of freedom means striving to realize ideals that one has set for oneself. Put another way, a free deed is one that is performed for reasons that are one's own."

And on Part I, I think that Barfield's Rudolf Steiner's Concept of Mind does all I wanted to do. It is the last essay in Barfield's Romanticism Comes of Age (1966 edition, it's not in earlier editions), but is available on-line

here.

One could give an even shorter summary, but is it worth it? The PDF is only 7 pages.

[AshvinP]

Well, I seem to be stuck in Part II. On the one hand, I can't put into my own words what Steiner means by "intuitive thinking", at least as something one can distinguish in ordinary consciousness. (Any suggestions on that welcome, In Theosophy he says it is true and good ideas we get from the Spirit Self, but that of course won't do.) On the other, I'm not convinced that the message of Part II is any more than "Base your actions on your own ideals, arrived at by your own thinking." Or as Max Leyf says: "Fundamentally, acting out of freedom means striving to realize ideals that one has set for oneself. Put another way, a free deed is one that is performed for reasons that are one's own."

And on Part I, I think that Barfield's Rudolf Steiner's Concept of Mind does all I wanted to do. It is the last essay in Barfield's Romanticism Comes of Age (1966 edition, it's not in earlier editions), but is available on-line

here.

One could give an even shorter summary, but is it worth it? The PDF is only 7 pages.

One way to conceive intuitive thinking is instinctive activity that is influenced by high ideals. The other day I was watching a cat from above, as she was slowly stalking some prey in the bushes. At the same time, I could see the sun setting behind some mountains. Of course the cat couldn't see the sunset : ) and only humans can see and reflect on both at the same time.

I was thinking, if I could consciously experience the meaning of this sunset penetrating and inspiring my cognitive will like the cat experiences the prey in the bushes motivating its (group) will, then I would be thinking intuitively. Of course the latter experience wouldn't be anything similar to how we experience instincts formatted by our normal thinking. The "meaning" of sunset could be conceived as the vast array of ideational activity that went into making it so I would be perceiving-contemplating the sunset at that exact moment. The closest we normally come is when everything feels to make holistic sense for a few moments and there is a deep purpose to our lives.

So I'm not sure if that helps in this context or how to put it in concise philosophical terms.

[ScottRoberts]

One way to conceive intuitive thinking is instinctive activity that is influenced by high ideals. The other day I was watching a cat from above, as she was slowly stalking some prey in the bushes. At the same time, I could see the sun setting behind some mountains. Of course the cat couldn't see the sunset : ) and only humans can see and reflect on both at the same time.

I was thinking, if I could consciously experience the meaning of this sunset penetrating and inspiring my cognitive will like the cat experiences the prey in the bushes motivating its (group) will, then I would be thinking intuitively. Of course the latter experience wouldn't be anything similar to how we experience instincts formatted by our normal thinking. The "meaning" of sunset could be conceived as the vast array of ideational activity that went into making it so I would be perceiving-contemplating the sunset at that exact moment. The closest we normally come is when everything feels to make holistic sense for a few moments and there is a deep purpose to our lives.

So I'm not sure if that helps in this context or how to put it in concise philosophical terms.

It helps me. RS does say that intuitive thinking involves feeling, so I think one could define it as "pure, feeling-thinking". The "pure" could also be replaced by "free", that is, free of entanglements with antipathies and sympathies or outside authority. So an unfree/impure feeling-thinking might be resenting how someone has hurt you. Unfortunately, the only example I can think of of free/pure feeling-thinking is experiencing mathematical beauty, Though I suppose that could be extended to any case of satisfaction when realizing the solution to a problem.

[Federica]

Well, I seem to be stuck in Part II. On the one hand, I can't put into my own words what Steiner means by "intuitive thinking", at least as something one can distinguish in ordinary consciousness. (Any suggestions on that welcome, In Theosophy he says it is true and good ideas we get from the Spirit Self, but that of course won't do.) On the other, I'm not convinced that the message of Part II is any more than "Base your actions on your own ideals, arrived at by your own thinking." Or as Max Leyf says: "Fundamentally, acting out of freedom means striving to realize ideals that one has set for oneself. Put another way, a free deed is one that is performed for reasons that are one's own."

And on Part I, I think that Barfield's Rudolf Steiner's Concept of Mind does all I wanted to do. It is the last essay in Barfield's Romanticism Comes of Age (1966 edition, it's not in earlier editions), but is available on-line

here.

One could give an even shorter summary, but is it worth it? The PDF is only 7 pages.

The way I see it, by intuitive thinking Steiner means living thinking. Thinking that becomes aware of its potential as it seeks to explore the depth of that potential. It's thinking that wants to work on and through itself, towards higher and higher levels of consciousness. In this sense it encompasses feeling just as much as it encompasses the will. I don't think it's definable as feeling-thinking in particular. Rather, all conscious activity is set right, ennobled, when experienced through the light of (intuitive) thinking. "Pure" seems to me like an appropriate adjective, inasmuch as it refers to thinking experienced in its most proper nature. I believe that replacing "pure" with "free" would be less explicative in this context.

In terms of examples, I agree that resenting is impure, unintuitive thinking, (literally) narrow-minded: it's thinking stuck in the short waves of temporal fragments that can hardly provide meaning in isolation. Another easy example would be intellectual thinking, materialistic thinking, modeling. And for the positive examples: any thinking exercise, concentration, meditation, that incorporates the intent towards the purity of thinking (not necessarily the fully accomplished result); naturally, all sense-free thinking activity also, where thinking seeks expansion within itself, without any sense-perceptible anchor; and, any imperfect conscious attempt in these directions is pure thinking too, I would say. About the beauty of a mathematical solution, I would think: yes, great example, and also all the thinking leading to that beautiful solution, to the extent that the mathematical solution is lived ‘from within’, to the extent that it becomes the shape of our being, as Cleric would say. On the contrary, if the solution is satisfying from some utilitarian perspective that lies outside thinking, or if it's been pursued as part of an intellectual reasoning, executed from the side, then it's ordinary thinking, that has little to do with the intention of pure thinking.

Regarding Barfield's essay (thank you for sharing it!) I have only read the first of the 7 pages (I've found the word "axiome" alarming ). Still, my impression is that the work you are doing is different, and not at all nullified by this essay. You are writing a contextual reading guide, where you want to refrain from elaborations of any kind. It will surely be highly useful, in a very distinct way with respect to Barfield’s comments.