Please note that I do not refer to the (bad) use made of Nietzsche'swi will to power nor to Nietzsche's moral condition. Nietzsche may will be considered a morally noble person. I'm talking about subjectivity. Nietzsche has various aphorisms about science. There are scientists, says Nietzsche, who are descendants of lawyers, for whom a good job is to put things in order. Darwin's evolution stems from small people whose whole ambition is self-preservation and other claims in a similar spirit about the lack of objectivity of science and its dependence on the character of scientists.AshvinP wrote: ↑Mon Mar 08, 2021 8:19 pmMade by you or someone else, the point is invalid. I know many fundamentalist theists and secular relativists both want us to believe Nietzsche was in the relativist camp, but that simply doesn't cash out from his work. He was concerned with freedom, the freedom of the human spirit to realize these 'objective values' for itself so that they could naturally flow from its own essence. And it was not an abstract concern either, because it clearly provided him penetrating insights into the various 'movements' of his era and how they would develop in the century to come, which only look rather unimpressive now because we have the benefit of hindsight.Shaibei wrote: ↑Mon Mar 08, 2021 4:09 pmThis is not really a point made by me, but by various philosophers. As i wrote one can understand why. As a jew i have no problem rejecting jesus and have no interest with converting others to judahismAshvinP wrote: ↑Sun Mar 07, 2021 11:15 pm
I know, and the point I am making is that Kant and Nietzsche do not deny the objective reality of ideals, only the claim that humanity has already found those ideals as static/fixed entities from the past. Therefore it is not accurate to say they embrace or are generally responsible for relativism when properly understood. Although I can see why the static view would be adopted if Christ is denied as the archetype. Ironically, it was Nietzsche who said:
Steiner wrote:The soul experiences of the Germans during the War of 1870 found so little echo in his soul that “while the thunder of battle passed from Wörth over Europe,” he sat in a small corner of the Alps, “brooding and puzzled, consequently most grieved, and at the same time not grieved,” and wrote down his thoughts about the Greeks. And, a few weeks later, as he found himself “under the walls of Metz,” he still was not freed from the questions which he had concerning the life and art of the Greeks. (See Versuch einer Selbstkritik, Attempt at a Self-Critique, in the 2nd edition of his Geburt der Tragödie, Birth of Tragedy.) When the war came to an end, he entered so little enthusiasm of his German contemporaries over the decisive victory that in the year 1873 in his writing about David Strauss he spoke about “the bad and dangerous consequences” of the victorious struggle. He even represented it as insanity that German culture should have been victorious in this struggle, and he described this insanity as dangerous because if it should become dominant within the German nation, the danger would exist of transforming the victory into complete defeat; a defeat, yes, an extirpation of the German spirit in favor of “the German realm.” This was Nietzsche's attitude at a time when the whole of Europe was filled with national fanaticism. It is the thinking of a personality not in harmony with his time, of a fighter against his time.
-Friedrich Nietzsche: Fighter for Freedom (1895) (emphasis in original)
The same goes for Nietzsche's claims that morality is only for the benefit of society and is not absolute on its own part and the like