Do you mean that speculative hypothesis as a consideration against idealism in general (as a proof for materialism), or specifically against analytical idealism?Dave casarino wrote: ↑Tue Mar 09, 2021 2:04 pm Anywaaaay a strong consideration against Kastrup may (or may not) be the future possibility of AI developers fully activating subjection within some pseudo organic material construct that has no basis in real living DNA of any kind (because real DNA/genetics might be magical and the only way consciousness can manifest whether emergent or as alter) and is thus completely synthetic despite being intricately analogous in form and structure to the brains found in organic entities. But if this is achieved then what we would have to consider is would the precise architecture of an adequate brain form be a producer/generator or does it mathematically tie consciousness to one spot due to the dynamic of it's function in tandem with it's special architecture, as in does the form of accurate brain do something to localise MAL or pull in "souls" so long as it is "activated" or alive? We would have to ask this android of sorts these questions, after teaching it to speak and accentuate itself (chances are it may not know).
In the first case, possibility of creating tulpa thought-forms and assigning them to silicon base would be a counterargument against validity of proof of agentive AI. Preventing such Pygmalion type experimenter effect would be extremely difficult to control and verify.
In the latter case, the argumentation would be very nuanced comparison of analytical idealism vs. the sort of animism that enables tulpa forms.