Gramsci and idealism

[JustinG]

In this post I am going to discuss some of the aspects of an interesting section of Gramsci’s notebooks titled ‘The So-Called “Reality of the External World” ’(SPN 440-448).

Gramsci notes at the beginning of this section that the general public never questions that the external world objectively exists. To raise any objections to such a belief is likely to provoke ‘an irresistible and gargantuan outburst of laughter’. He then asks what the origin of this steadfast common sense belief in an objective, external world is. For Gramsci, it has religious origins:

‘Since all religions have taught and do teach that the world, nature, the universe were created by God before the creation of man, and therefore man found the world all ready made, catalogued and defined once and for all, this belief has become an iron fact of “common sense” and survives with the same solidity even if religious feeling is dead or asleep’ (441).

Whilst belief in an objective external world may have religious origins, it also fuels a scientistic view of the world in which the ‘so-called exact or physical sciences... are regarded as the only true philosophy or knowledge of the world’ (442).

Contrary to the common sense of the general public, religious transcendentalism and scientism, Gramsci argues that’[w]ithout doubt the subjectivist conception is proper to modern philosophy in its most achieved and advanced form..’. The ‘subjectivist conception’ referred to here is the conception that the world is a creation of subjectivity, and does not have independent, objective existence. Gramsci argues that the subjectivist conception is useful for the criticism of both ‘the philosophy of transcendence on the one hand and the naïve metaphysics of commons sense and of philosophical materialism on the other’ (444). In affirming the validity of the subjectivist conception and critiquing the notion of an ‘extra-historical and extra-human objectivity’ Gramsci asks ‘who is the judge of such objectivity? Who is able to put himself in this kind of “standpoint of the cosmos in itself” and what could such a standpoint mean?’ (445).

It might seem here that Gramsci is going down the path of solipsism. However, he avoids this pathway through stressing that knowledge is a social, rather than an individual creation. ‘Objectivity’ is something that is created through the intersubjective relations between humans. Thus, he writes:

“We know reality only in relation to man, and since man is historical becoming, knowledge and reality are also a becoming and so is objectivity..’ (446).

Ultimately, Gramsci sees this becoming as culminating in the cultural unification of all of humanity:

‘Man knows objectively in so far as knowledge is real for the whole human race historically unified in a single unitary cultural system … What the idealists call “spirit” is not a point of departure but a point of arrival’ (445).

Looking from a contemporary perspective, Gramsci’s talk of the cultural unification of humanity has a distinctly totalizing and authoritarian ring to it. In this respect, his philosophy seems outdated, lacking in appreciation of diverse ways of knowing, and in need of revision. Contemporary Gramscian scholars, such as Laclau and Mouffe reject this totalizing aspect of Gramsci’s philosophy and develop it in different ways, though I haven’t read enough of their work to make any comments on it. Gramsci’s focus on human subjectivity and social development has also been criticised as being overly anthropocentric and neglectful of the rest of nature ( I’ll return to this criticism in another post).

Despite these flaws, his account of the intersubjective social construction of the world, and his critique of scientism and the notion of an independent ‘objective reality’ still has, in my view, considerable contemporary relevance.

[SanteriSatama]

In this post I am going to discuss some of the aspects of an interesting section of Gramsci’s notebooks titled ‘The So-Called “Reality of the External World” ’(SPN 440-448).

Gramsci notes at the beginning of this section that the general public never questions that the external world objectively exists. To raise any objections to such a belief is likely to provoke ‘an irresistible and gargantuan outburst of laughter’. He then asks what the origin of this steadfast common sense belief in an objective, external world is. For Gramsci, it has religious origins:

‘Since all religions have taught and do teach that the world, nature, the universe were created by God before the creation of man, and therefore man found the world all ready made, catalogued and defined once and for all, this belief has become an iron fact of “common sense” and survives with the same solidity even if religious feeling is dead or asleep’ (441).

Whilst belief in an objective external world may have religious origins, it also fuels a scientistic view of the world in which the ‘so-called exact or physical sciences... are regarded as the only true philosophy or knowledge of the world’ (442).

Contrary to the common sense of the general public, religious transcendentalism and scientism, Gramsci argues that’[w]ithout doubt the subjectivist conception is proper to modern philosophy in its most achieved and advanced form..’. The ‘subjectivist conception’ referred to here is the conception that the world is a creation of subjectivity, and does not have independent, objective existence. Gramsci argues that the subjectivist conception is useful for the criticism of both ‘the philosophy of transcendence on the one hand and the naïve metaphysics of commons sense and of philosophical materialism on the other’ (444). In affirming the validity of the subjectivist conception and critiquing the notion of an ‘extra-historical and extra-human objectivity’ Gramsci asks ‘who is the judge of such objectivity? Who is able to put himself in this kind of “standpoint of the cosmos in itself” and what could such a standpoint mean?’ (445).

It might seem here that Gramsci is going down the path of solipsism. However, he avoids this pathway through stressing that knowledge is a social, rather than an individual creation. ‘Objectivity’ is something that is created through the intersubjective relations between humans. Thus, he writes:

“We know reality only in relation to man, and since man is historical becoming, knowledge and reality are also a becoming and so is objectivity..’ (446).

Ultimately, Gramsci sees this becoming as culminating in the cultural unification of all of humanity:

‘Man knows objectively in so far as knowledge is real for the whole human race historically unified in a single unitary cultural system … What the idealists call “spirit” is not a point of departure but a point of arrival’ (445).

Looking from a contemporary perspective, Gramsci’s talk of the cultural unification of humanity has a distinctly totalizing and authoritarian ring to it. In this respect, his philosophy seems outdated, lacking in appreciation of diverse ways of knowing, and in need of revision. Contemporary Gramscian scholars, such as Laclau and Mouffe reject this totalizing aspect of Gramsci’s philosophy and develop it in different ways, though I haven’t read enough of their work to make any comments on it. Gramsci’s focus on human subjectivity and social development has also been criticised as being overly anthropocentric and neglectful of the rest of nature ( I’ll return to this criticism in another post).

Despite these flaws, his account of the intersubjective social construction of the world, and his critique of scientism and the notion of an independent ‘objective reality’ still has, in my view, considerable contemporary relevance.

Gramski's anthropocentric intersubjectivism can be expanded to intersubjectivism of new animism, ie. perspectival multinaturalism and planetary (etc.) ecology of their/our social relations.

[Lou Gold]

Gramski's anthropocentric intersubjectivism can be expanded to intersubjectivism of new animism, ie. perspectival multinaturalism and planetary (etc.) ecology of their/our social relations.

Surely the octopus and the ant perceive an external environment. Is it merely the degree of dissociation that generates the need/desire for religion (theist or atheist)? For philosophy? What if the view is turned around to observe the degree of integration? What does this say about Jung's individuation?

[JustinG]

Gramski's anthropocentric intersubjectivism can be expanded to intersubjectivism of new animism, ie. perspectival multinaturalism and planetary (etc.) ecology of their/our social relations.

I kind of agree with that, but think animism can run into problems, at least in terms of thinking from a Eurocentric point of view, in terms of the unity of subjects (eg if a rock is a subject, does breaking a rock up into a thousand pieces create a thousand subjects?). As Freya Mathews argues (https://www.amazon.com/Love-Matter-Cont ... 0791458083), the boundaries between regions of matter, such as mountain ranges containing mountains and rocks, are nominal and not discrete, whereas subjectivity has an ontological unity and indivisibility.

Mathews solves this problem by using a cosmopsychist framework to argue that if the cosmos as a whole has a subjective unity, particular regions of it may express aspects of this subjective unity. So there may be a ‘spirit of place’ associated with regions of space or natural formations even if such regions have no subjective unity in themselves, by virtue of them being expressions of the subjectivity and intentionality of the whole cosmos.

[SanteriSatama]

I kind of agree with that, but think animism can run into problems, at least in terms of thinking from a Eurocentric point of view, in terms of the unity of subjects (eg if a rock is a subject, does breaking a rock up into a thousand pieces create a thousand subjects?). As Freya Mathews argues (https://www.amazon.com/Love-Matter-Cont ... 0791458083), the boundaries between regions of matter, such as mountain ranges containing mountains and rocks, are nominal and not discrete, whereas subjectivity has an ontological unity and indivisibility.

Mathews solves this problem by using a cosmopsychist framework to argue that if the cosmos as a whole has a subjective unity, particular regions of it may express aspects of this subjective unity. So there may be a ‘spirit of place’ associated with regions of space or natural formations even if such regions have no subjective unity in themselves, by virtue of them being expressions of the subjectivity and intentionality of the whole cosmos.

Another way to solve this issue, the way our still largely animistic language speaks, is asubjective ground, on which intersubjective and subject-object relations can arise and cease. Person pronoun of asubjective verb forms is null/indefinite. For subjectivities to be able to reciprocally relate and reflect, ground of omnipresent open interval is necessary.

[JustinG]

This post is about Gramsci and nature.

Gramsci’s philosophy has been criticised for being overly anthropocentric and lacking in appreciation of the constraints imposed by the natural world. For instance, he talks of human progress in terms of ‘rationally dominating nature’ (SPN 358). Further, his contention that it is ‘not atomic theory that explains human history but the other way about’ (468) could be conducive to views which are dismissive of the importance of the natural sciences (although this was not the view of Gramsci himself). In these days of mounting ecological crises, in which effective application of the natural sciences is essential, Gramsci’s views on nature may therefore not be useful or suitable.

The following passage captures both the resonances of Gramsci's philosophy of praxis with idealism and its anthropocentric character:

‘The idea of “objective” in metaphysical materialism would appear to mean an objectivity that exists even apart from man; but when one affirms that a reality would exist even if man did not, one is either speaking metaphorically, or one is falling into a form of mysticism. We know reality only in relation to man, and since man is historical becoming, knowledge and reality are also a becoming and so is objectivity..’ (446)

The passage above can be criticised for its implicit assumption that the subjective experience of reality is limited to humans. This amounts to something almost like a ‘species solipsism’. Yet even if one emphasizes the intersubjective character of experience, as Gramsci does, there does not seem to be any good reason to deny intersubjective experience to other groups of primates, or to a colony of ants for that matter.

So, Gramsci’s assertion that we ‘know reality only in relation to man’ would better be reformulated as ‘reality can only be known in relation to knowing subjects’. Gramsci's anthropocentrism and its tendency towards devaluation of environmental concerns can then be rectifed through this recognition that subjectivity is not limited to humans. It then becomes a matter of inferring what types of entities are knowing subjects, which could lead to a variety of animist, panpsychist or cosmopsychist positions. Which non-human entities should be characterised as subjects is, of course, an issue of great debate, but is not relevant for the purposes of this post.

The anthropocentric defect in Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis does not invalidate this philosophy. Rather, it is consistent with it. The philosophy of praxis entails that philosophy evolves with sociohistorical circumstances, and this includes the tenets of the philosophy of praxis itself. Gramsci was writing at a time when anthropocentric humanism was prevalent, and the constraints of living on a finite planet were not as evident as they are today. As these circumstances have changed, the anthropocentric bias of the philosophy praxis is not appropriate and can be rejected, without rejecting the philosophy of praxis itself.

[AshvinP]

This post is about Gramsci and nature.

Gramsci’s philosophy has been criticised for being overly anthropocentric and lacking in appreciation of the constraints imposed by the natural world. For instance, he talks of human progress in terms of ‘rationally dominating nature’ (SPN 358). Further, his contention that it is ‘not atomic theory that explains human history but the other way about’ (468) could be conducive to views which are dismissive of the importance of the natural sciences (although this was not the view of Gramsci himself). In these days of mounting ecological crises, in which effective application of the natural sciences is essential, Gramsci’s views on nature may therefore not be useful or suitable.

The following passage captures both the resonances of Gramsci's philosophy of praxis with idealism and its anthropocentric character:

‘The idea of “objective” in metaphysical materialism would appear to mean an objectivity that exists even apart from man; but when one affirms that a reality would exist even if man did not, one is either speaking metaphorically, or one is falling into a form of mysticism. We know reality only in relation to man, and since man is historical becoming, knowledge and reality are also a becoming and so is objectivity..’ (446)

The passage above can be criticised for its implicit assumption that the subjective experience of reality is limited to humans. This amounts to something almost like a ‘species solipsism’. Yet even if one emphasizes the intersubjective character of experience, as Gramsci does, there does not seem to be any good reason to deny intersubjective experience to other groups of primates, or to a colony of ants for that matter.

So, Gramsci’s assertion that we ‘know reality only in relation to man’ would better be reformulated as ‘reality can only be known in relation to knowing subjects’. Gramsci's anthropocentrism and its tendency towards devaluation of environmental concerns can then be rectifed through this recognition that subjectivity is not limited to humans. It then becomes a matter of inferring what types of entities are knowing subjects, which could lead to a variety of animist, panpsychist or cosmopsychist positions. Which non-human entities should be characterised as subjects is, of course, an issue of great debate, but is not relevant for the purposes of this post.

The anthropocentric defect in Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis does not invalidate this philosophy. Rather, it is consistent with it. The philosophy of praxis entails that philosophy evolves with sociohistorical circumstances, and this includes the tenets of the philosophy of praxis itself. Gramsci was writing at a time when anthropocentric humanism was prevalent, and the constraints of living on a finite planet were not as evident as they are today. As these circumstances have changed, the anthropocentric bias of the philosophy praxis is not appropriate and can be rejected, without rejecting the philosophy of praxis itself.

I would say Gramsci's anthropocentric approach, based on what you have been posting, is not a defect but a feature. It is the only proper philosophical approach to take. There is no any reason to deny intersubjective experience to non-humans, but there is also no reason to pretend we can philosophize about it until we have actually experienced their conscious perspectives. Until then, we must stick with the human modes of experiencing and knowing the world. The anthropocentric empirical-pragmatic approach is more respectful to non-human life, as it does not claim their perspectives to be fully encompassed within our own.

[AshvinP]

This post is about Gramsci and nature.

Gramsci’s philosophy has been criticised for being overly anthropocentric and lacking in appreciation of the constraints imposed by the natural world. For instance, he talks of human progress in terms of ‘rationally dominating nature’ (SPN 358). Further, his contention that it is ‘not atomic theory that explains human history but the other way about’ (468) could be conducive to views which are dismissive of the importance of the natural sciences (although this was not the view of Gramsci himself). In these days of mounting ecological crises, in which effective application of the natural sciences is essential, Gramsci’s views on nature may therefore not be useful or suitable.

The following passage captures both the resonances of Gramsci's philosophy of praxis with idealism and its anthropocentric character:

‘The idea of “objective” in metaphysical materialism would appear to mean an objectivity that exists even apart from man; but when one affirms that a reality would exist even if man did not, one is either speaking metaphorically, or one is falling into a form of mysticism. We know reality only in relation to man, and since man is historical becoming, knowledge and reality are also a becoming and so is objectivity..’ (446)

The passage above can be criticised for its implicit assumption that the subjective experience of reality is limited to humans. This amounts to something almost like a ‘species solipsism’. Yet even if one emphasizes the intersubjective character of experience, as Gramsci does, there does not seem to be any good reason to deny intersubjective experience to other groups of primates, or to a colony of ants for that matter.

So, Gramsci’s assertion that we ‘know reality only in relation to man’ would better be reformulated as ‘reality can only be known in relation to knowing subjects’. Gramsci's anthropocentrism and its tendency towards devaluation of environmental concerns can then be rectifed through this recognition that subjectivity is not limited to humans. It then becomes a matter of inferring what types of entities are knowing subjects, which could lead to a variety of animist, panpsychist or cosmopsychist positions. Which non-human entities should be characterised as subjects is, of course, an issue of great debate, but is not relevant for the purposes of this post.

The anthropocentric defect in Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis does not invalidate this philosophy. Rather, it is consistent with it. The philosophy of praxis entails that philosophy evolves with sociohistorical circumstances, and this includes the tenets of the philosophy of praxis itself. Gramsci was writing at a time when anthropocentric humanism was prevalent, and the constraints of living on a finite planet were not as evident as they are today. As these circumstances have changed, the anthropocentric bias of the philosophy praxis is not appropriate and can be rejected, without rejecting the philosophy of praxis itself.

I would say Gramsci's anthropocentric approach, based on what you have been posting, is not a defect but a feature. It is the only proper philosophical approach to take. There is no reason to deny intersubjective experience to all non-humans, but there is also no reason to pretend we can philosophize about it until we have actually experienced their conscious perspectives. Until then, we must stick with the human modes of experiencing and knowing the world. The anthropocentric empirical-pragmatic approach is more respectful to non-human life, as it does not claim their perspectives to be fully encompassed within our own.

[SanteriSatama]

I would say Gramsci's anthropocentric approach, based on what you have been posting, is not a defect but a feature. It is the only proper philosophical approach to take. There is no reason to deny intersubjective experience to all non-humans, but there is also no reason to pretend we can philosophize about it until we have actually experienced their conscious perspectives. Until then, we must stick with the human modes of experiencing and knowing the world. The anthropocentric empirical-pragmatic approach is more respectful to non-human life, as it does not claim their perspectives to be fully encompassed within our own.

Your argument fails as 1) supposing/demanding either-or situation, b) implying that philosophy is limited to "aboutness" and 3) very limited "we", instead of accepting empirically attested various degrees of perspective sharing. When people live with e.g. cat and dog people as their family members, there is plenty of perspective sharing, and cat and dog people can be great teachers of philosophy. There are also horse whisperers etc. etc. with talent and/or training for communication with non-human people.

[Lou Gold]

The anthropocentric defect in Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis does not invalidate this philosophy. Rather, it is consistent with it. The philosophy of praxis entails that philosophy evolves with sociohistorical circumstances, and this includes the tenets of the philosophy of praxis itself. Gramsci was writing at a time when anthropocentric humanism was prevalent, and the constraints of living on a finite planet were not as evident as they are today. As these circumstances have changed, the anthropocentric bias of the philosophy praxis is not appropriate and can be rejected, without rejecting the philosophy of praxis itself.

Science is now completely rethinking animal cognition