Can you help me with metaphysical Isms?

[Eugene I]

My understanding is that bare intellectual concepts are only one half of the equation, like bare percepts of the world. When the percepts are united with their proper concepts, that is a meaningful idea. It is more a network-constellation of percept-concepts. We tell the difference by testing them to see if they remain solid upon further examination. We see if they remain at odds with our ideal network or whether they fit in and satisfy our Reason and desire for a more complete whole. That is the scientific method. It is of course an ongoing process as long as the ideal network remains incomplete.

The scientific method changed a lot since medieval times, and currently it is more building scientific concepts and models using cognitive tools such as mathematics, logic etc, and such cognitive model-building tools (math and logic) themselves are defined by the rules that we can arbitrary define or choose. There is no "Reason" or any other absolute standard to judge the truthfulness of such tools and models (at least in modern science). Then we exercise those models in an algorithmic fashion to make them produce predictions and descriptions of the experientially observable phenomena, and then we discard the models that make less predictions/descriptions and keep the models that make the most accurate ones. Over time we find more and more accurate and comprehensive scientific models, yet, they never describe the reality with absolute accuracy, and such process development of scientific models is always asymptotic. In such scientific method there is no way to distinguish between concepts and cognitive models, and Platonic "ideas" that satisfy the "Reason". One can even argue (see your parallel thread on Kant) that such Reason also belongs to the a-priori type of categories, like space and time, and therefore can not be used to distinguish between human-made concepts and ontic "ideas".

[AshvinP]

My understanding is that bare intellectual concepts are only one half of the equation, like bare percepts of the world. When the percepts are united with their proper concepts, that is a meaningful idea. It is more a network-constellation of percept-concepts. We tell the difference by testing them to see if they remain solid upon further examination. We see if they remain at odds with our ideal network or whether they fit in and satisfy our Reason and desire for a more complete whole. That is the scientific method. It is of course an ongoing process as long as the ideal network remains incomplete.

The scientific method changed a lot since medieval times, and currently it is more building scientific concepts and models using cognitive tools such as mathematics, logic etc, and such cognitive model-building tools (math and logic) themselves are defined by the rules that we can arbitrary define or choose. There is no "Reason" or any other absolute standard to judge the truthfulness of such tools and models (at least in modern science). Then we exercise those models in an algorithmic fashion to make them produce predictions and descriptions of the experientially observable phenomena, and then we discard the models that make less predictions/descriptions and keep the models that make the most accurate ones. Over time we find more and more accurate and comprehensive scientific models, yet, they never describe the reality with absolute accuracy, and such process development of scientific models is always asymptotic. In such scientific method there is no way to distinguish between concepts and cognitive models, and Platonic "ideas" that satisfy the "Reason". One can even argue (see your parallel thread on Kant) that such Reason also belongs to the a-priori type of categories, like space and time, and therefore can not be used to distinguish between human-made concepts and ontic "ideas".

My parallel thread on Kant is a critique of his a priori categories - I dispute Kant's notion of "knowledge/truth" and support Goethe's instead.

[Eugene I]

My parallel thread on Kant is a critique of his a priori categories - I dispute Kant's notion of "knowledge/truth" and support Goethe's instead.

Modern science abandoned the Kantian categories as well. Modern physics is developing models in where time and space are secondary phenomena.

On the other hand, there is a different way to get around the Kantian categories, which is the Eastern spiritual traditions leading to the direct experience beyond any a-priori categories, and to realizing fabricated nature and unconscious functioning of those categories. Neither Kant not Steiner were familiar with such experience of reality beyond space and time, even though it is well known to many advanced meditators. ("Even if there were some non-spatial or non-temporal thing, I can know nothing about it, for I can picture nothing to myself without space and time." - Steiner)

[AshvinP]

My parallel thread on Kant is a critique of his a priori categories - I dispute Kant's notion of "knowledge/truth" and support Goethe's instead.

Modern science abandoned the Kantian categories as well. Modern physics is developing models in where time and space are secondary phenomena.

On the other hand, there is a different way to get around the Kantian categories, which is the Eastern spiritual traditions leading to the direct experience beyond any a-priori categories, and to realizing fabricated nature and unconscious functioning of those categories. Neither Kant not Steiner were familiar with such experience of reality beyond space and time, even though it is well known to many advanced meditators. ("Even if there were some non-spatial or non-temporal thing, I can know nothing about it, for I can picture nothing to myself without space and time." - Steiner)

That's a bold presumption for Steiner. Anyway you are describing the Schopenhauer approach which is progress from Kantian divide but still incomplete. Goethe's critique is not about how to "get around" the categories but whether they can be said to exist at all in the way Kant imagined. Whether the phenomenon are forever separated from noumenon or whether they instead speak for themselves. And I'm not sure if you realized this, but the Steiner quote you used was in the context of describing Kant's position which he disgrees with.

[Eugene I]

That's a bold presumption for Steiner. Anyway you are describing the Schopenhauer approach which is progress from Kantian divide but still incomplete. Goethe's critique is not about how to "get around" the categories but whether they can be said to exist at all in the way Kant imagined. Whether the phenomenon are forever separated from noumenon or whether they instead speak for themselves.

I don't know much about Schop's approach, but speaking for the Easter non-dual one, the way to close the Kantian divide is to experientially realize that we and all the reality appearing phenomenally IS the noumenon existentially, and its noumenal aspects (such as beingness and awareness) can be experientially directly known prior to exercising any thinking, and can be experienced as inseparable from the phenomenal aspects. Then, in addition to that, thinking can be exercised as well to comprehend the "comprehendible" aspects of reality as much as possible.

The noumenon can speak to us in two possible ways: through us directly knowing/experiencing its noumenal aspects prior to exercising any thinking, and trough us comprehending the primordial Platonic ideas that belong to the realm of the noumenon (providing that such ideas indeed exist) through our thinking ability. Even if the Plationic assumption is true, that does not invalidate the direct-experiential approach, but rather they would complement each other.

[AshvinP]

That's a bold presumption for Steiner. Anyway you are describing the Schopenhauer approach which is progress from Kantian divide but still incomplete. Goethe's critique is not about how to "get around" the categories but whether they can be said to exist at all in the way Kant imagined. Whether the phenomenon are forever separated from noumenon or whether they instead speak for themselves.

I don't know much about Schop's approach, but speaking for the Easter non-dual one, the way to close the Kantian divide is to experientially realize that we and all the reality appearing phenomenally IS the noumenon existentially, and its noumenal aspects (such as beingness and awareness) can be experientially directly known prior to exercising any thinking, and can be experienced as inseparable from the phenomenal aspects. Then, in addition to that, thinking can be exercised as well to comprehend the "comprehendible" aspects of reality as much as possible.

The noumenon can speak to us in two possible ways: through us directly knowing/experiencing its noumenal aspects prior to exercising any thinking, and trough us comprehending the primordial Platonic ideas that belong to the realm of the noumenon (providing that such ideas indeed exist) through our thinking ability. Even if the Plationic assumption is true, that does not invalidate the direct-experiential approach, but rather they would complement each other.

You are describing a smearing out of ideal content into homogenous uniformity rather than unity. That is not a bridge, more like running away from the bear hoping you are faster than the other guy running away. You are adding on thinking and ideas like an afterthought, a token gesture, which we should also note is not consistent with objective idealism. The nihilist divide will not be overcome that naively. We need to experience-understand that our thinking activity produces a unity which is greater than the sum of its isolated parts. It provides a spiritual rebirth for the ideal content of the world.

[Eugene I]

It provides a spiritual rebirth for the ideal content of the world.

Correct, providing that such ideal content indeed exists. But that is unprovable (per Platonic assumption) and can only be a subject of belief/faith.
And in case that the Platonic assumption is indeed wrong, it is easy to fool ourselves into believing that the ideal content that we are able to comprehend through thinking belongs to the realm of noumenon, while in reality it does not

You are adding on thinking and ideas like an afterthought, a token gesture, which we should also note is not consistent with objective idealism.

It is not consistent with Platinic versions of idealism. Yet, there are plenty of non-Platinic ones (including BK's, Schopenhauer's, Eastern etc)

[AshvinP]

It provides a spiritual rebirth for the ideal content of the world.

Correct, providing that such ideal content indeed exists. But that is unprovable (per Platonic assumption) and can only be a subject of belief/faith.
And in case that the Platonic assumption is indeed wrong, it is easy to fool ourselves into believing that the ideal content that we are able to comprehend through thinking belongs to the realm of noumenon, while in reality it does not

[shifted response to other Kant thread, which is probably best since this one has gotten pretty far afield of original question]

[j.joerg@posteo.de]

You are right. You can not know Being. You can only be it.

Awareness must always have a content. Otherwise there would be no awareness. And awareness of awareness boils down to Being in my understanding.

Being is the enabler or ontological base of a Awareness-Content relationship.

Well, it is possible to have awareness with no content and thinking, that's known to advanced meditators (n Advaia tradition specifically). So it is possible for the Being to be directly aware of itself (with no content and no thinking). And awareness of awareness indeed boils down to Being, but there is still awareness in such state.

The key question is: is it possible for the Being to BE, but not to be AWARE? The answer will determine whether the ontology of such Being is idealistic or neutral. Because if it is possible to BE but not to be AWARE, then it's a neutral monism where the awareness becomes an emergent property of the Being, while the Being itself is non-emergent (it always exist and can't not to BE, but it can be not AWARE). If not, then it is idealism in where the Being-Awareness is non-emergent (it can't not to BE and it can't not to be AWARE).

As I see it, there is unrelational Being. Then there is a relational awareness and content, within the universe. And then there is the posibility of a neural awareness of the neural awareness-process within the relational setting of the universe, a transcending ​but still relational experience of Being. Its not without content but has itself as input, a self-causal neural loop.

The word awareness makes no sense to me if there is no content. Being is pure awareness, but it is no aware of anything and thus not aware. By the way I do think, that to think of universal consciousness in terms of our human experience of consciousness makes no sense. Maybe even Bernardo is a neutral dual-property monist without even knowing it...

[j.joerg@posteo.de]

Is such uncaused, irreducible 'be-ing' non-aware? If so, at which point does awareness arise and how? Seems like just another iteration of the 'hard problem.'

Being is awareness. But without content it is not at the same time. The nonrelational Being is paradoxical from the perspective of a relational universe and therefore has ever been the big mystery. If Being relates to Being it becomes awareness and content.