Dismissal of the simulation hypothesis

[AshvinP]

I have never heard simulation hypothesis invoked as another form of idealism, i.e. the base "computer" is fundamentally ideational activity. Rather it is always invoked in a materialist (or perhaps dualist) framework. Materialist frameworks, when considered non-naively, are all simulation hypotheses. They all posit mindless quantitative stuff giving rise to qualitative stuff that is nothing like the underlying stuff, and therefore the appearances are essentially virtual simulations, with as few or as many layers of stuff you want to shove in between the base and the appearances. So basically all of the idealist criticisms of materialism apply to simulation hypotheses as well. And the latter are useless under all circumstances, so they are pragmatically untrue.

I think idealism has to incorporate computationalism. We know from our experience that our consciousness can easily do computations and math, so I do not see any inconsistency here and I do not see why can not we assume that MAL is doing computations in its mind to ideate the appearances of the world. And, we actually have to, because otherwise how else can you explain an amazing mathematical consistency of the appearances of the world? MAL ideating the world motivated by blind instincts with the appearances exactly following Schrodinger and Einstein equations? How would that happen?

That's what I am saying - as soon as you make the "computer" a form of ideational activity, you obviate the need for the "simulation hypothesis" and the distinction between it and standard idealism.

I think we discussed this before, but I do not see why instinctive MAL is incompatible with mathematical consistency or predictability. If anything, it is much easier to predict the behavior of an instinctive animal, for ex., than a meta-cognitive human being.

[Eugene I]

That's what I am saying - as soon as you make the "computer" a form of ideational activity, you obviate the need for the "simulation hypothesis" and the distinction between it and standard idealism.

I think we discussed this before, but I do not see why instinctive MAL is incompatible with mathematical consistency or predictability. If anything, it is much easier to predict the behavior of an instinctive animal, for ex., than a meta-cognitive human being.

Right, may be it's just terminological, we don't need to use the term "computer", and yes, perhaps the mathematical consistency can be explained with the instinctive animalism of MAL. But some (and quite powerful) computational mental activity is necessary to assume in order to explain the mathematical consistency of the appearances of the world (which IMO is linguistically the same as to say that the apparent world is a result of a computational simulation in the MAL's mind).

[Simon Adams]

Yes I agree Eugene. I think the ‘computation’ terms is too closely associated with computers, which isn’t helpful. Nonetheless there is something about nature/MaL/world soul where the precision and consistency seems categorically different from anything we know as instinct or our own conscious experience. My instinct is that the ‘laws of nature’ point to something in the realm of divine ideas, that determines the forms and behaviour of nature. Only living things have their own agency outside of this, and that makes this subset far less precise and consistent.

[AshvinP]

That's what I am saying - as soon as you make the "computer" a form of ideational activity, you obviate the need for the "simulation hypothesis" and the distinction between it and standard idealism.

I think we discussed this before, but I do not see why instinctive MAL is incompatible with mathematical consistency or predictability. If anything, it is much easier to predict the behavior of an instinctive animal, for ex., than a meta-cognitive human being.

Right, may be it's just terminological, we don't need to use the term "computer", and yes, perhaps the mathematical consistency can be explained with the instinctive animalism of MAL. But some (and quite powerful) computational mental activity is necessary to assume in order to explain the mathematical consistency of the appearances of the world (which IMO is linguistically the same as to say that the apparent world is a result of a computational simulation in the MAL's mind).

To be clear, I am not claiming instinctive behavior is the sum total of MAL ideation (as I am sure is clear from previous postings). Only that some significant portion of ideal relations which lend themselves to mathematical description can be explained by activity of instinctive idea-beings. We should also remember that what we call "instinctive" is defined by our human perspective in the present day.

[Jim Cross]

I think idealism has to incorporate computationalism. We know from our experience that our consciousness can easily do computations and math, so I do not see any inconsistency here and I do not see why can not we assume that MAL is doing computations in its mind to ideate the appearances of the world.

Since there are some problems computation cannot solve then wouldn't that be somewhat limiting for MAL?

[Ed Konderla]

I watched up to the point where Bernardo addresses the simulation hypothesis. Even when I disagree with Bernardo on something I always enjoy listening to him. He is always very firm in his opinions and I'm not left with the feeling like I am attempting to pin a jelly fish under my thumb. On this particular subject I don't really have an opinion. I can see merit on both sides of the argument providing one want to take up this particular argument. There are several subjects touched on prior I want to figure out how to discuss in this forum however. Thanks for the link.

[Simon Adams]

To be clear, I am not claiming instinctive behavior is the sum total of MAL ideation (as I am sure is clear from previous postings). Only that some significant portion of ideal relations which lend themselves to mathematical description can be explained by activity of instinctive idea-beings. We should also remember that what we call "instinctive" is defined by our human perspective in the present day.

Yes and if you take the terms to mean a fixed pattern of behaviour, that does match what nature does. There’s just a vast difference between the version that applies to living things versus non living things, and I think precision and consistency are examples of the difference.

I’m not a fan of the simulation hypothesis at all, but I do find it strange that people can find it plausible and not idealism. However I do think the ‘pure’ idealism of Bernardo has a problem in terms of all the laws and mathematical foundations being instinctive. You can propose a hierarchy of thoughts, with low instinctual processes and higher order levels, like the difference between alters and sub alters (heart beating, kidneys filtering etc), but I just don’t get how you can have these structures within experience alone. You need another dimension, and even then you get into a problem of infinite regress - you can’t have the higher order building out of the lower orders, if the higher orders form the context within which the lower orders ‘function’. From the simulation perspective, it’s a bit like saying the operating system created the hardware, although that’s a very faulty analogy.

Anyway I’m probably straw-manning this view, so I should probably stop!

[Ed Konderla]

To be clear, I am not claiming instinctive behavior is the sum total of MAL ideation (as I am sure is clear from previous postings). Only that some significant portion of ideal relations which lend themselves to mathematical description can be explained by activity of instinctive idea-beings. We should also remember that what we call "instinctive" is defined by our human perspective in the present day.

Yes and if you take the terms to mean a fixed pattern of behaviour, that does match what nature does. There’s just a vast difference between the version that applies to living things versus non living things, and I think precision and consistency are examples of the difference.

I’m not a fan of the simulation hypothesis at all, but I do find it strange that people can find it plausible and not idealism. However I do think the ‘pure’ idealism of Bernardo has a problem in terms of all the laws and mathematical foundations being instinctive. You can propose a hierarchy of thoughts, with low instinctual processes and higher order levels, like the difference between alters and sub alters (heart beating, kidneys filtering etc), but I just don’t get how you can have these structures within experience alone. You need another dimension, and even then you get into a problem of infinite regress - you can’t have the higher order building out of the lower orders, if the higher orders form the context within which the lower orders ‘function’. From the simulation perspective, it’s a bit like saying the operating system created the hardware, although that’s a very faulty analogy.

Anyway I’m probably straw-manning this view, so I should probably stop!

I wonder many times if Bernardo's reluctance to see mind at large as having a direction is in an effort to remain impeccable. I'm going to choose to believe that is the case otherwise I'm left with questioning his credibility.

[isaac_hagoel]

Kastrup doesn't mean / say that simulation theory is false. He means that even if it were true, it wouldn't tell us anything about the true nature of the ultimate universe. So bringing simulation theory into an ontic discussion is pointless.

@Martin:
it might be pointless (I'm not sure it is) but that is not a basis for dismissing it. If it is true and doesn't tell us anything - what's the justification for making up some other false story instead? Isn't it more reasonable to say something along the lines of "if it is true we are kind of stuck, so we'll assume it is not true and go from there" instead of calling it "idiotic" (as Bernardo does)?

[AshvinP]

To be clear, I am not claiming instinctive behavior is the sum total of MAL ideation (as I am sure is clear from previous postings). Only that some significant portion of ideal relations which lend themselves to mathematical description can be explained by activity of instinctive idea-beings. We should also remember that what we call "instinctive" is defined by our human perspective in the present day.

Yes and if you take the terms to mean a fixed pattern of behaviour, that does match what nature does. There’s just a vast difference between the version that applies to living things versus non living things, and I think precision and consistency are examples of the difference.

I’m not a fan of the simulation hypothesis at all, but I do find it strange that people can find it plausible and not idealism. However I do think the ‘pure’ idealism of Bernardo has a problem in terms of all the laws and mathematical foundations being instinctive. You can propose a hierarchy of thoughts, with low instinctual processes and higher order levels, like the difference between alters and sub alters (heart beating, kidneys filtering etc), but I just don’t get how you can have these structures within experience alone. You need another dimension, and even then you get into a problem of infinite regress - you can’t have the higher order building out of the lower orders, if the higher orders form the context within which the lower orders ‘function’. From the simulation perspective, it’s a bit like saying the operating system created the hardware, although that’s a very faulty analogy.

Anyway I’m probably straw-manning this view, so I should probably stop!

I lost you somewhere in the 3rd sentence of the 2nd paragraph, so I have no idea if you are straw-manning

Could you elaborate on the bolded part?