I think I have a clearer idea from this about where we differ. You assume that (1) the deeper meaning of things is purely in the “ideal content”, and you assume (2) this ideal content is like physical properties in that it only has substance in relation. From all you’ve written I think I understand why you make these assumptions, but I just have different conclusions.AshvinP wrote: ↑Wed Jun 09, 2021 3:53 am
BK's conclusion is correct here, but the major difference between us is how he presumes to reach it. I know nothing of Rovelli's metaphysics so I will leave him out of it. BK adheres to Schopenhauer's philosophy of universal Will, which presumes that in the individual's "direct" experience of will, absent all ideal content, there is experience of Reality-in-itself. There is a major error here, which is the same error of naïve realism (such as we find in physicalism) - a perception of experience (will) can be considered real without its ideal content. The naïve physicalist sees grass, flowers, trees, etc. outside himself and considers them all essentially real without thinking through how they relate in their ideal content. The philosopher of Will sees an act of will within himself and considers it essentially real without any ideal content relating it to the world at large.
The philosopher of Will is even more inconsistent than the physicalist because he arbitrarily gives priority to inner perception over outer perception.
This difference is very important because it leads directly to BK's concept of the physical world as "a set of dials". If the universal principle which links us to the world's Unity is the mere experience of will without ideal content, then one must claim all other perceptions in the world are pretty much useless towards knowledge of the underlying relations. They help us survive in a virtual reality game, but that's the entire extent of it. At the lowest level of resolution, we could say that concept is sufficiently accurate to challenge the naïve physicalist, but at any higher resolution, such as discussions which take place within idealism, it is simply incorrect.
I will say, though, that in discussion with Mark Vernon, BK speaks of the songs of birds and says it gives him a strong intuition there is more to the phenomenal world than simply forms which evolved for physical survival and only such survival. If he follows that intuition, then he cannot help but remove Thinking from his blind spot to recognize that ideational activity-content is what truly bears the world's aesthetic Unity.
For (1), I very much don’t deny the deeper meaning. However I don’t see the deepest meaning coming from our relations. I see the meaning folding out from a centre, where we are part of the folding out, not the unfolder that originates it. We do generate our own meaning, and we also do our own refolding where we try to discover the deeper meaning (maybe what you call Thinking), but this is in effect a mirror of the original process. It’s the original unfolding where all fundamental meaning comes from. So whilst I agree that we co-create meaning, at the most fundamental level this is just us recreating from discovered meaning. I sympathise with your ‘good intentions’ of giving Bernardo (and even more so the dead thinking of physicalists) reason to find deliberate meaning in the beauty of birdsong, but to me you’re sourcing that meaning purely in perception and thinking, when in fact it has a more hidden original source.
With (2), I do agree with Bernardo that there is a reality which he calls absolute behind the representation (the word sub-stance is very appropriate). I wouldn’t use the word “absolute”, but I agree with it in terms of not requiring human perception for it’s existence.
You will of course disagree with both of these, and you have your reasons, I just disagree with them. To me the reason for your assumptions is an assumption that you, Bernardo, Jung, the German idealists etc etc etc all make, which is that mind at large is the same as god. It was an assumption made at some point between Aquinas and Spinoza, and then just became assumed fact.