Blood Transfusions and alter formation

[JustinG]

Here is an argument against the metabolizing organism being the level at which alter formation occurs:

1. Whether it is reasonable to infer that a particular entity (say, a rock, a toaster, a cell, or a human) is an alter is based on reasonable inference from the entity's external behavior.

2. It is reasonable to infer that dissociation occurs at the level of the metabolizing organism, and that individual cells of an organism are not alters (this is BK's argument - see the third point from this post: viewtopic.php?p=3237#p3237).

3. It follows from 2 that blood cells in the body are not alters.

4. Blood cells outside the body can stay alive and behave like single celled organisms for a period of time. Therefore, it follows from 1 that blood cells outside the body are alters.

5. During the removal of blood cells from the body, it follows from 3 and 4 that there must be some point at which a non alter cell becomes an alter.

6. The external behavior of blood cells at any hypothesized point of alter formation during blood removal is no different to their behavior just prior to this moment (eg the external behavior of a blood cell at the point of entry into a needle is no different from it's external behavior at the moment prior to this).

7. It follows from 6 and 1 that there is no reason to infer that alter formation happens at some point in removal of a blood cell from the body.

8. It follows from 4 and 7 that living blood cells inside or outside of the body are alters.

9. It follows from 8 that 2 is false (it is not reasonable to infer that dissociation only occurs at the level of the metabolizing organism).

[Jim Cross]

I think it is reasonable to suppose that all living organisms are alters but that some are more alterier than others.

[AshvinP]

Here is an argument against the metabolizing organism being the level at which alter formation occurs:

1. Whether it is reasonable to infer that a particular entity (say, a rock, a toaster, a cell, or a human) is an alter is based on reasonable inference from the entity's external behavior.

Why is it reasonable to infer that? It's really not reasonable to infer anything using only external appearances under idealism, especially if we factor in that, in the modern age, our perception of external appearances has rigidified so that we can barely discern any interiority in the mineral, plant, and animal kingdoms (especially the former two). I think this is something BK also fails to factor in when discussing "alters". We conclude under idealism that these sorts of judgments based on hard 'boundaries' of external appearance are invalid, but then we snap right back to that way of thinking whenever we want more detailed resolution. We really need to 'deprogram' these habits of mind when pursuing such questions.

[JustinG]

Here is an argument against the metabolizing organism being the level at which alter formation occurs:

1. Whether it is reasonable to infer that a particular entity (say, a rock, a toaster, a cell, or a human) is an alter is based on reasonable inference from the entity's external behavior.

Why is it reasonable to infer that? It's really not reasonable to infer anything using only external appearances under idealism, especially if we factor in that, in the modern age, our perception of external appearances has rigidified so that we can barely discern any interiority in the mineral, plant, and animal kingdoms (especially the former two). I think this is something BK also fails to factor in when discussing "alters". We conclude under idealism that these sorts of judgments based on hard 'boundaries' of external appearance are invalid, but then we snap right back to that way of thinking whenever we want more detailed resolution. We really need to 'deprogram' these habits of mind when pursuing such questions.

You could be right, in which case 2 ( It is reasonable to infer that dissociation occurs at the level of the metabolizing organism, and that individual cells of an organism are not alters) is also false and the conclusion to the argument still holds.

[AshvinP]

Here is an argument against the metabolizing organism being the level at which alter formation occurs:

1. Whether it is reasonable to infer that a particular entity (say, a rock, a toaster, a cell, or a human) is an alter is based on reasonable inference from the entity's external behavior.

Why is it reasonable to infer that? It's really not reasonable to infer anything using only external appearances under idealism, especially if we factor in that, in the modern age, our perception of external appearances has rigidified so that we can barely discern any interiority in the mineral, plant, and animal kingdoms (especially the former two). I think this is something BK also fails to factor in when discussing "alters". We conclude under idealism that these sorts of judgments based on hard 'boundaries' of external appearance are invalid, but then we snap right back to that way of thinking whenever we want more detailed resolution. We really need to 'deprogram' these habits of mind when pursuing such questions.

You could be right, in which case 2 ( It is reasonable to infer that dissociation occurs at the level of the metabolizing organism, and that individual cells of an organism are not alters) is also false and the conclusion to the argument still holds.

I am not sure I would go that far

When it comes to "metabolizing", we are talking about a broad process that is a foundational principle (as opposed to appearance) of living activity. So now I think we are getting much closer to the meaningful interiority of life. What BK calls "subjectivity itself" below.

I think the error of this notion is to carry over to subjectivity itself a structure only discernible in perception. In other words, we imagine the noumena (the thing in itself) as having the same structure of the phenomena (the way the thing in itself appears to observation). This is a logical error.

The issue I have with BK's formulation is that he then uses the perceptible physical structures to define what is any given "organism", when he just rejected that approach for deriving "subjectivity itself". He may say that those boundaries also coincide with what DNA/genes are doing in terms of evolutionary survival, but I would say that is yet again bringing in physicalist assumptions and conclusions into an idealist method. Can my genes survive without any other genes outside of me? Obviously not. Can the human genes survive without plant genes? No again.

So, eventually, we come to realize that the "alter" cannot be meaningfully separated from the Cosmos itself. That is basically what Whitehead concluded in his theory of "prehension", for ex, or what ancients concluded with the imagery of Indra's net. All of that undermines the notion of "alters" as any sort of permanent or stable 'entities' within MAL, or anything more than a convenient icon to use in discussion, which must be abandoned as soon as we try to get higher resolution on what gives rise to our so-called "personal" experiences.

BK's illustrations definitely give the impression that the "alters" are stable features of the bigger overall ontological picture. Otherwise there would not be so much confusion and discussion about what exactly is an "alter" and what is it not.

[Shajan624]

Metabolizing organisms as alters follows from the ontological position of mind as the only fundamental reality.

Idealist has to explain the apparent reality of living and non-living things. Non-living things are explained as the ‘dashboard’ of perception (material stuff are actually subjective processes in M@L, seen across a dissociative boundary). Living things has to be different because they have subjectivity. They must be ‘little minds’ enclosed in a material shell called body.

Alters, if I understand correctly, is a way to explain the presence of autonomous metabolizing agents in a mind-only universe, but I think it leads to some difficulties.

[JustinG]

Metabolizing organisms as alters follows from the ontological position of mind as the only fundamental reality.

Idealist has to explain the apparent reality of living and non-living things. Non-living things are explained as the ‘dashboard’ of perception (material stuff are actually subjective processes in M@L, seen across a dissociative boundary). Living things has to be different because they have subjectivity. They must be ‘little minds’ enclosed in a material shell called body.

Alters, if I understand correctly, is a way to explain the presence of autonomous metabolizing agents in a mind-only universe, but I think it leads to some difficulties.

I don't have a problem inferring that metabolizing organisms are alters in an idealistic model, though maybe not plants. But I also think that it makes more sense to infer that all cells within an organism (whether animal, plant or funghi) are also alters. Possibly organelles within cells, and even lower levels than that, as well .

[Shajan624]

But I also think that it makes more sense to infer that all cells within an organism (whether animal, plant or funghi) are also alters. Possibly organelles within cells, and even lower levels than that, as well .

I suspect that would lead to the combination problem - how individual cell subjectivities combine to form the unified subjectivity of the whole organism?

[AshvinP]

Metabolizing organisms as alters follows from the ontological position of mind as the only fundamental reality.

Idealist has to explain the apparent reality of living and non-living things. Non-living things are explained as the ‘dashboard’ of perception (material stuff are actually subjective processes in M@L, seen across a dissociative boundary). Living things has to be different because they have subjectivity. They must be ‘little minds’ enclosed in a material shell called body.

Alters, if I understand correctly, is a way to explain the presence of autonomous metabolizing agents in a mind-only universe, but I think it leads to some difficulties.

I don't have a problem inferring that metabolizing organisms are alters in an idealistic model, though maybe not plants. But I also think that it makes more sense to infer that all cells within an organism (whether animal, plant or funghi) are also alters. Possibly organelles within cells, and even lower levels than that, as well .

What is the reason for assuming there are non-living 'things'? Idealism requires no such assumption. We are adding that assumption on to the givens of our experience, which is only the experience of living activity. To get to "non-living", we must naively assume our bare perceptions are revealing the full essence of the mineral kingdom. I see no warrant for that assumption under idealism (or even materialism). In terms of "subjectivity", we can posit a relative state of unconsciousness for the mineral and plant kingdoms, such as we experience in deep dreamless sleep, but we also know that we still experience at least duration during that state, and our subjectivity returns upon awakening. And/or we can posit the living beings responsible for those appearances are supersensible, i.e. we cannot currently sense them with normal cognition.

[ScottRoberts]

But I also think that it makes more sense to infer that all cells within an organism (whether animal, plant or funghi) are also alters. Possibly organelles within cells, and even lower levels than that, as well .

I suspect that would lead to the combination problem - how individual cell subjectivities combine to form the unified subjectivity of the whole organism?

There is a combination problem only if one assumes that one's subjectivity is a combination of that of the cells. There is no reason to make that assumption, and reason to reject it, namely the evidence from NDE's and OOBE's that one continues to exist without a physical body.