Jim Cross wrote: ↑Mon Aug 16, 2021 4:02 pm
Nobody even cares about the question of how consciousness emerges from matter except philosophers. It isn't a scientific question. It is akin to the "why is there something rather than nothing" question" that befuddles children and others confused by the difference between language and reality. We only know there is something because of consciousness. We could say consciousness is how matter knows it exists.
We discussed it many times before, but no, it is a scientific question for the physicalist science, because the commitment of scientific method is:
- either to develop models/theories to explain all known experimental/experiential facts
- or to claim that the fact under investigation is ontologically fundamental and therefore is beyond the competence of science.
The existence of conscious experience is an undeniable experimental fact obvious and known to every conscious being. Physicalist science claims that consciousness is NOT metaphysically fundamental but is an emergent epiphenomenon of material brain, yet it fails miserably to provide any plausible explanation for such epiphenomenal emergence. To get around such embarrassment you are attempting to claim that science should not care about that question, but that is obviously cheating for the physicalist science, and I'll explain why.
The difference here form "why is there something rather than nothing" question is that for this "why is there something rather than nothing" question physicalist science is not claiming that "something (existence)" is an epiphenomenon of matter, in other words, it agrees that the "something (existence)" is ontologically fundamental and therefore this question does not belong to science, and that is totally fair. However, that's not the case for consciousness, because physicalist science claims the emergence of consciousness from matter, but if any phenomenon is claimed to be emergent (from matter) and not ontologically fundamental, the science has to commit to explain how exactly such emergence happen.
So, physicalist science, apart from cheating, has only two options:
- Admit that consciousness is ontologically fundamental and it is NOT an emergent epiphenomenon of material brain, just like with the "why is there something rather than nothing" question. Unfortunately it can not do that because that move would be obviously suicidal for the physicalist science.
- Claim that consciousness is an emergent epiphenomenon of matter, but in this case, it has to admit that the question belongs to science and commit to providing scientific explanation for such emergence (which it obviously can't)
Also, the physicalist science can not run away from metaphysical/philosophical questions, because the very premise of the physicalist science - the ontological primacy of matter - is already a metaphysical claim which is already beyond science (being unverifiable and unfalsifiable). So, including metaphysical claims in its very foundation and then refusing to address any metaphysical problems or contradictions arising from such metaphysical claims (because they allegedly "do not belong to science") is cheating.
My take on it is that it would be a better position for the core natural sciences to be entirely metaphysically agnostic and not biased towards any ontology (be it materialism, idealism or any other). In other words, natural sciences should study that nature DOES, not what it IS. In such case your claim that natural science should not be concerned about the emergence of consciousness would be totally valid. And then in addition to that core, sciences may have "extensional" branches stretching to include certain metaphysical claims as possible hypotheses (those would be "physicalist science" or "idealist science" or whatever), and that would be fine too, but in such case these sciences can not run away from addressing metaphysical problems arising from such claims. And the very first metaphysical problem that such metaphysical physicalist science would run into would obviously be the "hard problem" with no way to run away from it. Also, both metaphysical assumptions of the physicalist and of idealist science branches could be equally termed as "beliefs", because the primacy of matter is as much a scientifically unverifiable belief as the primacy of consciousness.