Jim Cross wrote: ↑Wed Aug 18, 2021 7:53 pm Ashvin,
Your argument would make sense if Hoffman's model really worked. Here is a pretty devastating critique.
https://www.rationalrealm.com/philosoph ... alism.html
Wow! That's an incredible view.AshvinP wrote: ↑Wed Aug 18, 2021 8:54 pmJim Cross wrote: ↑Wed Aug 18, 2021 7:53 pm Ashvin,
Your argument would make sense if Hoffman's model really worked. Here is a pretty devastating critique.
https://www.rationalrealm.com/philosoph ... alism.html
Jim - I am making a very simple point:
Jim's assertion: pursuing science with materialist or idealist metaphysics makes no difference, because the same paths of scientific inquiry are pursued and the results end up the same.
My assertion: many scientists throughout history up to present day, remaining metaphysically agnostic or assuming idealism, pursued much different paths of scientific inquiry and ended up with much different results than those with standard materialist metaphysical assumptions.
Your argument that Hoffman's model does not work is irrelevant to my assertion.
I took a quick look but so far these objections seem laughable. Look at this argumentJim Cross wrote: ↑Wed Aug 18, 2021 7:53 pm Ashvin,
Your argument would make sense if Hoffman's model really worked. Here is a pretty devastating critique.
https://www.rationalrealm.com/philosoph ... alism.html
Is the guy a scientist or philosopher at all? No wonder his review was not published in any refereed journals.I want to dig down a little deeper here with a couple of specific examples illustrating the absurdity of Hoffman's position. Consider again Hoffman's case study using an organism's perception of the quantity of a resource [Hoffman et al 2015a: 1486]. In their simulation, the organism employing the interface (non-veridical) strategy is able to perceive a variable quantity of resource using just four colours. One such resource is water. Now picture yourself sitting in front of a very large transparent tank that is being gravity-filled with water at a constant rate. We know that the tank is being filled at a constant rate because the force of gravity is constant and the water is being fed through a fixed diameter tube.
Now Hoffman would have us believe that although the volume of water in the tank appears to be increasing, it may in fact not be so. For Hoffman, when the tank appears to be two thirds full, it could in reality be one third full or it could be two thirds full (green bands in Figure 3). You just don't know. The quantity you think you are perceiving is a 'you know not what'. Even more absurd, for Hoffman, when you perceive the tank as empty, it could in reality be full (red bands in Figure 3).
Hoffman then applies this absurd conclusion to all of the other properties we sense. These include temperature, shape, velocity, hardness, and so on. If we cannot in reality determine the scalar quantities of these properties, then how do Hoffman and other scientists practice science? If a hydrologist measures the volume of water as, say, 70 cubic litres, and we believe Hoffman, the volume could be anything. It could be one cubic litre or it could be 1000 cubic litres. We just don't know. How then can we support a science of hydrology, or cosmology or biology at all?
Jim Cross wrote: ↑Wed Aug 18, 2021 9:09 pmWow! That's an incredible view.AshvinP wrote: ↑Wed Aug 18, 2021 8:54 pmJim Cross wrote: ↑Wed Aug 18, 2021 7:53 pm Ashvin,
Your argument would make sense if Hoffman's model really worked. Here is a pretty devastating critique.
https://www.rationalrealm.com/philosoph ... alism.html
Jim - I am making a very simple point:
Jim's assertion: pursuing science with materialist or idealist metaphysics makes no difference, because the same paths of scientific inquiry are pursued and the results end up the same.
My assertion: many scientists throughout history up to present day, remaining metaphysically agnostic or assuming idealism, pursued much different paths of scientific inquiry and ended up with much different results than those with standard materialist metaphysical assumptions.
Your argument that Hoffman's model does not work is irrelevant to my assertion.
That means anybody can do "science", make up whatever they want, and it is all the same because it doesn't matter if it works.
Ashvin,AshvinP wrote: ↑Wed Aug 18, 2021 9:54 pmJim Cross wrote: ↑Wed Aug 18, 2021 9:09 pmWow! That's an incredible view.AshvinP wrote: ↑Wed Aug 18, 2021 8:54 pm
Jim - I am making a very simple point:
Jim's assertion: pursuing science with materialist or idealist metaphysics makes no difference, because the same paths of scientific inquiry are pursued and the results end up the same.
My assertion: many scientists throughout history up to present day, remaining metaphysically agnostic or assuming idealism, pursued much different paths of scientific inquiry and ended up with much different results than those with standard materialist metaphysical assumptions.
Your argument that Hoffman's model does not work is irrelevant to my assertion.
That means anybody can do "science", make up whatever they want, and it is all the same because it doesn't matter if it works.
Who said any of that?
I don't think I can make my argument against your assertion any simpler to comprehend. And now it seems like you can't remember your own assertion, even though I retyped it and bolded it for you in the comment above, with the preface, "Jim's assertion".
Once again, your assertion had nothing to do with the validity of scientific results. If Goethe's color theory is wrong, and Hoffman's model of conscious realism is wrong (things it would take quite longer than a few comments on a thread to establish), how does that relate to your assertion in any way? I have now added blue color to it so it's easier for you to identify and jog your memory.
Eugene I wrote: ↑Wed Aug 18, 2021 9:27 pmI took a quick look but so far these objections seem laughable. Look at this argumentJim Cross wrote: ↑Wed Aug 18, 2021 7:53 pm Ashvin,
Your argument would make sense if Hoffman's model really worked. Here is a pretty devastating critique.
https://www.rationalrealm.com/philosoph ... alism.html
Is the guy a scientist or philosopher at all? No wonder his review was not published in any refereed journals.I want to dig down a little deeper here with a couple of specific examples illustrating the absurdity of Hoffman's position. Consider again Hoffman's case study using an organism's perception of the quantity of a resource [Hoffman et al 2015a: 1486]. In their simulation, the organism employing the interface (non-veridical) strategy is able to perceive a variable quantity of resource using just four colours. One such resource is water. Now picture yourself sitting in front of a very large transparent tank that is being gravity-filled with water at a constant rate. We know that the tank is being filled at a constant rate because the force of gravity is constant and the water is being fed through a fixed diameter tube.
Now Hoffman would have us believe that although the volume of water in the tank appears to be increasing, it may in fact not be so. For Hoffman, when the tank appears to be two thirds full, it could in reality be one third full or it could be two thirds full (green bands in Figure 3). You just don't know. The quantity you think you are perceiving is a 'you know not what'. Even more absurd, for Hoffman, when you perceive the tank as empty, it could in reality be full (red bands in Figure 3).
Hoffman then applies this absurd conclusion to all of the other properties we sense. These include temperature, shape, velocity, hardness, and so on. If we cannot in reality determine the scalar quantities of these properties, then how do Hoffman and other scientists practice science? If a hydrologist measures the volume of water as, say, 70 cubic litres, and we believe Hoffman, the volume could be anything. It could be one cubic litre or it could be 1000 cubic litres. We just don't know. How then can we support a science of hydrology, or cosmology or biology at all?
Oh, apparently "Leslie Allan is a Former Managing Director at Business Performance Pty Ltd". OK, makes sense
Take, for example, Hoffman's bold announcement that his reconstructions give 'mathematically precise theories about how certain conscious agents construct their physical worlds' [Hoffman 2008: 106]. Unfortunately for Hoffman, however, his reconstruction shows only how one conscious agent constructs their world. Despite his promise, his reformulation says nothing substantive about 'conscious agents and their dynamical interactions' [2008: 104]. His mathematical model is entirely silent on how, when I get a headache from a rock falling on my head when I'm all alone, this is the result of a 'decision' and 'action' of another conscious agent. His model says nothing about how, when I look up and see the moon, my moon experience is the result of the 'decision' and 'action' of other conscious agents in the network.
Jim Cross wrote: ↑Thu Aug 19, 2021 11:35 amAshvin,AshvinP wrote: ↑Wed Aug 18, 2021 9:54 pm
Who said any of that?
I don't think I can make my argument against your assertion any simpler to comprehend. And now it seems like you can't remember your own assertion, even though I retyped it and bolded it for you in the comment above, with the preface, "Jim's assertion".
Once again, your assertion had nothing to do with the validity of scientific results. If Goethe's color theory is wrong, and Hoffman's model of conscious realism is wrong (things it would take quite longer than a few comments on a thread to establish), how does that relate to your assertion in any way? I have now added blue color to it so it's easier for you to identify and jog your memory.
I can see the complete disconnect now and why we are forever talking past each other.
Science, to me, isn't science if it doesn't work. So, it doesn't matter where Hoffman or anybody else starts from, it doesn't end up as science unless it works.
I thought this was all pretty much a given in any discussion of science but you apparently can envision a science in which "it doesn't matter if it works."
My comments were made in regard to science where it does matter if it works.
Actually my argument that metaphysics doesn't matter inscience is almost self-evident because ultimately the test for science is that it works - that it predicts something or explains something more simply than we explained it before. It is all about measurement and results. That is the problem with Hoffman's approach. It doesn't predict anything that realistic science doesn't already predict while introducing new constructs for which no proof or evidence can be offered.
There is a misunderstanding of what DH is actually saying. As an analogy, think of the reality that we perceive as a screen image of a computer VR simulation (DH often uses this analogy). What we observe is images on the screen, what happens in reality is a stream of bits in the processor. However, there is a math algorithm that defines how bits are processed and produce screen images. Our measurements are positions and movements of the images. They are not "false" or "true", they simply do not represent the reality of the processor functioning bits directly. There are no "green trees" and "clouds" in the processor, only bits. But there is still an indirect representation because there is a functional (encoded) mathematical correspondence between the processor bits and the screen images and screen measurements. So, if we can figure out the underlying algorithm, we can then back-calculate the actual bit stream based on our screen measurements and figure out what is actually going on at the processor level. And once we know the algorithm, we can use it to our benefit to make predictions and develop technologies. In the DH model the "processor" is a network of conscious agents.
Nobody is arguing that consciousness is not a representation of external reality. Hoffman's argument is that it is not a veridical representation. My argument is it is not that simple. There are aspects that are veridical and aspects that are not. Especially in the aspects that science is most concerned about - measurement and relationships - it is likely quite veridical; otherwise, as the author argues, we would never be able to launch a rocket and put a rover on Mars. We would never be to adapt to prism glasses that turns everything upside down. That are regularities in the world that we can perceive at some level is a requirement for being able to interact with the world.Eugene I wrote: ↑Thu Aug 19, 2021 3:12 pmThere is a misunderstanding of what DH is actually saying. As an analogy, think of the reality that we perceive as a screen image of a computer VR simulation (DH often uses this analogy). What we observe is images on the screen, what happens in reality is a stream of bits in the processor. However, there is a math algorithm that defines how bits are processed and produce screen images. Our measurements are positions and movements of the images. They are not "false" or "true", they simply do not represent the reality of the processor functioning bits directly. There are no "green trees" and "clouds" in the processor, only bits. But there is still an indirect representation because there is a functional (encoded) mathematical correspondence between the processor bits and the screen images and screen measurements. So, if we can figure out the underlying algorithm, we can then back-calculate the actual bit stream based on our screen measurements and figure out what is actually going on at the processor level. And once we know the algorithm, we can use it to our benefit to make predictions and develop technologies. In the DH model the "processor" is a network of conscious agents.
I find the arguments of that guy simply childish, he has no clue what DH is actually talking about. Certain level of professionalism does matter and is required in natural sciences and philosophy, just like in any other profession.
The cue-driven agent is like the beetle that sees brown and decides to mate. More complex organisms have a more complex decision making process that takes into account memory and learning, that can test the environment through its own actions and correct perceptions or override them. But what are they testing against? They are testing against agent-independent, objective world that Hoffman tries to replace with his networks of conscious agents that is derived from his PDA loop which is shown to be reflect "an extremely impoverished picture of the informational connections that hold between agent and world."Here I examine the game-theoretic version of this skeptical line of argument developed by Donald Hoffman and his colleagues. I show that their argument only works under an extremely impoverished picture of the informational connections that hold between agent and
world. In particular, it only works for cue-driven agents, in Kim Sterelny’s sense. In cases in which the agents’s understanding of what is useful results from combining pieces of information that reach them in different ways, and that complement one another (i.e., that are synergistic), maximizing usefulness involves construing first a picture of agent-independent, objective matters of fact.