Philosophy Unbound: Schopenhauer vs. Steiner (Round One)

[AshvinP]

But either way, if we are prepared to say that just as there is only one concept of triangle that all thinkers participate when grasping the nature of a triangle, there is only one essence of thinking that is being grasped as the very essence of one's own thinking.

Right, and this is exactly Platonism, which is a legitimate and elegant, but yet unverifiable and unnecessary assumption. And as such, it is non-parsimonious, which is why Bernardo would exclude it from his metaphysics based on his strong view on the parsimony principle. Personally I'm still open to it as a legitimate possibility, yet I can see some issues with it. One issue is: what kind of "existence" we could attribute to these ideas? In the consistent Platonism all infinity of possible ideas eternally exist, but there is a "weak version" where the ideas do exist but they exist "potentially" (whatever it means), and a "strong version" claiming that they exist "actually" as the whole infinity of them. The strong version implies the actual existence of infinity, which is another mathematically problematic assumption (if you listen to mathematicians from the intuitionist camp). But more important issue is that, under idealism, all that exists is always consciously experienced, which for Platonic idealism means that all the infinity of ideas is actually experienced by the Global Consciousness. Which is the same as to say that the Global Consciousness is omniscient. This is essentially what the traditional theology claimed. But to make this compatible with the Whiteheadian evolving God, another assumption needs to be introduced that God exists as omniscient in no-time, yet simultaneously exist in time as evolving and non-omniscient (if it makes sense). So you can see how many more non-parsimonious, unprovable and unnecessary assumptions we need to bring to make Platinic idealism more-or-less consistent.

You must recognize that only modern mental habits make any aspect of shared ideal content "non-parsimonious, unnecessary, and unverifiable". Those habits result mostly from divisions of subject-object (Descartes) and ontology-epistemology (Kant), which simply did not constrain the thought of ancient Greeks (for ex.) as it does modern man. Although I realize my inclusions of the word "must" has already unconsciously ruled out your consideration of the argument I am making, because that is what you are truly arguing against. You are always only arguing against the idea that any spiritual path is more valid or useful than others. You will claim that you are not and some spiritual paths are, in fact, better than others, because it is not really possible to defend the alternative, but then your comments will return substantially to that same argument. Every comment you make on this topic is a rearrangement of words to form that same argument.

[Eugene I]

You must recognize that only modern mental habits make any aspect of shared ideal content "non-parsimonious, unnecessary, and unverifiable". Those habits result mostly from divisions of subject-object (Descartes) and ontology-epistemology (Kant), which simply did not constrain the thought of ancient Greeks (for ex.) as it does modern man. Although I realize my inclusions of the word "must" has already unconsciously ruled out your consideration of the argument I am making, because that is what you are truly arguing against. You are always only arguing against the idea that any spiritual path is more valid or useful than others. You will claim that you are not and some spiritual paths are, in fact, better than others, because it is not really possible to defend the alternative, but then your comments will return substantially to that same argument. Every comment you make on this topic is a rearrangement of words to form that same argument.

The principle of parsimony has nothing to do with Cartesian dualism or of Kantian divide.
I thought we agreed to "work around" each other?

[Cleric]

Let's start by appreciating that when we speak about the will and thinking (feeling being in between) we have a fundamental asymmetry. It's one thing to speak about polarity of hearing and sight for example, or left and right hand, then to argue which is more fundamental, it's altogether different to compare two poles of which we could never know one, if we only knew the other. We can easily imagine having only hearing or only sight but we can't know experience of only will, without the thinking pole. The other is possible - we can easily imagine a state of only thinking without feelings and bodily will and sensory perceptions. So there's fundamental asymmetry here.

Things are very clear but we must not fall for the blind spot. In other words we need the exceptional state - we need to be aware of our cognitive activity. The simple fact is that Thinking is the expression of our knowing activity. Without it we would never know that feeling or willing exist. This is the simple fact that so easily falls in the blind spot. We experience thoughts (words for example), we have feelings, we have will impulses and perceptions. If we imagine these in front of us and discard the thoughts we can easily make the mistake: "there, I discarded thinking, I only have feelings and will now and I'm still conscious". This simply fails to understand what is called Thinking. It's the spiritual activity that animates the thoughts and cognizes all perceptions, feelings, will (that is, experiences meaning, intuitive understanding in relation to them). If we manage to transform this activity such that we don't produce thought-forms (words, symbols, etc.), we're still a cognizing Spirit! We still cognitively experience feelings and will and maybe even higher order perceptions with their corresponding higher-order ideal counterparts. We imagine thinking, feeling and willing as spread out before us but they are actually one within the other, so to speak, like Russian dolls (again, we should not be thinking of literal geometric relations).



In the course of evolution our Spiritual core awakens in the innermost sphere. As said, it's not at all difficult to attain to a state of pure thinking without any presence of feelings, desires, bodily sensations, will. But if we drop the innermost sphere we simply lose consciousness. Even if we assume that the other spheres are there, we simply can't know this.
The reality of the will is furthest away from our thinking core. We're completely oblivious of what happens in our muscles for example when we will the movement of our arm. We simply send our spiritual intent which sinks in the darkness and we find its effects only in the bodily and sensory perceptions. We have no clue what happens through the dark zone, between our conscious will-intent and its perception through the bodily senses. We are fully asleep about the processes in that dark zone.
Feeling is a little closer. It's still a world of mystery for us, it confronts us as something semi-independent, sometimes we can interact with it, we can arouse a feeling through our activity, but as a whole they approach us as from another world, which we grasp only vaguely, as in a fuzzy dream.
Finally in thinking we are fully awake. The perceptions of the thoughts and the spiritual world where the causes of these thoughts belong, are united in thinking.

Please note that in our ordinary consciousness we don't know the reality of feeling and willing. We only know how they impress into our bodily cognition.



For Kant the whole greyed area is the thing-in-itself. We only know the white sphere of thinking and the perceptions (representations, mental images). The border between the white sphere and the greyed area is completely impassible.

Schopenhauer finds a point of contact with the greyed area. For him the Will includes the whole greyed area - all the urges, desires, needs, cravings, etc. (more refined Western thought differentiates bodily will, where the Spirit meets the physical world, from feelings, desires, etc.) For him the human intellect (thinking sphere) "is like a lame man who can see, but who rides on the shoulders of a blind giant". And this is actually correct observation. This is how life actually looks like for a major part of humanity. With a complete lack of spiritual education, people float like leaves on the flow of unconscious impulses. They simply call them 'my desires', as if they can choose to have them or not. For Schopenhauer this aimless will is the source of all suffering (after the satisfaction of every desire another comes in and so on). The only thing for him which can alleviate this pain is aesthetic contemplation.

"…aesthetic pleasure in the beautiful consists, to a large extent, in the fact that, when we enter the state of pure contemplation, we are raised for the moment above all willing, above all desires and cares; we are, so to speak, rid of ourselves."
(Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol. I, § 68, Dover page 390)

This is the best we can do, and what is wisdom for Schopenhauer. Cognition is as an epiphenomenon patched on top of the blind giant. This is the way many Eastern schools see things (Eugene, I know that there are other Eastern schools which don't do that). It's the realization of the Sisyphus myth. Consciousness rises above the surging sea of will or feeling only to become aware of all the suffering. The return to the sea is the only escape. Schopenhauer at least adds the possibility for the temporary alleviation of suffering through aesthetic contemplation, where consciousness can disconnect from its suffering-prone Will counterpart.

All this is very different in the Western metamorphic view. Please note that I'm not talking about right vs. wrong. We can see how there's gradation from Kant, through Schopenhauer, Hegel, Steiner. For Hegel the white sphere is not at all some epiphenomenon. Archetypal thoughts are the very foundation of reality. Of course Hegel's philosophy is also only a milestone. He never left the sphere of the intellect. He built the world out of intellectual thoughts (of course in a much deeper sense and not out of abstract thoughts existing in the head). We can never do justice to Hegel's philosophy in few words but let us just appreciate the stark contrast with the previous views - for him the foundations of reality are cognizable, they are of thought nature.



It takes a bridge between the intellect and the higher spheres if we are to grow beyond the white sphere in full consciousness (and not only deal with the shadows of will and feelings in our ego consciousness). These are the methods of Initiatic science which was Steiner's task to disclose to the world. Through Imaginative, Inspirative and Intuitive cognition we can penetrate the greyed area in full consciousness. For example, only through Intuitive cognition we can live and have consciousness in the sphere of Will. Here we really find the World Will but not as aimless, surging and suffering sea but as fully conscious, ideating activity of Spirits.

In the metamorphic view it's not about seeking some static equilibrium between thinking and the shadow of will that we experience in our ego consciousness. It's about the gradual growth in consciousness which penetrates cognitively in the depths of the greyed spheres. The penetration in the feeling sphere is the most understandable and I've given different examples so far. It's about unveiling the world of our hidden desires and their related karmic entanglements, and bringing them to light. The more we purify our desires the more selfless we become. Selfless doesn't mean centerless or without individual perspective. It means that we outgrow our personal egoic interests and begin to consciously participate in the work of the Guiding Spirits. We can imagine that in meditation the white sphere drops the rigid thought-forms and metamorphically grows to merge with the feeling sphere where it becomes lucid cognition of the processes there. I repeat that within our ordinary consciousness, feelings are only the dreamy shadows of spiritual processes in that sphere. The more we grow towards the Will sphere, the more Cosmic-scale our consciousness becomes. Only there we can find, through the highest forms of cognition, the ideating activity which supports our inner and outer World. The Will at the highest sphere is not at all the will in the way we understand it through its shadow in the ordinary thinking sphere. If we draw an analogy with physics, we can say that the fundamental spiritual forces are united in the spiritual activity of pure Intuition in the highest worlds. Just as the physical forces differentiate, so through the involutionary iterations the spiritual forces 'delaminate', they differentiate, but not side by side, as symmetrical objects, but 'vertically', as cocoons within cocoons, as Russian dolls. This gives that differentiation the characteristic asymmetry. We have the cognitive character of the fundamental force within thinking but the forms of activity left behind in the higher spheres impress in our cognition only as dream-like feelings and dark will (the spiritual forces operating in the physical world which we are unconscious of in our ordinary state).

Once again we see how endless quarrels about right and wrong are magically resolved when we see things through metamorphic-evolutionary perspective. As long as we argue within the flat projection "which is more primary - shadow willing or thinking", we completely miss the point. So Steiner didn't simply want to take a jab at Schopenhauer by outwitting him through some clever logical arguments. His whole life was dedicated to show the path that cognitively penetrates the spheres in full consciousness. If this is not grasped, the intellect will always see things as kid's fight about 'whose sphere is more important'.

[AshvinP]

You must recognize that only modern mental habits make any aspect of shared ideal content "non-parsimonious, unnecessary, and unverifiable". Those habits result mostly from divisions of subject-object (Descartes) and ontology-epistemology (Kant), which simply did not constrain the thought of ancient Greeks (for ex.) as it does modern man. Although I realize my inclusions of the word "must" has already unconsciously ruled out your consideration of the argument I am making, because that is what you are truly arguing against. You are always only arguing against the idea that any spiritual path is more valid or useful than others. You will claim that you are not and some spiritual paths are, in fact, better than others, because it is not really possible to defend the alternative, but then your comments will return substantially to that same argument. Every comment you make on this topic is a rearrangement of words to form that same argument.

The principle of parsimony has nothing to do with Cartesian dualism or of Kantian divide.
I thought we agreed to "work around" each other?

But the claim that shared ideal content (such as "triangle") is less parsimonious than the only alternative, i.e. a bunch of different "triangle" concepts generated within each individual bubble of consciousness, which somehow resemble each other in the exact way that makes it possible to communicate them and make math-science possible, has everything to do with that dualism-divide. You also added the shared ideal content claim is "unnecessary and unverifiable", and that also has everything to do with the dualism-divide, which treats "subjective" ideal content as beyond the boundaries of rigorous and objective empirical inquiry. So your comment was the trifecta of flawed conclusions only made possible by Cartesian-Kantian divides.

But I suppose you are right, we did agree to work around. My fault.

[Eugene I]

But the claim that shared ideal content (such as "triangle") is less parsimonious than the only alternative, i.e. a bunch of different "triangle" concepts generated within each individual bubble of consciousness, which somehow resemble each other in the exact way that makes it possible to communicate them and make math-science possible, has everything to do with that dualism-divide. You also added the shared ideal content claim is "unnecessary and unverifiable", and that also has everything to do with the dualism-divide, which treats "subjective" ideal content as beyond the boundaries of rigorous and objective empirical inquiry. So your comment was the trifecta of flawed conclusions only made possible by Cartesian-Kantian divides.

But I suppose you are right, we did agree to work around. My fault.

When a computer analyses an image, it can recognize certain patterns if it has pattern recognition algorithms programmed. The recognized patterns themselves do not need to be programmed in advance, the modern AI algorithms are smart enough to generate and recognize new patterns. It can also communicate these patterns to another computer, and that other comp can use these communicated patterns as templates for its own pattern recognition algorithm and recognize similar patterns in its own perceived images. So these patterns (computer ideas) can be shared and communicated between computers. But that does not mean that such patterns "objectively exist" somewhere "out there" and both computers get "access" to them. The patterns are generated as a result of the functioning of the algorithms. But because the computers have similar algorithms, they can communicate and use the communicated patterns. So, it is the similarity in the structure and algorithms of the computers that make such communication possible, but not the existence of the patterns as some ideal objects.

This is simplified analogy of course. The point is, if Consciousness has similar structures in each individual mind, these minds can generate ideas and meanings, communicate them through language and share them with other similarly structured minds. Even if dumb computers can do that, no doubt Consciousness can do that as well. There is no need to assume any existence of Platonic ideas (hence Platonism is not necessary). Neither it creates any "divides", because it is the same Consciousness activity based on the same functional structures acting in every individual mind and making them possible to communicate and understand the communicated meanings. It is the same conscious activity that makes the ideas communicable, and not the same objectively existing ideas. So, it is natural to assume that all meanings and ideas are created by conscious activity and then shared through communications across the dissociated boundaries.

However, that also includes ideas generated by the MAL itself, and such ideas can be communicated to alters, and from the alters perspective such ideas would be "objectively existing" in the MAL's mind. But from the MAL's perspective they would still be subjectively existing ideas - they do not exist anywhere "out there", but are simply generated by conscious activity of the MAL. So, in a way, Platonism and objective idealism are how the ideal world is perceived from the alters' perspective, and anti-Platonism and subjective idealism is how it is perceived from the MAL's perspective. So, in a way, both are true, depending on the perspective.

Yet, the alters themselves has creative abilities and can generate ideas that have not yet existed even in the MAL's mind, and then communicate them to MAL and other alters. The Bach's Toccata did not exist anywhere in the MAL and other alters' minds until Bach himself composed it and communicated it to them.

[Eugene I]

In the course of evolution our Spiritual core awakens in the innermost sphere. As said, it's not at all difficult to attain to a state of pure thinking without any presence of feelings, desires, bodily sensations, will. But if we drop the innermost sphere we simply lose consciousness. Even if we assume that the other spheres are there, we simply can't know this.

You are right, Cleric, without thinking we can not recognize (discriminate, know) all other aspects of Reality.

Now, the willing part is a bit terminologically confusing. There are two meanings associated with the word "Will": one is an "impulse" or "drive", the other one is "volition". The volition is an action that does not necessarily need any "impulse", "drive" or "desire", it's just a pure free-willing "act" of creative activity. Thinking could not produce any thoughts without volition, each thought is created as an act of volition. Another term for volition is "free will". The "impulsive" Will is not free, it is bound to its instincts. So now we can see that volition is as fundamental as Thinking itself.

[AshvinP]

But the claim that shared ideal content (such as "triangle") is less parsimonious than the only alternative, i.e. a bunch of different "triangle" concepts generated within each individual bubble of consciousness, which somehow resemble each other in the exact way that makes it possible to communicate them and make math-science possible, has everything to do with that dualism-divide. You also added the shared ideal content claim is "unnecessary and unverifiable", and that also has everything to do with the dualism-divide, which treats "subjective" ideal content as beyond the boundaries of rigorous and objective empirical inquiry. So your comment was the trifecta of flawed conclusions only made possible by Cartesian-Kantian divides.

But I suppose you are right, we did agree to work around. My fault.

When a computer analyses an image, it can recognize certain patterns if it has pattern recognition algorithms programmed. The recognized patterns themselves do not need to be programmed in advance, the modern AI algorithms are smart enough to generate and recognize new patterns. It can also communicate these patterns to another computer, and that other comp can use these communicated patterns as templates for its own pattern recognition algorithm and recognize similar patterns in its own perceived images. So these patterns (computer ideas) can be shared and communicated between computers. But that does not mean that such patterns "objectively exist" somewhere "out there" and both computers get "access" to them. The patterns are generated as a result of the functioning of the algorithms. But because the computers have similar algorithms, they can communicate and use the communicated patterns. So, it is the similarity in the structure and algorithms of the computers that make such communication possible, but not the existence of the patterns as some ideal objects.

This is simplified analogy of course. The point is, if Consciousness has similar structures in each individual mind, these minds can generate ideas and meanings, communicate them through language and share them with other similarly structured minds. Even if dumb computers can do that, no doubt Consciousness can do that as well. There is no need to assume any existence of Platonic ideas (hence Platonism is not necessary). Neither it creates any "divides", because it is the same Consciousness activity based on the same functional structures acting in every individual mind and making them possible to communicate and understand the communicated meanings. It is the same conscious activity that makes the ideas communicable, and not the same objectively existing ideas. So, it is natural to assume that all meanings and ideas are created by conscious activity and then shared through communications across the dissociated boundaries.

However, that also includes ideas generated by the MAL itself, and such ideas can be communicated to alters, and from the alters perspective such ideas would be "objectively existing" in the MAL's mind. But from the MAL's perspective they would still be subjectively existing ideas - they do not exist anywhere "out there", but are simply generated by conscious activity of the MAL. So, in a way, Platonism and objective idealism are how the ideal world is perceived from the alters' perspective, and anti-Platonism and subjective idealism is how it is perceived from the MAL's perspective. So, in a way, both are true, depending on the perspective.

Yet, the alters themselves has creative abilities and can generate ideas that have not yet existed even in the MAL's mind, and then communicate them to MAL and other alters. The Bach's Toccata did not exist anywhere in the MAL and other alters' minds until Bach himself composed it and communicated it to them.

I am not sure where to start... the entire analogy is an expression of the Cartesian-Kantian divides. It is using imagery of separate computers communicating "patterns" to each other to generate meaning. Not only does it divide the computers (individuals) from each other, it divides the world into non-meaningful computer programs and meaningful phenomenon (or epiphenomenon) which only arrive later. Furthermore, the analogy is more detailed than the alleged spiritual reality it is pointing to, which means it provides no further insight into what exactly is happening with within this realm of generated ideal content.

Finally, the distinction between whether the ideal content is "discovered" or "generated" is rather irrelevant, as Cleric has explained before. The only relevant question is whether it is shared by all human perspectives. The "discovered vs. generated" question comes from the 3rd person spectator perspective which is yet another philosophical dead-end. It assumes we can stand apart all human perspectives and then judge whether the ideal content always existed or came into being at some point in time. The meaningless of such an inquiry should become evident if we are not beholden to the Cartesian divide.

The bolded part I can actually get behind, if not for the fact that you are using this entire line of reasoning to argue against the capacity for ideal content to be rigorously and objectively studied and known through study. As I said before, that is what you want to deny more than anything else, because it takes Thinking to a level of spiritual activity which "pure" Will, Awareness, Beingness, etc. can never achieve by everyone's admission. There is no other possibility once that rigorous empirical investigation of ideal content and the underlying ideal relations which rise to that content is deemed possible. Then it is game, set, and match in regards to the unique role of Thinking in our spiritual existence.

Also, as Cleric mentioned in yet another one his brilliant posts on this topic, even though I decided to try this boxing game format to spurn deeper discussion, it is not about any side "winning" in that really trivial sense. I will admit, I am competitive and really enjoy watching and playing sports. I find it to be a remarkable sphere where one can truly admire the discipline, skill, and aesthetic creativity it takes for an individual to excel in a particular sport. So, if anything, that aspect of sporting competition should be the connection to Steiner's philosophy here, the major difference being we all get to participate in his excellence if we decide to.

[findingblanks]

I hear ya on all that. Personally, I see BK's general model (despite my various qualms about this and that aspect) utterly compatible with Steiner and Schopenhauer. And, strange enough, I so far haven't come across anything that make Steiner and Schopenhauer incompatible to me. They both seem to have dug deeply into the ground-floor with different tools, expectations, goals and prior understandings. That said, based on language and many other factors, I also understand why we should expect most people to consider one of them to be more right or to have dug more deeply or more accurately. The joy is in the digging and carefully examining and reeximing what we see until we realize it'll keep changing as long as we it's the right thing. Too simply put, but you get the gist of it, I'm sure. Have a great night.

But either way, if we are prepared to say that just as there is only one concept of triangle that all thinkers participate when grasping the nature of a triangle, there is only one essence of thinking that is being grasped as the very essence of one's own thinking.

Right, and this is exactly Platonism, which is a legitimate and elegant, but yet unverifiable and unnecessary assumption. And as such, it is non-parsimonious, which is why Bernardo would exclude it from his metaphysics based on his strong view on the parsimony principle. Personally I'm still open to it as a legitimate possibility, yet I can see some issues with it. One issue is: what kind of "existence" we could attribute to these ideas? In the consistent Platonism all infinity of possible ideas eternally exist, but there is a "weak version" where the ideas do exist but they exist "potentially" (whatever it means), and a "strong version" claiming that they exist "actually" as the whole infinity of them. The strong version implies the actual existence of infinity, which is another mathematically problematic assumption (if you listen to mathematicians from the intuitionist camp). But more important issue is that, under idealism, all that exists is always consciously experienced, which for Platonic idealism means that all the infinity of ideas is actually experienced by the Global Consciousness. Which is the same as to say that the Global Consciousness is omniscient. This is essentially what the traditional theology claimed. But to make this compatible with the Whiteheadian evolving God, another assumption needs to be introduced that God exists as omniscient in no-time, yet simultaneously exist in time as evolving and non-omniscient (if it makes sense). So you can see how many more non-parsimonious, unprovable and unnecessary assumptions we need to bring to make Platinic idealism more-or-less consistent.

[findingblanks]

Good evening, you wrote:

"I think it is now your burden to state a counter-formulation of Schopenhauer to mine bolded above if you don't agree with it."

"Therefore they posit that the mere percept of Will in absence of Thinking activity discloses the Will's true essence."

Even though treating that sentence as if it is is simply accurate automatically introduces a layer of distortion and distraction, we don't have the time and context to settle all of this, so I'll try to say my point clearly without starting from the ground-floor.

If we aren't begging our understanding of what a 'percept', 'the will', and 'thinking activity mean, we can read the following phrase:

"they posit that the mere percept of Will in absence of Thinking activity..."

And we can see that a 'mere percept' can also mean an experience that is free from any encrustedly dead concepts functioning in its beholding. If we don't beg the question, we can think of many meanings for such terms and the kind of 'beholding' that is free from 'thinking activity' (This could be distinguishing finished thinking activity from a cognitive participated union that is free from perspectival cognitive encounter: please know that I'm not arguing for or against any way of taking these terms at this point; I'm merely showing that they don't have to be taken in a way that already implies a particular interpretation of Steiner).

So if beholding "the Will" directly is another way (in a different schema, maybe one like Schopenhauer's) of saying encoungering it free from even creative conceptualizations that capture many true facets, then, in that case, we would already see why such a philosophy might not even use the word 'intuition' to describe this 'mere' beholding. Just as a careful look at Steiner's first edition of PoF can explain why he never directly spoke of the true union between thinking's essence and the true essence of the willing. Later he agrees to use different language that makes it explcit because he saw that many people were misunderstanding what he thought was implicit and clear enough.

So unless we insist on pre-loading the words with meanings that force them into one shape, I think we can see that encountering the Will free from the activity of conceptualizations can be said to be a unique kind of direct perception that is unmediated by that kind of thinking activity. Just as Steiner decided he need to use different words to speak to some people, it isn't hard for me to imagine Schopenhaer might have decided to say to some people, "I thought I made perfectly clear that beholding the universal will is not what happens when you feel yourself moving your arm. Sure, once you've truly grasped the intuition (a word I avoided using at the time, but thought was implcitly clear) of universal will, THEN you can grasp how it is active in the moving of your arm as well."

Anyway, I don't want to get caught up in anybody's hypothetical understandings of the various interpretations, but I did want to show that it is possible (for some) to read the sentence you provided and have it make perfect sense within a context that recognizes an inherent unition between unitive thinking and the nature of universal will. I'm not trying to prove it here, just as I know you are making proofs. We are trying to carefully notice how words can mean very precisely different things in different context.

More than anything I want to point out the wonderful thing you are doing above. You aren't simply selecting some of Steiner's ambiguous words (all words are so I'm not blaming Steiner) and then showing how you can find a spot of bad logic or inconsistency. You are naturally showing what some people call "The Chicago Method of Philosophy" in that your premise is that Steiner has thought enough about the issue that it most likly means you are missing something if it seems Steiner is making simple missteps in logic. This is a very wise approach. What I notice is that there are context when people naturally take the approach you are so skillfully demonstrating and, then, the very same person, will simply not take it in other contexts. The difference tends to often simply boil down to one's prior (conscious or unconscious or mixed) commitments. This is why when many people read The Philosophy of Freedom and see when Steiner claims to have demolished Schopenhauer's conclusions, they simply read the logic of the words and go, Yep, he did." And the same for people who think Schopenhauer demolished Hegel with his summary of Hegel's obvious errors.

"According to them, it is directly perceived prior to any representations of the Will. Therefore they posit that the mere percept of Will in absence of Thinking activity discloses the Will's true essence. That is a form of naïve realism. It leaves out that ideal element which, ironically, allows anyone to say the their individual will is connected to Will at large."

First I feel it is important to say that thus far I don't think any of us should claim that we have studied Schopenhauer enough to rephrase his points in short sentences that claim to stand in for his points. I do not think that is what you are doing, but I just want to make clear that we are not really presenting his points in contrast to Steiner. We are taking some very flimsy and scattershot notices (all very interesting and probably related to aspects of his edifice) and then wondering how THAT relates to our interpretation of Steiner.

That said, from what you wrote above, I fear we will unavoidably fall into the unintentional equiviation trap. That is, we will use words like 'thinking' and 'will' and 'ideal element' in different ways and we will impose one way of using those words on a thinker (either of our guys) who would be using that word other ways. And, to make it even harder, we need to remember that these guys might NOT use a word but expect their reader to see that the entire concept is implied by how they are setting up their other ideas. This is why Steiner often, years later, needed to clairfy that his 'intuitive thinking' is not something separated from a very specific activity of a fundamental form of and nature of Willing.

There are so many different versions of naive realism. Steiner points out the only form of naive realism that he thinks is legit in PoF he sets up a version of it that he points to as false, which all other philosophers agree with him upon. But most phenomenologically inclined philosophers, like Steiner, will point to where in their system there is a form of naive realism that is essential.

Thanks for the complement, I appreciate it! And I also agree we should not think we have exhausted someone's major philosophy with a couple of short sentences or even paragraphs. Of course, we also cannot appeal to some sort of "read all of his writings and quote them in full context here before you are critical of his philosophy" argument. I would say the best approach is for us to do exactly what we are doing - try our best to summarize the various arguments in play, and then go back and forth with clarifications and adjustments as necessary. In that process, we must always be careful to make sure we have not simply given new meanings to previous words used, completely misrepresent what the other person said before, etc., as you correctly point out.

In this case, I think it is now your burden to state a counter-formulation of Schopenhauer to mine bolded above if you don't agree with it, and/or why my formulation does not fall within the sphere of "naïve realism". You say Steiner is himself relying on or implicating naïve realism at some point in his PoF argument - where specifically does this occur?

Now, again, not speaking for Schopy, there is nothing incoherent in claiming a fundamental Will that is NOT the result of human cognitive activity but that is by it's fundamental nature ideal. There is nothing incoherent about characterizing that Will as being directly participated by all forms of life and that this participation can be both conceptually grasped and lived. Just because we may not use Steiner's terms in how we come to understand this fundamental ideal activity that we participate in the deepest depths of our being (and even if we need to distinguish it from ways we understand various definitions of 'thinking' or 'knowing') that doesn't mean that there isn't a kind of thinking/knowing that can be identified with our direct intuitively living participation. Just as we can't clobber Steiner as 'being wrong' or not using the right terms because we find gaps or seeming missteps in his sentences, we can't simply say that it is a naive realism (in the critical sense) to claim that we have a non-conceptual unity with an experience of fundamental 'will'.

To get back closer to the nature of this entire thread:

I personally do not believe that Steiner demolished Schopenhauer by pointing to the logical contradiciton he finds in the way he, Steiner, summarized Schopenhauer's work. I used to definitely think he did. So in this sense I'm team Schopenhauer. But I definitely don't think BK grasps Steiner's core ideas and I know BK does not claim to know much about Steiner's epistemology. So in that sense I'm on team Steiner.

Like I said I'm on the sidelines and curious to see why some of you feel one of the teams is winning. Thanks.

So here we have a pretty big misunderstanding - neither Steiner nor we on "team Steiner" (perhaps including you now, and we are happy to have you!) are claiming there is something "incoherent" about claiming Will can exist apart from human cognitive activity. Rather, we are claiming that such a claim can only be coherently made by reliance on human cognitive activity (in its highest sense, which we must always remember). This highest sense of Thinking includes "direct intuitive living participation". Now if you say that intuitive participation is the same as Schopenhauer's Will, then it is your burden to provide the arguments for why. It seems pretty clear to me, and BK apparently agrees, that Schopenhauer does not believe any sort of ideal content is necessary to experience the universal Will. In fact, once ideal content is experienced in connection with the Will, we are no longer directly experiencing the Will but rather we are experiencing the Will plus ideal illusion ("representation") we have generated ourselves. So if you disagree with that claim re: Schopenhauer, we need arguments for why. You could argue "intuitive participation" does not involve ideal content, but I doubt you want to do that.

But either way, if we are prepared to say that just as there is only one concept of triangle that all thinkers participate when grasping the nature of a triangle, there is only one essence of thinking that is being grasped as the very essence of one's own thinking.

This universal essence need not be assumed to be self-conscious. It need not be assumed to be inactive or a blog. It can be understood and experienced to be the living 'field' from which any and all living ideas will spring and grow and fade (those that are dynamic) or be 'found' (if you believe there are core ideas that never change).

Either way, discovering the fundamental essence that is revealed one's thinking does not necessitate thinking being the only pathway to make this disocvery. Indeed, Steiner gives other lectures where he talks about other legitimate pathways towards recognizing the ground of existence, pathways that do not start with a careful cultivation of thinking. He prefers and advocates the cognitive path. He points to dangers upon other paths. But he also specifies some paths that can safely get people there via forms of devotion. If we let ourselves consider the possibility that Steiner perhaps didn't know or mention every conceivable way that the fundamental nature of reality could be 'grasped', we can imagine pathways that blend aspects of philosophy with that of devotion and contemplation. We need not assume a cookie-cutter set of options in how a given human can freely grasp the nature of fundamental reality. And, then, once grasped, why would we expect them to explicate this in a way that is clear to most people or, even more unlikely, that matches up to how other people are trying to explicate this unitive knowledge.

Here is where I think the argument re: always receding horizon of Thinking is instructive. As mentioned before, basically the argument is that whenever we start reflecting on our Thinking process which generated thought-forms, that 'layer' of the Thinking process becomes the new thought-form and another 'layer' of non-observed Thinking is 'formed'. This simple fact implies that there is always some Thinking in the Cosmos observing the layer of Thinking which we cannot observe and keep pushing back every time we try. That is an argument for self-awareness as fundamental to Thinking and it is one we can all verify for ourselves at any time. Perhaps I am getting that wrong and I am certainly open to that possibility, but I don't think so.

re: Thinking as only pathway to discovering fundamental essence - I am curious to see the "other lectures" you are referring to so I can look at the specific context. The very concept of "discovering" or "recognizing" the Ground implicates Thinking activity in such recognition. And, we should keep in mind, the fact that this argument for Thinking's exclusive role is so simple does not make it any less true.

[AshvinP]

Good evening, you wrote:

"I think it is now your burden to state a counter-formulation of Schopenhauer to mine bolded above if you don't agree with it."

"Therefore they posit that the mere percept of Will in absence of Thinking activity discloses the Will's true essence."

Even though treating that sentence as if it is is simply accurate automatically introduces a layer of distortion and distraction, we don't have the time and context to settle all of this, so I'll try to say my point clearly without starting from the ground-floor.

If we aren't begging our understanding of what a 'percept', 'the will', and 'thinking activity mean, we can read the following phrase:

"they posit that the mere percept of Will in absence of Thinking activity..."

And we can see that a 'mere percept' can also mean an experience that is free from any encrustedly dead concepts functioning in its beholding. If we don't beg the question, we can think of many meanings for such terms and the kind of 'beholding' that is free from 'thinking activity' (This could be distinguishing finished thinking activity from a cognitive participated union that is free from perspectival cognitive encounter: please know that I'm not arguing for or against any way of taking these terms at this point; I'm merely showing that they don't have to be taken in a way that already implies a particular interpretation of Steiner).

So if beholding "the Will" directly is another way (in a different schema, maybe one like Schopenhauer's) of saying encoungering it free from even creative conceptualizations that capture many true facets, then, in that case, we would already see why such a philosophy might not even use the word 'intuition' to describe this 'mere' beholding. Just as a careful look at Steiner's first edition of PoF can explain why he never directly spoke of the true union between thinking's essence and the true essence of the willing. Later he agrees to use different language that makes it explcit because he saw that many people were misunderstanding what he thought was implicit and clear enough.

So unless we insist on pre-loading the words with meanings that force them into one shape, I think we can see that encountering the Will free from the activity of conceptualizations can be said to be a unique kind of direct perception that is unmediated by that kind of thinking activity. Just as Steiner decided he need to use different words to speak to some people, it isn't hard for me to imagine Schopenhaer might have decided to say to some people, "I thought I made perfectly clear that beholding the universal will is not what happens when you feel yourself moving your arm. Sure, once you've truly grasped the intuition (a word I avoided using at the time, but thought was implcitly clear) of universal will, THEN you can grasp how it is active in the moving of your arm as well."

Anyway, I don't want to get caught up in anybody's hypothetical understandings of the various interpretations, but I did want to show that it is possible (for some) to read the sentence you provided and have it make perfect sense within a context that recognizes an inherent unition between unitive thinking and the nature of universal will. I'm not trying to prove it here, just as I know you are making proofs. We are trying to carefully notice how words can mean very precisely different things in different context.

Look, I do not want to get caught up in this terminology game any more than you do. I want to make real progress in shared understanding. So, if I am reading you correctly, then you are suggesting that not only was Steiner's understanding of Schopenhauer very shallow, so is BK's understanding, so is Cleric's, and so is every other commentator on his philosophy. You are saying he snuck in an understanding of universal Will that has escaped all of these other brilliant minds and every later philosopher who built their philosophy of Will on his foundation. Now if you can point me towards another person's writing who takes the same view as you do on Schopenhauer, then I may be able to adjust that understanding of what you are claiming and come to a better one. Is there any such person?

Beyond that, I think Cleric addressed all of the other issues very well in his last post (quote relevant to this interpretation issue below). And perhaps you intend to address his post specifically. So feel free to do that instead of responding to me here. I just want the discussion to continue in a productive manner.

"…aesthetic pleasure in the beautiful consists, to a large extent, in the fact that, when we enter the state of pure contemplation, we are raised for the moment above all willing, above all desires and cares; we are, so to speak, rid of ourselves."
(Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol. I, § 68, Dover page 390)

This is the best we can do, and what is wisdom for Schopenhauer. Cognition is as an epiphenomenon patched on top of the blind giant. This is the way many Eastern schools see things (Eugene, I know that there are other Eastern schools which don't do that). It's the realization of the Sisyphus myth. Consciousness rises above the surging sea of will or feeling only to become aware of all the suffering. The return to the sea is the only escape. Schopenhauer at least adds the possibility for the temporary alleviation of suffering through aesthetic contemplation, where consciousness can disconnect from its suffering-prone Will counterpart.

All this is very different in the Western metamorphic view. Please note that I'm not talking about right vs. wrong. We can see how there's gradation from Kant, through Schopenhauer, Hegel, Steiner. For Hegel the white sphere is not at all some epiphenomenon. Archetypal thoughts are the very foundation of reality. Of course Hegel's philosophy is also only a milestone. He never left the sphere of the intellect. He built the world out of intellectual thoughts (of course in a much deeper sense and not out of abstract thoughts existing in the head). We can never do justice to Hegel's philosophy in few words but let us just appreciate the stark contrast with the previous views - for him the foundations of reality are cognizable, they are of thought nature.