Serious Question Related to the Unconscious

[mkusluvan]

I am very familiar with Bernardo's work but something has been boggling my mind for quite some time. I do not know if Bernardo sees these questions but I hope somebody can answer it. Here it is:

When Bernardo refers to consiousness I know that he refers to phenomenological consciousness, which means that there is something it is like to experience a particular state. He acknowledges the psychological unconscious but he rightfully says that because there is a mental state there because there is something it is like to be. For example I am meta-conscious of writing this post right now, but there are millions of things in my unconscious which are still mental states. For example, I was breathing but I was not meta-consious of this experience even though I was experiencing it. So far so good. Now according to my understanding Bernardo says that it seems like only organisms that metabolise have meta-consciousness. I also understand that humans and animals do not possess consciousness but rather humans, animals and chairs are IN consciousness. But here is my problem. There is something it is like to be me. But how come there is not it is something like to be a chair. Since both of us do not possess consciousness but are an image of a process of consciousness If there is something it is like to feel my breathing, even though I may not be meta-consciouss of it why it wouldn't be the same for a chair. Of course the chair would not have meta-consciousness so that a chair can never report it's experience or become aware of it. Also is my "unconscious" same as the mind at large. I understand that it is not "my" consciousness fundamentally but anyways. Do my "unconscious" mental states belong to my dissociated mind or mind at large? Is there a difference between my "unconscious" mental states an mind at large or are they connected somehow? If they are different is it safe to say that I have "my own" consciousness because there is something it is like to be me. How am I exactly different from a chair in these regards?

[Federica]

I am very familiar with Bernardo's work but something has been boggling my mind for quite some time. I do not know if Bernardo sees these questions but I hope somebody can answer it. Here it is:

When Bernardo refers to consiousness I know that he refers to phenomenological consciousness, which means that there is something it is like to experience a particular state. He acknowledges the psychological unconscious but he rightfully says that because there is a mental state there because there is something it is like to be. For example I am meta-conscious of writing this post right now, but there are millions of things in my unconscious which are still mental states. For example, I was breathing but I was not meta-consious of this experience even though I was experiencing it. So far so good. Now according to my understanding Bernardo says that it seems like only organisms that metabolise have meta-consciousness. I also understand that humans and animals do not possess consciousness but rather humans, animals and chairs are IN consciousness. But here is my problem. There is something it is like to be me. But how come there is not it is something like to be a chair. Since both of us do not possess consciousness but are an image of a process of consciousness If there is something it is like to feel my breathing, even though I may not be meta-consciouss of it why it wouldn't be the same for a chair. Of course the chair would not have meta-consciousness so that a chair can never report it's experience or become aware of it. Also is my "unconscious" same as the mind at large. I understand that it is not "my" consciousness fundamentally but anyways. Do my "unconscious" mental states belong to my dissociated mind or mind at large? Is there a difference between my "unconscious" mental states an mind at large or are they connected somehow? If they are different is it safe to say that I have "my own" consciousness because there is something it is like to be me. How am I exactly different from a chair in these regards?

Hi M,

Thanks for your question. Let me give you my thoughts about how Bernardo considers the problem you are pointing to.
In his view, everything is in consciousness (=phenomenological consciousness, non meta-cognitive consciousness, in BK’s language) because consciousness is all there is: phenomenological consciousness. That’s the only true nature of all reality, according to Bernardo. So in this sense, he says that conscious agents - say, humans for example - do not “possess” consciousness, rather, they are “in” consciousness, since that’s what they are made of, like all reality is.

How come there is nothing like being a chair, according to Bernardo -
This is because a chair is nothing else than a representation on the screen of perceptions. That’s its only existence, as a physical object. The only agent there is something to be like, in connection with the chair, is the universe as a whole. So the universe as a whole is phenomenologically conscious, and the universe as a whole gives raise, on the screen of perceptions, to isolated representations of objects such as for example the chair.

Now, when BK says that humans do not possess consciousness, he wants to emphasize that this is the nature of all reality, which includes humans. However, he still considers that humans are conscious (and meta-conscious) agents. He calls them “centers of awareness”. So, in this sense, a center of awareness is an individual perspective that has (=possess) conscious and possibly meta-conscious experiences. A chair is not a center of awareness. It’s only a representation formed on the screen of perception of a center of awareness, like a human being, for example. And the unconscious, for Bernardo, is the part of conscious reality that is not meta-conscious, or the part of reality that is dissociated from the perspective of a center of awareness. (see is analytic idealism course part VI, from minute 32).

So this is for what Bernardo has elaborated in his theory, under the hypothesis he has decided to start from.

Now, on this forum we continuously discuss how all this model-building, although very structured, linguistically sophisticated, and clever, will never be sufficient to provide a fully satisfying and truthful understanding of reality. This is because meta-consciousness, attention, reporting, re-representation, thinking about our experience, or however we want to call it, is, in and of itself, part of what we are trying to understand and explain. However, when theorizing like in analytic idealism (when theorizing in general) we are rolling out our reasoning, our meta-consciousness, we are putting thinking and consciousness at work, while thinking and consciousness are actually what we are trying to explain. Nonetheless, we don’t do anything to take this major flaw into account. To supposedly explain things, we dynamically use that same faculty that we are trying to explain. Therefore, we completely miss how this faculty evolves when we put it in motion like that. We use it as if it could be kept outside of the question at stake, but we can’t keep it outside, because it is, indeed the very thing we are trying to explain. So in the end this huge issue remains unnoticed, and we miss whatever happens to this faculty while we are using it dynamically to try and explain…...... this faculty.

Good for us, there is a way out of this “dog eating its own tail” situation. And that’s what this forum is all about. What is your position on that?

[mkusluvan]

Thank you for your kind response Federica. I understand what you are saying in fact I just watched his analytic idealism course regarding the unconscious. What I am wondering is this: What is aware of my unconscious mental states when I am not meta-conscious of them. Do my unconscious mental states belong to me, in other words do they belong to my dissociated mind, or do they belong to the mind at large? But I guess it becomes more clear to me. It seems to me like meta-consciousness is basically a skill that developed in humans as a result of evolution. My unconscious mind is a dissociated part of the universal consciousness. This part also exists in other animals because there is something it is like to be my dog but my dog is not necessarily aware of his experiences. This makes me think that my mind as a dissociated alter exists but "I" am not experiencing my unconscious experiences because it is actually mind at large experiencing them. "I" am just meta-cognitive idea here, but I guess it depends on what there word "I" refers to here. It seems like "I" can refer to three things here. My ego (a meta-conscious construct), my dissociated alter (ego + unconscious), and the consciousness itself. Since the ego and the unconscious can be reduced to consciousness itself what is looking at the world thorugh my eyes right this second is God himself in a sense, which is a funny feeling to be honest

[Federica]

Thank you for your kind response Federica. I understand what you are saying in fact I just watched his analytic idealism course regarding the unconscious. What I am wondering is this: What is aware of my unconscious mental states when I am not meta-conscious of them. Do my unconscious mental states belong to me, in other words do they belong to my dissociated mind, or do they belong to the mind at large? But I guess it becomes more clear to me. It seems to me like meta-consciousness is basically a skill that developed in humans as a result of evolution. My unconscious mind is a dissociated part of the universal consciousness. This part also exists in other animals because there is something it is like to be my dog but my dog is not necessarily aware of his experiences. This makes me think that my mind as a dissociated alter exists but "I" am not experiencing my unconscious experiences because it is actually mind at large experiencing them. "I" am just meta-cognitive idea here, but I guess it depends on what there word "I" refers to here. It seems like "I" can refer to three things here. My ego (a meta-conscious construct), my dissociated alter (ego + unconscious), and the consciousness itself. Since the ego and the unconscious can be reduced to consciousness itself what is looking at the world thorugh my eyes right this second is God himself in a sense, which is a funny feeling to be honest

Do my unconscious mental states belong to me

The true answer is: no they don't, be the mental states conscious or metaconscious, they don't belong to us. Our thoughts are never only formed and represented by us alone. They are un interference, the result of un interconnected unfolding within the forces of mind at large, of universal consciousness.

But for Bernardo they are, since he contends that we are dissociated behind an imprisoning barrier.

Since the ego and the unconscious can be reduced to consciousness itself what is looking at the world through my eyes right this second is God himself in a sense, which is a funny feeling to be honest

If you want to stick to Bernardo's construct, this is only true in a very limited sense, because his mind at large is an unconscious, non metaconscious kind of instinctive god.

[mkusluvan]

I think that Bernardo would agree with my last statement fundamentally, because the core subjectiviy is what experiences things isn't it? As Schopenhauer said "core-subjectivity is "that one eye of the world which looks out from all knowing creatures".

[Federica]

I think that Bernardo would agree with my last statement fundamentally, because the core subjectiviy is what experiences things isn't it? As Schopenhauer said "core-subjectivity is "that one eye of the world which looks out from all knowing creatures".

I think so, he would agree.

[AshvinP]

Thank you for your kind response Federica. I understand what you are saying in fact I just watched his analytic idealism course regarding the unconscious. What I am wondering is this: What is aware of my unconscious mental states when I am not meta-conscious of them. Do my unconscious mental states belong to me, in other words do they belong to my dissociated mind, or do they belong to the mind at large? But I guess it becomes more clear to me. It seems to me like meta-consciousness is basically a skill that developed in humans as a result of evolution. My unconscious mind is a dissociated part of the universal consciousness. This part also exists in other animals because there is something it is like to be my dog but my dog is not necessarily aware of his experiences. This makes me think that my mind as a dissociated alter exists but "I" am not experiencing my unconscious experiences because it is actually mind at large experiencing them. "I" am just meta-cognitive idea here, but I guess it depends on what there word "I" refers to here. It seems like "I" can refer to three things here. My ego (a meta-conscious construct), my dissociated alter (ego + unconscious), and the consciousness itself. Since the ego and the unconscious can be reduced to consciousness itself what is looking at the world thorugh my eyes right this second is God himself in a sense, which is a funny feeling to be honest

Hello,

A key question here is, what is the relationship between our "I" and MAL? When we use the word "I", we don't need to generate some abstract definition for it. Instead, we can simply consider our intimate phenomenal experience. For example, if we do a math problem, say 13 x 17 + 40, most people will sense some inner activity, some mental struggling, before the answer comes out. What is the source of this mental struggling? It is not anything perceptible like the mathematical concepts we are working with, but nevertheless the experiential reality of its existence cannot be reasonably denied. We can use the symbol of "I" for this invisible inner activity that we never see, but still feel intimately involved in and responsible for.

So then we ask, what is the relationship between this "I" and MAL? Here we can further clarify "MAL" to mean the totality of those unconscious experiential states that you mentioned. Now the question is, what's the relationship between our inner mental struggling, such as when we do a mathematical operation, and the totality of our unconscious experiential states. It's already clear that the answer to this question cannot come by arranging more concepts together, just as no amount of mathematical operations will output the explanation of the inner activity that is doing the operation. Rather, the inner activity, the "I", should be willing to experience how it is constrained by MAL, by the unconscious experiential states.

This experiential method can lead us in many interesting directions. For example, you initially mentioned how breathing can be one of those unconscious states that we clearly experience but are often not 'meta-conscious' of, i.e. we don't usually direct our inner activity to reflect on the experience. We know that our breathing can act as a constraint on our "I" - if we are really short of breath, we may find it very difficult to concentrate our activity on doing a math problem. So then you wondered, can we say whether there is something it is like to be our breathing? In other words, to be the inner activity that is set in motion and performs, not mathematical operations, but natural life processes like breathing, which constrain our activity in some way? If we are following, clearly the only answer to this will come from actually experiencing that higher-order activity, the inner active nature of our breathing.

BK's model suggests that seeking such an experience is absurd from the start, because essentially we are seeking to drop out of normal 'meta-consciousness' into completely instinctive consciousness, which is practically unconsciousness. But where does the assumption that this must be the case come from? Really it comes from humans in the modern age imagining they are the most intelligent and lucid beings in the Cosmos, or at least the Solar system. Whether we are materialist or idealist, we imagine human intelligence as the culmination of a long process of simple and stupid 'agents' combining together and somehow emerging into sentience. If we refrain from making any such assumptions that demotivate further inner efforts, and instead seek the inner experiences in good faith, we may find it turns out to be completely unwarranted.

As said, the place to start is in the intimate experience of our own inner activity, the same activity by which we make sense of all experiences and by which we form all models and world outlooks. We won't find the normally unconscious inner activity responsible for the breathing process on the 'other side' of our perceptual experiences, but within our own activity. The ancient yogis knew that and therefore sought the spirit, MAL, etc. through inner concentration on the breathing process itself. But humanity has now advanced, we are now intellectual thinking beings doing philosophy and science, so we are much less conscious of the breathing process and much more conscious of how our mental images transform. For example, we can imagine a triangle and move it around in our imagination. We can feel very closely how our inner activity is reflected in the movements of the triangle - the activity and the perceptual transformations are entirely synchronized. That gives us a hint on where to start, a firm point which we can leverage to expand our consciousness further into the unconscious experiential states.

Does that make sense?