Serious Question Related to the Unconscious
Posted: Mon Mar 25, 2024 5:39 am
I am very familiar with Bernardo's work but something has been boggling my mind for quite some time. I do not know if Bernardo sees these questions but I hope somebody can answer it. Here it is:
When Bernardo refers to consiousness I know that he refers to phenomenological consciousness, which means that there is something it is like to experience a particular state. He acknowledges the psychological unconscious but he rightfully says that because there is a mental state there because there is something it is like to be. For example I am meta-conscious of writing this post right now, but there are millions of things in my unconscious which are still mental states. For example, I was breathing but I was not meta-consious of this experience even though I was experiencing it. So far so good. Now according to my understanding Bernardo says that it seems like only organisms that metabolise have meta-consciousness. I also understand that humans and animals do not possess consciousness but rather humans, animals and chairs are IN consciousness. But here is my problem. There is something it is like to be me. But how come there is not it is something like to be a chair. Since both of us do not possess consciousness but are an image of a process of consciousness If there is something it is like to feel my breathing, even though I may not be meta-consciouss of it why it wouldn't be the same for a chair. Of course the chair would not have meta-consciousness so that a chair can never report it's experience or become aware of it. Also is my "unconscious" same as the mind at large. I understand that it is not "my" consciousness fundamentally but anyways. Do my "unconscious" mental states belong to my dissociated mind or mind at large? Is there a difference between my "unconscious" mental states an mind at large or are they connected somehow? If they are different is it safe to say that I have "my own" consciousness because there is something it is like to be me. How am I exactly different from a chair in these regards?
When Bernardo refers to consiousness I know that he refers to phenomenological consciousness, which means that there is something it is like to experience a particular state. He acknowledges the psychological unconscious but he rightfully says that because there is a mental state there because there is something it is like to be. For example I am meta-conscious of writing this post right now, but there are millions of things in my unconscious which are still mental states. For example, I was breathing but I was not meta-consious of this experience even though I was experiencing it. So far so good. Now according to my understanding Bernardo says that it seems like only organisms that metabolise have meta-consciousness. I also understand that humans and animals do not possess consciousness but rather humans, animals and chairs are IN consciousness. But here is my problem. There is something it is like to be me. But how come there is not it is something like to be a chair. Since both of us do not possess consciousness but are an image of a process of consciousness If there is something it is like to feel my breathing, even though I may not be meta-consciouss of it why it wouldn't be the same for a chair. Of course the chair would not have meta-consciousness so that a chair can never report it's experience or become aware of it. Also is my "unconscious" same as the mind at large. I understand that it is not "my" consciousness fundamentally but anyways. Do my "unconscious" mental states belong to my dissociated mind or mind at large? Is there a difference between my "unconscious" mental states an mind at large or are they connected somehow? If they are different is it safe to say that I have "my own" consciousness because there is something it is like to be me. How am I exactly different from a chair in these regards?