New interview with Bernardo

[Eugene I]

If we try to think of 'what we are' we simply return in the ordinary state within the mirrors. The matter is that in this state we no longer need to identify ourselves with anything. ... In the higher state self-consciousness and self-activity are inseparably united, there's no more conflict between 'doing' and 'doer'.

I could not agree more with you here, Cleric. It's exactly the self-identification with "something" that is one of the root causes of human egotism and split/dualistic perception of reality that most of us are caught and lost in. I also agree that simply discarding the "I" is not going to solve all our problems, and can even make things worse, if other means of spiritual development are neglected. The Buddhist anatta (no-self) precept is only one component of the Buddhist path, and not even the most important. However, it is still one of the key ones because it addresses and aims to unroot our tendency of self-identification. So, this precept, together with other components of spiritual practice, can do the magic of spiritual transformation and transcending the fragmented, distorted and egoic state of an average human person, if practiced in the right way. Addressing the problem of self-identification is an important component and insight of the Buddhist practice that I find missing in many other spiritual traditions, but of course it is not a magic bullet and can only work in a consort with other components of spiritual practice.

I also agree that neither "noun", nor "verb" representations adequately reflect the reality of consciousness. As I said earlier, no meaning/concept can ever adequately represent the reality simply because the reality itself is not a meaning or a concept. The meanings still help us to function in reality and model it, but the key is to always remember not to confuse the map with the territory.

Self-mastery is not achieved by enforcing restrictions on the possibilities for wrong-doing but by rising to ever higher levels of consciousness where the consequences of the possibilities are clearly perceived and one can conduct their life in freedom, in accordance to their highest aspirations.

Well said, I fully agree. I'm glad we found a common ground, Cleric, and thank you for your insightful thoughts, I learnt and gained a lot of insights from your posts.

[AshvinP]

If we try to think of 'what we are' we simply return in the ordinary state within the mirrors. The matter is that in this state we no longer need to identify ourselves with anything. ... In the higher state self-consciousness and self-activity are inseparably united, there's no more conflict between 'doing' and 'doer'.

I could not agree more with you here, Cleric. It's exactly the self-identification with "something" that is one of the root causes of human egotism and split/dualistic perception of reality that most of us are caught and lost in. I also agree that simply discarding the "I" is not going to solve all our problems, and can even make things worse, if other means of spiritual development are neglected. The Buddhist anatta (no-self) precept is only one component of the Buddhist path, and not even the most important. However, it is still one of the key ones because it addresses and aims to unroot our tendency of self-identification. So, this precept, together with other components of spiritual practice, can do the magic of spiritual transformation and transcending the fragmented, distorted and egoic state of an average human person, if practiced in the right way. Addressing the problem of self-identification is an important component and insight of the Buddhist practice that I find missing in many other spiritual traditions, but of course it is not a magic bullet and can only work in a consort with other components of spiritual practice.

I also agree that neither "noun", nor "verb" representations adequately reflect the reality of consciousness. As I said earlier, no meaning/concept can ever adequately represent the reality simply because the reality itself is not a meaning or a concept. The meanings still help us to function in reality and model it, but the key is to always remember not to confuse the map with the territory.

This is one of the main issues I have trouble reconciling within BK's idealism, perhaps because I am very much aligned with Western pragmatic philosophy. How can we consistently claim that which is fundamental to our existence and spiritual development is also an "illusion" or at least not fundamental at the ontological level? That could be consistent under most ontologies, but I don't see how it could work under idealism, where the maps we construct are of the same essence as the territory we are exploring.

[Eugene I]

This is one of the main issues I have trouble reconciling within BK's idealism, perhaps because I am very much aligned with Western pragmatic philosophy. How can we consistently claim that which is fundamental to our existence and spiritual development is also an "illusion" or at least not fundamental at the ontological level? That could be consistent under most ontologies, but I don't see how it could work under idealism, where the maps we construct are of the same essence as the territory we are exploring.

That's because the maps that we construct are the meanings of the thoughts. The thoughts, being phenomena of conscious experiences, are indeed of the same fundamental nature as the "territory" itself - of the nature of reality of our conscious experience. However, the content of the thoughts, their meanings, are only abstracted "facets" of the conscious phenomena of thought, and such facets ("maps") are unable to capture the reality of the "territory". In other words, the meanings are only the "qualia" of thoughts and do not represent the reality and the nature of thoughts (or any other phenomena of conscious experience) in their fullness. So, the maps that we construct can never encompass the wholeness of the essence of the territory, and even more, can be distortions or misrepresentations of the territory.

If we claim that the maps (any maps) are always of the same essence as the territory and therefore fully represent the territory, then how would we distinguish between true and false maps? How could then we claim that materialism is a false map of the territory of reality? That is why I classified the meanings in a separate category of #2 in my classification. As I said in my previous post here, if we don't distinguish between thoughts and their qualia/meanings, then we run into a problem when applying the criteria of truthfulness. If we say "the Unicorn is an illusion" but don't distinguish the thought about Unicorn from the meaning of that though, the statement "the Unicorn is an illusion" would mean that the though about the Unicorn is an illusion. But a thought is never an illusion, any thought is absolutely real, because the experience of any though is real. It's the meaning of that though that is an illusion or false. IMO this is the way it should (or might) work under idealism, but if you have a better idea how to approach this challenge, please share with us. This is the epistemological problem that any metaphysics, including idealism, faces, and there is no easy solution to it.

[AshvinP]

This is one of the main issues I have trouble reconciling within BK's idealism, perhaps because I am very much aligned with Western pragmatic philosophy. How can we consistently claim that which is fundamental to our existence and spiritual development is also an "illusion" or at least not fundamental at the ontological level? That could be consistent under most ontologies, but I don't see how it could work under idealism, where the maps we construct are of the same essence as the territory we are exploring.

That's because the maps that we construct are the meanings of the thoughts. The thoughts, being phenomena of conscious experiences, are indeed of the same fundamental nature as the "territory" itself - of the reality of our conscious experience. However, the content of the thoughts, their meanings, are only abstracted "facets" of the conscious phenomena of thought, and such facets ("maps") are unable to capture the reality of the "territory". In other words, the meanings are only the "qualia" of thoughts and do not represent the reality and the nature of thoughts (or any other phenomena of conscious experience) in their fullness. So, the maps that we construct can never encompass the wholeness of the essence of the territory, and even more, can be a distortion or misrepresentations of the territory.

If we claim that the maps (any maps) are always of the same essence as the territory and therefore fully represent the territory, then how would we distinguish between true and false maps? How could then we claim that materialism is a false map of the territory of reality? That is why I classified the meanings in a separate category of #2 in my classification. As I said in my previous post here, if we don't distinguish between thoughts and their qualia/meanings, then we run into a problem when applying the criteria of truthfulness. If we say "the Unicorn is an illusion" but don't distinguish the thought about Unicorn from the meaning of that though, the statement "the Unicorn is an illusion" would mean that the though about the Unicorn is an illusion. But a thought is never an illusion, any thought is absolutely real, because the experience of any though is real. It's the meaning of that though that is an illusion or false. IMO this is the way it should (or might) work under idealism, but if you have a better idea how to approach this challenge, please share with us. This is the epistemological problem that any metaphysics, including idealism, faces, and there is no easy solution to it.

OK, so first I would say the language/reality (map/territory) 'problem' which faces idealism is much different than materialism (or dualism). In the latter, the map is constructed with abstract thoughts which are fundamentally of a different essence than the underlying Reality. Therefore, it is possible that the maps will never be adequate to describe even some portion of the Reality. For idealism, that is never the case. At worst, we will construct maps with erroneous assumptions or data points which then need to be reworked. But there always remains a link between the language and the Reality, no matter how many levels of thought abstraction occur.

Secondly, in that sense, one of the fundamental criteria of determining True thought-abstractions is that they work when made concrete through action, i.e. the expected results of acting them out match up with the actual results, similar to how we would assess the truth of a geographical map. In fact, since we can never fully represent the territory (I think everyone basically agrees with that), the pragmatic criteria becomes essential to accurately representing any portion of the territory. Put another way, I cannot think of any good reason why we would ever discount the pragmatic utility of the abstract representations when assessing Truth value.

Thoughts?

[Eugene I]

Ashvin, I agree with both of your statements. There may be multiple criteria of truthfulness of the maps/abstractions, such as:
- absence of logical inconsistencies or contradictions
- accuracy of representation (pattern matching) of the "territory"
- pragmatic criterium of allowing to perform actions that are aligned with reality (the one that you mentioned)
- another pragmatic criterion often used in science: the maps (theories) allow us to make predictions of our actions or of the events (with a certain accuracy)

[AshvinP]

Ashvin, I agree with both of your statements. There may be multiple criteria of truthfulness of the maps/abstractions, such as:
- absence of logical inconsistencies or contradictions
- accuracy of representation (pattern matching) of the "territory"
- pragmatic criterium of allowing to perform actions that are aligned with reality (the one that you mentioned)
- another pragmatic criterion often used in science: the maps (theories) allow us to make predictions of our actions or of the events (with a certain accuracy)

Right, I was basically lumping the last 3 criteria into "pragmatic". So the next question is, does the representation of Self meet that criterium? Based on your discussion with Cleric, it seems that you agree that it does meet those criteria, as long as it is not identified with some 'thing' we perceive-conceive, such as the isolated ego?

[Shaibei]

I saw about three hours from the interview. Bernardo as usual interesting. One of the points at which my view is separate from his own is regarding the nature of Mind at large, or God (as he chooses to appear). Bernardo looks at nature as Schopenhauer and sees it as instinct. One can understand such a point of view, after all there is a lot of evil that happens within nature. I do not think that in the context of thinking, or at least thinking alone, it is possible to give meaningto events. But, in the framework of faith it is possible. Just as in the use of psychedelics one sees reality differently, so there are righteous people who penetrate the inner nature of reality. Same thing about morality. Morality is not a human invention as Nietzsche believed. It is an ideal reality that God, for the sake of free choice, hides when he acts within the framework of nature

[Eugene I]

Right, I was basically lumping the last 3 criteria into "pragmatic". So the next question is, does the representation of Self meet that criterium? Based on your discussion with Cleric, it seems that you agree that it does meet those criteria, as long as it is not identified with some 'thing' we perceive-conceive, such as the isolated ego?

Yes, I agree, but I still think that using the term "Self" is confusing and better be avoided, since in the minds of the ordinary people such term resonates with their habitual self-identification as separate entities/egos, and a more accurate term term "Spiritual Activity" (or any other similar one) should be used instead.

[AshvinP]

Right, I was basically lumping the last 3 criteria into "pragmatic". So the next question is, does the representation of Self meet that criterium? Based on your discussion with Cleric, it seems that you agree that it does meet those criteria, as long as it is not identified with some 'thing' we perceive-conceive, such as the isolated ego?

Yes, I agree, but I still think that using the term "Self" is confusing and better be avoided, since in the minds of the ordinary people such term resonates with their habitual self-identification as separate entities/egos, and a more accurate term term "Spiritual Activity" (or any other similar one) should be used instead.

What about "Spirit"? Because "activity" implies only a portion of what the Spirit is/does.

And, just to confirm, we are in agreement that BK's idealism falls short in this regard, in so far as it denies the reality of Self-Spirit?

[AshvinP]

I saw about three hours from the interview. Bernardo as usual interesting. One of the points at which my view is separate from his own is regarding the nature of Mind at large, or God (as he chooses to appear). Bernardo looks at nature as Schopenhauer and sees it as instinct. One can understand such a point of view, after all there is a lot of evil that happens within nature. I do not think that in the context of thinking, or at least thinking alone, it is possible to give meaningto events. But, in the framework of faith it is possible. Just as in the use of psychedelics one sees reality differently, so there are righteous people who penetrate the inner nature of reality. Same thing about morality. Morality is not a human invention as Nietzsche believed. It is an ideal reality that God, for the sake of free choice, hides when he acts within the framework of nature

I am not sure it is fair to say Nietzsche believed morality is a human invention. I think it's more fair to say he claimed all systematic human conceptions of "morality" to the time he was writing were grossly inadequate. And he further claimed we must look to evolved natural instincts and agency to begin any inquiry into authentic morality. That seems to be about where he left it, and that is not really compatible with Schopenhauer as you point out, because the latter conceived of Reality as blind will rather than a purposive will-to-something.