How do we think of relations within Kastrup's model?
Posted: Thu Feb 25, 2021 7:03 pm
Staying within the language and details of Kastrup's model:
1) When we look at the inanimate world, we are looking at a partial image of MaL's inner experiencing.
2) We must not assume that any definite values (quantitative or qualitative) that we can measure/observe in that image represent 'an' experience. For instance: you can study the intricate and reliable patterns happening in a group of my neurons but you must not then assume that those are 'having' my inner experience.
3) My question: In that case, how do we thinking specifically about the very detailed and repetitive relationships we can track in our observations of the inanimate world?
Illustration: When we look at a car, we are able to speak in detail about an amazing blend of very intricate relationships taking place (rusting, combustion, wind-force, how a specific movement of a shaft of metal is changing the wear on a small pad and how the slight moisture affects that...). These are very reliable patterns that we ARE NOT thinking are experiences of MaL itself. They are like the neurons that partially are how my experience of planning my daughter's birthday look to YOU because of how your body translates my experience across the dissociative membrane.
So we know MaL's experience is objectively happening (within the presuppositions of Kastrup's model). We know that I am able to study and know almost exactly how this car will change in millions of details over time and in specific circumstances.
Is it fair to say that the car is a blend of MaL's excitations? As Bernardo always points out, the car itself is nominal not ontic. MaL isn't packing up 'cars' as images of experience. We reach out and shape images of inanimate objects into things we call cars. But we don't create the 'rules' of all those relations we can study.
Those 'rules' are what happen when we blend any images of MaL together and have something to do with whatever MaL is....
How do we think of these detailed and highly intricate relations?
1) When we look at the inanimate world, we are looking at a partial image of MaL's inner experiencing.
2) We must not assume that any definite values (quantitative or qualitative) that we can measure/observe in that image represent 'an' experience. For instance: you can study the intricate and reliable patterns happening in a group of my neurons but you must not then assume that those are 'having' my inner experience.
3) My question: In that case, how do we thinking specifically about the very detailed and repetitive relationships we can track in our observations of the inanimate world?
Illustration: When we look at a car, we are able to speak in detail about an amazing blend of very intricate relationships taking place (rusting, combustion, wind-force, how a specific movement of a shaft of metal is changing the wear on a small pad and how the slight moisture affects that...). These are very reliable patterns that we ARE NOT thinking are experiences of MaL itself. They are like the neurons that partially are how my experience of planning my daughter's birthday look to YOU because of how your body translates my experience across the dissociative membrane.
So we know MaL's experience is objectively happening (within the presuppositions of Kastrup's model). We know that I am able to study and know almost exactly how this car will change in millions of details over time and in specific circumstances.
Is it fair to say that the car is a blend of MaL's excitations? As Bernardo always points out, the car itself is nominal not ontic. MaL isn't packing up 'cars' as images of experience. We reach out and shape images of inanimate objects into things we call cars. But we don't create the 'rules' of all those relations we can study.
Those 'rules' are what happen when we blend any images of MaL together and have something to do with whatever MaL is....
How do we think of these detailed and highly intricate relations?