I'm A Materialist, Change My Mind
Posted: Sun Feb 28, 2021 12:31 pm
Firstly I want to apologize because I haven't read properly through this forum, so a post of this nature may likely be boring and old to you by now, but hopefully that only means you will have more experience in knowing how to deal with me. I want to say that I have done my best to understand Idealism before posting this, and most of the research I've done is through Bernado Kastrup's website, however I have also ordered "Why Materialism Is Baloney" so I look forward to reading that in the coming weeks as-well. I learn best through conversation, and so I've been thinking about the reasons I'm a materialist and why Idealism hasn't convinced me yet, so I'm putting those arguments forward and if I'm wrong, I will most likely change my mind altogether.
Firstly, let me make sure that I have the definitions completely right here to avoid any word games as often comes up in these debates/discussions.
Idealism: Processes within consciousness - The brain within consciousness, the material world within consciousness, biology within consciousness.
Materialism: Physical reality outside consciousness - Consciousness generated from somewhere within the material world.
I'm A Materialist, Change My Mind
Firstly, why am I not an idealist by default, given that it seems to be the most obvious ontological position? The whole philosophy seems to be predicated on that very fact that it is the most obvious ontological position anyone can take. At first, this does seem to make sense, because consciousness is the only thing we can know is not an illusion with one hundred percent certainty, so I understand that argument. But on behalf of materialism I won’t be conceding the rational high ground here just yet. While consciousness is not simple to define, it seems fair to say that it is the experience of “being?” Or as Thomas Nagel put it, a creature is conscious if there is “something that it is like to be” that particular creature. If we agree on that, then when there is no creature “to be like” do we still even have such an idea as consciousness? If so, what does it feel like? What’s it like to be mind at large? I’m assuming you have never experienced that, so to say that consciousness is actually some ineffable, metaphysical, mindy-ness that contains all of what we know as physical reality, does not seem obvious to me at all as an ontological position, it actually just seems like a very large leap. The only thing I know for sure is that I am experiencing what it’s like to be a human being, to hear, to see, to feel, to smell, to taste, but if I can’t do any of those, what exactly am I even having a subjective experience of? In what way am I conscious?
On the other hand I know that things appear to exist, we can all observe them. A bat can’t see the way I do, but we still share the same physical reality, the bat will swerve out of the way to avoid a tree whereas I will walk out of the way to avoid the same tree. I do not know what it’s like to be a bat, and a bat does not know what it’s like to be me, we are both seemingly conscious creatures, and we share the same objective reality that there are obstacles we cannot simply run or fly through. I admit this analogy begs the question, because Idealism states that the tree is just a process in consciousness, so it’s still real, but inside of consciousness. However, that is assuming Idealism, and why should I assume Idealism? Should I assume that there is an ineffable, metaphysical, mindy-ness that contains all of what we know as physical reality? I just have to trust the Empirical evidence around me. Can you explain how this immaterial, disembodied, non-located thing you’re calling a mind, ever affects my body? Ever pushes it around? Show me where it actually happens, because we know we have particles in us, we know we have atoms, we know what they do, and we know how they behave. We even know an equation that says if you put them in a certain situation, here’s what’s going to happen next. There’s no room in that equation for consciousness to say, aha well if this electron is in consciousness it moves in a different way. It’s really hard to imagine given what we know about the stuff that is in our brains, that there is anything else pushing it around. Does this stuff conserve energy? Is it predictable? Is it deterministic? Does it obey Schrödinger’s equation? Does it have a location in Space? There might be answers to all these questions, but there’s also an easier answer which is that there isn’t any such stuff. To me Idealism, is invoking new stuff that is outside of the laws of physics, and therefore it is not the most obvious ontological position. (Dislcaimer: I have quoted a lot of Sean Carroll, so this is not all that original, but nonetheless, the arguments convince me thus far)
I am looking forward to being debunked lol, thank you for reading.
Firstly, let me make sure that I have the definitions completely right here to avoid any word games as often comes up in these debates/discussions.
Idealism: Processes within consciousness - The brain within consciousness, the material world within consciousness, biology within consciousness.
Materialism: Physical reality outside consciousness - Consciousness generated from somewhere within the material world.
I'm A Materialist, Change My Mind
Firstly, why am I not an idealist by default, given that it seems to be the most obvious ontological position? The whole philosophy seems to be predicated on that very fact that it is the most obvious ontological position anyone can take. At first, this does seem to make sense, because consciousness is the only thing we can know is not an illusion with one hundred percent certainty, so I understand that argument. But on behalf of materialism I won’t be conceding the rational high ground here just yet. While consciousness is not simple to define, it seems fair to say that it is the experience of “being?” Or as Thomas Nagel put it, a creature is conscious if there is “something that it is like to be” that particular creature. If we agree on that, then when there is no creature “to be like” do we still even have such an idea as consciousness? If so, what does it feel like? What’s it like to be mind at large? I’m assuming you have never experienced that, so to say that consciousness is actually some ineffable, metaphysical, mindy-ness that contains all of what we know as physical reality, does not seem obvious to me at all as an ontological position, it actually just seems like a very large leap. The only thing I know for sure is that I am experiencing what it’s like to be a human being, to hear, to see, to feel, to smell, to taste, but if I can’t do any of those, what exactly am I even having a subjective experience of? In what way am I conscious?
On the other hand I know that things appear to exist, we can all observe them. A bat can’t see the way I do, but we still share the same physical reality, the bat will swerve out of the way to avoid a tree whereas I will walk out of the way to avoid the same tree. I do not know what it’s like to be a bat, and a bat does not know what it’s like to be me, we are both seemingly conscious creatures, and we share the same objective reality that there are obstacles we cannot simply run or fly through. I admit this analogy begs the question, because Idealism states that the tree is just a process in consciousness, so it’s still real, but inside of consciousness. However, that is assuming Idealism, and why should I assume Idealism? Should I assume that there is an ineffable, metaphysical, mindy-ness that contains all of what we know as physical reality? I just have to trust the Empirical evidence around me. Can you explain how this immaterial, disembodied, non-located thing you’re calling a mind, ever affects my body? Ever pushes it around? Show me where it actually happens, because we know we have particles in us, we know we have atoms, we know what they do, and we know how they behave. We even know an equation that says if you put them in a certain situation, here’s what’s going to happen next. There’s no room in that equation for consciousness to say, aha well if this electron is in consciousness it moves in a different way. It’s really hard to imagine given what we know about the stuff that is in our brains, that there is anything else pushing it around. Does this stuff conserve energy? Is it predictable? Is it deterministic? Does it obey Schrödinger’s equation? Does it have a location in Space? There might be answers to all these questions, but there’s also an easier answer which is that there isn’t any such stuff. To me Idealism, is invoking new stuff that is outside of the laws of physics, and therefore it is not the most obvious ontological position. (Dislcaimer: I have quoted a lot of Sean Carroll, so this is not all that original, but nonetheless, the arguments convince me thus far)
I am looking forward to being debunked lol, thank you for reading.