The Nose Dive of Philosophy

[AshvinP]

Isn't Nietzsche (with An idealist named kant) reponsible for the relativism you revolt against?

Not according to Heidegger. The latter's interpretation of the former is similar to what BK has now done with Jung - reveal in a compelling manner that Jung's metaphysics is not at all what the mainstream (including foremost 'experts' on Jungian psychology) imagines it to be. They either dump him in some category of dualism or pretend he doesn't even have a metaphysical position. I see the same thing going on with Nietzsche, who was probably the biggest philosophical influence on Jung along with Kant.

Nietzsche had a clear position that humanity was headed in a certain direction, from the 'last man' to the 'superman', the former acting as a bridge from 'animal consciousness' to meta-meta-cognition. In some sense it was similar to the dialectical progression of Hegel-Marx, except Marx envisioned a materialist process while Hegel and Nietzsche did not. The 'will-to-power' concept is also clearly derived in large part from Schopenhauer's Will, except more specified and carrying teleological connotations, which he attempted to prophesy in advance and did a damn good job as far I can tell.

So for those reasons I would say Nietzsche is pretty far from relativism. I am also not sure why you are identifying Kant as a relativist? He is certainly responsible for philosophical traditions which claim the noumenal is absolutely outside of experience, but at the same time he necessarily admits that an objective noumenal realm exists, independent of any personal experience and cognition, and must influence humanity in some ineffable, undetectable way.

Nietzsche has aphorisms about the relativity of science, and his superman creates values, as there are really no inter-subjective values, so it is no wonder that some see him as the first postmodernist.
As for Kant, he caused the Copernican revolution, didn't he? We are the ones who shape reality. If we compare him with his critic Maimon, then the latter argued that in order to justify the objectivity of science one must assume that the categories of mind correspond to the categories of M@L.
At the end of his book Miamon also writes about the development of consciousness, but while he remains skeptical Hegel takes this idea further. The way in which Maimon tries to justify science will also explain the difference between Nietzsche's superman to, for example, the Kabbalists' perception of Primordial man. For the Kabbalists Primordial man is the ideal of values ​​to which humanity approaches. In other words, God gives objectivity to morality. I do not know Steiner in depth, but I suppose that in some way he also treats values ​​as truly exist

I am not at all familiar with Maimon's work, so cannot really comment on that. I am curious, what would you suggest as the best introductory work of his or commentary on his work (if he is really difficult to follow)?

I see what you are saying with Nietzsche and Kant, but ultimately we must evaluate them on their own metaphysical positions rather than perceptions of their positions or the positions they may have inspired/influenced after them. They are thoroughly embedded within the German idealist tradition which also flows through Heidegger and Jung. The latter believed the 'collective unconscious' (M@L) was beyond introspective access and only discernible through its impingement on ego consciousness. In that sense, we are responsible for the creation of values, although I would call it the re-creation/rediscovery of ideal values through self-knowledge, making the unconscious conscious.

The Judeo-Christian God, in Jung's view, as expressed in his Answer to Job, is no different from the collective unconscious. He posited that God needs self-reflective man to save Him as much as we need Him to save us. To the extent Kabbalist tradition follows that rather mystical, semi-Gnostic take on the scripture, I would agree with it. From my understanding of Steiner (who also wrote about Nietzsche as a "fighter for freedom"), he takes it beyond all of the above through his first-hand experience of higher realms. So his position is in tension with Kant/Jung, but simply because he is taking their positions further and refusing to accept the Kantian phenomenal/noumenal divide as absolute for 'post-modern' man.

So I believe values "truly exist" for all of these thinkers, but they also posit that these values do not exist separate of our own evolutionary spiritual development as self-reflective beings, and in fact that development is what allows the values to be freely and fully revealed through humanity. It is what allows the values to be known experientially, rather than merely intellectually, in the most meaningful way. Christ is the archetypal representation of that particular process which is unfolding, i.e. there is currently no more comprehensive and profound symbol for that process.

[Shaibei]

Not according to Heidegger. The latter's interpretation of the former is similar to what BK has now done with Jung - reveal in a compelling manner that Jung's metaphysics is not at all what the mainstream (including foremost 'experts' on Jungian psychology) imagines it to be. They either dump him in some category of dualism or pretend he doesn't even have a metaphysical position. I see the same thing going on with Nietzsche, who was probably the biggest philosophical influence on Jung along with Kant.

Nietzsche had a clear position that humanity was headed in a certain direction, from the 'last man' to the 'superman', the former acting as a bridge from 'animal consciousness' to meta-meta-cognition. In some sense it was similar to the dialectical progression of Hegel-Marx, except Marx envisioned a materialist process while Hegel and Nietzsche did not. The 'will-to-power' concept is also clearly derived in large part from Schopenhauer's Will, except more specified and carrying teleological connotations, which he attempted to prophesy in advance and did a damn good job as far I can tell.

So for those reasons I would say Nietzsche is pretty far from relativism. I am also not sure why you are identifying Kant as a relativist? He is certainly responsible for philosophical traditions which claim the noumenal is absolutely outside of experience, but at the same time he necessarily admits that an objective noumenal realm exists, independent of any personal experience and cognition, and must influence humanity in some ineffable, undetectable way.

Nietzsche has aphorisms about the relativity of science, and his superman creates values, as there are really no inter-subjective values, so it is no wonder that some see him as the first postmodernist.
As for Kant, he caused the Copernican revolution, didn't he? We are the ones who shape reality. If we compare him with his critic Maimon, then the latter argued that in order to justify the objectivity of science one must assume that the categories of mind correspond to the categories of M@L.
At the end of his book Miamon also writes about the development of consciousness, but while he remains skeptical Hegel takes this idea further. The way in which Maimon tries to justify science will also explain the difference between Nietzsche's superman to, for example, the Kabbalists' perception of Primordial man. For the Kabbalists Primordial man is the ideal of values ​​to which humanity approaches. In other words, God gives objectivity to morality. I do not know Steiner in depth, but I suppose that in some way he also treats values ​​as truly exist

I am not at all familiar with Maimon's work, so cannot really comment on that. I am curious, what would you suggest as the best introductory work of his or commentary on his work (if he is really difficult to follow)?

I see what you are saying with Nietzsche and Kant, but ultimately we must evaluate them on their own metaphysical positions rather than perceptions of their positions or the positions they may have inspired/influenced after them. They are thoroughly embedded within the German idealist tradition which also flows through Heidegger and Jung. The latter believed the 'collective unconscious' (M@L) was beyond introspective access and only discernible through its impingement on ego consciousness. In that sense, we are responsible for the creation of values, although I would call it the re-creation/rediscovery of ideal values through self-knowledge, making the unconscious conscious.

The Judeo-Christian God, in Jung's view, as expressed in his Answer to Job, is no different from the collective unconscious. He posited that God needs self-reflective man to save Him as much as we need Him to save us. To the extent Kabbalist tradition follows that rather mystical, semi-Gnostic take on the scripture, I would agree with it. From my understanding of Steiner (who also wrote about Nietzsche as a "fighter for freedom"), he takes it beyond all of the above through his first-hand experience of higher realms. So his position is in tension with Kant/Jung, but simply because he is taking their positions further and refusing to accept the Kantian phenomenal/noumenal divide as absolute for 'post-modern' man.

So I believe values "truly exist" for all of these thinkers, but they also posit that these values do not exist separate of our own evolutionary spiritual development as self-reflective beings, and in fact that development is what allows the values to be freely and fully revealed through humanity. It is what allows the values to be known experientially, rather than merely intellectually, in the most meaningful way. Christ is the archetypal representation of that particular process which is unfolding, i.e. there is currently no more comprehensive and profound symbol for that process.

I'm heading of to bed so i would just comment that of course christ is this archetype for Christians, in judahism the emodiment of these values are represented with other figures. Though this could explain the interest of Various christians and jung in kabbalah. As for maimon you can read a general review on him on stanfords's site. The point i was trying to make is about the asumption of objective physical rules and objective reality of ideals

[AshvinP]

I'm heading of to bed so i would just comment that of course christ is this archetype for Christians, in judahism the emodiment of these values are represented with other figures. Though this could explain the interest of Various christians and jung in kabbalah. As for maimon you can read a general review on him on stanfords's site. The point i was trying to make is about the asumption of objective physical rules and objective reality of ideals

I know, and the point I am making is that Kant and Nietzsche do not deny the objective reality of ideals, only the claim that humanity has already found those ideals as static/fixed entities from the past. Therefore it is not accurate to say they embrace or are generally responsible for relativism when properly understood. Although I can see why the static view would be adopted if Christ is denied as the archetype. Ironically, it was Nietzsche who said:

To reduce being a Christian, Christianness to a holding something to be true, to a mere phenomenality of consciousness, means to negate Christianness. In fact there have been no Christians at all... only Christian practice, a life such as he who died on the Cross lived, is Christian.… even today such a life is possible, for certain men even necessary: genuine, primitive Christianity will be possible at all times…. not a belief but a doing, above all a not-doing of many things, a different being.

[Simon Adams]

Wasn’t Kant’s point that philosophy must rely on reason, and reason cannot approach god, who can only be known through faith?

I think this was the precipice Jordan Peterson was at in the interview with Pageau. He knows the archetype of Christ and what it represents, but the step where that cosmic narrative touches as a real living person takes you from reason, philosophy and psychology into faith. You can have objective, real values, laws, principles etc via reason and philosophy (which is the sense that I have been contrasting with relativism in the thread), but you can only ‘touch’ absolute truths by faith (and they will always remain outside of our capability to conceptualise via reason alone). It seems to me this is what Peterson is troubled by, the difference between an abstract archetype and it’s real embodiment.

[AshvinP]

Wasn’t Kant’s point that philosophy must rely on reason, and reason cannot approach god, who can only be known through faith?

I think this was the precipice Jordan Peterson was at in the interview with Pageau. He knows the archetype of Christ and what it represents, but the step where that cosmic narrative touches as a real living person takes you from reason, philosophy and psychology into faith. You can have objective, real values, laws, principles etc via reason and philosophy (which is the sense that I have been contrasting with relativism in the thread), but you can only ‘touch’ absolute truths by faith (and they will always remain outside of our capability to conceptualise via reason alone). It seems to me this is what Peterson is troubled by, the difference between an abstract archetype and it’s real embodiment.

Precisely. It is what philosophers may refer to as "rationalism" and what Nietzche calls a "will to truth". It is a prioritizing of propositional truth over the effects that truth has on one's personality and life. Therefore it is ultimately a foraking of the free living organism for slavery to external forces, whether that be mindless material forces or "supernatural" deities separate from one's Self. JP has always been deeply troubled by such a framing of spirituality, but he is now admittedly more sensitive and vulnerable to it. Pageau may have understood but did not articulate that understanding well enough IMO. That's why I would love for BK to discuss Jung and Christianity with him.

[SanteriSatama]

Alan Sokal in the 1990s and Peter Boghossian in the last couple of years have shown. If complete nonsense can so clearly get through peer review, surely something has gone wrong?

Actually, I think Sokal's "bogus" article is unironically his most valuable scientific contribution, reading it with benevolent interpretation, it contains very interesting and deep ideas. Barthes' 'Death of the Author' is short and sweet liberation of the reader. And a materialist physicalist can't consistently demand that a reader should take his epiphenomenal "intentions" in any way seriously when finding meaning in a text.

[Astra052]

Alan Sokal in the 1990s and Peter Boghossian in the last couple of years have shown. If complete nonsense can so clearly get through peer review, surely something has gone wrong?

Actually, I think Sokal's "bogus" article is unironically his most valuable scientific contribution, reading it with benevolent interpretation, it contains very interesting and deep ideas. Barthes' 'Death of the Author' is short and sweet liberation of the reader. And a materialist physicalist can't consistently demand that a reader should take his epiphenomenal "intentions" in any way seriously when finding meaning in a text.

Honestly if you find Sokal's article interesting or deep beyond it's social experiment nature I find that concerning. It was made intentionally as a hoax and if you're reading it and think you're getting something out of it I don't think that reflects well on you. It was made to fool people who don't really understand the terms it was using, especially cause most of them were useless buzzwords. Now, I don't think you're a gullible or irrational person so I'm hoping you don't mean to say that "Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity" actually has any value beyond the hoax itself.

[SanteriSatama]

Honestly if you find Sokal's article interesting or deep beyond it's social experiment nature I find that concerning. It was made intentionally as a hoax and if you're reading it and think you're getting something out of it I don't think that reflects well on you. It was made to fool people who don't really understand the terms it was using, especially cause most of them were useless buzzwords. Now, I don't think you're a gullible or irrational person so I'm hoping you don't mean to say that "Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity" actually has any value beyond the hoax itself.

I don't mind losing "my" personal credibility in the Internets. Another nick I use, the Fraudian fapse 'id-entity', suggests that my game of identity politics is on some other level.

Why should Sokal's claims of his hoax intention matter when interpreting the actual text? Really? We don't really know about the actual inspirations (ie. spirit possessions) that occurred when he was writing / first-reading the article. He claims to be a dishonest, not in good faith agent, and creates his own version of liar's paradox. The situation brings to mind a Steve Martin movie about a religious charlatan whose career and world view gets crushed by a real miracle.

Any case the article has some good stuff that is non-problematic and interesting from idealist point of view and some ideas I fully agree with. Morphogenetic field approach to quantum gravity makes plenty of sense in the context of analytical idealism. And this: "liberatory science cannot be complete without a profound revision of the canon of mathematics". Together with the general relational tone, Sokal is being quite prophetic. My foundational revision of mathematics is based on the codependent relation of relational operators, which is fully naturalist asubjective approach, instead of metaphysical postulation of existential quantification which presupposes postulation of subject-object dualism. We can go in more detail, if you are interested more in the idea itself than the subject possessed by it.

[Shaibei]

I'm heading of to bed so i would just comment that of course christ is this archetype for Christians, in judahism the emodiment of these values are represented with other figures. Though this could explain the interest of Various christians and jung in kabbalah. As for maimon you can read a general review on him on stanfords's site. The point i was trying to make is about the asumption of objective physical rules and objective reality of ideals

I know, and the point I am making is that Kant and Nietzsche do not deny the objective reality of ideals, only the claim that humanity has already found those ideals as static/fixed entities from the past. Therefore it is not accurate to say they embrace or are generally responsible for relativism when properly understood. Although I can see why the static view would be adopted if Christ is denied as the archetype. Ironically, it was Nietzsche who said:

To reduce being a Christian, Christianness to a holding something to be true, to a mere phenomenality of consciousness, means to negate Christianness. In fact there have been no Christians at all... only Christian practice, a life such as he who died on the Cross lived, is Christian.… even today such a life is possible, for certain men even necessary: genuine, primitive Christianity will be possible at all times…. not a belief but a doing, above all a not-doing of many things, a different being.

This is not really a point made by me, but by various philosophers. As i wrote one can understand why. As a jew i have no problem rejecting jesus and have no interest with converting others to judahism

[AshvinP]

I'm heading of to bed so i would just comment that of course christ is this archetype for Christians, in judahism the emodiment of these values are represented with other figures. Though this could explain the interest of Various christians and jung in kabbalah. As for maimon you can read a general review on him on stanfords's site. The point i was trying to make is about the asumption of objective physical rules and objective reality of ideals

I know, and the point I am making is that Kant and Nietzsche do not deny the objective reality of ideals, only the claim that humanity has already found those ideals as static/fixed entities from the past. Therefore it is not accurate to say they embrace or are generally responsible for relativism when properly understood. Although I can see why the static view would be adopted if Christ is denied as the archetype. Ironically, it was Nietzsche who said:

To reduce being a Christian, Christianness to a holding something to be true, to a mere phenomenality of consciousness, means to negate Christianness. In fact there have been no Christians at all... only Christian practice, a life such as he who died on the Cross lived, is Christian.… even today such a life is possible, for certain men even necessary: genuine, primitive Christianity will be possible at all times…. not a belief but a doing, above all a not-doing of many things, a different being.

This is not really a point made by me, but by various philosophers. As i wrote one can understand why. As a jew i have no problem rejecting jesus and have no interest with converting others to judahism

Made by you or someone else, the point is invalid. I know many fundamentalist theists and secular relativists both want us to believe Nietzsche was in the relativist camp, but that simply doesn't cash out from his work. He was concerned with freedom, the freedom of the human spirit to realize these 'objective values' for itself so that they could naturally flow from its own essence. And it was not an abstract concern either, because it clearly provided him penetrating insights into the various 'movements' of his era and how they would develop in the century to come, which only look rather unimpressive now because we have the benefit of hindsight.

The soul experiences of the Germans during the War of 1870 found so little echo in his soul that “while the thunder of battle passed from Wörth over Europe,” he sat in a small corner of the Alps, “brooding and puzzled, consequently most grieved, and at the same time not grieved,” and wrote down his thoughts about the Greeks. And, a few weeks later, as he found himself “under the walls of Metz,” he still was not freed from the questions which he had concerning the life and art of the Greeks. (See Versuch einer Selbstkritik, Attempt at a Self-Critique, in the 2nd edition of his Geburt der Tragödie, Birth of Tragedy.) When the war came to an end, he entered so little enthusiasm of his German contemporaries over the decisive victory that in the year 1873 in his writing about David Strauss he spoke about “the bad and dangerous consequences” of the victorious struggle. He even represented it as insanity that German culture should have been victorious in this struggle, and he described this insanity as dangerous because if it should become dominant within the German nation, the danger would exist of transforming the victory into complete defeat; a defeat, yes, an extirpation of the German spirit in favor of “the German realm.” This was Nietzsche's attitude at a time when the whole of Europe was filled with national fanaticism. It is the thinking of a personality not in harmony with his time, of a fighter against his time.
-Friedrich Nietzsche: Fighter for Freedom (1895) (emphasis in original)