Gramsci and idealism
Re: Gramsci and idealism
No. It was an indigenous (in-place) adaptation to changes that were happening in its biomes. Meanwhile, there were other indigenous cultures and civilizations evolving and adapting to their conditions at other biomes. It was not until the 16th Century or 2000 years later that these power-oriented colonizing empire building civilizations established global hegemony over a vast pre-existing diversity. The story is one of conquest. Not surprisingly, the more powerful but not necessarily the more spiritual or enlightened won. Interestingly, these civilizations did not focus on rebalancing in their own places but instead grabbed toward resources elsewhere or for liberation from suffering off-earth. And the victors wrote stories of how progressive were their increasingly non-indigenous ways that continue to leave a legacy of destroyed places and the beings of place. It's not a joyous story.
Be calm - Be clear - See the faults - See the suffering - Give your love
Re: Gramsci and idealism
This post will look at Gramsci's conception of hegemony and how it relates to philosophy and idealism. Hegemony refers to the dominant world-view of a society. In this respect, a strong argument could be made that physicalism or scientific materialism is an integral part of the hegemonic world-view of contemporary Western societies (though I won’t justify that in this post).
One of Gramsci’s contentions in relation to philosophy is that he does not see a strict divide between formal philosophy and the conceptions of everyday people. Thus, he writes that ‘everyone is a philosopher, though in his own way and unconsciously’ (SPN 323). The philosophy of the general public is embedded in practices such as language, ‘common sense’, religion and folklore.
The hegemonic philosophical outlook which dominates a particular age is neither the philosophy of professional philosophers and intellectuals, nor the conceptions of the bulk of the population, but a combination of these. Thus the ‘philosophy of a historical epoch is, therefore, nothing other than the ‘history’ of that epoch itself, nothing other than the mass of variations that the leading group has succeeded in imposing on preceding reality’’ (345). This is not to say that the dominant philosophical outlook is accepted by all members of society. Various elements of philosophy combine in different ways and at different levels, whether it be philosopher’s philosophy, conceptions of the leading groups, or the religions and common sense of the masses of ordinary people.
This also does not imply that the philosophy of everyday people is logically or exhaustively worked out, or uniform across all social groups. ‘Common sense’ takes numerous forms and is fragmentary and incoherent (422). Thus, at the level of uncritical, unreflective, taken-for-granted conceptions of the world ‘one belongs simultaneously to a multiplicity of mass human groups. The personality is strangely composite: it contains Stone Age elements and principles of a more advanced science, prejudices from all past phases of history and intuitions of a future philosophy..’ (324).
It follows from this that for the bulk of people, conceptions of the world are to a large degree based on faith. The average person may recognize that someone better educated than them may be able to defeat their beliefs and world-view. Nevertheless, they still have confidence in what they believe because of the faith that ‘while he himself, admittedly, is not able to uphold and develop his arguments as well as the opponent, in his group there is someone who could do this and could certainly argue better than the particular man he has against him’ (339).
Whilst recognizing that they may be incoherent and based on faith to an extent, Gramsci is not disparaging of conceptions of the world held by everyday people. Thus, he writes that the ‘popular element “feels” but does not always know or understand; the intellectual element “knows” but does not always understand and in particular does not always feel' (418). Further, the significance of a philosophy for Gramsci is related to how it impacts on common sense conceptions of the world and can thereby help alter the direction of society. Hence, in relation to the philosophy of philosophers, the ‘extent to which it reacts back is the measure of its historical importance, of its not being individual “elucubration" but “historical fact” ‘ (346).
For Gramsci the predominance of a particular philosophy within society is very much a sociological phenomenon rather than the result of a disinterested quest for truth. This does not mean that logic and intellectual rigor are not an important part of philosophy. However, ‘the rational and logically coherent form, the exhaustive reasoning which neglects no argument, positive or negative, of any significance, has a certain importance, but is far from being decisive’ (338). He argues that reason and intellectual rigor are important in establishing the parameters of a new world view, but less so in its diffusion. Thus, he writes that one ‘can conclude that the process of diffusion of new conceptions takes place for political (that is, in the last analysis, social) reasons; but that the formal element, that of logical coherence, the element of authority and the organisational element have a very important function in the process immediately after the general orientation has been reached, whether by single individuals or groups of a certain size’ (339).
In view of his position that changing dominant conceptions of the world is primarily a sociological phenomenon that goes beyond mere argumentation, Gramsci contends that there are two cultural necessities for changing such conceptions. The first is repetition. The second is the development of ‘elites of intellectuals of a new type which arise directly out of the masses, but remain in contact with them to become, as it were, the whalebone in the corset’ (340). These necessities exist alongside social and economic factors which may be integral to changing world conceptions.
So how does this all relate to idealism? Well, from a Gramscian perspective, for idealism to become part of a dominant world view would involve far more than putting forward the most rational arguments for it. Physicalism is not only engrained in academic disciplinary divisions (such as those between the sciences and the humanities, and then between the ‘hard’, objective sciences and the ‘soft’ social sciences), but also in economic, educational and medical structures, and in popular media. To fully overcome physicalism thus entails overcoming a hegemonic world-view.
On the other hand, it would theoretically be possible for idealism to obtain a dominant position in academic philosophy without having much broader effects on the hegemonic physicalist world-view. For example, German idealism in the nineteenth century and British idealism in the early twentieth century were dominant within academic philosophy, but this did not have much of an effect on countering the rise of the world-view of scientific materialism.
As an aside, an interesting case study of the relation between hegemonic world-views and social and economic factors is provided in Carolyn Merchant’s the Death of Nature (https://www.amazon.com/Death-Nature-Eco ... 1094156213 ) in relation to mining. In the sixteenth century, a significant world-view in the West was that the earth was living and sacred, and this constrained the moral acceptability and prevalence of mining. By the early eighteenth century, commercial activity and the rise of mechanistic philosophies of nature legitimated the manipulation of nature and removed moral constraints on mining. Of course, it is possible that the likes of Descartes, Hobbes and Newton may have developed their views on matter regardless of the commercial, socioeconomic and industrial activities of their day. But whether aspects of their philosophies would have become part of a hegemonic world-view in the absence of all these activities is doubtful.
One of Gramsci’s contentions in relation to philosophy is that he does not see a strict divide between formal philosophy and the conceptions of everyday people. Thus, he writes that ‘everyone is a philosopher, though in his own way and unconsciously’ (SPN 323). The philosophy of the general public is embedded in practices such as language, ‘common sense’, religion and folklore.
The hegemonic philosophical outlook which dominates a particular age is neither the philosophy of professional philosophers and intellectuals, nor the conceptions of the bulk of the population, but a combination of these. Thus the ‘philosophy of a historical epoch is, therefore, nothing other than the ‘history’ of that epoch itself, nothing other than the mass of variations that the leading group has succeeded in imposing on preceding reality’’ (345). This is not to say that the dominant philosophical outlook is accepted by all members of society. Various elements of philosophy combine in different ways and at different levels, whether it be philosopher’s philosophy, conceptions of the leading groups, or the religions and common sense of the masses of ordinary people.
This also does not imply that the philosophy of everyday people is logically or exhaustively worked out, or uniform across all social groups. ‘Common sense’ takes numerous forms and is fragmentary and incoherent (422). Thus, at the level of uncritical, unreflective, taken-for-granted conceptions of the world ‘one belongs simultaneously to a multiplicity of mass human groups. The personality is strangely composite: it contains Stone Age elements and principles of a more advanced science, prejudices from all past phases of history and intuitions of a future philosophy..’ (324).
It follows from this that for the bulk of people, conceptions of the world are to a large degree based on faith. The average person may recognize that someone better educated than them may be able to defeat their beliefs and world-view. Nevertheless, they still have confidence in what they believe because of the faith that ‘while he himself, admittedly, is not able to uphold and develop his arguments as well as the opponent, in his group there is someone who could do this and could certainly argue better than the particular man he has against him’ (339).
Whilst recognizing that they may be incoherent and based on faith to an extent, Gramsci is not disparaging of conceptions of the world held by everyday people. Thus, he writes that the ‘popular element “feels” but does not always know or understand; the intellectual element “knows” but does not always understand and in particular does not always feel' (418). Further, the significance of a philosophy for Gramsci is related to how it impacts on common sense conceptions of the world and can thereby help alter the direction of society. Hence, in relation to the philosophy of philosophers, the ‘extent to which it reacts back is the measure of its historical importance, of its not being individual “elucubration" but “historical fact” ‘ (346).
For Gramsci the predominance of a particular philosophy within society is very much a sociological phenomenon rather than the result of a disinterested quest for truth. This does not mean that logic and intellectual rigor are not an important part of philosophy. However, ‘the rational and logically coherent form, the exhaustive reasoning which neglects no argument, positive or negative, of any significance, has a certain importance, but is far from being decisive’ (338). He argues that reason and intellectual rigor are important in establishing the parameters of a new world view, but less so in its diffusion. Thus, he writes that one ‘can conclude that the process of diffusion of new conceptions takes place for political (that is, in the last analysis, social) reasons; but that the formal element, that of logical coherence, the element of authority and the organisational element have a very important function in the process immediately after the general orientation has been reached, whether by single individuals or groups of a certain size’ (339).
In view of his position that changing dominant conceptions of the world is primarily a sociological phenomenon that goes beyond mere argumentation, Gramsci contends that there are two cultural necessities for changing such conceptions. The first is repetition. The second is the development of ‘elites of intellectuals of a new type which arise directly out of the masses, but remain in contact with them to become, as it were, the whalebone in the corset’ (340). These necessities exist alongside social and economic factors which may be integral to changing world conceptions.
So how does this all relate to idealism? Well, from a Gramscian perspective, for idealism to become part of a dominant world view would involve far more than putting forward the most rational arguments for it. Physicalism is not only engrained in academic disciplinary divisions (such as those between the sciences and the humanities, and then between the ‘hard’, objective sciences and the ‘soft’ social sciences), but also in economic, educational and medical structures, and in popular media. To fully overcome physicalism thus entails overcoming a hegemonic world-view.
On the other hand, it would theoretically be possible for idealism to obtain a dominant position in academic philosophy without having much broader effects on the hegemonic physicalist world-view. For example, German idealism in the nineteenth century and British idealism in the early twentieth century were dominant within academic philosophy, but this did not have much of an effect on countering the rise of the world-view of scientific materialism.
As an aside, an interesting case study of the relation between hegemonic world-views and social and economic factors is provided in Carolyn Merchant’s the Death of Nature (https://www.amazon.com/Death-Nature-Eco ... 1094156213 ) in relation to mining. In the sixteenth century, a significant world-view in the West was that the earth was living and sacred, and this constrained the moral acceptability and prevalence of mining. By the early eighteenth century, commercial activity and the rise of mechanistic philosophies of nature legitimated the manipulation of nature and removed moral constraints on mining. Of course, it is possible that the likes of Descartes, Hobbes and Newton may have developed their views on matter regardless of the commercial, socioeconomic and industrial activities of their day. But whether aspects of their philosophies would have become part of a hegemonic world-view in the absence of all these activities is doubtful.
Last edited by JustinG on Fri Apr 30, 2021 8:10 am, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Gramsci and idealism
Contents
To keep track of my Gramsci references, I’ve listed my main posts in this thread here, which may also be of use to others:
1. Introduction viewtopic.php?p=4048#p4048
2. ‘Truth’ and metaphysics viewtopic.php?p=4085#p4085
3. The So-Called “Reality of the External World” https://metakastrup.org/viewtopic.php?p=4256#p4256
4. Gramsci and Nature https://metakastrup.org/viewtopic.php?p=4664#p4664
5. Hegemony, philosophy and idealism viewtopic.php?p=5660#p5660
To keep track of my Gramsci references, I’ve listed my main posts in this thread here, which may also be of use to others:
1. Introduction viewtopic.php?p=4048#p4048
2. ‘Truth’ and metaphysics viewtopic.php?p=4085#p4085
3. The So-Called “Reality of the External World” https://metakastrup.org/viewtopic.php?p=4256#p4256
4. Gramsci and Nature https://metakastrup.org/viewtopic.php?p=4664#p4664
5. Hegemony, philosophy and idealism viewtopic.php?p=5660#p5660