Question about Kastrup's perspective on Freewill

[ItayNagar]

After listening to quite a few interviews with Kastrup, I'm still having some difficulty understanding his take on freewill. Perhaps someone could clarify this more..

In BK's recent interview with ZDoggMD, it sounds like he rejects the notion of freewill in its strong sense (i.e., the ability to do otherwise), and he offers some interpretation that reminded me of a Compatiblist version of free will (i.e., will that is not constrained by outside forces).

In other interviews, BK seems to allow for some limited freewill, but only in how we mentally relate to our condition in the world. Therefore, one could resist his condition, and thus create more internal suffering, or one could be more accepting to their unfolding reality, and live with more harmony in the world.

These two perspectives of freewill seem contradictory to me. For, if our thoughts and actions are a direct result of a purely instinctive will, I don't see how there is any room for choosing to mentally resist or accept our condition. Any resistance or acceptance would also be a determined (or random) reflection of the instinctive will, and some people will be more resistant and other more accepting, solely by their instinctive nature. That is, even the 'choice' to resist or accept will not be at all free, but wholly determined or random. Human metacognition cannot affect this, as it is also a determined part of the instinctive will.

Any ideas on how to reconcile this?

[Shaibei]

After listening to quite a few interviews with Kastrup, I'm still having some difficulty understanding his take on freewill. Perhaps someone could clarify this more..

In BK's recent interview with ZDoggMD, it sounds like he rejects the notion of freewill in its strong sense (i.e., the ability to do otherwise), and he offers some interpretation that reminded me of a Compatiblist version of free will (i.e., will that is not constrained by outside forces).

In other interviews, BK seems to allow for some limited freewill, but only in how we mentally relate to our condition in the world. Therefore, one could resist his condition, and thus create more internal suffering, or one could be more accepting to their unfolding reality, and live with more harmony in the world.
חן
These two perspectives of freewill seem contradictory to me. For, if our thoughts and actions are a direct result of a purely instinctive will, I don't see how there is any room for choosing to mentally resist or accept our condition. Any resistance or acceptance would also be a determined (or random) reflection of the instinctive will, and some people will be more resistant and other more accepting, solely by their instinctive nature. That is, even the 'choice' to resist or accept will not be at all free, but wholly determined or random. Human metacognition cannot affect this, as it is also a determined part of the instinctive will.

Any ideas on how to reconcile this?

Not really. But I wonder how you were exposed to Bernardo's books. From your name I guess you are from Israel

[Starbuck]

After listening to quite a few interviews with Kastrup, I'm still having some difficulty understanding his take on freewill. Perhaps someone could clarify this more..

In BK's recent interview with ZDoggMD, it sounds like he rejects the notion of freewill in its strong sense (i.e., the ability to do otherwise), and he offers some interpretation that reminded me of a Compatiblist version of free will (i.e., will that is not constrained by outside forces).

In other interviews, BK seems to allow for some limited freewill, but only in how we mentally relate to our condition in the world. Therefore, one could resist his condition, and thus create more internal suffering, or one could be more accepting to their unfolding reality, and live with more harmony in the world.

These two perspectives of freewill seem contradictory to me. For, if our thoughts and actions are a direct result of a purely instinctive will, I don't see how there is any room for choosing to mentally resist or accept our condition. Any resistance or acceptance would also be a determined (or random) reflection of the instinctive will, and some people will be more resistant and other more accepting, solely by their instinctive nature. That is, even the 'choice' to resist or accept will not be at all free, but wholly determined or random. Human metacognition cannot affect this, as it is also a determined part of the instinctive will.

Any ideas on how to reconcile this?

Hi Itay, I often here Bernardo describe the whole question as a bit of a red herring. The whole idea of agency could only apply to an agent that persists over time, of which we have no evidence. Some will hear that and assume he is saying there is no free will. Yet because nothing is static, everything is responsive and open to conditioning from everything else. Some will hear that and conclude that there is free will. My belief is that that apparent dichotomy becomes resolved not by the rational mind but but direct absorption or merging of the illusory self into its ultimate identity.

[ItayNagar]

Not really. But I wonder how you were exposed to Bernardo's books. From your name I guess you are from Israel

Good guess. I'm originally from Israel, but living in the US now. I studied some philosophy and became interested in the viability of a Materialistic ontology. I think I first saw an interview Jeffery Mishlove had with Kastrup, and was very impressed. I've only read 'The Idea of the World' and 'Decoding Schopenhauer' so far.

[AshvinP]

After listening to quite a few interviews with Kastrup, I'm still having some difficulty understanding his take on freewill. Perhaps someone could clarify this more..

In BK's recent interview with ZDoggMD, it sounds like he rejects the notion of freewill in its strong sense (i.e., the ability to do otherwise), and he offers some interpretation that reminded me of a Compatiblist version of free will (i.e., will that is not constrained by outside forces).

In other interviews, BK seems to allow for some limited freewill, but only in how we mentally relate to our condition in the world. Therefore, one could resist his condition, and thus create more internal suffering, or one could be more accepting to their unfolding reality, and live with more harmony in the world.

These two perspectives of freewill seem contradictory to me. For, if our thoughts and actions are a direct result of a purely instinctive will, I don't see how there is any room for choosing to mentally resist or accept our condition. Any resistance or acceptance would also be a determined (or random) reflection of the instinctive will, and some people will be more resistant and other more accepting, solely by their instinctive nature. That is, even the 'choice' to resist or accept will not be at all free, but wholly determined or random. Human metacognition cannot affect this, as it is also a determined part of the instinctive will.

Any ideas on how to reconcile this?

I am not sure there is any philosophical reconciliation if the MAL is "purely instinctive will" in the Schopenhauer-BK sense. It does make it difficult to avoid some form of metaphysical determinism. Although the purely academic question may also be the wrong question, similar to the question of solipsism. Russell's critique of solipsism was basically that no one actually behaves as if it were true.

As against solipsism it is to be said, in the first place, that it is psychologically impossible to believe, and is rejected in fact even by those who mean to accept it. I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine Ladd-Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a logician and a solipsist, her surprise surprised me.

The same critique could be launched against determinism. We all act as if we are interacting with others who have some meaningful amount of free will. All of our social, political and legal institutions are based on that premise. And our activity of thinking also implicitly reveals a meaningful amount of freedom, especially if we are thinking about thinking itself.

[Simon Adams]

After listening to quite a few interviews with Kastrup, I'm still having some difficulty understanding his take on freewill. Perhaps someone could clarify this more..

In BK's recent interview with ZDoggMD, it sounds like he rejects the notion of freewill in its strong sense (i.e., the ability to do otherwise), and he offers some interpretation that reminded me of a Compatiblist version of free will (i.e., will that is not constrained by outside forces).

In other interviews, BK seems to allow for some limited freewill, but only in how we mentally relate to our condition in the world. Therefore, one could resist his condition, and thus create more internal suffering, or one could be more accepting to their unfolding reality, and live with more harmony in the world.

These two perspectives of freewill seem contradictory to me. For, if our thoughts and actions are a direct result of a purely instinctive will, I don't see how there is any room for choosing to mentally resist or accept our condition. Any resistance or acceptance would also be a determined (or random) reflection of the instinctive will, and some people will be more resistant and other more accepting, solely by their instinctive nature. That is, even the 'choice' to resist or accept will not be at all free, but wholly determined or random. Human metacognition cannot affect this, as it is also a determined part of the instinctive will.

Any ideas on how to reconcile this?

I have noticed Bernardo’s views do seem a bit contradictory on free will. My way of understanding his view is that he thinks mind at large is exploring it’s potential instinctively, which includes us but also now (only through us) includes metacognition. So we have metaconscious ability to make genuine choices, but if we make choices that conflict with what mind at large is doing instinctively, then we cause ourselves problems.

I may well be wrong on this, and it’s certainly not my view, but that’s my way of reconciling his seemingly different positions...

[Martin_]

Have you read this one?

BK: Yes, Free Will Exists - Just ask Schopenhauer

some quotes:

if I believe that I make free choices, it is because I feel that my choices are determined by me. A free choice is one determined by my preferences, likes, dislikes, character, etc., as opposed to someone else’s or other external forces.

So, the question of free will boils down to one of metaphysics: are our felt volitional states reducible to something outside and independent of consciousness? If so, there cannot be free will, for we can only identify with contents of consciousness. But if, instead, neurophysiology is merely how our felt volitional states present themselves to observation from an outside perspective—that is, if neurophysiology is merely the image of conscious willing, not its cause or source—then we do have free will; for in the latter case, our choices are determined by volitional states we intuitively regard as expressions of ourselves.

[ItayNagar]

Have you read this one?

BK: Yes, Free Will Exists - Just ask Schopenhauer

some quotes:

if I believe that I make free choices, it is because I feel that my choices are determined by me. A free choice is one determined by my preferences, likes, dislikes, character, etc., as opposed to someone else’s or other external forces.

So, the question of free will boils down to one of metaphysics: are our felt volitional states reducible to something outside and independent of consciousness? If so, there cannot be free will, for we can only identify with contents of consciousness. But if, instead, neurophysiology is merely how our felt volitional states present themselves to observation from an outside perspective—that is, if neurophysiology is merely the image of conscious willing, not its cause or source—then we do have free will; for in the latter case, our choices are determined by volitional states we intuitively regard as expressions of ourselves.

Thanks for the link! This does help clarify Kastrup's position.

Unfortunately, his view seems eerily similar to Dan Dennett's Compatiblist notion of freewill (minus the materialist view of course). But here I tend to share Sam Harris' intuition, which is, if this is what compatiblists call 'freewill', might as well use a different term to describe it, because one thing this will is not - free.

Even if we grant that freewill in its stronger sense (the ability to do otherwise) is incoherent or a red-herring - since there is no space between determinism and randomness - I don't see a reason to keep describing such will as free in a compatiblist sense. This simply amounts to redefining freewill in an odd way. To me at least...

[AshvinP]

Have you read this one?

BK: Yes, Free Will Exists - Just ask Schopenhauer

some quotes:

if I believe that I make free choices, it is because I feel that my choices are determined by me. A free choice is one determined by my preferences, likes, dislikes, character, etc., as opposed to someone else’s or other external forces.

So, the question of free will boils down to one of metaphysics: are our felt volitional states reducible to something outside and independent of consciousness? If so, there cannot be free will, for we can only identify with contents of consciousness. But if, instead, neurophysiology is merely how our felt volitional states present themselves to observation from an outside perspective—that is, if neurophysiology is merely the image of conscious willing, not its cause or source—then we do have free will; for in the latter case, our choices are determined by volitional states we intuitively regard as expressions of ourselves.

Thanks for the link! This does help clarify Kastrup's position.

Unfortunately, his view seems eerily similar to Dan Dennett's Compatiblist notion of freewill (minus the materialist view of course). But here I tend to share Sam Harris' intuition, which is, if this is what compatiblists call 'freewill', might as well use a different term to describe it, because one thing this will is not - free.

Even if we grant that freewill in its stronger sense (the ability to do otherwise) is incoherent or a red-herring - since there is no space between determinism and randomness - I don't see a reason to keep describing such will as free in a compatiblist sense. This simply amounts to redefining freewill in an odd way. To me at least...

I think BK's approach as expressed in the linked article is very helpful. Why do we have such a problem with the concept of free will? Because we are starting with the concept of free choices rather than the phenomenon of choices themselves, i.e. our experience of choices. We then try to trace back the concept we have produced to some metaphysical Ground and see if it all makes sense. We should not expect that method to work for these fundamental experiences. That is a huge problem of Western metaphysics in general when it comes to many different fundamental experiences.

Schopenhauer brought us closer to starting with the phenomenon (than Kant) since he asserted the volitional will is Reality and therefore we are always experiencing it at some level. However he still made our ideas into illusory representations of the will which cannot disclose that Reality to us. I think BK starts off well but then falls into the same trap - "the will is free because it is all there ultimately is". That statement does not sit well with us and for good reason. Because what makes us feel free, i.e. that our choices flow freely from ourselves rather than 'external forces', is precisely our Thinking activity, i.e. our ideas. It is more than our simple volitional states of will which every predictable animal shares.

[JustinG]

Unfortunately, his view seems eerily similar to Dan Dennett's Compatiblist notion of freewill (minus the materialist view of course).

Yes, and I agree that compatiblism doesn't really seem like free will at all.

This is an advantage of Whitehead's philosophy, in which there is genuine free will (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Process_p ... nd_process).