The Impossibility of Absolute Unconsciousness in the 1st-Person

[electricshephard]

Absolute unconsciousness cannot be experienced in the 1st-person.

If one could be unconscious, they would not even realise that they were unconscious, and therefore cannot experience their own unconsciousness. If they cannot experience their own unconsciousness, then they cannot ever be in the state of unconsciousness, and if they cannot be in the state of unconsciousness, then they cannot be unconscious in an absolute sense.

Consciousness and unconsciousness are a binary pair: there is no tertiary state, and neither can it be considered a spectrum because even partial consciousness falls under the banner of consciousness.

However, if 1st-person unconsciousness is impossible then the binary collapses. We already know that 1st-person consciousness is a certainty because it survives mechanisms of skepticism such as the Cartesian evil demon proposition.

Therefore, is 1st-person consciousness is possible, and 1st-person unconsciousness is impossible, then 1st-person consciousness is inevitable.

Or in other words, 1st-person consciousness is eternal.

[Simon Adams]

Therefore, is 1st-person consciousness is possible, and 1st-person unconsciousness is impossible, then 1st-person consciousness is inevitable.

Or in other words, 1st-person consciousness is eternal.

I may be missing something, but I'm not sure I follow the logic on this. It seems to make some ontological assumptions that, say, a physicalist would not accept (not that any of their assumptions around consciousness make much sense). I guess you could make a kind of ontological argument similar to this that first person consciousness is irreducible, and therefore whatever gives rise to first person consciousness must be irreducible? But again, those that see consciousness as an emergent phenomena from matter, would probably disagree about it bring irreducible.

I guess the question is about what the aim of this argument is? Is it to suggest to other idealists that individual consciousness cannot have a "start"?

[Eugene I]

Therefore, is 1st-person consciousness is possible, and 1st-person unconsciousness is impossible, then 1st-person consciousness is inevitable.

Or in other words, 1st-person consciousness is eternal.

You have a logical flaw here. It is true that "1st-person unconsciousness is impossible" to experience. But that does not necessarily mean that "unconsciousness is impossible" in principle. It may be possible in principle, but it just could not be experienced from the 1-st person perspective. Therefore it is impossible to verify the possibility of such state experimentally from the 1-st person perspective. But neither it is possible to falsify it and prove that it does not exist. Therefore, the "unconsciousness" belongs to the category of experimentally non-verifiable and non-falsifiable "things" such as "matter" or "flying spaghetti monster" and so on, and can only be a subject of rational inference/belief. However, to avoid such useless fantasies, in philosophy we apply the principle of parsimony (the Occam's razor) and refuse to accept any inferences or beliefs that introduce any unnecessary assumptions about existence of unprovable and unnecessary entities (such as matter, unconsciousness or flying spaghetti monster). So, we eliminate the assumption of the existence of unconsciousness not by bluntly stating that it does not exist, but by stating its non-verifiability and non-falsifiability and by applying the principle of parsimony.

[electricshephard]

You have a logical flaw here. It is true that "1st-person unconsciousness is impossible" to experience. But that does not necessarily mean that "unconsciousness is impossible" in principle. It may be possible in principle, but it just could not be experienced from the 1-st person perspective.

I would argue that 1st-person consciousness and 1st-person experience are essentially synonymous. It might be a semantic issue or a limitation of the lexicon (as is often the case), but in essence I would say that the underlying phenomenon is the same.

For example if you are having an experience, then you are conscious. If you are conscious, then by extension you are having an experience.

Just as 1st-person unconsciousness (in an absolute sense) is impossible to experience, so too is 1st-person un-experience (in an absolute sense) impossible to be conscious of.

To be clear, I’m defining un-experience here not as the experiencing of no-things, but rather the absence of any type of experience, even that of a sensational void.

So if 1st-person experience/consciousness is possible and 1st-person un-experience/unconsciousness is impossible, then 1st-person experience/consciousness is inevitable.

The non-zero % probability of 1st-person consciousness and the zero % probability of 1st-person unconsciousness leads to a 100% probability of consciousness at any one single moment.

Or in other words: There can never be a moment when one is not having an experience, all that can change is the nature of that experience.

I guess the question is about what the aim of this argument is? Is it to suggest to other idealists that individual consciousness cannot have a "start"?

I may be missing something, but to me this is self-evident rationality for why consciousness is an indestructible primitive. As long as it has no opposite and can happen at least once, then it is everlasting and eternal, irrespective of any material starting conditions.

[Simon Adams]

I may be missing something, but to me this is self-evident rationality for why consciousness is an indestructible primitive. As long as it has no opposite and can happen at least once, then it is everlasting and eternal, irrespective of any material starting conditions.

So lets say that I’m a physicalist. I could rephrase your argument in terms of a rock (for consciousness) and it’s stoniness (for experience). When there is no rock, there is also no stoniness. It’s impossible to have any aspect of the stoniness without the rock.

Does this mean that the rock is fundamental and eternal? Again I’m probably missing something, but I just don’t understand the fundamental difference between this example and yours...

[Eugene I]

Or in other words: There can never be a moment when one is not having an experience, all that can change is the nature of that experience.

That is correct, but only from the 1-st person perspective. There are ontologies, such as idealism, claiming that there is nothing to the world beyond the 1-st person experiencing. So, within the framework of such ontologies your claim is true.

However, there are ontologies (materialism, dualism etc) claiming that in addition to the 1-st person perspective, there exists a "3-rd person perspective", the world as it is even without any experiencing of it. The "3-rd person perspective" can be also called the "no-person perspective". Anyway, in such ontologies, there are moments when the "1-st person" is actually unconscious, but such person can not experience it of course. Form his 1-st person perspective he is always conscious and always experiencing. But from the perspectives of other persons observing him, or form a 3-rd person perspective, he was actually unconscious at that moment. We have no reason to believe that such ontologies are true, however, we have no way to prove that they are wrong. Therefore, the possibility of unconsciousness does exist, but it is just non-verifiable from the 1-st person perspective.

[AshvinP]

Saying 1st person unconciousness is impossible is a tautology, which I guess is your point. But what about 2nd and 3rd person unconsciousness?

[electricshephard]

Saying 1st person unconciousness is impossible is a tautology, which I guess is your point. But what about 2nd and 3rd person unconsciousness?

That is correct, but only from the 1-st person perspective. There are ontologies, such as idealism, claiming that there is nothing to the world beyond the 1-st person experiencing. So, within the framework of such ontologies your claim is true.

However, there are ontologies (materialism, dualism etc) claiming that in addition to the 1-st person perspective, there exists a "3-rd person perspective", the world as it is even without any experiencing of it. The "3-rd person perspective" can be also called the "no-person perspective". Anyway, in such ontologies, there are moments when the "1-st person" is actually unconscious, but such person can not experience it of course. Form his 1-st person perspective he is always conscious and always experiencing. But from the perspectives of other persons observing him, or form a 3-rd person perspective, he was actually unconscious at that moment. We have no reason to believe that such ontologies are true, however, we have no way to prove that they are wrong. Therefore, the possibility of unconsciousness does exist, but it is just non-verifiable from the 1-st person perspective.

The key word here is “claim”.

As long as it is “claimed” that 3rd-person consciousness exists, then the burden of proof rests with the “claimer”. Otherwise such ontologies are merely new religions.

What makes 1st-person consciousness so unique is its capacity to thrive against instruments of supreme skepticism, such as the Cartesian evil demon. Likewise, the impossibility of unconsciousness in the 1st-person immortalises 1st-person consciousness as an “evil demon proof” ontological primitive.

Neither 3rd-person consciousness nor 3rd-person unconsciousness survives the evil demon.

However, even any speculation that 3rd-person consciousness might exist is problematic, because when we speak of 3rd-person consciousness, what we’re actually talking about (or assuming) is 1st-person consciousness currently not present. The only alternative to that is emulative consciousness or some type of algorithmic phoney / philosophical zombie, which isn't true consciousness.

Or in other words: 3rd-person consciousness is either 1st-person consciousness currently not present, or it simply doesn’t exist at all.

If it’s the latter, then it rules itself out of the conversation about true consciousness. If it’s the former, then the same rules apply as laid out in the 1st-person:- Unconsciousness is logically and certainly impossible, and any point that it seems to be in effect can only be ascribed to illusion/delusion.

I would even go as far to suggest that consciousness is actually defined by the 1st-person, so that the word consciousness implies the 1st-person, and that the 1st-person implies consciousness.

So lets say that I’m a physicalist. I could rephrase your argument in terms of a rock (for consciousness) and it’s stoniness (for experience). When there is no rock, there is also no stoniness. It’s impossible to have any aspect of the stoniness without the rock.

Does this mean that the rock is fundamental and eternal? Again I’m probably missing something, but I just don’t understand the fundamental difference between this example and yours...

In your metaphor of the rock and its stoniness, you’re using stoniness as a property of the rock. I would argue that experience isn’t a property of consciousness but rather that they are interchangeable synonyms.

[AshvinP]

Saying 1st person unconciousness is impossible is a tautology, which I guess is your point. But what about 2nd and 3rd person unconsciousness?

Or in other words: 3rd-person consciousness is either 1st-person consciousness currently not present, or it simply doesn’t exist at all.

If it’s the latter, then it rules itself out of the conversation about true consciousness. If it’s the former, then the same rules apply as laid out in the 1st-person:- Unconsciousness is logically and certainly impossible, and any point that it seems to be in effect can only be ascribed to illusion/delusion.

I would even go as far to suggest that consciousness is actually defined by the 1st-person, so that the word consciousness implies the 1st-person, and that the 1st-person implies consciousness.

I think you are correct to identify appeals to 2nd or 3rd person perspectives as added and unwarranted assumptions. So I will substitute my original question for this one:

What about the 1st person experience of becoming aware of an experience we had which we were not aware of at the time it happened, i.e. when previously 'unconscious' contents of experience are made conscious?

[Eugene I]

Or in other words: 3rd-person consciousness is either 1st-person consciousness currently not present, or it simply doesn’t exist at all.

Not necessarily. The 3-person perspective is only an abstraction, do not take it literally. Of course what is implied here is some actual 1-st person existing perspective, but just a perspective of a person non-involved in the functioning of the system under study, an observer "external" with respect to system's boundaries, so that such perspective can be theoretically abstracted and took out of the system equations provisionally. But of course if you take it literally, then your conclusion would be correct.