Curt Jaimungal announces a 3 way conversation between himself, Hoffman, and Kastrup is coming!

[Eugene I]

Yes, he did say meaning is fundamental. They were discussing ontology and the "meaning crisis" when he said it.

May be I missed that. If ontology can solve the meaning crisis, that does not mean that the meaning is ontological. It means that a better ontology can bring better meanings to us. But anyway, if you can find any BK's quote where he states that the meaning is ontically fundamental, that would definitely help

Go to 1:40 timestamp of "Meaning and Ontology" - BK discusses Schopenhauer's criticism of Kantian epistemology and then goes into a discussion of whether depth psychology can address the absence of meaning, i.e. the fundamental issue of our day, without also discussing ontology. He says, "either meaning is really there, or my giving meaning to things is self-deception" and asks, "do you think we can solve the meaning crisis without addressing ontology head on?"

You are confusing two different things:
1. Meaning crisis can only be solved by addressing ontology (because a bad ontology of materialism brought us to the the meaning crisis)
2. Meaning itself is ontological

He is saying exactly #1. But were did he stated #2 exactly?

[AshvinP]

May be I missed that. If ontology can solve the meaning crisis, that does not mean that the meaning is ontological. It means that a better ontology can bring better meanings to us. But anyway, if you can find any BK's quote where he states that the meaning is ontically fundamental, that would definitely help

Go to 1:40 timestamp of "Meaning and Ontology" - BK discusses Schopenhauer's criticism of Kantian epistemology and then goes into a discussion of whether depth psychology can address the absence of meaning, i.e. the fundamental issue of our day, without also discussing ontology. He says, "either meaning is really there, or my giving meaning to things is self-deception" and asks, "do you think we can solve the meaning crisis without addressing ontology head on?"

You are confusing two different things:
1. Meaning crisis can only be solved by addressing ontology (because a bad ontology of materialism brought us to the the meaning crisis)
2. Meaning itself is ontological

He is saying exactly #1. But were did he stated #2 exactly?

I just quoted it. But even better, go to the beginning of JV's response to BK in that section. He says "I think the key to 'participatory knowing', which I take from Plato, and I consider Jung is a 'Platonist', he is basically the Plato of the inner psyche..." and then watch BK's reaction to that (he smiles and nods in agreement).

[Eugene I]

Go to 1:40 timestamp of "Meaning and Ontology" - BK discusses Schopenhauer's criticism of Kantian epistemology and then goes into a discussion of whether depth psychology can address the absence of meaning, i.e. the fundamental issue of our day, without also discussing ontology. He says, "either meaning is really there, or my giving meaning to things is self-deception" and asks, "do you think we can solve the meaning crisis without addressing ontology head on?"
...
I just quoted it.

I can't find it, where is this "Meaning and Ontology"?

But even better, go to the beginning of JV's response to BK in that section. He says "I think the key to 'participatory knowing', which I take from Plato, and I consider Jung is a 'Platonist', he is basically the Plato of the inner psyche..." and then watch BK's reaction to that (he smiles and nods in agreement).

BK always smiles, he is a nice guy, that does not mean he agreed, he is not a Platonist. But it looks like John is, which is OK, there are many Platonists around.

[AshvinP]

Go to 1:40 timestamp of "Meaning and Ontology" - BK discusses Schopenhauer's criticism of Kantian epistemology and then goes into a discussion of whether depth psychology can address the absence of meaning, i.e. the fundamental issue of our day, without also discussing ontology. He says, "either meaning is really there, or my giving meaning to things is self-deception" and asks, "do you think we can solve the meaning crisis without addressing ontology head on?"
...
I just quoted it.

I can't find it, where is this "Meaning and Ontology"?

But even better, go to the beginning of JV's response to BK in that section. He says "I think the key to 'participatory knowing', which I take from Plato, and I consider Jung is a 'Platonist', he is basically the Plato of the inner psyche..." and then watch BK's reaction to that (he smiles and nods in agreement).

BK always smiles, he is a nice guy, that does not mean he agreed, he is not a Platonist. But it looks like John is, which is OK, there are many Platonists around.

If you go below the video to the description, then you will see timestamps. "Meaning and ontology" is at 1:40:00. BK starts talking about depth psychology and how meaning is not helpful self-deception we employ as part of our narrative (which means it is not epiphenomenal and it is fundamental). JV's response I am referring to is a few minutes into that. BK does not just smile when JV characterizes Jung as the "Plato of the inner psyche", he nods several times. Keep in mind BK just wrote a book on Jung's idealism, as you know, and is on record saying he "agrees with everything Jung thought". They are discussing ontology and both of them have high philosophical IQ and are very careful with their philosophical terminology. Put this also in the context of him retweeting the Incarnating the Christ essay (the first post I have sent him which he retweeted, and I tag him on almost all of my posts). Also in the context of him stating MAL experiences from "both sides" of dissociative boundary, instinctive and meta-cognitive.

Of course, none of this is relevant to the actual power of the philosophical-scientific arguments which establish ideational activity as fundamental, it just indicates BK also knows that it is the best conclusion for the empirical data we have. He realizes philosophy-science is intimately linked with specific forms of spirituality, which, as Dana pointed out on the other thread, should also be clear from his books.

[Eugene I]

If you go below the video to the description, then you will see timestamps. "Meaning and ontology" is at 1:40:00. BK starts talking about depth psychology and how meaning is not helpful self-deception we employ as part of our narrative (which means it is not epiphenomenal and it is fundamental). JV's response I am referring to is a few minutes into that. BK does not just smile when JV characterizes Jung as the "Plato of the inner psyche", he nods several times. Keep in mind BK just wrote a book on Jung's idealism, as you know, and is on record saying he "agrees with everything Jung thought". They are discussing ontology and both of them have high philosophical IQ and are very careful with their philosophical terminology. Put this also in the context of him retweeting the Incarnating the Christ essay (the first post I have sent him which he retweeted, and I tag him on almost all of my posts). Also in the context of him stating MAL experiences from "both sides" of dissociative boundary, instinctive and meta-cognitive.

Of course, none of this is relevant to the actual power of the philosophical-scientific arguments which establish ideational activity as fundamental, it just indicates BK also knows that it is the best conclusion for the empirical data we have. He realizes philosophy-science is intimately linked with specific forms of spirituality, which, as Dana pointed out on the other thread, should also be clear from his books.

The problem is: the proposition of the pre-existence of meaning is incoherent with BK's position that the MAL is non-metacognitive and has no intentionality (which is not the same as the will). How cam a instinctive mind with no meta-cognition and no intentionality develop any meanings? Regarding Plaonism, I would need to see an explicit statement from BK confirming that he subscribes to Platonism.

[AshvinP]

If you go below the video to the description, then you will see timestamps. "Meaning and ontology" is at 1:40:00. BK starts talking about depth psychology and how meaning is not helpful self-deception we employ as part of our narrative (which means it is not epiphenomenal and it is fundamental). JV's response I am referring to is a few minutes into that. BK does not just smile when JV characterizes Jung as the "Plato of the inner psyche", he nods several times. Keep in mind BK just wrote a book on Jung's idealism, as you know, and is on record saying he "agrees with everything Jung thought". They are discussing ontology and both of them have high philosophical IQ and are very careful with their philosophical terminology. Put this also in the context of him retweeting the Incarnating the Christ essay (the first post I have sent him which he retweeted, and I tag him on almost all of my posts). Also in the context of him stating MAL experiences from "both sides" of dissociative boundary, instinctive and meta-cognitive.

Of course, none of this is relevant to the actual power of the philosophical-scientific arguments which establish ideational activity as fundamental, it just indicates BK also knows that it is the best conclusion for the empirical data we have. He realizes philosophy-science is intimately linked with specific forms of spirituality, which, as Dana pointed out on the other thread, should also be clear from his books.

The problem is: the proposition of the pre-existence of meaning is incoherent with BK's position that the MAL is non-metacognitive and has no intentionality (which is not the same as the will). How cam a instinctive mind with no meta-cognition and no intentionality develop any meanings? Regarding Plaonism, I would need to see an explicit statement from BK confirming that he subscribes to Platonism.

Exactly - as mentioned on the other thread, he has clarified his view that MAL's non-metacognition is a statement of relational perspective, i.e. from human perspective Nature is non-metacognitive (an assertion very much consistent with Western idealism). From MAL's own perspective, it is self-aware because humans are self-aware and our perspective is known by MAL. I could be remembering incorrectly so I will try to find the time he said that (I definitely remember him saying MAL experiences from "both sides"). Saying MAL is non-metacognitive is also consistent because "metacognition" is really only useful to distinguish perspectives - MAL which directly experiences all phenomenon is not metacognitive because it does not use abstractions i.e. symbols in such a process of experience.

[Eugene I]

Exactly - as mentioned on the other thread, he has clarified his view that MAL's non-metacognition is a statement of relational perspective, i.e. from human perspective Nature is non-metacognitive (an assertion very much consistent with Western idealism). From MAL's own perspective, it is self-aware because humans are self-aware and our perspective is known by MAL. I could be remembering incorrectly so I will try to find the time he said that (I definitely remember him saying MAL experiences from "both sides"). Saying MAL is non-metacognitive is also consistent because "metacognition" is really only useful to distinguish perspectives - MAL which directly experiences all phenomenon is not metacognitive because it does not use abstractions i.e. symbols in such a process of experience.

OK, I'm fine with that, but this means that it's only the metacognitive alters that have intentionality and can develop meanings. The meanings do not come from the non-metacognitive instinctive "cosmic" side of MAL, they come from the alters side. It is we alters who invent them and define them. I'm not saying that there are no meanings or that they are not real. Of course there are meanings, but they are alter-created. There were no meanings until the alters developed their metacognition.

But this view is counter-Platonic. In the Platonic view the ideas and meaning exist in consciousness regardless whether it is meta-cognitive or not. Once some "parts" of it become metacognitive, they just "pull out" those ready-to-be-used meanings from the "shelves" of their eternal existence so to speak.

[AshvinP]

Exactly - as mentioned on the other thread, he has clarified his view that MAL's non-metacognition is a statement of relational perspective, i.e. from human perspective Nature is non-metacognitive (an assertion very much consistent with Western idealism). From MAL's own perspective, it is self-aware because humans are self-aware and our perspective is known by MAL. I could be remembering incorrectly so I will try to find the time he said that (I definitely remember him saying MAL experiences from "both sides"). Saying MAL is non-metacognitive is also consistent because "metacognition" is really only useful to distinguish perspectives - MAL which directly experiences all phenomenon is not metacognitive because it does not use abstractions i.e. symbols in such a process of experience.

OK, I'm fine with that, but this means that it's only the metacognitive alters that have intentionality and can develop meanings. The meanings do not come from the non-metacognitive instinctive "cosmic" side of MAL, they come from the alters side. It is we alters who invent them and define them. I'm not saying that there are no meanings or that they are not real. Of course there are meanings, but they are alter-created. There were no meanings until the alters developed their metacognition.

But this view is counter-Platonic. In the Platonic view the ideas and meaning exist in consciousness regardless whether it is meta-cognitive or not. Once some "parts" of it become metacognitive, they just "pull out" those ready-to-be-used meanings from the "shelves" of their eternal existence so to speak.

No, that ontic framing is an artifice of Cartesian dualism. The "two sides" language is used by BK to differentiate the relational perspectives. Obviously BK does not believe there are ontically "two sides" of experience, interior to MAL and exterior to MAL. Ontically there is only One Side and ideation-meaning is a fundamental aspect of that One Side.

[Eugene I]

No, that ontic framing is an artifice of Cartesian dualism. The "two sides" language is used by BK to differentiate the relational perspectives. Obviously BK does not believe there are ontically "two sides" of experience, interior to MAL and exterior to MAL. Ontically there is only One Side and ideation-meaning is a fundamental aspect of that One Side.

Oh, I agree with that, although it's a matter of definition of what the word "ontic" means. That basically means that everything is equally ontic, including all ideas, forms, meanings, perceptions, and that's fine, except that calling everything "ontic" becomes moot. But that's not the point, the point is that it is we alters who define meanings. That also means that it's Consciousness/MAL as a whole that defines meanings in an "ontic" sense, but as a process it happens only through us alters as local activities of the MAL.

[AshvinP]

No, that ontic framing is an artifice of Cartesian dualism. The "two sides" language is used by BK to differentiate the relational perspectives. Obviously BK does not believe there are ontically "two sides" of experience, interior to MAL and exterior to MAL. Ontically there is only One Side and ideation-meaning is a fundamental aspect of that One Side.

Oh, I agree with that, although it's a matter of definition of what the word "ontic" means. That basically means that everything is equally ontic, including all ideas, forms, meanings, perceptions, and that's fine, except that calling everything "ontic" becomes moot. But that's not the point, the point is that it is we alters who define meanings. That also means that it's Consciousness/MAL as a whole that defines meanings in an "ontic" sense, but as a process it happens only through us alters as local activities of the MAL.

You are adding assumption that we "define" meanings, as in "inventing" them. It is better to think of it as matching existing meanings to existing perceptions (although that is still abstract simplification). Most of that happens unconsciously right now, so not even meta-cognitively. And it is certainly possible we inaccurately match meanings to perceptions in meta-cognitive mode. That is essentially what philosophical-scientific method is about - figuring out what matches are accurate i.e. expansive and useful towards specific aims of relational knowledge.