Dismissal of the simulation hypothesis

[AshvinP]

Kastrup doesn't mean / say that simulation theory is false. He means that even if it were true, it wouldn't tell us anything about the true nature of the ultimate universe. So bringing simulation theory into an ontic discussion is pointless.

@Martin:
it might be pointless (I'm not sure it is) but that is not a basis for dismissing it. If it is true and doesn't tell us anything - what's the justification for making up some other false story instead? Isn't it more reasonable to say something along the lines of "if it is true we are kind of stuck, so we'll assume it is not true and go from there" instead of calling it "idiotic" (as Bernardo does)?

The key is to realize that what is True under pragmatic idealism cannot possibly be useless, i.e. not tell us anything of value to our lives. BK is aligned with pragmatic idealism as far as I can tell. None of us start from a completely "neutral" metaphysics when evaluating other perspectives. Most here are at least assuming conscious activity is a real phenomenon which cannot be reduced to physical stuff. And if go one step further to say conscious activity is all there is (ruling out dualism), then a world-conception that reflects true ideal relations will always be useful. In fact, that is the only sort of conception that is useful under idealism. So BK is essentially saying simulation theory's metaphysical uselessness renders it untrue in the most real sense.

[Simon Adams]

I wonder many times if Bernardo's reluctance to see mind at large as having a direction is in an effort to remain impeccable. I'm going to choose to believe that is the case otherwise I'm left with questioning his credibility.

I don’t really understand what you mean by direction? I certainly wasn’t questioning his credibility …

[Simon Adams]

Yes and if you take the terms to mean a fixed pattern of behaviour, that does match what nature does. There’s just a vast difference between the version that applies to living things versus non living things, and I think precision and consistency are examples of the difference.

I’m not a fan of the simulation hypothesis at all, but I do find it strange that people can find it plausible and not idealism. However I do think the ‘pure’ idealism of Bernardo has a problem in terms of all the laws and mathematical foundations being instinctive. You can propose a hierarchy of thoughts, with low instinctual processes and higher order levels, like the difference between alters and sub alters (heart beating, kidneys filtering etc), but I just don’t get how you can have these structures within experience alone. You need another dimension, and even then you get into a problem of infinite regress - you can’t have the higher order building out of the lower orders, if the higher orders form the context within which the lower orders ‘function’. From the simulation perspective, it’s a bit like saying the operating system created the hardware, although that’s a very faulty analogy.

Anyway I’m probably straw-manning this view, so I should probably stop!

I lost you somewhere in the 3rd sentence of the 2nd paragraph, so I have no idea if you are straw-manning

Could you elaborate on the bolded part?

I’m talking about things like the laws of nature, not our theories of physics which are a partial attempt to describe them, but the actual constraints on nature that make it always behave according to GR, SR, QM etc, the fact that it can all be described mathematically, that it all conforms to the mathematical models to massively high precision, which can then predict new things no one has ever seen before etc.

I can imagine MaL instinctively developing new ‘patterns of representation’ over time, maybe push the boat out as far as imagining the standard model of particles being like learning new musical notes to play (although even that seems pre-set in some way), but the suggestion that it also develops the constraints on it’s own representations seems to me to be categorically different. If you look at non living stuff, mind at large does appear entirely, and precisely, deterministic.

[AshvinP]

Yes and if you take the terms to mean a fixed pattern of behaviour, that does match what nature does. There’s just a vast difference between the version that applies to living things versus non living things, and I think precision and consistency are examples of the difference.

I’m not a fan of the simulation hypothesis at all, but I do find it strange that people can find it plausible and not idealism. However I do think the ‘pure’ idealism of Bernardo has a problem in terms of all the laws and mathematical foundations being instinctive. You can propose a hierarchy of thoughts, with low instinctual processes and higher order levels, like the difference between alters and sub alters (heart beating, kidneys filtering etc), but I just don’t get how you can have these structures within experience alone. You need another dimension, and even then you get into a problem of infinite regress - you can’t have the higher order building out of the lower orders, if the higher orders form the context within which the lower orders ‘function’. From the simulation perspective, it’s a bit like saying the operating system created the hardware, although that’s a very faulty analogy.

Anyway I’m probably straw-manning this view, so I should probably stop!

I lost you somewhere in the 3rd sentence of the 2nd paragraph, so I have no idea if you are straw-manning

Could you elaborate on the bolded part?

I’m talking about things like the laws of nature, not our theories of physics which are a partial attempt to describe them, but the actual constraints on nature that make it always behave according to GR, SR, QM etc, the fact that it can all be described mathematically, that it all conforms to the mathematical models to massively high precision, which can then predict new things no one has ever seen before etc.

I can imagine MaL instinctively developing new ‘patterns of representation’ over time, maybe push the boat out as far as imagining the standard model of particles being like learning new musical notes to play (although even that seems pre-set in some way), but the suggestion that it also develops the constraints on it’s own representations seems to me to be categorically different. If you look at non living stuff, mind at large does appear entirely, and precisely, deterministic.

Got it. I would offer two things here:

1) As Cleric has referred to in several essays, the Mandelbrot fractals are decent analogy in so far as they show that simple mathematical 'rules' can give rise to never-ending complexity and novelty of representational forms.

2) There is still an element missing, which is that of self-reflective thinking. It allows the Spirit to explore the complex forms in a manner that merely instinctual processes could not, and to further transform such forms in the processes of abstract reasoning and imagination.

[Eugene I]

I can imagine MaL instinctively developing new ‘patterns of representation’ over time, maybe push the boat out as far as imagining the standard model of particles being like learning new musical notes to play (although even that seems pre-set in some way), but the suggestion that it also develops the constraints on it’s own representations seems to me to be categorically different. If you look at non living stuff, mind at large does appear entirely, and precisely, deterministic.

Possibly the MAL tried these ideastions of the world google times before and they did not work because they were too loose and indeterministic and because of that they fell apart, but he found that the more deterministic they are, the more stable and able to survive and self-sustain they become, so the MAL developed that "computational" faculty to maintain the mathematically deterministic ideation process running and that is how he was able to get the world to evolve up to the point of the conditions for conscious life forms to develop.

[Ed Konderla]

I wonder many times if Bernardo's reluctance to see mind at large as having a direction is in an effort to remain impeccable. I'm going to choose to believe that is the case otherwise I'm left with questioning his credibility.

I don’t really understand what you mean by direction? I certainly wasn’t questioning his credibility …

Number one I never implied you would question his credibility, I was. Bernardo seems to feel compelled to deny any possibility that there is a "plan" for lack of a better word or concept. Much like Darwinian evolutionist that need to believe the physical world is one big happy accident. That may be an over simplification of Bernardo's position but for the sake of argument let's go with it. Now there is no doubt that Bernardo is a really smart guy and has a drive, need, desire however you choose to characterize it to be seen as a promoter, leader, guide or we wouldn't know who he was or that he'll be on Youtube interviews eleventy billion times in the next year. I once saw the head futurist for Hewlett Packard at a meeting I was attending. Never heard of a futurist before but he's a really smart guy that reads all of the tea leaves concerning technology, society, possible global disasters you name it he looks at it and helps plot the course for the company. He started his talk with a slideshow of quotes from the smartest people in history, from Einstein to Aristotle that not only were they wrong they were comically wrong from the position of hindsight. He went on to talk about how you have to be careful with really smart people because they are good at two things. One, being really smart and two convincing their followers they are right about everything. I see Bernardo, bless his heart, as being guilty of both.

[isaac_hagoel]

Kastrup doesn't mean / say that simulation theory is false. He means that even if it were true, it wouldn't tell us anything about the true nature of the ultimate universe. So bringing simulation theory into an ontic discussion is pointless.

@Martin:
it might be pointless (I'm not sure it is) but that is not a basis for dismissing it. If it is true and doesn't tell us anything - what's the justification for making up some other false story instead? Isn't it more reasonable to say something along the lines of "if it is true we are kind of stuck, so we'll assume it is not true and go from there" instead of calling it "idiotic" (as Bernardo does)?

The key is to realize that what is True under pragmatic idealism cannot possibly be useless, i.e. not tell us anything of value to our lives. BK is aligned with pragmatic idealism as far as I can tell. None of us start from a completely "neutral" metaphysics when evaluating other perspectives. Most here are at least assuming conscious activity is a real phenomenon which cannot be reduced to physical stuff. And if go one step further to say conscious activity is all there is (ruling out dualism), then a world-conception that reflects true ideal relations will always be useful. In fact, that is the only sort of conception that is useful under idealism. So BK is essentially saying simulation theory's metaphysical uselessness renders it untrue in the most real sense.

@Martin_
I get that this is the key but I don't get why truth and uselessness are the same thing. usefulness is very context related, as in a true fact might be useful in one context or for one person but not for another. If I tell you the true fact: "I wear black pants", it is not useful for you or for anyone really, yet it is still very much true.

[AshvinP]

@Martin:
it might be pointless (I'm not sure it is) but that is not a basis for dismissing it. If it is true and doesn't tell us anything - what's the justification for making up some other false story instead? Isn't it more reasonable to say something along the lines of "if it is true we are kind of stuck, so we'll assume it is not true and go from there" instead of calling it "idiotic" (as Bernardo does)?

The key is to realize that what is True under pragmatic idealism cannot possibly be useless, i.e. not tell us anything of value to our lives. BK is aligned with pragmatic idealism as far as I can tell. None of us start from a completely "neutral" metaphysics when evaluating other perspectives. Most here are at least assuming conscious activity is a real phenomenon which cannot be reduced to physical stuff. And if go one step further to say conscious activity is all there is (ruling out dualism), then a world-conception that reflects true ideal relations will always be useful. In fact, that is the only sort of conception that is useful under idealism. So BK is essentially saying simulation theory's metaphysical uselessness renders it untrue in the most real sense.

@Martin_
I get that this is the key but I don't get why truth and uselessness are the same thing. usefulness is very context related, as in a true fact might be useful in one context or for one person but not for another. If I tell you the true fact: "I wear black pants", it is not useful for you or for anyone really, yet it is still very much true.

So, keeping it very simple, even though this is a deep and contested issue in philosophy, your example there is of the "correspondence theory of truth". Your statement is true under that theory if it corresponds to "objective" fact(s) in the world - in this case the fact that you are wearing black pants. This theory is rejected by pragmatism for various reasons which we can get into some more later if you want (related to whether the objective world is actually comprised of 'things' like "black pants" or rather functions/meanings in relation to agents with goals).

For now, we can just try to understand the "pragmatic theory of truth" and how it applies - a conceptual scheme is true under this theory if it is useful to achieve the goal one is aiming at. Here we are aiming at figuring out what can explain the existence of consciousness and its dynamics (that is generally what BK is trying to do). The hypothesis that we are living in a virtual simulation of some computational device gets us absolutely no more closer to resolving our question. We are no more closer to explaining the existence of consciousness. Therefore, the hypothesis is untrue.

[isaac_hagoel]

The key is to realize that what is True under pragmatic idealism cannot possibly be useless, i.e. not tell us anything of value to our lives. BK is aligned with pragmatic idealism as far as I can tell. None of us start from a completely "neutral" metaphysics when evaluating other perspectives. Most here are at least assuming conscious activity is a real phenomenon which cannot be reduced to physical stuff. And if go one step further to say conscious activity is all there is (ruling out dualism), then a world-conception that reflects true ideal relations will always be useful. In fact, that is the only sort of conception that is useful under idealism. So BK is essentially saying simulation theory's metaphysical uselessness renders it untrue in the most real sense.

@Martin_
I get that this is the key but I don't get why truth and uselessness are the same thing. usefulness is very context related, as in a true fact might be useful in one context or for one person but not for another. If I tell you the true fact: "I wear black pants", it is not useful for you or for anyone really, yet it is still very much true.

So, keeping it very simple, even though this is a deep and contested issue in philosophy, your example there is of the "correspondence theory of truth". Your statement is true under that theory if it corresponds to "objective" fact(s) in the world - in this case the fact that you are wearing black pants. This theory is rejected by pragmatism for various reasons which we can get into some more later if you want (related to whether the objective world is actually comprised of 'things' like "black pants" or rather functions/meanings in relation to agents with goals).

For now, we can just try to understand the "pragmatic theory of truth" and how it applies - a conceptual scheme is true under this theory if it is useful to achieve the goal one is aiming at. Here we are aiming at figuring out what can explain the existence of consciousness and its dynamics (that is generally what BK is trying to do). The hypothesis that we are living in a virtual simulation of some computational device gets us absolutely no more closer to resolving our question. We are no more closer to explaining the existence of consciousness. Therefore, the hypothesis is untrue.

@AshvinP thanks for clarifying. Based on this definition of truth, does it follow that explaining the existence of consciousness must be within our reach and anything that suggests that it might be out of our reach has to be false?

[AshvinP]

@Martin_
I get that this is the key but I don't get why truth and uselessness are the same thing. usefulness is very context related, as in a true fact might be useful in one context or for one person but not for another. If I tell you the true fact: "I wear black pants", it is not useful for you or for anyone really, yet it is still very much true.

So, keeping it very simple, even though this is a deep and contested issue in philosophy, your example there is of the "correspondence theory of truth". Your statement is true under that theory if it corresponds to "objective" fact(s) in the world - in this case the fact that you are wearing black pants. This theory is rejected by pragmatism for various reasons which we can get into some more later if you want (related to whether the objective world is actually comprised of 'things' like "black pants" or rather functions/meanings in relation to agents with goals).

For now, we can just try to understand the "pragmatic theory of truth" and how it applies - a conceptual scheme is true under this theory if it is useful to achieve the goal one is aiming at. Here we are aiming at figuring out what can explain the existence of consciousness and its dynamics (that is generally what BK is trying to do). The hypothesis that we are living in a virtual simulation of some computational device gets us absolutely no more closer to resolving our question. We are no more closer to explaining the existence of consciousness. Therefore, the hypothesis is untrue.

@AshvinP thanks for clarifying. Based on this definition of truth, does it follow that explaining the existence of consciousness must be within our reach and anything that suggests that it might be out of our reach has to be false?

I don't think that follows from the pragmatic definition of truth by itself. It is possible that some goals are completely out of reach. But I do think that the fact it is within our reach follows from our experience and reason. At least, it is within our reach to gain a much deeper understanding of our consciousness than we currently have.