Philosophical Speculations

isaac_hagoel wrote: ↑Tue Apr 27, 2021 5:22 am He then proceeds to ask whether there is a "meta meta computer" and concludes that "it would never end". I don't see why this reasoning holds either. I agree that it is possible that it is an "infinite regress" but it is also possible that it stops after n steps. It is even possible that n=1. Why would Bernardo think it must be an infinite regress?

isaac_hagoel wrote: ↑Tue Apr 27, 2021 5:22 am Hi everyone,
I watched this AMA with Bernardo. I have the utmost respect for Bernardo and his work but I struggle to make sense of some of his answers.
Specifically, he is asked about the simulation hypothesis (link should point to the correct timestamp):

1. He dismisses it (calls it "idiotic") based on its lack of usefulness - because we can't know the nature of the meta computer. Even if we agree (I'm not sure I do, but that's a whole other discussion) that it's indeed useless, how does it make it false? Can't it be useless for the beings experiencing the simulation and still true (like the brain in a vat concluding it is a brain in a vat but having nothing much to do about it)?
2. He then proceeds to ask whether there is a "meta meta computer" and concludes that "it would never end". I don't see why this reasoning holds either. I agree that it is possible that it is an "infinite regress" but it is also possible that it stops after n steps. It is even possible that n=1. Why would Bernardo think it must be an infinite regress?

Thank you very much,
Isaac

isaac_hagoel wrote: ↑Tue Apr 27, 2021 12:24 pm @electricshephard let's say we take it literally (i don't). If we assume we are base reality and Mario in Super Mario is a being within a simulation (one level below base) - he can explain his reality in terms of our computer program (if he could learn about it) and/or the electrical signals on the super Nintendo hardware. Why is that a problem?

Martin_ wrote: ↑Tue Apr 27, 2021 12:29 pm Because the nature of the computer program and the electrical signals still haven't been explained, and that's what we're after. We want to explain the base no matter how far away it is from our layer of reality

Eugene I wrote: ↑Tue Apr 27, 2021 12:40 pm

Martin_ wrote: ↑Tue Apr 27, 2021 12:29 pm Because the nature of the computer program and the electrical signals still haven't been explained, and that's what we're after. We want to explain the base no matter how far away it is from our layer of reality

That's right, but the simulation hypothesis helps to detach the base reality from the apparent reality and in doing so at least to detach the ontology from "naïve realism" (which states that the the reality that we perceive IS the ontologically base reality).

Simulation hypothesis can also be easily matched with idealism - the MAL ideation of the world can be a simulation running in his "computational" part of mind. This can explain the mathematical consistency in the behavior of the "material" objects that we perceive. It is hard to explain how MAL is "ideating" the appearance of the world driven by its blind "instincts" (according to the BK's model) and yet produces highly and meticulously mathematically structured appearances down to the elementary particles and quantum level. Such degree of mathematical structure requires a high computational power in the MAL's mind, which is the same as to say that MAL is running a "simulation" in his mind's "computer" (with the ontic base of the computer being consciousness).

AshvinP wrote: ↑Tue Apr 27, 2021 2:29 pm I have never heard simulation hypothesis invoked as another form of idealism, i.e. the base "computer" is fundamentally ideational activity. Rather it is always invoked in a materialist (or perhaps dualist) framework. Materialist frameworks, when considered non-naively, are all simulation hypotheses. They all posit mindless quantitative stuff giving rise to qualitative stuff that is nothing like the underlying stuff, and therefore the appearances are essentially virtual simulations, with as few or as many layers of stuff you want to shove in between the base and the appearances. So basically all of the idealist criticisms of materialism apply to simulation hypotheses as well. And the latter are useless under all circumstances, so they are pragmatically untrue.