Dismissal of the simulation hypothesis

[isaac_hagoel]

Hi everyone,
I watched this AMA with Bernardo. I have the utmost respect for Bernardo and his work but I struggle to make sense of some of his answers.
Specifically, he is asked about the simulation hypothesis (link should point to the correct timestamp):

1. He dismisses it (calls it "idiotic") based on its lack of usefulness - because we can't know the nature of the meta computer. Even if we agree (I'm not sure I do, but that's a whole other discussion) that it's indeed useless, how does it make it false? Can't it be useless for the beings experiencing the simulation and still true (like the brain in a vat concluding it is a brain in a vat but having nothing much to do about it)?
2. He then proceeds to ask whether there is a "meta meta computer" and concludes that "it would never end". I don't see why this reasoning holds either. I agree that it is possible that it is an "infinite regress" but it is also possible that it stops after n steps. It is even possible that n=1. Why would Bernardo think it must be an infinite regress?

Thank you very much,
Isaac

[electricshephard]

He then proceeds to ask whether there is a "meta meta computer" and concludes that "it would never end". I don't see why this reasoning holds either. I agree that it is possible that it is an "infinite regress" but it is also possible that it stops after n steps. It is even possible that n=1. Why would Bernardo think it must be an infinite regress?

That's not necessarily what he's saying.

The point of ontology is the pursuit of fundamental truth. That's the primary objective: The search for an ontological primitive.

There may be much potential for permutations of relative truth within duality (e.g a place where n=1) but that doesn't answer the question of the base.

[isaac_hagoel]

@electricshephard: not sure I follow. why is it not what he is saying? and why doesn't n=1 (if that's the case) answer the question of the base?

[electricshephard]

@isaac_hagoel

Apologies I may have misspoke in referencing n=1.

N=1 in an absolute sense is impossible within the context of a literal technological simulation, because the question remains what is the nature of the meta-computer? The reasons for why any meta-computer cannot be an ontological primitive are the same reasons at the very heart of metaphysical idealism.

I think that what Bernardo is drawing attention to is that many people take technological simulation theory as a literal truth in answer to an ontological question.

[isaac_hagoel]

@electricshephard let's say we take it literally (i don't). If we assume we are base reality and Mario in Super Mario is a being within a simulation (one level below base) - he can explain his reality in terms of our computer program (if he could learn about it) and/or the electrical signals on the super Nintendo hardware. Why is that a problem?

[Martin_]

Hi everyone,
I watched this AMA with Bernardo. I have the utmost respect for Bernardo and his work but I struggle to make sense of some of his answers.
Specifically, he is asked about the simulation hypothesis (link should point to the correct timestamp):

1. He dismisses it (calls it "idiotic") based on its lack of usefulness - because we can't know the nature of the meta computer. Even if we agree (I'm not sure I do, but that's a whole other discussion) that it's indeed useless, how does it make it false? Can't it be useless for the beings experiencing the simulation and still true (like the brain in a vat concluding it is a brain in a vat but having nothing much to do about it)?
2. He then proceeds to ask whether there is a "meta meta computer" and concludes that "it would never end". I don't see why this reasoning holds either. I agree that it is possible that it is an "infinite regress" but it is also possible that it stops after n steps. It is even possible that n=1. Why would Bernardo think it must be an infinite regress?

Thank you very much,
Isaac

Kastrup doesn't mean / say that simulation theory is false. He means that even if it were true, it wouldn't tell us anything about the true nature of the ultimate universe. So bringing simulation theory into an ontic discussion is pointless.

[Martin_]

@electricshephard let's say we take it literally (i don't). If we assume we are base reality and Mario in Super Mario is a being within a simulation (one level below base) - he can explain his reality in terms of our computer program (if he could learn about it) and/or the electrical signals on the super Nintendo hardware. Why is that a problem?

Because the nature of the computer program and the electrical signals still haven't been explained, and that's what we're after. We want to explain the base no matter how far away it is from our layer of reality

[Eugene I]

Because the nature of the computer program and the electrical signals still haven't been explained, and that's what we're after. We want to explain the base no matter how far away it is from our layer of reality

That's right, but the simulation hypothesis helps to detach the base reality from the apparent reality and in doing so at least to detach the ontology from "naïve realism" (which states that the the reality that we perceive IS the ontologically base reality).

Simulation hypothesis can also be easily matched with idealism - the MAL ideation of the world can be a simulation running in his "computational" part of mind. This can explain the mathematical consistency in the behavior of the "material" objects that we perceive. It is hard to explain how MAL is "ideating" the appearance of the world driven by its blind "instincts" (according to the BK's model) and yet produces highly and meticulously mathematically structured appearances down to the elementary particles and quantum level. Such degree of mathematical structure requires a high computational power in the MAL's mind, which is the same as to say that MAL is running a "simulation" in his mind's "computer" (with the ontic base of the computer being consciousness).

[AshvinP]

Because the nature of the computer program and the electrical signals still haven't been explained, and that's what we're after. We want to explain the base no matter how far away it is from our layer of reality

That's right, but the simulation hypothesis helps to detach the base reality from the apparent reality and in doing so at least to detach the ontology from "naïve realism" (which states that the the reality that we perceive IS the ontologically base reality).

Simulation hypothesis can also be easily matched with idealism - the MAL ideation of the world can be a simulation running in his "computational" part of mind. This can explain the mathematical consistency in the behavior of the "material" objects that we perceive. It is hard to explain how MAL is "ideating" the appearance of the world driven by its blind "instincts" (according to the BK's model) and yet produces highly and meticulously mathematically structured appearances down to the elementary particles and quantum level. Such degree of mathematical structure requires a high computational power in the MAL's mind, which is the same as to say that MAL is running a "simulation" in his mind's "computer" (with the ontic base of the computer being consciousness).

I have never heard simulation hypothesis invoked as another form of idealism, i.e. the base "computer" is fundamentally ideational activity. Rather it is always invoked in a materialist (or perhaps dualist) framework. Materialist frameworks, when considered non-naively, are all simulation hypotheses. They all posit mindless quantitative stuff giving rise to qualitative stuff that is nothing like the underlying stuff, and therefore the appearances are essentially virtual simulations, with as few or as many layers of stuff you want to shove in between the base and the appearances. So basically all of the idealist criticisms of materialism apply to simulation hypotheses as well. And the latter are useless under all circumstances, so they are pragmatically untrue.

[Eugene I]

I have never heard simulation hypothesis invoked as another form of idealism, i.e. the base "computer" is fundamentally ideational activity. Rather it is always invoked in a materialist (or perhaps dualist) framework. Materialist frameworks, when considered non-naively, are all simulation hypotheses. They all posit mindless quantitative stuff giving rise to qualitative stuff that is nothing like the underlying stuff, and therefore the appearances are essentially virtual simulations, with as few or as many layers of stuff you want to shove in between the base and the appearances. So basically all of the idealist criticisms of materialism apply to simulation hypotheses as well. And the latter are useless under all circumstances, so they are pragmatically untrue.

I think idealism has to incorporate computationalism. We know from our experience that our consciousness can easily do computations and math, so I do not see any inconsistency here and I do not see why can not we assume that MAL is doing computations in its mind to ideate the appearances of the world. And, we actually have to, because otherwise how else can you explain an amazing mathematical consistency of the appearances of the world? MAL ideating the world motivated by blind instincts with the appearances exactly following Schrodinger and Einstein equations? How would that happen?