Barfield, property and the evolution of consciousness

[JustinG]

I came across this blog article http://hipcrimevocab.com/2019/06/09/th ... -the-soul/ which connects Owen Barfield’s ideas on consciousness and the soul with those of Classics professor Richard Seaford, who argues for the influence of the development of monetization and property systems in the evolution of consciousness.

Much of the article is a partial transcript of this podcast episode with Seaford https://shwep.net/podcast/richard-seafo ... interview/. The article also includes excerpts from one of Scott Roberts’ essays on BK’s website.

By Way of background, Seaford’s latest book The Origins of Philosophy in Ancient Greece and Ancient India: A Historical Comparison https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B081HGKYBQ compares the development of philosophy in ancient India and Greece, and their correlation with the development of monetary and property systems.

Here are some comments on the article in the context of previous discussions on this forum regarding Barfield, the evolution of consciousness and related issues:

• BK writes that “Under idealism, the physical is simply the contents of perception, a particular type of phenomenality. As such, what we call ‘physical interference with the brain’ is the extrinsic appearance of phenomenality external to an alter that disrupts the inner experiences of the alter from across its dissociative boundary”.

• It follows from this that social practices - the way people act and interact with each other through the mediation of their sense organs - could affect the consciousness of an alter as much as the ingestion of food or psychedelics can.

• Thus, including socioeconomic factors in idealist explanations of the evolution of consciousness does not go against idealism any more than incorporating insights from the natural sciences does.

• Including such factors is also not necessarily incompatible with spiritual or religious accounts of the evolution of consciousness. Just as mystical or psychedelic experiences can be examined form an ‘inner’ experiential perspective as well as from an ‘outer’ neurophysiological perspective, so too can the evolution of consciousness be explored from an ‘inner’ experiential perspective and from an ‘outer’ anthropological and historical perspective.

[AshvinP]

It appears they misattributed Scott's guest essay on Barfield to BK! Needless to say, I agree. That is the topic I have been exploring in Metamorphoses of Spirit essays. I had never heard of Seaford before, so it will be interesting to explore his ideas. Thank you for bringing him to our attention.

The problem I see, however, is this:

Thus, including socioeconomic factors in idealist explanations of the evolution of consciousness does not go against idealism any more than incorporating insights from the natural sciences does.

There definitely cannot be a separation of socioeconomic factors from the metamorphic progression of Spirit. However, we must be consistent and say the metamorphoses cause the socioeconomic structures and not the other way around. It is also true that socioeconomic relations became a big factor in the spiritual activity of past ages, however we should also realize that what became a big factor during Axial age right through to the modern era has stopped having much of a role in the Spirit's continued progression. The individual person has now become the locus of spiritual activity.

[AshvinP]

By the way, Scott, not sure if you saw, but Owen Barfield's grandson commented on your Idealism v. Common Sense essay.

Monday, August 03, 2020 3:45:00 PM
"Thanks for mentioning Barfield, and for your good work."
Owen A. Barfield, Oxfordshire

[JustinG]

There definitely cannot be a separation of socioeconomic factors from the metamorphic progression of Spirit. However, we must be consistent and say the metamorphoses cause the socioeconomic structures and not the other way around.

I'm not sure if that is the right way of putting it. To use an analogy, a psychedelic experience can be investigated neurophysiologically or described phenomenologically, but the phenomenology does not 'cause' the neurophysiology. Rather the phenomenological description is an account of the first-person experience, whereas the neurophysiological description is a third-person description based on sense data impinging on the neurophysiologist's dissociative boundary. They are accounts from different perspectives.

[AshvinP]

There definitely cannot be a separation of socioeconomic factors from the metamorphic progression of Spirit. However, we must be consistent and say the metamorphoses cause the socioeconomic structures and not the other way around.

I'm not sure if that is the right way of putting it. To use an analogy, a psychedelic experience can be investigated neurophysiologically or described phenomenologically, but the phenomenology does not 'cause' the neurophysiology. Rather the phenomenological description is an account of the first-person experience, whereas the neurophysiological description is a third-person description based on sense data impinging on the neurophysiologist's dissociative boundary. They are accounts from different perspectives.

Interesting analogy. In Part II of the essays, I mention that we cannot philosophize from third-person perspective because it simply does not exist. If we do philosophize from the perspective, then we can only say we are making assumptions rather than drawing conclusions from the givens of our experience. So in my view, the phenomenological perspective of philosophy is the only valid one. Relevant points bolded below.

This final installment of the Metamorphoses of the Spirit essay will explore the spiritual implications which unfold from that one simple fact about our thinking activity (used interchangeably with "spiritual activity"). It is important to keep in mind that we are not seeking an "absolute" Reality which is external to the human perspective and the human way of knowing. Such an endeavor is simply a fool's errand. The human perspective may expand or contract, perhaps it will even encompass what we now call a 'non-human' perspective at another time, but we can never assume it is possible to know anything external to this perspective, whether we are engaged in philosophy, science, or both.
...
Schopenhauer can say, at best, that our willing plus our thinking is always experienced. Anything short of that is abstractly speculated from our thinking activity rather than being rooted in the givens of our experience. Schopenhauer cannot possibly claim universal Will exists without ideal content. To fully internalize the point I am making, we should remember that we can only philosophize from what we experience via our first-person perspective as human beings (as Kant understood), because we cannot know anything external to that perspective. Some would call that approach "solipsism" and I am not opposed to that characterization, except I would call it "healthy solipsism".

I am not claiming our limited ego is the only thing we can know exists, which is what I call "unhealthy solipsism". Rather, we are admitting in humility that all we logically derive from outside our first-person experience is an assumption which, whether actually true or untrue, we cannot verify empirically in any case. So, what can any person, including those who enter deep mystical states, claim to have experienced? It will become obvious that, no matter what we experience in the 'deprivation chamber', when any ideal content is expressed, either to ourselves internally or to others, we are already in the presence of thinking activity.

Also, if we are to proceed with the analogy anyway, I would claim the "neurophysiology" (socioeconomic relations) of psychedelic experience is an image of the underlying experience which is caused by the underlying experience (evolution of consciousness). That is the idealist interpretation.

[ScottRoberts]

By the way, Scott, not sure if you saw, but Owen Barfield's grandson commented on your Idealism v. Common Sense essay.

Monday, August 03, 2020 3:45:00 PM
"Thanks for mentioning Barfield, and for your good work."
Owen A. Barfield, Oxfordshire

I hadn't seen that. Thanks for noticing. Great essays, by the way. I wish I had tried something along those lines back when I first encountered PoF and StA. Might have saved me from some needed re-readings, as there's nothing like writing to make things sink in.

[AshvinP]

By the way, Scott, not sure if you saw, but Owen Barfield's grandson commented on your Idealism v. Common Sense essay.

Monday, August 03, 2020 3:45:00 PM
"Thanks for mentioning Barfield, and for your good work."
Owen A. Barfield, Oxfordshire

I hadn't seen that. Thanks for noticing. Great essays, by the way. I wish I had tried something along those lines back when I first encountered PoF and StA. Might have saved me from some needed re-readings, as there's nothing like writing to make things sink in.

Thanks! Yeah I definitely like that aspect of it, but I am sure I will still end up re-reading them if I keep writing metaphysical essays. Especially those two books cover just about all interesting metaphysical topics a person can think of today.

[JustinG]

There definitely cannot be a separation of socioeconomic factors from the metamorphic progression of Spirit. However, we must be consistent and say the metamorphoses cause the socioeconomic structures and not the other way around.

I'm not sure if that is the right way of putting it. To use an analogy, a psychedelic experience can be investigated neurophysiologically or described phenomenologically, but the phenomenology does not 'cause' the neurophysiology. Rather the phenomenological description is an account of the first-person experience, whereas the neurophysiological description is a third-person description based on sense data impinging on the neurophysiologist's dissociative boundary. They are accounts from different perspectives.

Interesting analogy. In Part II of the essays, I mention that we cannot philosophize from third-person perspective because it simply does not exist. If we do philosophize from the perspective, then we can only say we are making assumptions rather than drawing conclusions from the givens of our experience. So in my view, the phenomenological perspective of philosophy is the only valid one. Relevant points bolded below.

This final installment of the Metamorphoses of the Spirit essay will explore the spiritual implications which unfold from that one simple fact about our thinking activity (used interchangeably with "spiritual activity"). It is important to keep in mind that we are not seeking an "absolute" Reality which is external to the human perspective and the human way of knowing. Such an endeavor is simply a fool's errand. The human perspective may expand or contract, perhaps it will even encompass what we now call a 'non-human' perspective at another time, but we can never assume it is possible to know anything external to this perspective, whether we are engaged in philosophy, science, or both.
...
Schopenhauer can say, at best, that our willing plus our thinking is always experienced. Anything short of that is abstractly speculated from our thinking activity rather than being rooted in the givens of our experience. Schopenhauer cannot possibly claim universal Will exists without ideal content. To fully internalize the point I am making, we should remember that we can only philosophize from what we experience via our first-person perspective as human beings (as Kant understood), because we cannot know anything external to that perspective. Some would call that approach "solipsism" and I am not opposed to that characterization, except I would call it "healthy solipsism".

I am not claiming our limited ego is the only thing we can know exists, which is what I call "unhealthy solipsism". Rather, we are admitting in humility that all we logically derive from outside our first-person experience is an assumption which, whether actually true or untrue, we cannot verify empirically in any case. So, what can any person, including those who enter deep mystical states, claim to have experienced? It will become obvious that, no matter what we experience in the 'deprivation chamber', when any ideal content is expressed, either to ourselves internally or to others, we are already in the presence of thinking activity.

Also, if we are to proceed with the analogy anyway, I would claim the "neurophysiology" (socioeconomic relations) of psychedelic experience is an image of the underlying experience which is caused by the underlying experience (evolution of consciousness). That is the idealist interpretation.

Still, even if it is not classified as philosophy, speaking in terms of physical causation can be a useful shorthand way of describing the impact of the extrinsic appearance of phenomenality on alters.

[findingblanks]

"...then we can only say we are making assumptions rather than drawing conclusions from the givens of our experience."

I agree with much of what you said, but I feel I must stress that the 'givens of our experience' are already shaped in many ways by our own (and collectively drawn) conclusions.

I'm not trying to nitpick.

[AshvinP]

"...then we can only say we are making assumptions rather than drawing conclusions from the givens of our experience."

I agree with much of what you said, but I feel I must stress that the 'givens of our experience' are already shaped in many ways by our own (and collectively drawn) conclusions.

I'm not trying to nitpick.

They are, but we have the unique capacity to discover and reflect on the way those underlying factors are influencing us and thereby bring them into alignment with our willing, feeling, and thinking. Some would say that is impossible, i.e. those who follow Kant's epistemology, but that is flawed and there is no fundamental limit to what we can perceive or know about the noumenal realm.