Consciousness: Intention and Purpose

[Eugene I]

1. The ideal content of the "flower" and the number "2" are the same for you and I. (if we perceived thought-forms as the ancients did, this would be much more clear to us) - do you believe this is ruled out by subject combo problem?

Yes, we are free to believe whatever we want, but the structure of Reality does not much care for our personal beliefs. And I think it's telling that this 3rd option does not even occur to most people after Cartesian-Kantian divides, while it would likely be the norm before the divides (to the extent people before that could abstractly think about these things).

The ideal content is not the same as a subjective qualitative experience of it. We can both think of the same idea of number 2, but each of us will have a unique subjective experience of it. Same with the blueness of the sky - we can both look at the same sky and experience the sensation of blueness. The sensation will be of the same kind of blueness, but the subjective experience of it will be unique to each of us.

[AshvinP]

1. The ideal content of the "flower" and the number "2" are the same for you and I. (if we perceived thought-forms as the ancients did, this would be much more clear to us) - do you believe this is ruled out by subject combo problem?

Yes, we are free to believe whatever we want, but the structure of Reality does not much care for our personal beliefs. And I think it's telling that this 3rd option does not even occur to most people after Cartesian-Kantian divides, while it would likely be the norm before the divides (to the extent people before that could abstractly think about these things).

The ideal content is not the same as a subjective qualitative experience of it. We can both think of the same idea of number 2, but each of us will have a unique subjective experience of it. Same with the blueness of the sky - we can both look at the same sky and experience the sensation of blueness. The sensation will be of the same kind of blueness, but the subjective experience of it will be unique to each of us.

I disagree for the usual reasons. The qualia of ideal content is truly shared. That is why Thinking provides a genuinely reliable anchor from which we can investigate noumenal relations. Otherwise we would simply be investigating our own phenomenal experience of qualia independent of all others. In fact, there is no warrant to say those others even exist if we do not share ideal content. Then their apparent consciousness and selfhood is nothing more than my own personal qualitative experience of them.