Why the Universe Cannot Have Arisen by Chance

[AshvinP]

What other schemes and hypotheses account for non-randomness of the world that we can know?

I gave some variants in my first post.

Anything we cannot possibly know should be considered non-existent to the consistently logical mind.

No it should not, but it may be considered non-existent if we apply the parsimony principle. The parsimony principle can not be used as a means to prove nonexistence of anything. It is only an argument, not a proof. And be careful with it, because, in the human form, we cannot possibly know anything beyond our individual field of human mind conscious experience, and we can not even possibly know if other human minds exist, we can only assume that they exist. So if we would directly and non-compromisingly apply your statement, we would immediately end up in solipsism.

You seem to be ignoring my repeated attempts to highlight the word "know". The consistently logical mind understands that nothing exists which remains forever beyond its experience. That is indeed the "healthy solipsism" I discussed in Part III(B) of Transfiguring our Thinking. Only the mere intellect takes isolated hypotheticals which cannot be derived from experience and treats them as plausible explanations - that is what you are doing. To use one of your favorite words, you are living in pure "fantasy" with such hypotheticals. Parsimony principle only applies to explanations which can be derived from experience, not explanations which are forever beyond the realm of experience. The latter must be discarded from consideration immediately if we are actually interested in logical analysis.

[Eugene I]

The consistently logical mind understands that nothing exists which remains forever beyond its experience.

Modern mathematics discovered a large variety of different possible logical systems, but this is the weirdest one I've ever seen.

[Jim Cross]

It is my sense you guys are completely missing what Robert is pointing to. We are speaking of what we can know as humans experiencing the world. We cannot know about "existence as a whole" as some third-party spectator viewing from above, neither can we know about infinite multiverses which exist parallel to our Universe, or in any case cannot be perceived. Those demands for explanation lack any practical significance for any meaningful question we may ask. Robert is asking whether our experience of the world can be characterized as "random" in any meaningful way, and his conclusion, as mine would be too, is that it cannot be characterized in that way.

Robert wrote this:

The universe either had a beginning, or it did not.

If it did not have a beginning, then it has always existed.
If it did have a beginning, then it arose from nothing.

So it sure seems he is talking about existence as whole as some third-party spectator.

[AshvinP]

The consistently logical mind understands that nothing exists which remains forever beyond its experience.

Modern mathematics discovered a large variety of different possible logical systems, but this is the weirdest one I've ever seen.

It follows directly from the nature of Logic (from Greek Logos). Put very simply, there is no Logic in the absence of percepts and concepts to which that Logic applies. If something remains forever beyond experience, then, by definition, it has no associated percepts-concepts. Logic belongs to the domain of experience. Now I just so happen to think that nothing lays beyond the possibility of experience, or at least I have no good reason to assume that something does. But, practically, if we use logic when thinking these things through, we will see why anything which happens to lay beyond the possibility of experience is not real in any meaningful sense of that word (even for the educated materialist). Most formulations of "infinite multiverses", i.e. the ones which try to maintain "randomness" by employing that "infinity", necessarily entail all other multiverses lay beyond the possibility of our experience. I would say the same thing goes for a "God" who remains 'outside' of the Universe while he creates and sustains it.

[AshvinP]

It is my sense you guys are completely missing what Robert is pointing to. We are speaking of what we can know as humans experiencing the world. We cannot know about "existence as a whole" as some third-party spectator viewing from above, neither can we know about infinite multiverses which exist parallel to our Universe, or in any case cannot be perceived. Those demands for explanation lack any practical significance for any meaningful question we may ask. Robert is asking whether our experience of the world can be characterized as "random" in any meaningful way, and his conclusion, as mine would be too, is that it cannot be characterized in that way.

Robert wrote this:

The universe either had a beginning, or it did not.

If it did not have a beginning, then it has always existed.
If it did have a beginning, then it arose from nothing.

So it sure seems he is talking about existence as whole as some third-party spectator.

Maybe he was, I don't know. But my point in general is that we cannot employ the "third-party spectator" view to either derive or challenge any philosophical argument. That is something Kant got right before proceeding to do the thing he had just ruled out to derive his epistemology.

[Robert Arvay]

Jim Cross wrote:

So you have fooled yourself into believing in design.

Merely argumentative, without basis.
Have you fooled yourself into believing that I have fooled myself?

This seems no way to have a mutually respectful conversation.
Perhaps that is by design?
.
.

[Eugene I]

It follows directly from the nature of Logic (from Greek Logos). Put very simply, there is no Logic in the absence of percepts and concepts to which that Logic applies. If something remains forever beyond experience, then, by definition, it has no associated percepts-concepts. Logic belongs to the domain of experience. Now I just so happen to think that nothing lays beyond the possibility of experience, or at least I have no good reason to assume that something does. But, practically, if we use logic when thinking these things through, we will see why anything which happens to lay beyond the possibility of experience is not real in any meaningful sense of that word (even for the educated materialist). Most formulations of "infinite multiverses", i.e. the ones which try to maintain "randomness" by employing that "infinity", necessarily entail all other multiverses lay beyond the possibility of our experience. I would say the same thing goes for a "God" who remains 'outside' of the Universe while he creates and sustains it.

That is a very flawed argument.

First, if you have had so far no access to experience of "something", that does not mean that it will remain "forever" beyond your experience. May be at some point in time you will have access to experience it. That happened many times in science when scientists predicted something that have never been experienced before, and later it was experimentally discovered. We may be able to find ways to experimentally prove the existence of other universes in the future. So, you can not use the "forever" arguments to prove that logic does not apply to "something" that is currently beyond your experience.

Second, if there is a reality beyond the access of your experience, it does not care if you can or can not experience it. If a deep ocean fish can never forever experience the forest on the ground, that does not mean that the forest does not exist. The forest exists regardless if the fish can or can not experience it.

Third, by applying your own argument, in your current human form you have no access to experience of anything beyond your own private conscious experiences, which means that you don't know if conscious experiences of other people even exist. Based on that, according to your argument, you cannot even apply logic to communicate with other people. So, this argument will corner you into complete one-person aka-Hume solipsism.

[AshvinP]

It follows directly from the nature of Logic (from Greek Logos). Put very simply, there is no Logic in the absence of percepts and concepts to which that Logic applies. If something remains forever beyond experience, then, by definition, it has no associated percepts-concepts. Logic belongs to the domain of experience. Now I just so happen to think that nothing lays beyond the possibility of experience, or at least I have no good reason to assume that something does. But, practically, if we use logic when thinking these things through, we will see why anything which happens to lay beyond the possibility of experience is not real in any meaningful sense of that word (even for the educated materialist). Most formulations of "infinite multiverses", i.e. the ones which try to maintain "randomness" by employing that "infinity", necessarily entail all other multiverses lay beyond the possibility of our experience. I would say the same thing goes for a "God" who remains 'outside' of the Universe while he creates and sustains it.

That is a very flawed argument.

First, if you have had so far no access to experience of "something", that does not mean that it will remain "forever" beyond your experience. May be at some point in time you will have access to experience it. That happened many times in science when scientists predicted something that have never been experienced before, and later it was experimentally discovered. We may be able to find ways to experimentally prove the existence of other universes in the future. So, you can not use the "forever" arguments to prove that logic does not apply to "something" that is currently beyond your experience.

We could argue over whether scientists experience something new or discover ideal relations which can now explain the experiences they were always having... but that is not necessary to my argument. I never claimed these things will remain forever beyond our experience, in fact I stated that I think most if not everything which exists will be encompassed by our experience at a later time. However, there are certain intellectual concepts which, by their very definition, place them forever beyond our experience. One such concept is the "wholly ineffable transcendent Deity". Another such concept, according to my understanding, is the "infinite [random] multiverses". If there was any possibility of another randomly generated multiverse of the infinite multiverses overlapping into our own, then it would actually happen and we would no longer be in an ordered universe.

Second, if there is a reality beyond the access of your experience, it does not care if you can or can not experience it. If a deep ocean fish can never forever experience the forest on the ground, that does not mean that the forest does not exist. The forest exists regardless if the fish can or can not experience it.

Third, by applying your own argument, in your current human form you have no access to experience of anything beyond your own private conscious experiences, which means that you don't know if conscious experiences of other people even exist. Based on that, according to your argument, you cannot even apply logic to communicate with other people. So, this argument will corner you into complete one-person aka-Hume solipsism.

The second point you make is again the third-party spectator argument which is, ironically, tied up with the "local realism" concept that materialists cling onto despite QM experiments. There is no warrant for us to assume such a perspective exists, i.e. the "it" which "does not care if you can experience it or not". You are compartmentalizing the Universe into objects and then further assuming some objects exist independently of any experience of those objects. It is the exact same fundamental mistake materialists make.

Your third point is somewhat valid - if we take the idealist monism framework fully seriously (no, I do not mean "without humor", but that we follow its logic all the way through), then we are all differentiated perspectives of the Same Unified Consciousness. That is, in a sense, solipsism. But, as I stated before, we can distinguish between "healthy" and "unhealthy" solipsism. The latter takes my current limited ego as the only reality I can experience and know, while the former takes the entirety of our shared Consciousness as what can be experienced and known. The only alternative is the Flat MAL model that treats everyone as personal bubbles of consciousness (Kantian bad habit) and thereby undermines the entire foundation of idealist monism.

[Eugene I]

We could argue over whether scientists experience something new or discover ideal relations which can now explain the experiences they were always having... but that is not necessary to my argument. I never claimed these things will remain forever beyond our experience, in fact I stated that I think most if not everything which exists will be encompassed by our experience at a later time. However, there are certain intellectual concepts which, by their very definition, place them forever beyond our experience. One such concept is the "wholly ineffable transcendent Deity". Another such concept, according to my understanding, is the "infinite [random] multiverses". If there was any possibility of another randomly generated multiverse of the infinite multiverses overlapping into our own, then it would actually happen and we would no longer be in an ordered universe.

Agreed that the infinitude of universes may be forever beyond our experience, because an experience of infinite is inconceivable in our human state of consciousness . But the same argument applies to your earlier hypothesis that the MAL can experience the actual infinity of all possible ideas. Such possibility is also inconceivable for us in our human state of consciousness.

The second point you make is again the third-party spectator argument which is, ironically, tied up with the "local realism" concept that materialists cling onto despite QM experiments. There is no warrant for us to assume such a perspective exists, i.e. the "it" which "does not care if you can experience it or not". You are compartmentalizing the Universe into objects and then further assuming some objects exist independently of any experience of those objects. It is the exact same fundamental mistake materialists make.

No, it has nothing to do with third-party spectator argument, because in the case of the forest there is a first-person experience of the forest - it is your own experience, because you can actually first-person experience the forest. But the fish never can.

Similarly, if there are living creatures in some of the universes different from ours, and even if we can never experience that other universe, those creatures still can in their first-person experience. It's like them saying "there are creatures calling themselves "humans" living in another universe who are convinced that our universe can not not exists just because they can never experience it. But nevertheless, we can still experience it, so it does exist, which proves them wrong"

Your third point is somewhat valid - if we take the idealist monism framework fully seriously (no, I do not mean "without humor", but that we follow its logic all the way through), then we are all differentiated perspectives of the Same Unified Consciousness. That is, in a sense, solipsism. But, as I stated before, we can distinguish between "healthy" and "unhealthy" solipsism. The latter takes my current limited ego as the only reality I can experience and know, while the former takes the entirety of our shared Consciousness as what can be experienced and known. The only alternative is the Flat MAL model that treats everyone as personal bubbles of consciousness (Kantian bad habit) and thereby undermines the entire foundation of idealist monism.

But you do not know at your current state if you will ever be able to experience the "shared Consciousness" and if such thing even exist at all. It is only a hypothesis for us humans at this point in time, even though it is metaphysically sound hypothesis. However, if you apply your argument, you cannot assume even that hypothesis, because such "shared Consciousness" is beyond your human experience. So, you end up in a "bad" solipsism.

[AshvinP]

We could argue over whether scientists experience something new or discover ideal relations which can now explain the experiences they were always having... but that is not necessary to my argument. I never claimed these things will remain forever beyond our experience, in fact I stated that I think most if not everything which exists will be encompassed by our experience at a later time. However, there are certain intellectual concepts which, by their very definition, place them forever beyond our experience. One such concept is the "wholly ineffable transcendent Deity". Another such concept, according to my understanding, is the "infinite [random] multiverses". If there was any possibility of another randomly generated multiverse of the infinite multiverses overlapping into our own, then it would actually happen and we would no longer be in an ordered universe.

Agreed that the infinitude of universes may be forever beyond our experience, because an experience of infinite is inconceivable in our human state of consciousness . But the same argument applies to your earlier hypothesis that the MAL can experience the actual infinity of all possible ideas. Such possibility is also inconceivable for us in our human state of consciousness.

It is not the same argument. The reason is not because "experience of infinite is inconceivable". It is because the meaning inherent in "infinite random multiverses" automatically rules it out from potential experience. We should just write it as, "infinite random multiverses [which cannot ever be experienced]" because that last bolded meaning of the concept is implied by the first part of the concept. This is sort of a practical illustration of why denial of (or only lip service to) Thinking-Thoughts as fundamental leads us astray. These simple observations are completely missed by the intellect which devalues Thinking.

The second point you make is again the third-party spectator argument which is, ironically, tied up with the "local realism" concept that materialists cling onto despite QM experiments. There is no warrant for us to assume such a perspective exists, i.e. the "it" which "does not care if you can experience it or not". You are compartmentalizing the Universe into objects and then further assuming some objects exist independently of any experience of those objects. It is the exact same fundamental mistake materialists make.

No, it has nothing to do with third-party spectator argument, because in the case of the forest there is a first-person experience of the forest - it is your own experience, because you can actually first-person experience the forest. But the fish never can.

Similarly, if there are living creatures in some of the universes different from ours, and even if we can never experience that other universe, those creatures still can in their first-person experience. It's like them saying "there are creatures calling themselves "humans" living in another universe who are convinced that our universe can not not exists just because they can never experience it. But nevertheless, we can still experience it, so it does exist, which proves them wrong"

You are using fish-to-forest analogy as support for human-to-unknowable realm argument. We are the "fish" who cannot experience the "forest" (unknowable realm), and, according to your argument, that is sufficient to establish there is logical warrant for unknowable realms for the human perspective. I am responding that the very fact you are using this analogy is implicating the third-party spectator perspective argument. A materialist would use the same analogy as support for the proposition there can exist trees in a forest if no conscious agent existed to perceive them.

The second example you give is even more explicitly 3rd person spectator argument. Instead of "3rd person" you are substituting in hypothetical alien race to make your argument. Again, I would say your failure to pick up on this links back to devaluing of Thinking. I am not just saying that to hammer my own Western perspective home - I genuinely believe that is at the root here.

Your third point is somewhat valid - if we take the idealist monism framework fully seriously (no, I do not mean "without humor", but that we follow its logic all the way through), then we are all differentiated perspectives of the Same Unified Consciousness. That is, in a sense, solipsism. But, as I stated before, we can distinguish between "healthy" and "unhealthy" solipsism. The latter takes my current limited ego as the only reality I can experience and know, while the former takes the entirety of our shared Consciousness as what can be experienced and known. The only alternative is the Flat MAL model that treats everyone as personal bubbles of consciousness (Kantian bad habit) and thereby undermines the entire foundation of idealist monism.

But you do not know at your current state if you will ever be able to experience the "shared Consciousness" and if such thing even exist at all. It is only a hypothesis for us humans at this point in time, even though it is metaphysically sound hypothesis. However, if you apply your argument, you cannot assume even that hypothesis, because such "shared Consciousness" is beyond your human experience. So, you end up in a "bad" solipsism.

It is not mere hypothesis or assumption. There is plenty of empirical evidence, from capacity of communicating intelligibly to that of genuine empathy and moral disgust at certain behavior. Only in the modern era of extreme nominalism, i.e. hard separation of perception from feeling and thinking, does the burden of proof-persuasion reverse to people like me to prove that those experiences mean shared Consciousness instead of your burden to show why that does not mean shared Consciousness.