AshvinP wrote: ↑Tue Aug 17, 2021 1:04 pm
Jim Cross wrote: ↑Tue Aug 17, 2021 10:49 am
Eugene I wrote: ↑Mon Aug 16, 2021 11:59 pm
PS: By the way, for such metaphysically agnostic physics, in addition to the relief from the "hard problem", there would also be no QM paradoxes whatsoever. The QM paradoxes only arise in the metaphysically-biased version of QM based on the ontological hypothesis of the existence and ontological primacy of matter.
But Jim, I get your position: you are trying to define a sort of half-way-metaphysically-biased science based on two claims:
- the existence and ontological primacy of matter is claimed and included in the set of the basic scientific axioms
- but the question of the metaphysical status of consciousness is avoided, any relevant claims are not included in the set of the scientific axioms and the entire question is left for philosophers
In such case you would also have to drop the physicalist claim that consciousness is an emergent epiphenomenon of matter. But in addition to that, I still think it's cheating to commit to one metaphysical assumption and to avoid addressing another one which is immediately related to the first one. In other words what such version of materialistic science claims is:
- The hypothesis that matter and only matter is ontologically fundamental is claimed, even though the existence of matter is scientifically unverifiable hypothesis.
- The existence of consciousness is not a hypothesis but an obvious experimental fact, yet such science claims that consciousness is not ontologically fundamental, but at the same time avoids addressing the obvious logical question: "if consciousness exists but not fundamental according to the claims of such science, then how does it arise from matter that is claimed to be fundamental?", leaving such question for philosophers. To me it simply sounds like "we just don't want to answer this question just because we can't, even though it logically derives from our assumptions and the known experimental facts".
Eugene,
Sometimes you seem to grasp what I saying then other times not so much.
You don't seem to be able to let go of the metaphysics. Of course, any individual scientist can have any metaphysics they want. Many are materialists. But whatever metaphysics is irrelevant to the product or the method.
Mind and matter are abstractions not reality.
Why do you keep repeating the above when I stated clearly Goethe's method AND product differed from Newtons when studying the color spectrum? That is directly connected to their metaphysical assumptions (some basic metaphysical assumption is unavoidable, as Eugene already pointed out). Even if you don't agree Goethe reached a more valid result, you cannot deny the clear documented facts of modern scientific history. The only reason can be ideological commitment to denying idealism any practical significance.
For a concrete example, here is an excerpt from the preface of Goethe's
Theory of Colours. Anyone can see in it how vastly different his general scientific approach was from materialists-dualists of his day and present day. And his scientific conclusions were vastly different as a result.
Goethe wrote:And thus as we descend the scale of being, Nature speaks to other senses—to known, misunderstood, and unknown senses: so speaks she with herself and to us in a thousand modes. To the attentive observer she is nowhere dead nor silent; she has even a secret agent in inflexible matter, in a metal, the smallest portions of which tell us what is passing in the entire mass. However manifold, complicated, and unintelligible this language may often seem to us, yet its elements remain ever the same. With light poise and counterpoise, Nature oscillates within her prescribed limits, yet thus arise all the varieties and conditions of the phenomena which are presented to us in space and time.
Infinitely various are the means by which we become acquainted with these general movements and tendencies: now as a simple repulsion and attraction, now as an upsparkling and vanishing light, as undulation in the air, as commotion in matter, as oxydation and de-oxydation; but always, uniting or separating, the great purpose is found to be to excite and promote existence in some form or other.
The observers of nature finding, however, that this poise and counterpoise are respectively unequal in effect, have endeavoured to represent such a relation in terms. They have everywhere remarked and spoken of a greater and lesser principle, an action and resistance, a doing and suffering, an advancing and retiring, a violent and moderating power; and thus a symbolical language has arisen, which, from its close analogy, may be employed as equivalent to a direct and appropriate terminology.
To apply these designations, this language of Nature to the subject we have undertaken: to enrich and amplify this language by means of the theory of colours and the variety of their phenomena, and thus facilitate the communication of higher theoretical views, was the principal aim of the present treatise.
...
In the second part[1] we examine the Newtonian theory; a theory which by its ascendancy and consideration has hitherto impeded a free inquiry into the phenomena of colours. We combat that hypothesis, for although it is no longer found available, it still retains a traditional authority in the world. Its real relations to its subject will require to be plainly pointed out; the old errors must be cleared away, if the theory of colours is not still to remain in the rear of so many other better investigated departments of natural science. Since, however, this second part of our work may appear somewhat dry as regards its matter, and perhaps too vehement and excited in its manner, we may here be permitted to introduce a sort of allegory in a lighter style, as a prelude to that graver portion, and as some excuse for the earnestness alluded to.
We compare the Newtonian theory of colours to an old castle, which was at first constructed by its architect with youthful precipitation; it was, however, gradually enlarged and equipped by him according to the exigencies of time and circumstances, and moreover was still further fortified and secured in consequence of feuds and hostile demonstrations.
The same system was pursued by his successors and heirs: their increased wants within, the harassing vigilance of their opponents without, and various accidents compelled them in some places to build near, in others in connexion with the fabric, and thus to extend the original plan.
