John Horgan defends not knowing

[AshvinP]

Ashvin,

I'm not finding a lot in Goethe's theory of colors that really jumps out at me as being that different from other science from 200 years ago. It got some things right and some things wrong. I also am not seeing how it arisies in any direct way from an idealistic premise. Some of it seems actually physicalist. Goethe seems to think of colors as real things in themselves. Even your own quote seems to talk about nature as something we observe and interact with. For example, take this part of your quote:

Nature speaks to other senses—to known, misunderstood, and unknown senses: so speaks she with herself and to us in a thousand modes. To the attentive observer she is nowhere dead nor silent; she has even a secret agent in inflexible matter, in a metal, the smallest portions of which tell us what is passing in the entire mass. However manifold, complicated, and unintelligible this language may often seem to us, yet its elements remain ever the same. With light poise and counterpoise, Nature oscillates within her prescribed limits, yet thus arise all the varieties and conditions of the phenomena which are presented to us in space and time.

Sure this is poetic but, aside from that, it seems to be about finding the regularity in the nature that is what science is all about.

But I'm certainly not an expert on Goethe. Do you have any better examples, something maybe in the last two hundred years?

Jim - this is not about whether Goethe's scientific conclusions were correct. From what you have read, you can tell that his approach and conclusions are radically different from standard scientific view, right? If you have only read my quote, then I will need to provide more. My quote was just to show how Goethe wanted to tear down the "castle" of Newton's color theory which is still today the standard view. Clearly no one, idealist or materialist, denies the importance of studying Nature in science.

If you want me to provide quotes showing Goethe was more inclined to idealism than physicalism, then I can do that, but actually that is not important. What is important is that he was a phenomenologist (note: I have not come across any phenomenologist who was not also an idealist), and that is how I believe science should be approached. It is a radically different approach than Bacon's inductive scientific method, which nearly all modern scientists, especially physicalists, hold to.

[Eugene I]

Do you have any better examples, something maybe in the last two hundred years?

Don Hoffman's mathematical theory of interacting conscious agents is a good example of idealist science.

Conscious agent networks: Formal analysis and application to cognition
Objects of consciousness
The Origin of Time In Conscious Agents

[AshvinP]

Do you have any better examples, something maybe in the last two hundred years?

Don Hoffman's mathematical theory of interacting conscious agents is a good example of idealist science.

Conscious agent networks: Formal analysis and application to cognition
Objects of consciousness
The Origin of Time In Conscious Agents

Yes this is also a good example. Just to clarify, the reason I point to Goethe is because he was back in the very early stages of modern science. It highlights how those sciences would have developed completely differently for hundreds of years if his phenomenological approach had become the most dominant one. But I am sure there are other more recent (or perhaps even earlier) examples. David Bohm also seems like a good candidate, or even Carl Jung for that matter. Fortunately, I think their approaches are not altogether lost and will return quite soon, while the materialist approach has used up all it's credit within the applied sciences and is running on borrowed time.

[Jim Cross]

Do you have any better examples, something maybe in the last two hundred years?

Don Hoffman's mathematical theory of interacting conscious agents is a good example of idealist science.

Conscious agent networks: Formal analysis and application to cognition
Objects of consciousness
The Origin of Time In Conscious Agents

We could get into an entirely new debate over Hoffman but I thought Hoffman himself has said he isn't an idealist.

A quick search of those links only finds the words "idealism" or "idealist" in a reference to a work written by another author.

[Soul_of_Shu]

We could get into an entirely new debate over Hoffman but I thought Hoffman himself has said he isn't an idealist.

Hoffman calls his theory 'conscious realism', and posits that there are conscious agents 'all the way down', which I take to mean that conscious agents are not reducible to non-conscious processes. However, whereas BK posits that only metabolizing lifeforms are phenomenally representative of conscious agents, DH does not seem to draw that line. No doubt there are other points they might differ on. Nonetheless, they also seem to resonate on many points, e.g. they share the same 'dashboard' metaphor, which BK may actually have borrowed from DH. Also DH has contributed to the Essentia endeavour, so clearly he has some affinity for its mission to offer counter-materialist positions. So whether or not it's called idealism, it is surely a close relative.

[Jim Cross]

We could get into an entirely new debate over Hoffman but I thought Hoffman himself has said he isn't an idealist.

Hoffman calls his theory 'conscious realism', and posits that there are conscious agents 'all the way down', which I take to mean that conscious agents are not reducible to non-conscious processes. However, whereas BK posits that only metabolizing lifeforms are phenomenally representative of conscious agents, DH does not seem to draw that line. No doubt there are other points they might differ on. Nonetheless, they also seem to resonate on many points, e.g. they share the same 'dashboard' metaphor, which BK may actually have borrowed from DH. Also DH has contributed to the Essentia endeavour, so clearly he has some affinity for its mission to offer counter-materialist positions. So whether or not it's called idealism, it is surely a close relative.

Okay. Looking at it again, I think the most reasonable interpretation of Hoffman is that he is an idealist, although Tam Hunt makes a good argument that his position could be taken as panpsychist.

Interestingly, Hoffman’s ideas can be interpreted as either idealism (and thus strongly critiqued per my arguments above) or as a type of panpsychism, as is made clear by this statement from the same interview quoted above: “I call [my view] conscious realism: Objective reality is just conscious agents, just points of view. … It’s conscious agents all the way down.” This perspective makes sense: reality is nothing but a vast web of nested conscious agents, but this reality includes all of the constituents of reality from the smallest kinds of entities like electrons and atoms, up to the largest structures we observe in the universe.

https://tamhunt.medium.com/debunking-i ... e9e25766f9

Still looking at his conscious agent theory, I have yet to understand what it predicts or offers beyond the conventional view of space-time as independent of consciousness. So as this just an example that makes my point. That starting with either premise, materialist or idealist, leads to the same place. I'm not seeing something spring out from Hoffman's theory that isn't predicted by conventional physics. As a matter of fact, Hoffman seems to be intent on demonstrating that the same physics arises from his theory as comes from conventional theory.

Also, there has always been a inherent contradiction built into Hoffman's theory of perception. If our perceptions are tuned by evolution for survival not veridicality, then how did our perceptions arise in the first place? Evolution, hence our perceptions, requires time but Hoffman's theory is that space-time arises from our perception. Tam Hunt sees a similar problem.

But under this interpretation, it is still entirely unreasonable to suggest, as Hofmann does in fact suggest in his 2014 paper, that time itself is created by conscious agents. That is again putting the cart before the horse. Consciousness requires consciousness of something. In the case of human consciousness, it’s all the perceptions, memories, worries, etc. that occupy our conscious minds. Consciousness of is by necessity a process in time. Accordingly, any conscious agents must, to be conscious, exist in time. Therefore, conscious agents cannot be the origin of time.

[Eugene I]

Still looking at his conscious agent theory, I have yet to understand what it predicts or offers beyond the conventional view of space-time as independent of consciousness. So as this just an example that makes my point. That starting with either premise, materialist or idealist, leads to the same place. I'm not seeing something spring out from Hoffman's theory that isn't predicted by conventional physics. As a matter of fact, Hoffman seems to be intent on demonstrating that the same physics arises from his theory as comes from conventional theory.

Yes, they both lead to the same place: to the explanatory model of the phenomenal world. However, if the idealistic model proves to be successful, it would be more "clean" from the stumbling blocks of the materialistic models such as the "hard problem of consciousness" and QM paradoxes. And in addition, from philosophical point of view, as BK argues, it is more parsimonious and elegant so to speak.

Also, there has always been a inherent contradiction built into Hoffman's theory of perception. If our perceptions are tuned by evolution for survival not veridicality, then how did our perceptions arise in the first place? Evolution, hence our perceptions, requires time but Hoffman's theory is that space-time arises from our perception. Tam Hunt sees a similar problem.

But under this interpretation, it is still entirely unreasonable to suggest, as Hofmann does in fact suggest in his 2014 paper, that time itself is created by conscious agents. That is again putting the cart before the horse. Consciousness requires consciousness of something. In the case of human consciousness, it’s all the perceptions, memories, worries, etc. that occupy our conscious minds. Consciousness of is by necessity a process in time. Accordingly, any conscious agents must, to be conscious, exist in time. Therefore, conscious agents cannot be the origin of time.

That is a valid point. In fact the Hoffman's model does include an iterative progression of events, there is definitely a dimension of "time" in his model. But what he is saying is that this "base"/fundamental time is not necessarily the same "time" that we humans experience through our interpretative "goggles".

[Soul_of_Shu]

Still looking at his conscious agent theory, I have yet to understand what it predicts or offers beyond the conventional view of space-time as independent of consciousness. So as this just an example that makes my point. That starting with either premise, materialist or idealist, leads to the same place. I'm not seeing something spring out from Hoffman's theory that isn't predicted by conventional physics. As a matter of fact, Hoffman seems to be intent on demonstrating that the same physics arises from his theory as comes from conventional theory.

Also, there has always been a inherent contradiction built into Hoffman's theory of perception. If our perceptions are tuned by evolution for survival not veridicality, then how did our perceptions arise in the first place? Evolution, hence our perceptions, requires time but Hoffman's theory is that space-time arises from our perception. Tam Hunt sees a similar problem.

Again, panpsychism as defined in the broadest sense just means that consciousness is omnipresent, so in that broad sense, some version of panpsychism could be likened to idealism, if it recognizes the phenomenal cosmos as idea construction. To be honest, some of Hoffman's ideas also leave me somewhat perplexed, and in need of further explication. But then so do some of BK's ideas. In any case, the whole point is that idealism is not incompatible with what QM predicts. However, where it departs from physics under materialism is that consciousness is inextricable from the processes of QM, which has implications in terms of how our mentation influences outcomes, and thus potentially greater power of explanation with respect to what materialism currently does not explain.

[Jim Cross]

I don't see anything particularly parsimonious about space-time arising from a complex interaction of conscious agents vs. it simply being a property of reality. If they both end in the same place, then you've made my point unless Hoffman's theory can predict something unique.

That is a valid point. In fact the Hoffman's model does include an iterative progression of events, there is definitely a dimension of "time" in his model. But what he is saying is that this "base"/fundamental time is not necessarily the same "time" that we humans experience through our interpretative "goggles".

But his intent is to derive space-time from conscious agents. Time would need to exist independently from our interpretive "goggles" in order to talk coherently about interpretive "goggles".

[AshvinP]

I don't see anything particularly parsimonious about space-time arising from a complex interaction of conscious agents vs. it simply being a property of reality. If they both end in the same place, then you've made my point unless Hoffman's theory can predict something unique.

That is a valid point. In fact the Hoffman's model does include an iterative progression of events, there is definitely a dimension of "time" in his model. But what he is saying is that this "base"/fundamental time is not necessarily the same "time" that we humans experience through our interpretative "goggles".

But his intent is to derive space-time from conscious agents. Time would need to exist independently from our interpretive "goggles" in order to talk coherently about interpretive "goggles".

Jim, do you at least see you are conflating two completely separate issues in nearly every single post? (I wouldn't keep pointing it out if it was not such a crucial distinction). One issue, the one you initially raised, is whether people starting from idealist or metaphysically agnostic (as much as possible) pursue different avenues of research and potentially reach different conclusions. That has been demonstrated to you beyond a shadow of a doubt from multiple different scientists, including DH. His conscious realism model would never be pursued by the materialist, and if he discovers dynamics which give rise to space-time and all theories within it, that negates the entire worldview of materialist researchers. The stark contrast is just patently obvious here.

The other issue is whether these vastly different conclusions of idealist or metaphysically agnostic science are valid, and no one on this thread, as far as I can tell, has even made an argument pertaining to that issue yet.