Okay. I say "Materialism!".
Seriously. Idealism doesn't explain it. It just says it is.
Okay. I say "Materialism!".
The whole point of idealism is that conscious experience is the irreducible, uncaused ontological primitive, so there's no point in trying to explain a cause that isn't there. That is the case for any cosmology, because, as BK points out, one can't just keep going with reductionism indefinitely. At some point there has to be the one uncaused state in terms of which all else, in theory, can be explained. What exactly that irreducible state is under materialism still remains a great debate among physicists, some of whom have not ruled out that the irreducible state is consciousness. However, surely there are implications for the study of how it correlates with brain activity if taking the primacy of consciousness into account.Jim Cross wrote: ↑Mon Oct 18, 2021 1:10 pmSimilar to Ben's point so same question. What does explain experience? Unless you can explain it, you would be hypocritical in faulting science for not being able to explain it.the challenge of explaining how any brain activity accounts for any experience whatsoever.
One other point - science really doesn't need to explain to do what it does. We don't need to measure the immeasurable to understand that brain activity associates with consciousness.
In that case, materialism shouldn't get criticized because it can't explain it either. But what exactly does "explaining it" mean? What is it that needs to be explained?The whole point of idealism is that conscious experience is the irreducible, uncaused ontological primitive, so there's no point in trying to explain a cause that isn't there.
Why does this have to be? I've never understand exactly how anything else is derived from "one uncaused state". Why not multiple states? 10, 20, 1000 -maybe an infinite number of states? One for each little excitation of consciousness?At some point there has to be the one uncaused state in terms of which all else, in theory, can be explained.
I don't know how that study would be different from what that didn't take the primacy of consciousness into account., surely there are implications for the study of how it correlates with brain activity if taking the primacy of consciousness into account.
The criticism of materialism is that it can't explain how consciousness is derived from its non-conscious ontological primitive, not that it must come up with a cause for its uncaused OP, whatever that OP may be.
At some point there has to be the one uncaused state in terms of which all else, in theory, can be explained.
Well, even if allowing for multiple co-existent uncaused states, that remains an irreducible realm.Why does this have to be? I've never understand exactly how anything else is derived from "one uncaused state". Why not multiple states? 10, 20, 1000 -maybe an infinite number of states? One for each little excitation of consciousness?
Unless neuroscience starts to take the primacy of consciousness and thinking into account, how could we know the implications that would have in the interpretation of the data?I don't know how that study would be different from what that didn't take the primacy of consciousness into account.
We discussed it already. In any metaphysical and/or scientific model there are two kinds of phenomena:Jim Cross wrote: ↑Mon Oct 18, 2021 2:10 pmIn that case, materialism shouldn't get criticized because it can't explain it either. But what exactly does "explaining it" mean? What is it that needs to be explained?The whole point of idealism is that conscious experience is the irreducible, uncaused ontological primitive, so there's no point in trying to explain a cause that isn't there.
Why does this have to be? I've never understand exactly how anything else is derived from "one uncaused state". Why not multiple states? 10, 20, 1000 -maybe an infinite number of states? One for each little excitation of consciousness?At some point there has to be the one uncaused state in terms of which all else, in theory, can be explained.
) Look again at the sentences. 'Consciousness' is exactly as common between the two, as brain activity. The propositions are perfectly symmetric, you have arbitrarily selected one of the elements to be more certain. But this is not that important.