BKs line of reasoning for the decomposition problem

[j.joerg@posteo.de]

Bernardo seems to rest his solution for the decomposition problem of idealism on the known phenomenon of dissociative identity disorder. This line of argument seems problematic to me: This mental condition only can develope, if extrem traumatizations occor in early childhood while the brain is still developing. Dissociative identity disorders only develope because certain regions of the brain do not sufficiently connect with each other while the brain is still developing and remain thus remain operating with strong autonomy.

According to this, the case of dissociative identity disorder is a symptom of missing connectivity and thus rather provides an argument for the combination problem of panpsychism. If regions of the brain connect as they should, than there is a unified mind. And even if a dissociation of a previously unified mind is happening, it can only dissociate if it has been associated before... What do I get wrong here?

[Ben Iscatus]

Yes, j.joerg, DID is an extreme example, but we all have dissociated minds. The obvious example is how the avatar in our dreams is dissociated from the rest of the dream imagery and the other dream characters. The part of the mind that says it cares about global warming is dissociated from the part that jets off to the Maldives. The part that shares risqué jokes with the lads in the pub is dissociated from the part that believes in feminist principles (and so on- hundreds of examples of non-joined up thinking could be cited in all our behaviour). Not to mention huge instinctive areas of the mind and autonomic functions we can't metacognitively access. We don't tend to think of ourselves as inconsistent or hypocritical by nature because our egos rule us and won't stand for it.

[j.joerg@posteo.de]

Yes, j.joerg, DID is an extreme example, but we all have dissociated minds...

I completely agree with all what you are saying. I just cannot see how this can be used as an argument for idealism. We do have associated minds just as much as dissociated. The recognition of a dissociated mental process is the unification, the association of two mental processes. Obviously mental dissociations and associations happen all the time. This does not suggest metaphysical conclusions.

[Ben Iscatus]

We do have associated minds just as much as dissociated.

The way I'd explain it is: at bottom, there is a single field of awareness. When our ego identifies with thoughts and emotions, it effectively plucks them from the field of possibility. This identification dissociates them from the field. The ego then tries to make them coherent, but since they are really disconnected from the field, the coherence is bogus. We, as individuals, are bogus -illusory.

[Ben Iscatus]

Sorry, this is BK topic-specific, so I should add that I recall BK saying words to the effect that our sense of agency is illusory - that there is ultimately only one conscious agent (i.e. MAL).

[AshvinP]

Yes, j.joerg, DID is an extreme example, but we all have dissociated minds...

I completely agree with all what you are saying. I just cannot see how this can be used as an argument for idealism. We do have associated minds just as much as dissociated. The recognition of a dissociated mental process is the unification, the association of two mental processes. Obviously mental dissociations and associations happen all the time. This does not suggest metaphysical conclusions.

Why does it not? Under idealism, all is Mind. The polar phenomena of dissociation (differentiation-fragmentation) and reassociation (integration) is ideal in its nature. So it stands to reason that this phenomena directly implies metaphysical conclusions. They are very vague ones, "which could just as well apply to any other world as they could apply to our own", but valid conclusions nonetheless. It is not strictly an argument for idealism, but rather an argument for the apparent discontinuity between our limited abstract experience, i.e. we perceive "physical things" around us, and that of an eternally unified Mind, once idealism is already assumed or concluded from other arguments. That discontinuity is a pretty traumatic event, if you ask me. The key, however, is to see how dissocation-reassociation are relational terms which apply to any given perspective at any given state of cognitive development, i.e. they are not universally fixed reflections of the structure of Reality itself (if they were the latter, then we lapse into dualism).