Criticism

[Eugene I]

After last night, I don’t know why I’m even bothering to respond to you, but experience of the world is not conjecture. It is that direct experience that distinguishes it from metaphysics. Seriously, you’re hopeless.

Also, other than Kastrup, there are quite a few "hopeless idiots" among well-known idealist academic philosophers who also do not share the belief in the existence of the physical world outside consciousness, here is some of them:
Donald Hoffman
Miri Albahari
Paul Marshall
Yujin Nagasawa
Khai Wager
Itai Shani
Joachim Kepler

And finally, one of the greatest philosophers of our times, David Chalmers:

When I was in graduate school, I recall hearing “One starts as a materialist, then one becomes
a dualist, then a panpsychist, and one ends up as an idealist”.1
I don’t know where this comes from,
but I think the idea was something like this. First, one is impressed by the successes of science,
endorsing materialism about everything and so about the mind. Second, one is moved by problem of consciousness to see a gap between physics and consciousness, thereby endorsing dualism,
where both matter and consciousness are fundamental. Third, one is moved by the inscrutability
of matter to realize that science reveals at most the structure of matter and not its underlying nature, and to speculate that this nature may involve consciousness, thereby endorsing panpsychism.
Fourth, one comes to think that there is little reason to believe in anything beyond consciousness
and that the physical world is wholly constituted by consciousness, thereby endorsing idealism.
Some recent strands in philosophical discussion of the mind–body problem have recapitulated
this progression: the rise of materialism in the 1950s and 1960s, the dualist response in the 1980s
and 1990s, the festival of panpsychism in the 2000s, and some recent stirrings of idealism.2
In my
own work, I have taken the first two steps and have flirted heavily with the third. In this paper I
want to examine the prospects for the fourth step: the move to idealism.

From "Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem"

[AshvinP]

In fact i have been the one here arguing against consciousness as a hermetically concealed container we cannot escape. It is far more like an entanglement that obliterates subject/object metaphysics. But experience only shows this when a living brain is part of the entanglement. I do see it as a local entangled event between equally participating entities.


My position is somewhat different. I don’t categorically rule it out, but don’t consider worth considering without experiential reasons to do so.

Once conscious activity is delocalized from physical objects like the brain, then I see even less reason for you to consider your own lack of memory as evidence of anything about the existence of the underlying conscious activity. When you had no memory (except duration and continuity of self, as mentioned before), at a bare minumum, we know for certain that conscious activity was occurring through other living organisms (also without hard boundaries) and some, perhaps 'entangled' with yours, were having the experiences surrounding you that you won't remember after you wake up.

I am not sure what "it" is that you say is not worth considering. The mythic evidence, the intuition of duration and continuity of self, the evidence of evolving perception-cognition over the epochs of human history, higher cognition which perceives supersensible phenomena? If you specify, I could elaborate on the concrete experiential reasons the evidence should be considered seriously and deeply.

Also we should keep in mind our habit of thinking we have already thought of everything our own experiences can teach us. But, if that were true, we would never learn anything from revisiting our memories. We wouldn't have fields like depth psychology which can bring to light old subconscious memories and therefore new knowledge. Etc. It is again an artifice of naive realism and dualism which convinces us that, at any given moment, a chance cross-section of our experiential state from birth to death, we have figured out what is "worth considering" from our own experience. The unfortunate consequence of that is, we will never have motivation to reevaluate what we know from experience if we are assuming that at all times of our thinking life.

PS - I use "we" because I genuinely mean "we" - these are transpersonal habits of mind ubiquotous in the modern age, and not one of us, including myself, is immune to them. We only ward them off by constant vigilance which must be renewed afresh every time we set in to think about a philosophical issue (or ideally any issue at all).

[Eugene I]

The bottom line is: Kant failed to confront Hume's skepticism with his transcendental arguments and so the scandal in philosophy still remains. That simply means that any philosophy or mysteriainst or poetic worldview other than brute skepticism or agnosticism is always based on conjectures, whether they are implicit or explicit. In other words, it's either metaphysics (if formulated philosophically), or a belief system. Analytical philosophy with its language and the logical analysis failed to deliver any non-agnostic philosophy free of metaphysics. We just have to accept that and live with that. We live in a free society and nobody forces any ideology or belief system on anyone else, anyone is free to choose to believe in whatever they want (as long as they do not harm others). Subjective idealists ground their beliefs based on the experienced transcendental conjecture, other worldviews/philosophies do that based on the inexperienced transcendental conjecture, that's the only difference. Apart from philosophical arguments, there are plenty of other practical criteria and arguments for choosing the worldviews, such as esthetical and ethical values, promotion of psychological health and spiritual development, peaceful and functional social structures and relations etc.

So, if JF wants to believe in the existence of non-conscious external physical world where consciousness emerges from energy, there is no problem with that. The only thing he needs to admit is that his view is based on a conjecture (inexperienced transcendental conjecture). So, if it is claimed to be a philosophical view, it is by definition a metaphysics. The same applies to all versions of idealism (with the only difference that some versions of idealism are based on the experienced transcendental conjecture).

[AshvinP]

The bottom line is: Kant failed to confront Hume's skepticism with his transcendental arguments and so the scandal in philosophy still remains. That simply means that any philosophy or mysteriainst or poetic worldview other than brute skepticism or agnosticism is always based on conjectures, whether they are implicit or explicit. In other words, it's either metaphysics (if formulated philosophically), or a belief system. Analytical philosophy with its language and the logical analysis failed to deliver any non-agnostic philosophy free of metaphysics. We just have to accept that and live with that. We live in a free society and nobody forces any ideology or belief system on anyone else, anyone is free to choose to believe in whatever they want (as long as they do not harm others). Subjective idealists ground their beliefs based on the experienced transcendental conjecture, other worldviews/philosophies do that based on the inexperienced transcendental conjecture, that's the only difference. Apart from philosophical arguments, there are plenty of other practical criteria and arguments for choosing the worldviews, such as esthetical and ethical values, promotion of psychological health and spiritual development, peaceful and functional social structures and relations etc.

So, if JF wants to believe in the existence of non-conscious external physical world where consciousness emerges from energy, there is no problem with that. The only thing he needs to admit is that his view is based on a conjecture (inexperienced transcendental conjecture). So, if it is claimed to be a philosophical view, it is by definition a metaphysics. The same applies to all versions of idealism (with the only difference that some versions of idealism are based on the experienced transcendental conjecture).

Despite claiming your own approach is phenomenology, you completely leave it out as an option. The reason is simple - you view all that comes by way of our logical reasoning through experience as "conjectures", as abstract things layered on top of the World Content. That is why you also feel all spiritual systems are based on pure speculation and/or metaphysical faith, despite the deep evolving archetypal patterns evident in human experience, as reflected through cultural manifestations, throughout the epochs of human history. "Evolving" here is not synonymous with random change or "endless differentiation" - actually it's the exact opposite, i.e. an inner lawfulness which naturally brings about integration of phenomenal relations through our essential cognitive activities. The one criteria which should be prioritized over all others is Truth. If we a priori rule out the capacity for Truth via logical reasoning, then we fall back on "psychological health", "peaceful society", and any number of things which can only be assessed according to purely individual likes and dislikes.

[Martin_]

How is the phenomenology you speak of not a metaphysics?

[AshvinP]

How is the phenomenology you speak of not a metaphysics?

Phenomenology does not presuppose any first principles and try to deduce all other phenomenal manifestations from those. Rather it reasons only from the givens of 1st-person experience of phenomena. MAL with "raw instinctive consciousness", or "energy independent of consciousness", or any similar conception is not a given of reasoned experience.

met·a·phys·ics
/ˌmedəˈfiziks/
plural

1.
the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space:
"they would regard the question of the initial conditions for the universe as belonging to the realm of metaphysics or religion"

[Martin_]

Ok. fair enough, but that might also provide an explanation why Phenomenology isn't mentioned it the current discussion: Eugene and Jeffery are discussing ontology!

anyway. i will now go away and get back to work.

[AshvinP]

Ok. fair enough, but that might also provide an explanation why Phenomenology isn't mentioned it the current discussion: Eugene and Jeffery are discussing ontology!

anyway. i will now go away and get back to work.

As I keep saying here, there is a major difference between assuming an ontology and concluding one by reasoning through the givens of experience without any added assumptions along the way. Metaphysics is the former, phenomenology can lead to the latter. It is not a merely technical difference, but a pragmatic one which has extremely significanct ramifications for the rest of our knowing inquiry into the World Content. I think JW is firmly within the sphere of the latter and has been trying to express that here, although we seem to disagree on the finer 'limits' to our reasoning activity and cognitive capacity and the overall role it plays in phenomenal experience, which is a pretty significant disagreement.

[JeffreyW]

For some fans of Kant's epistemology on this thread:

First, I’m not a Kantian. Second, your quote is out of context which goes on to argue against what you think it claims. He is referring to the scandal created by Hume’s skepticism and Kant goes on to resolve that scandal by securing a sure place for objective knowledge. It is always a bad idea to quote from a book you never read.

Ah, transcendental arguments?

Despite Kant’s remaining defenders, however, few now believe that transcendental arguments can yield a direct refutation of epistemic skepticism. Most now agree that more modest goals are in order if such arguments are to remain relevant.

Also:

Where did I make a transcendental argument? That is what metaphysics does. You really are hopelessly confused.

[JeffreyW]

In fact i have been the one here arguing against consciousness as a hermetically concealed container we cannot escape. It is far more like an entanglement that obliterates subject/object metaphysics. But experience only shows this when a living brain is part of the entanglement. I do see it as a local entangled event between equally participating entities.


My position is somewhat different. I don’t categorically rule it out, but don’t consider worth considering without experiential reasons to do so.

Once conscious activity is delocalized from physical objects like the brain, then I see even less reason for you to consider your own lack of memory as evidence of anything about the existence of the underlying conscious activity. When you had no memory (except duration and continuity of self, as mentioned before), at a bare minumum, we know for certain that conscious activity was occurring through other living organisms (also without hard boundaries) and some, perhaps 'entangled' with yours, were having the experiences surrounding you that you won't remember after you wake up.

I am not sure what "it" is that you say is not worth considering. The mythic evidence, the intuition of duration and continuity of self, the evidence of evolving perception-cognition over the epochs of human history, higher cognition which perceives supersensible phenomena? If you specify, I could elaborate on the concrete experiential reasons the evidence should be considered seriously and deeply.

Also we should keep in mind our habit of thinking we have already thought of everything our own experiences can teach us. But, if that were true, we would never learn anything from revisiting our memories. We wouldn't have fields like depth psychology which can bring to light old subconscious memories and therefore new knowledge. Etc. It is again an artifice of naive realism and dualism which convinces us that, at any given moment, a chance cross-section of our experiential state from birth to death, we have figured out what is "worth considering" from our own experience. The unfortunate consequence of that is, we will never have motivation to reevaluate what we know from experience if we are assuming that at all times of our thinking life.

PS - I use "we" because I genuinely mean "we" - these are transpersonal habits of mind ubiquotous in the modern age, and not one of us, including myself, is immune to them. We only ward them off by constant vigilance which must be renewed afresh every time we set in to think about a philosophical issue (or ideally any issue at all).

I would never suggest we have thought of everything experience can teach us. Quite the opposite. My point was that we can only know what experience teaches us.