Criticism

[AshvinP]

Put another way, I avoid metaphysical speculation by referring to the infinite appearances of energy with no apparent signs of consciousness and the only appearances of consciousness arising from the energy dispersal of ATP. In other words, I appropriate Kastrup’s own argument.

JW,

My 2 cents on this:

I think the above can be valid if only held as a tentative hypothesis (which I also think would be disproven over time). If it is asserted as genuine knowledge, then we are dealing with another form of naive realist metaphysics. This time it is due to the arbitrary cessation of reasoning through the phenomenal manifestations of energy, i.e. warmth, light, charge, etc. And that cessation is motivated once again by the implicit dualism which holds our cognitive content as "less real" or as a mere accretion to the sense-perceptual content of energy. We feel that the "raw energy" we perceive is the given phenomena and everything we think about it through logical reasoning is something added on top. Without that dualism, we can see how there is never any "raw energy" experienced in the absence of the cognitive element which imbues it with the meaning of warmth, light, charge, etc. That is a conclusion confirmed by all well-reasoned modern science - there is no perception (or experience) of anything in the World Content which is not also interlaced with cognitive element. Without that meaningful element factored into terms like "ATP", we are once again dealing with pure abstractions divorced from experience.

[Eugene I]

Let’s once again clarify metaphysics, which is speculation transcending experience of what is presented in the physical world, and bounded only by what seems possible. A theist’s speculation of the consciousness of God is clearly transcendent possibility, but nothing encountered in experience of what is present before us in the physical world. The same would hold for any sort of consciousness outside of certain living beings as mere speculation of what might be possible. Non-metaphysical thought holds fast to what is experienced in the physical world. In our experience we encounter energy with no signs of consciousness, and we experience consciousness which is grounded in energy. That in itself reveals consciousness to be reducible to energy, and thus physical.

The highlighted statements are implicitly built on the assumption that there is a "physical world" the objects of which can be experienced by conscious subjects. This is already a metaphysical statement, as the existence of the physical world outside our own consciousness is as much a speculation as the existence of consciousness outside of certain living beings.

There is still a difference between these two metaphysical speculations. The existence of our own conscious experience and our own consciousness bearing this experience is not a speculation but a bare experiential fact intimately known to us. When we speculate about the existence of consciousness outside certain living beings, we are not inventing any new abstract entities or natures, but only extrapolating into the unknown the existence of conscious experience that is already proven to exist in our own experience.

On the contrary, the existence of the physical world is only an abstraction from the very start, because all we know about the alleged "physical world" is only our sense perceptions about it, which are by nature the phenomena of our own inner conscious experience only. We actually do now know whether these perceptions are caused by interaction of our senses with the actual physical world, or only from a virtual simulation of such world, or from some other instances of consciousness, or from subconscious layers of our own consciousness, or perhaps from something else completely mysterious for us. But in this case we invent an abstract concept of the "physical world" which looks and feels exactly according to our sense perceptions, then project/extrapolate its existence outside our own consciousness and form an implicit belief that such external physical world is real.

[Soul_of_Shu]

Non-metaphysical thought holds fast to what is experienced in the physical world. In our experience we encounter energy with no signs of consciousness, and we experience consciousness which is grounded in energy. That in itself reveals consciousness to be reducible to energy, and thus physical.

The most that can be said with any certainty is that there is a correlation between conscious agency and certain kinds of energetic states, allowing that correlation does not necessarily equate with causation. Surely you're not saying that you've experienced that consciousness is an emergent property of such states. That too is just speculation, with no definitive demonstration of how that must be the case. So presumably you're equally dismissive of that speculation, as you are about speculating that it may not be an emergent property. If not, why not?

[JeffreyW]

Non-metaphysical thought holds fast to what is experienced in the physical world. In our experience we encounter energy with no signs of consciousness, and we experience consciousness which is grounded in energy. That in itself reveals consciousness to be reducible to energy, and thus physical.

The most that can be said with any certainty is that there is a correlation between conscious agency and certain kinds of energetic states, allowing that correlation does not necessarily equate with causation. Surely you're not saying that you've experienced that consciousness is an emergent property of such states. That too is just speculation, with no definitive demonstration of how that must be the case. So presumably you're equally dismissive of that speculation, as you are about speculating that it may not be an emergent property. If not, why not?

Entirely irrelevant. Causation isn’t the issue. What we do know is that if you unplug the energy the consciousness goes out. That puts energy prior to consciousness as a necessary condition. What some of you continue to evade is that this is Kastrup’s argument against consciousness in computers and the implication.

[JeffreyW]

Let’s once again clarify metaphysics, which is speculation transcending experience of what is presented in the physical world, and bounded only by what seems possible. A theist’s speculation of the consciousness of God is clearly transcendent possibility, but nothing encountered in experience of what is present before us in the physical world. The same would hold for any sort of consciousness outside of certain living beings as mere speculation of what might be possible. Non-metaphysical thought holds fast to what is experienced in the physical world. In our experience we encounter energy with no signs of consciousness, and we experience consciousness which is grounded in energy. That in itself reveals consciousness to be reducible to energy, and thus physical.

The highlighted statements are implicitly built on the assumption that there is a "physical world" the objects of which can be experienced by conscious subjects. This is already a metaphysical statement, as the existence of the physical world outside our own consciousness is as much a speculation as the existence of consciousness outside of certain living beings.

There is still a difference between these two metaphysical speculations. The existence of our own conscious experience and our own consciousness bearing this experience is not a speculation but a bare experiential fact intimately known to us. When we speculate about the existence of consciousness outside certain living beings, we are not inventing any new abstract entities or natures, but only extrapolating into the unknown the existence of conscious experience that is already proven to exist in our own experience.

On the contrary, the existence of the physical world is only an abstraction from the very start, because all we know about the alleged "physical world" is only our sense perceptions about it, which are by nature the phenomena of our own inner conscious experience only. We actually do now know whether these perceptions are caused by interaction of our senses with the actual physical world, or only from a virtual simulation of such world, or from some other instances of consciousness, or from subconscious layers of our own consciousness, or perhaps from something else completely mysterious for us. But in this case we invent an abstract concept of the "physical world" which looks and feels exactly according to our sense perceptions, then project/extrapolate its existence outside our own consciousness and form an implicit belief that such external physical world is real.

Yes, metaphysics and physics implies there is a physical world we perceive. You accept that implication every time you respond here on your computer. Nobody really refuses that implication in practice - it’s ist a pose. It is also false that we only know the world through abstraction. Our representations are abstractions, but not our esthetic experience, which is unmediated by reductive objectification Most importantly, you still evade the essential difference of abstracting from direct experience and inexperienced transcendental conjecture.

[Eugene I]

What some of you continue to evade is that this is Kastrup’s argument against consciousness in computers and the implication.

I can't believe Kastrup actually used that argument because it's plain wrong and inconsistent with his philosophy. Can you give a link to where he said that?

[JeffreyW]

You are only beginning to see the inconstancies that run throughout his metaphysics.

[AshvinP]

Non-metaphysical thought holds fast to what is experienced in the physical world. In our experience we encounter energy with no signs of consciousness, and we experience consciousness which is grounded in energy. That in itself reveals consciousness to be reducible to energy, and thus physical.

The most that can be said with any certainty is that there is a correlation between conscious agency and certain kinds of energetic states, allowing that correlation does not necessarily equate with causation. Surely you're not saying that you've experienced that consciousness is an emergent property of such states. That too is just speculation, with no definitive demonstration of how that must be the case. So presumably you're equally dismissive of that speculation, as you are about speculating that it may not be an emergent property. If not, why not?

Entirely irrelevant. Causation isn’t the issue. What we do know is that if you unplug the energy the consciousness goes out. That puts energy prior to consciousness as a necessary condition. What some of you continue to evade is that this is Kastrup’s argument against consciousness in computers and the implication.

What you are saying about necessary conditions not equaling causative element is true. But let me just reiterate something here in a slightly different way:

The bold is what is concluded when we arbitarily stop reasoning through the concrete experience of energy and consciousness. What we actually know is that it appears there is no consciousness when we "unplug the energy", i.e. physical death. Just as it appears we did not experience anything when we are in dreamless sleep (or dreaming sleep if we cannot remember any of it). In the latter case, we know for certain that is simply an artifact of our own cognitive limitations - if we had capacity to retain consciousness during sleep we would be aware of many more experiences we have gone through. So the question is, could the same apply to physical birth and death, when all brain activity appears to cease (or never appeared to exist in the case of birth)? Only careful reasoning through our experience of the world content can say, one way or the other. It is a continuation of the careful reasoning you have used to determine energy is a necessary condition of [apparent] consciousness.

I suppose you may already know all of what I am writing above and you are simply trying to highlight the inherent meaningless in abstract metaphysics which says "consciousness must be at the bottom of everything including energy" from the outset, in which case I agree with you.

[Eugene I]

Yes, metaphysics and physics implies there is a physical world we perceive. You accept that implication every time you respond here on your computer. Nobody really refuses that implication in practice - it’s ist a pose. It is also false that we only know the world through abstraction. Our representations are abstractions, but not our esthetic experience, which is unmediated by reductive objectification.

As I said before, physics only describes or models the patterns of observable phenomena (and the only observable phenomena we ever know are the phenomena of our conscious experience) and has no say about what those phenomena pertain to, it describes what the nature does, not what the nature is. Assigning reality to the abstractions of physical math models is a very naive form of metaphysics.

I already told you that I have no concept of the external physical world, including any physical computer, I'm only manipulating the phenomena of my direct conscious experience (that visually look as the computer) in order to communicate with other instances of consciousness through our common entanglement through sense perceptions.

Then, our esthetic experiences are just that - experiences (conscious experiences of course, because there is no such thing as non-conscious experiences). They still arise in our consciousness with respect to acts of our internal esthetic creativity, or with respect to our sense perceptions. In case if our sense perceptions are the result of communication with the Divine or other instances of consciousness (as opposed to the contact with the "physical world"), these esthetic experiences bear the sense of beauty that the Divine or other conscious beings are communicating to us. However, the physical world, being unconscious, has no sense of beauty whatsoever and no reason to be beautiful, and so our esthetic experiences inspired from our contact with such world can not in principle have anything to do with the physical world, and so they are entirely the products of our minds.

Most importantly, you still evade the essential difference of abstracting from direct experience and inexperienced transcendental conjecture.

There is definitely a possibility of the inexperienced transcendental conjecture. This is often at the basis of many spiritual and religious traditions and peoples' spiritual and religious beliefs. If you accept the conjecture of the existence of physical world based on the inexperienced transcendental conjecture, how can you deny the legitimacy of the inexperienced transcendental conjecture of the existence of the Divine?

[Soul_of_Shu]

What we do know is that if you unplug the energy the consciousness goes out.

How is that not also speculation, based on speculation that consciousness is an emergent property? I can just as well speculate that the energy state returning to entropy is indicative of a locus of consciousness no longer being associated with corporeality.