How can surgical excision not affect consciousness?

[Ben Iscatus]

Our organs seem physical. We can have our appendix removed, or our tonsils and adenoids, or other parts without any real change in our consciousness. How so, if everything is mind?

Here is an answer I think is consistent with Analytic Idealism:

Many bodily functions are present in phenomenal consciousness (that is, they are experienced in the body/brain system), but are not available to metaconsciousness. This has evolutionary advantages: if we were obliged to metacognitively process every little bodily change, we'd be far too slow at the higher level functions necessary for survival. This is why losing an organ normally only experienced in our phenomenal consciousness has no obvious effect on our self-identity, no effect on our executive ego.

Everything to do with the body is a representation. It is the image or appearance of an idea in mind when viewed from across our dissociative boundary. The idea of our tonsils is a first line of defence against infection., but actually the full idea of any organ includes its evolutionary history, what we, as delimited alters, mentally stretch out into the past and the future, because ideas build on ideas. We notice how functions adapt and change. Simpler ideas come together to build more complex ideas, other functions, even other organisms. Ideas can also interfere with each other -hence disease. They can even become redundant: an appendix becomes irrelevant, a whole species becomes extinct. But all body parts are just ideas, and what we see are useful representations of those ideas.

[Starbuck]

Hi Ben, I'm pretty sure that through yoga and meditation, one can become meta conscious of greater aspects of the body, maybe therefore sensing the difference between having an appendix and not. In Bernardo's understanding, a metabolising system can lose certain components and still function - as you infer, a metabolising system is merely what an interlocking series of ideas looks like. 'Losing' certain ideas do not compromise the integrity of the metabolising organism, so it remain alive/dissociated, at least the dissociation that equates to the material realm.

And then of course, the appendix rots yet its atoms still represent something of mind at large, as we are composed of the same stuff of the inanimate universe!

[Ben Iscatus]

Starbuck,
I like your word "interlocking" - I'll have to work that in. I believe you're right about it being possible to become metaconscious of different body parts (not sure I'd want to though!). In fact, if true, it must be recognizable at other levels.

On the Essentia website one article suggests the High only becomes aware of the Low when the Low malfunctions. This is obviously true when we get pain and disease - which is why children have their tonsils removed. This would be like Jeff Bezos only becoming aware of his delivery drivers at Amazon when they stop delivering the goods.

But an enlightened CEO could still deliberately become aware of his staff - Jeff Bezos could organise a competition to give some of his warehouse staff a trip into space. He could give all his delivery drivers big Christmas bonuses. So I'd say yes - becoming metaconscious of your well-functioning kidneys must be possible!

[Starbuck]

Thats a great metaphor. Of course if Bezos was too hands on with the shopfront, the whole organisation would implode. A balance must be struck!

[Ben Iscatus]

Starbuck,
Now you've made me think!

I see that the metaphor fails in one important respect: whereas the delivery drivers and warehouse staff are subjects, the appendix and tonsils are not.
Considering (say) an appendix, "there is nothing it is like to be an appendix". It's an idea formed in consciousness, not a conscious subject. So if we were to try to adapt the analogy, the delivery drivers would need to be replaced by robotic self-driving vans!

I have to avoid falling foul of the subject combination problem: multiple subjects cannot merge to create another single conscious subject (a human alter). Organs in the body are not allowed to be conscious subjects under Analytic Idealism (this risks panpsychism). What is allowed under Analytic Idealism is decomposition: the dissociation of bounded alters from unbounded Mind at Large (proven possible by DID). Alters can later be reabsorbed by removing the dissociative boundary. I apologize for any confusion caused.

[Starbuck]

Easily done. The metaphor still works if you acknowledge it's limitations. I think we just have to question our conditioned assumptions as they conflict with the proposition we are entertaining. Even the notion of being 'reabsorbed' is nominal. Analytical idealism is a wonderful myth, and I appreciate how you have formulated your thread: i.e Here is a dilemma, how would Analytic Idealism address it?

[Ben Iscatus]

Analytical idealism is a wonderful myth, and I appreciate how you have formulated your thread: i.e Here is a dilemma, how would Analytic Idealism address it?

Yes, thank you! I confess, I myself often think of Analytic Idealism as a great work of art which I feel I must contemplate.

Here's a revised answer:
Many bodily functions are present in phenomenal consciousness (that is, they are experienced in the body/brain system), but are not available to metaconsciousness. This has evolutionary advantages: if we were obliged to metacognitively process every little bodily change, we'd be far too slow at the higher level functions necessary for survival. This is why losing an organ normally only experienced in our phenomenal consciousness has no obvious effect on our self-identity, no effect on our executive ego.
Everything to do with the body is a representation. It is the image or appearance of an idea in mind when viewed from across our dissociative boundary. The idea of our tonsils is a first line of defence against infection, but actually the full idea of any organ includes its evolutionary history, what we, as delimited alters, mentally stretch out into the past and the future, because ideas build on ideas. Simpler ideas come together to build more complex ideas. Interlocking ideas bring new functions and even create new organisms. Ideas can also interfere with each other -hence disease. They can even become redundant: an appendix becomes irrelevant, a whole species becomes extinct. But all body parts are really ideas, and all the images we see, including the DNA visible under the microscope, are useful representations of those ideas. As ideas, they are not separate subjects - in other words, there is nothing it is like to be an appendix. An appendix is not itself conscious, it is an idea generated in consciousness.

[Starbuck]

Analytical idealism is a wonderful myth, and I appreciate how you have formulated your thread: i.e Here is a dilemma, how would Analytic Idealism address it?

Here's a revised answer:
Many bodily functions are present in phenomenal consciousness (that is, they are experienced in the body/brain system), but are not available to metaconsciousness. This has evolutionary advantages: if we were obliged to metacognitively process every little bodily change, we'd be far too slow at the higher level functions necessary for survival. This is why losing an organ normally only experienced in our phenomenal consciousness has no obvious effect on our self-identity, no effect on our executive ego.
Everything to do with the body is a representation. It is the image or appearance of an idea in mind when viewed from across our dissociative boundary. The idea of our tonsils is a first line of defence against infection, but actually the full idea of any organ includes its evolutionary history, what we, as delimited alters, mentally stretch out into the past and the future, because ideas build on ideas. Simpler ideas come together to build more complex ideas. Interlocking ideas bring new functions and even create new organisms. Ideas can also interfere with each other -hence disease. They can even become redundant: an appendix becomes irrelevant, a whole species becomes extinct. But all body parts are really ideas, and all the images we see, including the DNA visible under the microscope, are useful representations of those ideas. As ideas, they are not separate subjects - in other words, there is nothing it is like to be an appendix. An appendix is not itself conscious, it is an idea generated in consciousness.

Pretty on point. As long as are definition of ideas include a profound sense of feeling/emotion. I always think of Dante's 'love that moves the sun and other stars'.

"Interlocking ideas bring new functions and even create new organisms" - certainly bright new meaning to 'conception' and 'conceive'!